Merillat Industries, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 9, 2004

No. 76357504 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2004)

Paper No.8
RFC
Mailed: March 9,
2004
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________
In re Meriliat Industries, Inc.
________
Serial No. 76357504
_______
Edgar A. Zarins of Masco Corporation for Meriliat
Industries, Inc.
Wendy B. Goodman, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
103 (Michael Hamilton, Managing Attorney).
_______
Before Cissel, Quinn and Bottorff, Administrative Trademark
Judges.
Opinion by Cissel, Administrative Trademark Judge:
With the above-referenced application, as amended,
applicant seeks registration of the mark “BENTLEY” on the
Principal Register for “cabinetry, namely, kitchen and
bathroom cabinets and cabinet doors,” in Class 20.
Registration has been refused under Section 2(e)(4) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(4), on the ground that the
mark is primarily merely a surname. We affirm the refusal
to register.
THIS OPINION IS NOT
CITABLE
AS PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Ser No. 76357504
2
The test for registrability under this section of the
Act is well settled. A mark is primarily merely a surname,
and hence unregistrable, if its primary significance to the
purchasers of the goods is that of a surname. In re Kahan
& Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 184 USPQ 421
(CCPA 1975). The Board has identified five factors to be
considered in determining whether be surname significance
of the term is its primary significance: (1) whether the
surname is a rare surname; (2) whether the name in
question is the surname of anyone connected with the
applicant; (3) whether the word has any recognized meaning
other than as a surname; (4) whether it has the “look and
feel” of a surname; and (5) whether the presentation of the
name is sufficiently distinctive to create a separate
commercial impression apart from that of the surname. In
re Benthin Management GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332 (TTAB 1995).
Notwithstanding applicant’s unsupported arguments to
the contrary, when each of these factors is considered, we
must conclude that the primary significance of “BENTLEY” is
that of a surname.
The Examining Attorney submitted in support of the
refusal to register the results of her search of the
PowerFinder database and of residential listings in the
United States, which shows that over 16,000 people use
Ser No. 76357504
3
“Bentley” as their surname. Under these circumstances, the
name certainly cannot be characterized as “rare.” With her
second Office Action, she included a copy of a dictionary
page, which shows no listing for the term. Also submitted
with that action were excerpts from periodicals published
in this country, which make reference to various
individuals whose surname is “Bentley.” The record is
silent as to whether anyone connected with applicant is
named “Bentley.”
In short, the Examining Attorney has clearly
established that the primary significance of “BENTLEY” is
that of a surname, that the surname is not rare, and that
the term has no significance other than as a surname. It
certainly has “the look and feel” of a surname. In that
applicant seeks registration of the name in typed form,
there is no distinctive display which could be argued to
create a commercial impression separate and apart from that
of the surname. Applicant’s arguments that the primary
significance of the term to consumers is as an identifier
of applicant’s products is simply not supported by any
evidence.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed and
registration to applicant is refused.