01a42724
06-24-2004
Michael L. Edwards, Complainant, v. Paul A. Quander, Jr., Director, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency Agency.
Michael L. Edwards v. Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
01A42724
6/24/2004
.
Michael L. Edwards,
Complainant,
v.
Paul A. Quander, Jr.,
Director,
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A42724
Agency No. 02-01
Hearing No. 100-A3-7270X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
Complainant, a Management Analyst at the agency's Washington, DC
facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on October 4, 2001, alleging
that the agency discriminated against him on the bases of sex (male)
and in reprisal for prior EEO activity<1> when:
(1) he was subjected to hostile work environment harassment and placed
on administrative leave on July 12, 2001, and
he was terminated on August 3, 2001.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,
finding no discrimination.
The agency's final order dated March 17, 2004, implemented the AJ's
decision.
On appeal, complainant states that the AJ's finding of no discrimination
was improper. Specifically, complainant states that he �established
a prima facie case of harassment based on sex� and that the �material
facts show that the [a]gency did unlawfully terminate [him].�
The agency requests that we affirm its final order.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Claim (1)-Hostile Work Environment<2>
Regarding claim (1), the AJ stated that while complainant in his response
to the agency's motion for summary judgment cited twelve incidents in
support of his harassment claim, �few, if any of these incidents can be
characterized as derogatory and/or discriminatory comments pertaining
to complainant's sex.� The AJ concluded that these comments were not
severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.
Some of the comments complainant alleged that his supervisor made were:
�earth to [complainant], are you there?�; �Can't you read?�; and �I'm
calling you because you are the only on[e] who makes as much as I do?�
Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's
race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is
unlawful. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded
as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker
v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the
harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII
must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Complainant alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.
To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment harassment,
a complainant must show that: (1) he is a member of a statutorily
protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of
unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class;
(3) the harassment complained of was based on the statutorily protected
class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment
and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. �1604.11.
The Commission determines that complainant has not presented evidence
to support his hostile work environment claim. Specifically, the
Commission finds that the alleged acts were not severe or pervasive
enough to constitute harassment. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 17, 21-22.
Claim 2-Complainant's Placement on Administrative Leave and Termination
Regarding claim (2), the AJ stated that the agency articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically,
the AJ stated that the record contained �numerous examples of performance
and conduct problems experienced by [c]omplainant.� The AJ concluded
that complainant failed to present sufficient evidence to indicate that
the agency's articulated reasons are pretext. Moreover, the AJ further
concluded that the agency properly dismissed complainant's claim that
he was retaliated against for failure to falsify an audit.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
Id. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met
its burden, the petitioner bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade
the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted
on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case to whether he has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
The record supports the AJ's determination that the agency articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically,
the record contains a copy of a memorandum to complainant from his second
level supervisor (S2) dated July 20, 2001. Therein,
S2 sets forth numerous examples of complainant's �rude, disrespectful,
disruptive, and insubordinate behavior.� In addition, the record contains
a counseling memorandum issued in March 2001 from complainant's supervisor
(S1). Therein, S1 states that complainant missed three deadlines in
February 2001 pertaining to a manual he was drafting and that there
were approximately eighty-seven errors in his fifth draft of the manual.
The Commission finds that complainant has failed to present sufficient
evidence that the agency's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions were pretext.
Moreover, the Commission determines that the agency properly dismissed
complainant's claim that he was retaliated against for failure to falsify
an audit. Retaliation for failure to falsify an audit is not a protected
basis within the purview of the Commission's regulations.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant
of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material
fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the
relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to
complainant, we note that complainant failed to present evidence that
any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus
toward complainant's protected classes.
Accordingly, the agency's final order implementing the AJ's decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
6/24/2004
Date
1In his formal complaint, complainant also claimed that he was retaliated
against for resisting instructions to falsify an audit. The agency
dismissed this claim in an acceptance/partial dismissal letter dated
January 29, 2002, stating that this was not a protected basis within
the purview of the Commission's regulations.
2In the AJ's decision dated March 8, 2004, the AJ noted that while
complainant's placement on administrative leave was part of claim (1),
�this action was a precursor to his subsequent termination� and therefore,
the AJ considered it within the context of claim (2).