Mercedes E. Tercilla, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 2, 2010
0120092734 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 2, 2010)

0120092734

07-02-2010

Mercedes E. Tercilla, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.


Mercedes E. Tercilla,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092734

Agency No. 4H330004201

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from an agency

determination (AD) by the Agency dated May 22, 2009, finding that it was

in compliance with the terms of the August 10, 2001 settlement agreement

into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. �

1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the Agency violated the terms of the August 10, 2001, settlement

agreement.

BACKGROUND

The record indicates that Complainant entered into a settlement agreement

with the Agency on August 10, 2001. The settlement agreement provided,

in pertinent part, that:

In a good faith effort by both parties to resolve this matter at the

lowest possible level, the following will constitute the full settlement

of this EEO case and due to the fact that the Station Manager through a

grievance-Step A meeting agreed that Complainant would be granted 06:30

a.m. temporary schedule changes (revised schedules) on a monthly basis,

with Complainant's understanding that the circumstances may change

(needs of service, heavy mail volume, Christmas season, etc.), which

may cause her reporting time to change as well.

No retaliation will stemmed [sic] from filing this EEO complaint. This

settlement is not to be construed as any admission of wrongdoing by

either party. ROI, Management's Aff., at page 10.

On June 6, 2007, Complainant alleged that the Agency breached the

settlement agreement by requiring her to report to work at 7:00 a.m.,

although she had previously been reporting to work at 6:30 a.m. since the

execution of the settlement agreement in 2001. Complainant requested that

the agency return her to a 6:30 a.m. begin tour time. In its August 15,

2007, AD, the Agency concluded that it did not breach the agreement.

Complainant subsequently appealed this decision to the Commission.

On February 19, 2009, the Commission issued a decision, finding that it

was not possible to ascertain whether the Agency breached the agreement

because it failed to supplement the record with evidence pertinent

to complainant's breach claim.1 Accordingly, the Commission ordered

the Agency to: (1) supplement the record with affidavits and other

documentary evidence as to whether it was in compliance with the above

provision of the August 10, 2001 settlement agreement; and (2) issue

a new determination as to whether the Agency breached the respective

provisions of the settlement agreement within 30 calendar days of the

Commission's decision.

On May 22, 2009, the Agency issued a new determination. In its AD, the

Agency concluded that it had complied with the terms of the settlement

agreement. The Agency noted that Complainant had maintained her requested

6:30 a.m. schedule from August 10, 2001 through May 27, 2007, a period

of over five years. The Agency then noted that the agreement expressly

provided that circumstances may necessitate a change in the terms of

the settlement agreement. In this respect, the Agency determined that

because mail volume had decreased and due to organizational changes within

the Postal Service, management changed all carriers tour report times.

On these grounds, the Agency determined that it had not breached the

terms of the settlement agreement.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant reiterates arguments that she previously

presented. In this regard, Complainant avers that the Agency breached the

terms of the settlement agreement when it changed her schedule on May

27, 2007, four days before the end of the month. Further, Complainant

contends that the Agency failed to issue a new determination within

the time frame stipulated in the Commission's order. Complainant also

contends that the Agency failed to provide the supplemental documents

as stipulated in the Commission's order dated February 19, 2009.

On appeal, the Agency argues that Complainant has not submitted any new

evidence on appeal that warrants reversing its AD. The Agency requests

that the Commission affirm its determination finding no breach of the

settlement agreement.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, we address Complainant's contention that the Agency failed

to provide supplemental documentation as stipulated in the Commission's

February 19, 2009, final order. In this respect, we find that the Agency

submitted appropriate documentation such that it complied with paragraph

(1) of the Commission's order. Specifically, Complainant's immediate

supervisor (S1) provided testimony sufficient to determine the Agency's

compliance with the settlement agreement.2

Next, we address Complainant's contention that the Agency failed to issue

a timely decision in compliance with our February 19, 2009 Order. In this

regard, we note that the Agency was directed to issue a new determination

within 30 days of the Commission's decision becoming final. Our decision

in EEOC Appeal No. 0120073789 became final on March 21, 2009, 30 days

after it was issued. Accordingly, the Agency had 30 days after that date

to issue its new AD, i.e., April 20, 2009. The record indicates, however,

that a decision was not issued until May 23, 2009, 32 days after the

deadline set forth in paragraph (2) of the Commission's final order.

While the Commission has the authority to sanction an agency for delays

in complying with a Commission Order, we find that a sanction would not

be appropriate in the case at hand. See Equal Employment Opportunity

Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614.404, Chapter 9, at 5.

In this regard, we note that the Agency complied with paragraph (1)

of the Commission's order. Moreover, to the extent that its new AD was

untimely, we find no persuasive evidence that the Agency's delay warrants

the imposition of a sanction.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC

Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August

23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the

terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on

the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing

appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be

determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

Complainant contends that the Agency breached the terms of the agreement

by changing her schedule four days before the end of the month. In this

regard, we note that the settlement agreement provides, in pertinent part,

that "[...] complainant would be granted 06:30 a.m. temporary schedule

changes (revised schedules) on a monthly basis." In this respect, we find

that the agreement does not indicate, as argued by Complainant, that the

Agency was required to revise her schedule only at the end of the month.

Indeed, the agreement expressly states that her schedule may change as

circumstances within the Agency necessitated. The Agency's testimony

indicates that circumstances did in fact change, thereby requiring

all carriers to begin at a later start time. Further, we note that

agreement did not specify a particular time period in which the new

schedule would be maintained. In the absence of a specific time frame

in a settlement agreement, it is interpreted to be for a reasonable

amount of time. Parker v. Department of Defense (Defense Logistics

Agency), EEOC Request No. 05910576 (August 29, 1991) (agreement that

did not specify length of service for position to which complainant was

promoted was not breached by the temporary detail of complainant two

years after the execution of the settlement agreement). Applying the

above legal principle, and taking into account the fact that the Agency

provided Complainant with a 6:30 a.m. begin tour schedule for a period

of approximately five and a half years, we determine that the Agency

complied with the settlement agreement.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, including Complainant's

arguments on appeal, the Agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically discussed in this decision, we find that the agency

complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. Therefore, we AFFIRM

the Agency's determination that no breach occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____7/2/10______________

Date

1 Tercilla v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073789

(February 19, 2009).

2 ROI, Management's Aff., at page 10.

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0120092734

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120092734