Meszaros, Richard

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

13239324 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/239,324 09/21/2011 Richard Meszaros MNGM.P0038US/1000369090 3130
29053 7590 09/30/2020
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
2200 ROSS AVENUE
SUITE 3600
DALLAS, TX 75201-7932
EXAMINER
POLLOCK, GREGORY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
doipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RICHARD MESZAROS
Appeal 2019-002639
Application 13/239,324
Technology Center 3600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7 and 10–26. Claims 8 and 9 are
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Moneygram International, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to the Specification, “[t]he present application relates to
money transfer transactions, and more specifically to systems and methods
for funding money transfer transactions.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of operation for an Automated Teller Machine
(ATM), the method comprising:
establishing, by the ATM, a money transfer transaction
between a sending party and a receiving party;
receiving, by the ATM, account information
corresponding to an account of the sending party;
determining, by the ATM, based at least in part on a
combination of information from a plurality of sources including
transaction reliability information received from a third party
over a communication network and transaction reliability
information from a money transfer entity, whether to accept a
bank draft transaction to fund the money transfer transaction
prior to clearance of the bank draft transaction, wherein said
determining step uses a reliability score generated for the
transaction to indicate reliability of a payment method of the
sending party, wherein the reliability score corresponds to a
compilation of information, weighted by source of the
information according to a location specific rule specific to a
destination of the money transfer transaction, regarding the
sending party, the transaction, and the sending party’s payment
account; and
funding, by the ATM, the money transfer transaction prior
to clearance of the bank draft transaction based on said
determining.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix).

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REFERENCES2
The Examiner relies on the following as prior art to the claims:
Name Reference Date
Horowitz US 6,349,290 B1 Feb. 19, 2002
Cook US 7,720,760 B1 May 18, 2010
Tullis US 8,170,953 B1 May 1, 2012
Moebs US 2005/0065872 A1 Mar. 24, 2005
Atef US 2006/0161435 A1 July 20, 2006
Bozeman US 2011/0087598 A1 Apr. 14, 2011
Harris US 2011/0320358 A1 Dec. 29, 2011
Estrada US 2012/0215658 A1 Aug. 23, 2012

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–7 and 10–26 stand rejecting under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph for lack of written description. Non-Final Act. 2–3.
Claims 1–7 and 10–26 stand rejecting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 3–7.
Claims 1–7, 10–26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Cook, Harris, Moebs, Bozeman, Tullis, Estrada, Atef, and
Horowitz. Non-Final Act. 7–12.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112
The Examiner rejects the claims for lack of written description
because the limitation “wherein the reliability score corresponds to a
compilation of information, weighted by source of the information according
to a location specific rule specific to a destination of the money transfer
transaction,” is not supported by the Specification. Non-Final Act. 3. The

2 We identify references according to their first named inventor.
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Examiner determines that although the Specification describes the use of a
combination of information sources (citing Spec. ¶ 20), it fails to support
“the weighting being according to a location specific rule specific to a
destination of the money transfer transaction.” Non-Final Act 3.
Appellant argue the limitation is supported by the disclosure found in
paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Specification. Specifically, Appellant argues:
[W]here paragraph [0020] of the [S]pecification discloses that
rules are assigned as to the specific weight that sources are
recognized, and paragraph [0021] . . . states that the rules may
vary between locations and countries, such as destinations
creating different hazards to look for, it is unreasonable to view
the recited feature as not being described.
Appeal Br. 6. We agree with Appellant.
Appellant’s Specification discloses that “embodiments may utilize a
combination of all sources of information and assign rules as to the specific
weight that sources are recognized.” Spec. ¶ 20. The Specification further
discloses that “decision engine 102 may take into account multiple types and
source of data to make a determining regarding the reliability of a bank
transaction.” Spec. ¶ 21. This disclosure supports the recitation “wherein
the reliability score corresponds to a compilation of information weight by
sourced of information.”
The Specification also discloses “in some embodiments, the types of
information and the rules which may surround a limitation may vary
between locations and countries for multiple reasons” and that “destinations
may create differing hazards to look for.” Spec. ¶ 21. This disclosure
supports that the rules may be location specific and also may be specific to
the destination of the transfer. As such, we agree with Appellant that the
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Examiner erred in determining the claims lack written description, and we
do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Standard for Patent Eligibility
In issues involving subject matter eligibility, our inquiry focuses on
whether the claims satisfy the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The Court instructs us
to “first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept,” id. at 218, and, in this case, the inquiry centers on
whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If the initial threshold is
met, we then move to the second step, in which we “consider the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). The Court
describes the second step as a search for “an ‘“inventive concept”’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The USPTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 consistent with Alice and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October 2019
Guidance Update”).
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Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (referred to Step 2A, prong 1 in
the Guidance); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(referred to Step 2A, prong 2 in the Guidance).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then move to Step 2B of the Guidance. There, we look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions3
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more under Alice. Non-Final Act. 3–7; Ans. 4–9.
Under the first step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines claim 1 is

3 The Non-Final Office Action, Appeal Brief, and Examiner’s Answer in this
appeal were each filed or mailed prior to the issuance of the Guidance, and
applied the case law-based approach from previous eligibility guidance in
rejecting the claims under § 101. Appellant’s Reply Brief was filed
subsequent to the issuance of the Guidance, and addresses the issues in view
of the Guidance. Likewise, our analysis of the § 101 rejection is made under
the Guidance, which is applicable to “all applications . . . filed before, on, or
after January 7, 2019.” Guidance 50..
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directed to a judicial exception. Non-Final Act. 5–6. Specifically, the
Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to “determining whether to
fund money transfer transactions prior to clearance of the bank draft
transaction,” which the Examiner determines is a certain method of
organizing human activity (as a fundamental economic practice) and also a
mental process (“activities which can be performed mentally by a human
using a pencil and paper”). Non-Final Act. 6.
Under the second step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines
that “claims require the additional limitations of a computer with a processor
and a tangible, non-transitory memory (Non-Final Act. 6)” and “[t]hese
generic computer components are claimed to perform their basic functions
of storing, retrieving, processing, and displaying that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities which amount to no more than
implementing the abstract idea with a computerized programmed system
(Non-Final Act. 6–7).” The Examiner explains:
The use of a generic computer to perform the extra solution
activities does not impose any meaningful limitation on the
computer implementation of the abstract idea(s). Thus, when
taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to
significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception
(the abstract idea). Looking at the limitations as an ordered
combination adds nothing that is not already present when
looking at the elements taken individually. There is no indication
that the combination of elements improve the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology. Their collective
functions merely provide conventional computer
implementation.
Non-Final Act. 7.

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Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant argues that under Step 2A, Prong One, the concept of
“determining wherever to fund money transfer transactions prior to
clearance of the bank transfer transaction,” does not “fall within any of the
Section I groupings of the Revised Guidance.” Reply Br. 4.
Appellant also asserts eligibility under Step 2A, Prong Two because
the claims “are tied to a particular machine having an underlying
functionality that is improved by new features that enable the machine to
function in a new/improved manner.” Reply Br. 5. Appellant argues the
underlying ATM machine is improved “because the computing system is
able to manage accounts so that they no longer have to be linked in order for
the funds transfer to occur.” Reply Br. 5. Appellant further argues the
claims integrate any abstract idea into a practical application “because the
ATM is empowered to determine a reliability score based on information
from multiple sources that is weighted by source of the information
according to a location specific rule specific to a destination of the money
transfer transaction, and fund the money transfer transaction prior to
clearance of the bank draft transaction based on the determined score.”
Reply Br. 5. Appellant further argues “the ordered combination of features
recited by the claims presents a solution necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the context
of computer networks, namely, how to weight, by an ATM, information
received from a third party over a communications network.” Reply Br. 5–
6.
Under Step 2B, Appellant contends “the claimed ATM is not merely a
general purpose processor” and that the Examiner “improperly dissects from
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the claim, as an alleged abstract idea, those features that improve the
underlying functionality of the ATM recited therein, and then asserts that
each of the remaining features is, individually, a generic feature.” Reply
Br. 6.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One4
The Judicial Exception
Applying the Guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred
in determining that the claims recite a judicial exception to patent eligible
subject matter. The Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices and commercial interactions, and
(3) mental processes. We focus our analysis on the second and third
groupings—certain methods of organizing human activity and mental
processes.5
We conclude the limitations of claim 1 recite both a mental process
and a commercial interaction, which amounts to a combination of abstract

4 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
5 Appellant’s Brief includes a separate section for claims 16–20 and another
section for claim 21. The arguments presented for these claims are
substantially the same as those for the other independent claims. As such,
we consider Appellant’s arguments against the § 101 rejection to be made to
the claims generally, and we treat claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground
of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by Appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal
as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the
basis of the selected claim alone.”).
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ideas under the Guidance.6 For example, claim 1 recites (1) “establishing
. . . a money transfer transaction between a sending party and a receiving
party,” and (2) “receiving . . . account information corresponding to an
account of the sending party,” (3) “determining . . . based at least in part on a
combination of information from a plurality of sources including transaction
reliability information received from a third party over a communication
network and transaction reliability information from a money transfer entity,
whether to accept a bank draft transaction to fund the money transfer
transaction prior to clearance of the bank draft transaction, wherein said
determining step uses a reliability score generated for the transaction to
indicate reliability of a payment method of the sending party, wherein the
reliability score corresponds to a compilation of information, weighted by
source of the information according to a location specific rule specific to a
destination of the money transfer transaction, regarding the sending party,
the transaction, and the sending party’s payment account,” and (4) “funding
. . . the money transfer transaction prior to clearance of the bank draft
transaction based on said determining.” As a whole, these limitations recite
a process for conducting a money transfer transaction. A money transfer
transaction is a commercial interaction and/or fundamental economic
practice similar to the examples provided in the MPEP and the Guidance.
See, e.g., MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(1), October 2019 Guidance Update at 5–6.

6 RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render
the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were
directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
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Accordingly, these limitations may be categorized as a commercial
interaction and/or fundamental economic practice that falls within the
enumerated group of “certain methods of organizing human activity.”
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Separately, these limitations each recite an
abstract mental process under the Guidance because they each can be
performed by a human in their mind either through observation, evaluation
and judgment, and also because they can be performed by a human with the
aid of pen and paper. See October 2019 Guidance Update at 7 (“examples of
mental processes include observations, evaluations, judgments, and
opinions”), 9 (“A claim that encompasses a human performing the step(s)
mentally with the aid of a pen and paper recites a mental process”)
(emphasis omitted).
For example, limitations (1) and (2), which recite establishing a
money transfer transaction between a sending party and a receiving party
and receiving account information corresponding to the sending party’s
account, are mental steps because a person could initiate such a transaction
by writing down the terms of the transaction and the account information on
a piece of paper. Limitation (3) which recites determining whether to accept
a bank draft transaction based on collected information and the destination
of the money transfer, is a mental process because it involves observations,
evaluations, and exercising judgment as to the risk of allowing the
transaction to occur without clearance. Limitation (4), which recites funding
the money transfer transaction prior to clearance of the bank draft
transaction, is a commercial interaction and/or fundamental economic
practice because any completed money transfer transaction ultimately must
be funded in order to complete the transaction.
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Under the Guidance, these limitations recite both mental processes
and a commercial interaction/fundamental economic practice of conducting
money transfer transactions. Accordingly, we conclude the claimed process
set forth in claim 1 recites judicial exceptions of both a mental process and a
certain method of organizing human activity under the Guidance.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our
analysis under the Guidance turns now to determining whether claim 1
recites any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Under the Guidance, limitations that are indicative of “integration into
a practical application” include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to
a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
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In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely include instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool
to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
As shown above, most of the claim limitations in claim 1 recite
abstract ideas. The only limitation in the claim additional to those abstract
limitations recites that the operations are performed “by the ATM.” The use
of an ATM, however, merely evinces the use of conventional computer
technology to implement the otherwise abstract process on a computer.
Appellant argues that an ATM is not merely a generic processor. Reply
Br. 6. The Specification describes ATMs in the most general of terms,
without any detail of how they are structured or otherwise operate. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶ 15. This use of generic technology to implement an abstract idea is
insufficient to integrate it into a practical application. See MPEP 2106.05(f)
(explaining that it is not indicative of integration into a practical application
where the claims “merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea
on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract
idea”).
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We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the underlying
functionality of the ATM to transfer funds between accounts is improved
because the computing system is able to manage accounts so that they no
longer have to be linked in order for the funds transfer to occur.” Reply
Br. 5. Appellant fails to provide sufficient evidence to support this
argument. We note that the Specification does not indicate that prior money
transfer methods required accounts to be linked. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 2
(describing known credit card transfers). We also are not persuaded that the
claims integrate any abstract idea into a practical application “because the
ATM is empowered to determine a reliability score based on information
from multiple sources that is weighted by source of the information
according to a location specific rule specific to a destination of the money
transfer transaction, and fund the money transfer transaction prior to
clearance of the bank draft transaction based on the determined score.”
Reply Br. 5. As we noted above, no improvement to how the ATM operates
is described in the Specification. The Specification merely describes a data
gathering process that can be carried out on various different platforms, such
as mobile devices, general purpose computers, an agent device, or an ATM.
Spec ¶ 15 (“such devices may be computer systems which are accessible by
an agent at an agent location, may be automated machines such as an
Automated Teller Machine (ATM), and the like.”).
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the ordered
combination of features recited by the claims presents a solution necessarily
rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the context of computer networks, namely, how to weight, by an
ATM, information received from a third party over a communications
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network.” Appellant’s characterization of the problem is not consistent with
what is described in the Specification. The Specification describes no
deficiencies in existing ATM machines, nor does it describe any problem
relating to weighting of third party information. Rather, the problems
identified in the Specification relate to transaction fees associated with credit
card transfers, and the longer completion time associated with ACH-funded
money transfer transactions. See Spec. ¶¶ 2–4.
In short, Appellant’s invention is focused on improving the
commercial practice of money transfer transactions. The purported
improvement provided by the claims is not to technology, but instead to a
commercial interaction and fundamental economic practice, and therefore
constitutes an improvement to the abstract idea itself. Improvements in the
abstract idea, as we have here, are insufficient to confer eligibility on an
otherwise ineligible claim. SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We conclude claim 1 is directed to a judicial
exception under Step 2A, Prong Two, of the Guidance.
The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Having determined the claim is directed to a judicial exception, we
proceed to evaluating whether claim 1 adds a specific limitation beyond the
judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 56.
Our review of the Examiner’s rejection under Step 2B is guided by the
Berkheimer Memorandum, which sets forth what fact finding requirements
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are applicable to rejections under § 101. Consistent with the Berkheimer
Memorandum, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not add
specific limitations beyond what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Our analysis focuses largely on the same limitation addressed in
Step 2A, prong 2, above. We agree with the Examiner that the addition of a
generic “ATM” does not supply an inventive concept under Step 2B because
the ATM is described at a high level, in functional terms, without any detail
in the Specification regarding how those functions are achieved. Spec. ¶ 15.
This lack of detailed description demonstrates the well-understood, routine,
and conventional nature of the recited “ATM,” and is sufficient to meet the
requirement for evidence set forth in the Berkheimer Memorandum.
Because the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception, and because Appellant does not identify any error in the
Examiner’s determination under step 2B of the Guidance, we sustain the
rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as well as of the
remaining claims.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings
of Cook, Harris, Moebs, Bozeman. Tullis, Estrada, Atef, and Horowitz.
Non-Final Act. 8. Relevant to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner finds
that the Atef and Horowitz teach or suggest “wherein the reliability score
corresponds to a compilation of information, weighted by source of the
information according to a location specific rule specific to a destination of
the money transfer transaction.” Non-Final Act. 14 (citing Atef, Figs. 3–4,
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8–9, 16; ¶¶ 8–9, 55, 64–65, 106–107, 111–112) 11 (citing Horowitz, Fig. 6;
col. 1, ll. 10–16, col. 2, ll. 52–58).
Appellant contends the cited references, and Atef and Horowitz in
particular, fail to teach or suggest the limitation “the reliability score
corresponds to a compilation of information, weighted by source of the
information according to a location specific rule specific to a destination of
the money transfer transaction, regarding the sending party, the transaction,
and the sending party’s payment account.” Appeal Br. 15. With respect to
Atef, Appellant asserts that “Atef merely discloses that a user may set a
restriction on a form of payment, such as a credit card, so that it cannot be
used in certain venues or geographic areas.” Appeal Br. 15 (citing Atef
¶¶ 65, 82, 106). Appellant further asserts Atef is deficient because “Atef
merely discusses weighting of sources of information based on reliability.”
Appeal Br. 15 (citing Atef ¶ 65). Appellant also argues Atef deals with
ACH transactions only in the context of credit cards, and therefore does not
disclose a “money transfer transaction.” Reply Br. 20. With respect to
Horowitz, Appellant argues “[t]he cited sections of Horowitz are entirely
silent regarding a destination of a money transfer transaction or a location
specific rule.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant further argues “Horowitz merely
discloses that a location of a customer is determined so that a token
representing the customer can be transferred to that location to enable a
financial institution [to tailor its offerings to the customer].” Appeal Br. 16.
We are not persuaded of error. Atef demonstrates that it was known
in the art to utilize multiple sources of information, including location, as a
basis for evaluating the risk associated with a money transfer transaction.
Atef ¶¶ 65, 82. For example, Atef teaches that the use of a scoring module
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that “can use a weighted summing function to add the individuals
identification scores of each of the sources of identification, while giving
greater weight to those sources of identification that are more reliable.” Atef
¶ 65. Atef further teaches that the location of the transaction may be a factor
to consider in whether to allow the transaction to take place. Atef ¶ 82 (“For
example, the user can restrict the locations of where the identification
information is used.”). Taken together, we agree with the Examiner that
these teachings render obvious the limitation “the reliability score
corresponds to a compilation of information, weighted by source of the
information according to a location specific rule specific to a destination of
the money transfer transaction.” Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Remaining Claims
Appellant does not present separate arguments for patentability of any
other claim. As such, the remaining claims fall along with claim 1, and we
sustain their rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
CONCLUSION
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection for each
claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject the claims.
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 10–26 112 Written description 1–7, 10–26
1–7, 10–26 101 Eligibility 1–7, 10–26
1–7, 10–26 103 Cook, Harris,
Moebs, Bozeman,
Tullis, Estrada,
Atef, Horowitz
1–7, 10–26
Overall
Outcome
1–7, 10–26

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED