MEGAN ROZMAN et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 11, 2021

2021003751 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90/013,969 06/07/2017 RE43529 12437.0240 9958
112093 7590 08/11/2021
Boisbrun Hofman, PLLC
1255 West 15th Street, Suite 400
Suite 400
Plano, TX 75075
EXAMINER
BANANKHAH, MAJID A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/11/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STAT ES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MEGAN ELIZABETH ROZMAN, MELANIE ANN ROZMAN,
and MORGAN LEE ROZMAN
Patent Owner and Appellant
____________

Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
United States Patent US RE43,529 E
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and
JENNIFER S. BISK, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 306 the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 21, 25–27, 29–36, 40–44, 46–53, 57–61, and 63–
65. Claims 22–24, 28, 37–39, 45, 54–56, and 62 have been indicated as
containing patentable subject matter. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 134 and 306, and we heard the appeal on July 19, 2021.2
We AFFIRM IN PART and enter a new ground of rejection.

1 Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Alfonso Cioffi and Allen
Rozman’s heirs. Appeal Br. 8.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the transcript of this oral hearing
mailed July 29, 2021 (“Tr.”).
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding arose from a request for ex parte reexamination filed
on June 7, 2017 of United States Patent RE43,529 (“the ’529 patent”) that
issued to Allen F. Rozman and Alfonso J. Cioffi on July 17, 2012.3
The ’529 patent describes a system that protects a computer system
from malicious software. To this end, the computer system includes first
and second data processors and associated memory spaces, and is configured
such that a malware program downloaded from a network executes on the
second data processor, but cannot initiate access to the first memory space.
See Abstract. Claim 21 is illustrative and reproduced below:
21. A method of generating data for display of website content on a
portable computer employing a common operating system in a secure
manner, comprising:

distributing website content, via a network of one or more computers,
to the portable computer capable of executing a secure web browser process,
wherein the website content potentially contains malware;

wherein the secure web browser process is capable of executing on at
least one electronic data processor and comprises a first web browser
process and at least one second protected web browser process, the first web
browser process and the at least one second protected web browser process
being configured to access the website content via the network of one or
more computers, the at least one electronic data processor capable of being
communicatively coupled to a first memory space and to a second protected
memory space, the first memory space having at least one system file, the
secure web browser process configured for:
executing instructions in the first web browser process, wherein the
first web browser process is configured to access data contained in the first

3 The ’529 patent reissued U.S. Patent 7,484,247 that issued on January 27,
2009.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

3
memory space and to initialize the at least one second protected web
browser process;

passing data from the first web browser process to the at least one
second protected web browser process;

executing instructions in the at least one second protected web
browser process, wherein the at least one second protected web browser
process is configured to access data contained in the second protected
memory space but is denied access to the first memory space;

generating data for display of the distributed website content
potentially containing malware;

wherein the secure web browser process is configured such that the at
least one system file residing on the first memory space is protected from
corruption by the website content potentially containing malware executing
in the at least one second protected web browser process.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is said to be related to various pending proceedings. First,
Appellant informs us of ex parte reexamination proceedings (Control
Numbers 90/013,967 and 90/013,968) in connection with two related
patents, where both proceedings are on appeal. See Appeal Br. 9.4 No
decision has been rendered in these appeals.
Second, Appellant informs us of pending district court litigation
involving the ’529 patent. See Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 6 (citing Cioffi v.
Google, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00103 (E.D. Tex.).

4 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed July 30,
2019 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed August 31, 2020 (“Appeal
Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed February 16, 2021 (“Ans.”); and
(4) the Reply Brief filed May 17, 2021 (“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

4
The ’529 patent was also at issue in a decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit that reversed and remanded the case to the district
court due to various recited terms—including the term “web browser
process”—that were incorrectly construed. See Cioffi v. Google, Inc., 632 F.
App’x 1013, 1014–24 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (unpublished).

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 21, 31, 36, 47, 48, and 50 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Joshi (US 7,694,328 B2; issued Apr. 6,
2010) (“Ground 3”).5 Final Act. 59–65.
The Examiner rejected claims 34 and 51 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi (“Ground 4”). Final Act. 65–67.
The Examiner rejected claims 25, 26, 35, 40–42, and 52 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Joshi and Jacobs (US 2004/0054588
Al; published Mar. 18, 2004) (“Ground 5”). Final Act. 67–70.
The Examiner rejected claims 27, 29, 32, 33, 43, 46, 53, 60, 61, and
64 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Joshi and Wolff (US
2002/0174137 Al; published Nov. 21, 2002) (“Ground 6”). Final Act. 70–
78.
The Examiner rejected claims 30 and 49 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi and Hasbun (US 2005/0188173 Al; published Aug.
25, 2005) (“Ground 7”). Final Act. 79–81.

5 For clarity, we identify each ground of rejection on appeal numerically
consistent with the Examiner’s and Appellant’s nomenclature.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

5
The Examiner rejected claim 44 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi and Angelo (US 6,581,162 Bl; issued June 17, 2003)
(“Ground 8”). Final Act. 81.
The Examiner rejected claims 57–59 and 65 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi, Wolff, and Jacobs (“Ground 9”). Final Act. 82–83.
The Examiner rejected claim 63 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi, Wolff, and Hasbun (“Ground 10”). Final Act. 83–
85.
The Examiner rejected claims 31 and 50 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi and McCrory (US 5,751,979; issued May 12, 1998)
(“Ground 11”). Final Act. 85–86.
The Examiner rejected claim 60 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Joshi, Wolff, and McCrory (“Ground 12”). Final Act. 86.

SUBSTANTIAL NEW QUESTION OF PATENTABILITY (SNQ)
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s SNQ determination in this
proceeding because the record ostensibly does not support treating Joshi
differently in the present ex parte reexamination proceeding of the ’529
patent as compared to the patent’s prosecution. See Appeal Br. 69–70.
According to Appellant, Joshi was not relied upon in any substantive
rejection during the ’529 patent’s prosecution despite the Examiner citing
Joshi with only four other prior art references. Appeal Br. 69.
On this record, we see no error in the Examiner’s SNQ determination.
As the Examiner explained during prosecution, the Joshi reference is
presented or viewed in a new light or different way in this proceeding,
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

6
namely with respect to, among other things, the functionality of Joshi’s web
browser processes. See Final Act. 4; see also Office Action Ordering
Reexamination mailed Aug. 4, 2017 (“Reexam Order”), at 10–12. Because
of these new and non-cumulative teachings, as well as those in various other
cited prior art references, an SNQ was deemed to be raised and, therefore,
reexamination was ordered. See Reexam Order at 2, 10–17. On this record,
we see no error in these findings and conclusions.
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s SNQ
determination.

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION (“GROUND 3”)
The Examiner finds that Joshi discloses every recited element of
independent claim 21 including, among other things, a secure web browser
process, namely software for browsing the web, that comprises (1) a first
web browser process, namely an Internet Explorer instance in a Protected
Context, and (2) a second protected web browser process, namely an Internet
Explorer instance in an Isolated Context, where both web browser processes
can access website content potentially containing malware. See Final Act.
59–61; Ans. 5–11, 24–25.
The Examiner also finds that Joshi’s first web browser process,
namely an Internet Explorer instance in the Protected Context, can initialize
the second protected web browser process, namely an Internet Explorer
instance in an Isolated Context, via an ActiveX control. Final Act. 60; Ans.
29–35. The Examiner also finds that data, namely a Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) and window handle, are passed from the first web browser
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

7
process in the Protected Context to the second protected web browser
process in the Isolated Context. Final Act. 60; Ans. 35–37. The Examiner
adds that Joshi’s secure web browser process, namely software for browsing
the web, is configured such that a system file residing on a first memory
space, namely that associated with the Protected Context, is protected from
corruption by the website content potentially containing malware in the
second protected web browser process, namely the Internet Explorer
instance in the Isolated Context. Final Act. 61; Ans. 38.
Appellant argues that Joshi does not disclose a single secure web
browser process that includes a first web browser process and a second
protected web browser process as claimed. Appeal Br. 71–79; Reply Br. 8–
19. According to Appellant, not only does the Examiner incorrectly
construe the term “secure web browser process” differently from the other
recited web browser processes, Joshi lacks an overarching secure web
browser process, namely a discrete web browser application, comprising the
two recited web browser processes. Appeal Br. 36–50, 71–79. Rather, Joshi
is said to disclose two web browser processes, namely Internet Explorer in
the Protected and Isolated Contexts. Appeal Br. 75.
Appellant further contends that Joshi does not disclose first and
second web browser processes configured to access network-distributed
website content that potentially contains malware as claimed. Appeal Br.
79–85; Reply Br. 19–33. According to Appellant, both recited web browser
processes must be able to access the same content that potentially contains
malware unlike Joshi’s website content that is not accessible to both of
Joshi’s Internet Explorer Contexts that the Examiner maps to the recited web
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

8
browser processes. Appeal Br. 80–84; Reply Br. 19–21. Rather, Appellant
contends, Joshi determines whether content is trusted or untrusted, and
directs that content to either the Isolated or Protected Context—but not both.
Reply Br. 22–26. Appellant emphasizes that website content potentially
containing malware is untrusted and is only accessible by Joshi’s second
web browser process, namely the Isolated Context. Reply Br. 27. Joshi’s
Protected Context, however, is said to be able to access only trusted content
that does not potentially contain malware. Id.
Appellant also argues that Joshi does not disclose a data processor that
can be communicatively coupled to (1) a first memory space having at least
one system file, and (2) a second protected memory space as claimed.
Appeal Br. 85–90; Reply Br. 33. According to Appellant, because
applications running in Joshi’s Isolated Context, which the Examiner maps
to the second protected memory space, can access shared memory in the
Protected Context, which the Examiner maps to the first memory space, the
two memory areas are not distinct, which is contrary to the District Court’s
construction of the recited memory spaces as distinct from each other. See
Appeal Br. 88–90. Appellant adds that if all memory accessible to all
programs in the Protected Context overlaps with memory accessible by
programs running in the Isolated Context, then Joshi’s system does not
protect a system file residing on the first memory space from corruption by
website content potentially containing malware executing in the second
protected web browser process as claimed. Appeal Br. 86–87.
Appellant also argues that Joshi’s first web browser process, namely
the Protected Context, does not initialize the second protected web browser
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

9
process as claimed. Appeal Br. 90–102; Reply Br. 33–34. According to
Appellant, Joshi’s ActiveX control—which is said to not be a web browser
process—runs in conjunction with the Protected Context and passes a
“window handle” to a child window created in the Isolated Context, where
the handle creates an Internet Explorer web browser control and causes
rendering Internet Explorer in the child window area. Appeal Br. 91–92.
According to Appellant, Joshi’s ActiveX control and Browser Helper Object
(BHO) are (1) processes separate from Internet Explorer regardless of
Context, and (2) ancillary programs that are not web browser processes, but
rather instances of code distinct from Internet Explorer’s executed code.
Appeal Br. 92–100. Appellant adds that just because separate instances of
ActiveX and Internet Explorer share the same address space does not merge
them into a single instance of a program or code to constitute the recited first
web browser process. Appeal Br. 100–02; Reply Br. 33–34.
Appellant further contends that Joshi does not pass data from the first
web browser process to the second protected web browser process as
claimed. Appeal Br. 103–09; Reply Br. 34–36. According to Appellant,
Joshi’s ActiveX control (1) creates a window in the Protected Context for
the Isolated Context, and (2) passes data, namely the window handle, to the
Isolated Context. Appeal Br. 103–05. Appellant emphasizes that the
ActiveX control—a program different from Internet Explorer’s Protected
Context that the Examiner maps to the first web browser process—passes
the window handle to the child window created in the Isolated Context and,
therefore, the first web browser process, namely Internet Explorer’s
Protected Context, does not pass data to the second protected web browser
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

10
process, namely Internet Explorer’s Isolated Context. Appeal Br. 105–06;
Reply Br. 35–36.
Appellant also argues that Joshi does not disclose a secure web
browser process configured such that at least one system file residing on the
first memory space is protected from corruption by the website content
potentially containing malware executing in the at least one second protected
web browser process as claimed. Appeal Br. 110–13; Reply Br. 36.
According to Appellant, because Joshi’s shared memory is within the
Examiner’s identified first memory space, malware executing in the second
protected web browser process, namely the Isolated Context, can access
Joshi’s memory space shared with the Protected Context and, therefore, a
system file on the first memory space would not be protected from
corruption. See Appeal Br. 110–13.

ISSUE
Under § 102, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 21 by finding
that Joshi discloses every recited limitation including a secure web browser
process comprising first and second web browser processes configured to
access network-distributed website content that potentially contains
malware?

ANALYSIS
We begin by construing a key disputed limitation of claim 21 that
recites, in pertinent part, a secure web browser process. As noted above, the
claim recites that the secure web browser process comprises (1) a first web
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

11
browser process, and (2) a second protected web browser process, where
both of these constituent web browser processes of the secure web browser
process are configured to access network-distributed website content that
potentially contains malware. The ’529 patent’s Specification, however,
does not define the term “web browser process,” let alone a “secure web
browser process.”
Although the Federal Circuit did not construe the term “secure web
browser process” in its decision that involved the ’529 patent, it did,
however, hold that (1) the term “web browser process” is a process that can
access data on websites, and (2) the district court incorrectly construed a
“web browser process” as requiring direct access capability. See Cioffi, 632
F. App’x at 1018–22, 1023. Given this holding, Appellant’s characterization
of the Federal Circuit’s construction of “web browser process” as “a process
capable of accessing data on websites directly or indirectly” (Appeal Br. 36)
is reasonably consistent with the court’s findings and conclusions. We,
therefore, adopt that construction.
The court, however, did not construe the term “process”—a key
element of the recited web browser processes, including the secure web
browser process. Nor does the ’529 patent define that term. Accordingly,
we construe the term “process” with its plain meaning in the art. A noted
computer dictionary defines the term “process” as “[a] program or part of a
program; a coherent sequence of steps undertaken by a program.” Process,
MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 423 (5th ed. 2002) (“Microsoft
Computer Dictionary”). Another special-purpose dictionary defines the term
“process,” in pertinent part, as “[a] sequence of steps, events, operations,
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

12
functions, or the like, which leads to a given result.” Process, Steven M.
Kaplan, WILEY ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING DICTIONARY 605
(2004) (“Wiley EE Dictionary”).
Under its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
Specification and these authorities, a “web browser process” is effectively a
sequence of steps, events, operations, functions, or the like, which leads to a
given result, namely the ability to access data on websites directly or
indirectly.
A secure web browser process, then, is a secure sequence of steps,
events, operations, functions, or the like, which leads to a given result,
namely the ability to access data on websites directly or indirectly. The term
“secure” is defined, in pertinent part, as “[s]afe from unauthorized use,
access, interception, monitoring, or the like.” Secure, Wiley EE Dictionary,
at 690. Therefore, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, a secure web
browser process is sequence of steps, events, operations, functions, or the
like, which leads to a given result, namely the ability to access data on
websites directly or indirectly, where the sequence of steps, events,
operations, functions, or the like is safe from unauthorized use, access,
interception, monitoring, or the like.
Therefore, to the extent Appellant contends that the term “secure web
browser process” must be limited to a multi-process browser (Appeal Br.
44), such arguments are unavailing and not commensurate with the scope of
the claim.
We reach this conclusion despite Dr. Dunsmore’s view that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would interpret a “secure web browser process” as
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

13
something narrower than an interactive network process, namely an actual
overarching web browser process or program. See 2d Supp. Dunsmore
Decl. ¶ 22; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 19. Although we appreciate Dr.
Dunsmore’s insights in this regard, nothing on this record precludes
construing the term “secure web browser process” broadly, but reasonably,
as a sequence of steps, events, operations, functions, or the like, which leads
to a given result, namely the ability to access data on websites directly or
indirectly, where the sequence of steps, events, operations, functions, or the
like is safe from unauthorized use, access, interception, monitoring, or the
like.
Given our interpretation, we see no error in the Examiner’s finding
that a secure web browser process includes software for browsing the web
(Ans. 24), at least to the extent this software includes a sequence of steps,
events, operations, functions, or the like, which leads to a given result,
namely the ability to access data on websites directly or indirectly, where the
sequence of steps, events, operations, functions, or the like is safe from
unauthorized use, access, interception, monitoring, or the like.
Turning to Joshi, Joshi’s “security solution” separates a client into
(1) a “Protected Context,” namely the client’s real files and resources, and
(2) an “Isolated Context,” which is a restricted execution environment that
uses virtualized resources to execute applications and modify content in the
Isolated Context without allowing explicit access to resources in the
Protected Context. See Joshi Abstract; col. 4, ll. 54–60.
As shown in Joshi’s Figure 1, client 10 is connected to network 20 via
enterprise server 30. Joshi col. 4, ll. 61–63. “Security solution” 40 is
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

14
installed on the network, where this “solution” provides general policy-
based definitions to servers to identify and tag external content. Joshi col. 4,
ll. 64–67. In addition, security solution security client software 50 is
installed on the client, where this software provides (1) local policies and
mechanisms for identifying content origin; (2) tagging mechanisms;
(3) means for creating restricted execution and virtual environments; (4)
means for consolidating the user interface; (5) visual indication of untrusted
content; and (6) means for detecting user intent. Joshi col. 4, l. 67 – col 5,
l. 6.
Notably, the combination of (1) security solution security client
software 50 (which Joshi also refers to as a “security client” 50), and
(2)“security solution” 40 (which Joshi also refers to as “security server” 40)
allow the user environment on client 10 to be separated into environments or
contexts, namely Isolated Context 60 and Protected Context 70. Joshi col. 5,
ll. 6–10.
This functionality associated with Joshi’s security solution security
client software 50 and security solution 40 collectively constitutes a secure
web browser process, for it is effectively a sequence of steps, events,
operations, functions, or the like, which leads to a given result, namely the
ability to access data on websites directly or indirectly, where the sequence
of steps, events, operations, functions, or the like is not only based on
software, it is also safe from unauthorized use, access, interception,
monitoring, or the like. Accord Joshi col. 3, ll. 4–8 (noting that the security
solution’s goal is to allow enterprise users unfettered access to external,
potentially malicious content, such as web pages, without exposing the
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

15
enterprise to the risk of infection or other malicious action). That Joshi
refers to this software-based functionality as a security solution underscores
the secure aspects of this web browser process.
In addition, Joshi’s secure web browser process, namely the
functionality associated with security solution security client software 50
and security solution 40, effectively comprises (1) a first web browser
process, namely the functionality associated with creating an instance of the
Internet Explorer web browser running in the Protected Context, and (2) a
second protected web browser process, namely the functionality associated
with creating an instance of Internet Explorer running in the Isolated
Context. Accord Final Act. 59–60; Ans. 24. That Joshi (1) refers to “a web
browser process running in the Protected Context” explicitly in column 34,
lines 21 and 22 (emphasis added), and (2) uses similar “process” language in
connection with the Isolated Context in column 34, lines 26 to 29
underscores these respective web browser processes.
As Joshi explains, the security solution employs an Internet Explorer
switching feature that enables the user to browse web sites seamlessly by
launching Internet Explorer in either the Protected or Isolated Context by
using the URL to decide the target context. Joshi col. 33, ll. 30–35. To this
end, the client implements a BHO and Pluggable Protocol handler to switch
Internet Explorer contexts based on the URL. Joshi col. 33, ll. 35–38.
As shown in Joshi’s Figure 10, after the user launches Internet
Explorer, the BHO checks the target’s context based on the URL being
navigated to and, if the context differs, the BHO launches Internet Explorer
in the Isolated Context. Joshi col. 33, ll. 45–60; Fig. 10 (steps 1010, 1020,
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

16
1060). If the target context is the same as the current context, however, the
BHO checks whether the page is internal or external in step 1030 and, if
external, the page is displayed in the Isolated Context in step 1040;
otherwise, the page is displayed in the Protected Context. See Joshi col. 33,
ll. 45–60; Fig. 10. Accord Ans. 29 (noting this functionality).
In one implementation, an ActiveX control or plugin is implemented
from a web browser process running in the Protected Context that takes, as a
parameter, a URL to a page that should be rendered in the Isolated Context.
Joshi, col. 34, ll. 14–22. At startup, a child window of the browser’s
window is created, and the ActiveX control (1) creates a process in the
Isolated Context by, for example, using the security solution COM proxy,
and (2) passes that process the window handle to the child window just
created. Joshi col. 34, ll. 20–29. The Isolated Context process may
(1) create an Internet Explorer web browser control, and (2) cause it to
render itself into a child window of the window created by the ActiveX
control in the Protected Context. Joshi col. 34, ll. 28–33. In this way, the
security solution effectively overlays the area of the web browser that is
used to contain external or untrusted content with a window that runs in the
Isolated Context and is able to display web content. Joshi col. 34, ll. 33–36.
The control can also command the Isolated Context process to cause the web
browser control to load the URL that was passed to the original (Protected
Context) control. Joshi col. 34, ll. 37–42.
Given these processes, Joshi discloses (1) a first web browser process,
namely the software-based functionality associated with creating an instance
of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the Protected Context, and
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

17
(2) a second protected web browser process, namely the software-based
functionality associated with creating an instance of Internet Explorer
running in the Isolated Context. Both these web browser processes comport
fully with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term, namely a
sequence of steps, events, operations, functions, or the like, which leads to a
given result which, as noted previously, is the ability to access data on
websites directly or indirectly.
Notably, because these two web browser processes are made possible
by the functionality associated with security solution security client software
50 and security solution 40, these web browser processes are effectively part
of Joshi’s overall secure web browser process. As noted previously, a
secure web browser process is a sequence of steps, events, operations,
functions, or the like, which leads to a given result, namely the ability to
access data on websites directly or indirectly, where the sequence of steps,
events, operations, functions, or the like is safe from unauthorized use,
access, interception, monitoring, or the like. Joshi’s first and second web
browser processes, namely (1) the software-based functionality associated
with creating an instance of the Internet Explorer web browser running in
the Protected Context, and (2) the software-based functionality associated
with creating an instance of Internet Explorer running in the Isolated
Context, are effectively part of Joshi’s overall secure web browser process,
namely the software-based functionality associated with security solution
security client software 50 and security solution 40. Accord Joshi col. 33, ll.
31–35 (“The security solution employs an Internet Explorer switching
feature that enables the user to seamlessly browse web sites by launching,
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

18
Internet Explorer in the right context (Protected Context/isolated Context) by
using the URL to decide the target context.”); id. col. 34, ll. 33–36
(“Effectively what the security solution has done is overlaid the area of the
web browser that used to contain external or untrusted content, with a
window that runs in the Isolated Context and is able to display web
content.”); id. col. 32, ll. 16–23 (noting that by injecting logic into Internet
Explorer via the pluggable protocol handler, the security solution can ensure
that when the user chooses (1) a restricted shortcut, it opens up in an Internet
Explorer instance running in the Isolated Context, and (2) an unrestricted
shortcut, it is launched into an Internet Explorer instance running in the
Protected Context). (emphases added).
Although Joshi discloses a secure web browser process that comprises
first and second web browser processes as claimed, we fail to see—nor has
the Examiner shown—that both the first and second web browser processes
are necessarily configured to access network-distributed website content that
potentially contains malware as claimed. Notably, claim 21 recites that the
first web browser process and the second protected web browser process are
configured to access the website content, where the website content
potentially contains malware. In other words, the recited term “the website
content” refers to the content recited earlier in the claim that potentially
contains malware. Therefore, both the first and second web browser
processes must be configured to access website content potentially
containing malware. Although this content need not contain malware, it
nevertheless must potentially contain malware.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

19
Despite the possibility of the recited website content lacking malware,
we cannot say that trusted content accessed by Joshi’s Internet Explorer
Protected Context necessarily potentially contains malware; otherwise, it
would not be trusted. Accord Reply Br. 27 (noting this point). The
Examiner’s finding that the recited website content potentially containing
malware encompasses both untrusted and trusted content in Joshi (Ans. 15)
runs counter to Joshi’s teachings that isolate Internet Explorer’s Protected
Context from untrusted content that potentially contains malware. See Joshi
col. 14, ll. 54–58 (“The TDI intercepts ensure[] that the Isolated Context
may only have access to external content, and the Protected Context may
only have access to internal content, thus avoiding any leaking of untrusted
content into the Protected Context or trusted content into the Isolated
Context.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, to say that Joshi somehow treats
content that potentially contains malware as trusted as the Examiner
seemingly suggests runs counter to Joshi’s teachings and is, therefore,
untenable on this record.
In short, there is no persuasive evidence on this record proving that
Joshi’s first web browser process, namely the instance of Internet Explorer
in the Protected Context, can necessarily access website content potentially
containing malware—a crucial requirement for inherent anticipation. See In
re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If anything, Joshi teaches
just the opposite: namely, that the browser in the Protected Context cannot
access that content because it is untrusted.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
(1) independent claim 21; (2) independent claim 36 that recites
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

20
commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 31, 47, 48, and 50 for
similar reasons. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the
Examiner’s rejection of these claims, we need not address Appellant’s other
associated arguments.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
DEPENDENT ON CLAIMS 21 AND 36

We also do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of
(1) claims 34 and 51 over Joshi; (2) claims 25, 26, 35, 40–42, and 52 over
Joshi and Jacobs; (3) claims 27, 29, 32, 33, 43, and 46 over Joshi and Wolff;
(4) claims 30 and 49 over Joshi and Hasbun; (5) claim 44 over Joshi and
Angelo; and (6) claims 31 and 50 over Joshi and McCrory. Final Act. 65–
74, 79–81, 85–86. Because the Examiner has not shown that the cited prior
art cures Joshi’s foregoing deficiencies in connection with the rejection of
independent claims 21 and 36, we do not sustain the obviousness rejections
of dependent claims 25–27, 29–35, 40–43, 46, 49, 50, and 52 for similar
reasons.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 53, 60, 61, AND 64
OVER JOSHI AND WOLFF (“GROUND 6”)

Regarding independent claim 53, the Examiner finds that Joshi
discloses every recited element except for the portable computer based
system to be configured such that the at least one second protected web
browser process is initialized from clean system files. Final Act. 74–76.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

21
The Examiner, however, cites Wolff for teaching this feature in concluding
that the claim would have been obvious. Final Act. 76–77.
Appellant reiterates the arguments made regarding Joshi’s alleged
shortcomings in connection with independent claims 21 and 36 in
concluding that the cited prior art fails to teach or suggest the limitations
recited in claim 53. Appeal Br. 130–31; Reply Br. 38–39. Appellant adds
that the claimed invention would not have been obvious given the proffered
evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness, namely
(1) commercial success; (2) long-felt need; (3) the lack of independent
and/or simultaneous invention; and (4) unexpected results. Appeal Br. 55–
69; Reply Br. 31. Appellant argues other recited limitations summarized
below.

ISSUES
I. Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Joshi and
Wolff collectively would have taught or suggested:
(1) a portable computer based system with a first web browser process
and second protected web browser process recited in claim 53?
(2) rendering data for display of website content using a video
processor as recited in claim 60?
(3) upon closing the second protected web browser process, deleting
at least one file selected from the group consisting of (a) a
temporary internet file; (b) a cookie; and (c) a file corrupted by
malware as recited in claim 61?
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

22
II. Is the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion erroneous in light of the
evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness?

ANALYSIS
Claims 53 and 64
We begin by noting key differences between independent claim 53
and independent claims 21 and 36. First, unlike claims 21 and 36, claim 53
does not recite a secure web browser process comprising first and second
web browser processes. Rather, claim 53 recites a portable computer based
system comprising a first web browser process and second protected web
browser process. Accord Appeal Br. 40 (noting this distinction). As
Appellant acknowledges, the particular “thing” that combines the first and
second web browser processes in claim 53 is open-ended and could be any
system that combines those processes. Appeal Br. 42. Given this lack of a
secure web browser process in claim 53, Appellant’s contention that
dependent claim 65 specifically narrows the term “secure web browser
process” (Appeal Br. 40) is puzzling and, at best, overstated, for claim 53
recites no such term as Appellant acknowledges. Accord Tr. 18
(acknowledging that this statement regarding claim 65 in the Brief may have
been erroneous).
Second, unlike claims 21 and 36, claim 53 does not configure both
web browser processes to access website content that potentially contains
malware—a key disputed aspect of claims 21 and 36. Although claim 53
recites a first web browser process configured to execute instructions to
access website content from a network, the claim does not say that this
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

23
website content potentially contains malware. Rather, claim 53 configures
only the second protected web browser process to execute instructions for
the display of the website content downloaded from the network, where the
instructions for the display of the website content potentially contain
malware.
Our emphasis on the term “instructions” underscores that it is the
instructions—not the website content—that potentially contains malware in
claim 53. Other references to the instructions in claim 53 are consistent with
this construction. Notably, the claim recites that the second protected web
browser process is configured to access data contained in the second
protected memory space, where the instructions potentially containing
malware are capable of accessing the second protected memory space, but
are denied access to the first memory space.
Using similar language, claim 53 adds that the portable computer
based system is configured such that the critical file residing on the first
memory space is protected from corruption by the instructions for the
display of website content potentially containing malware downloaded from
the network and executing as part of the second protected web browser
process. Although the term “potentially containing malware” is adjacent the
term “website content” in this clause, the limitation nonetheless recites, with
our emphasis, “the instructions for the display of website content” that refers
to the same display instructions that potentially contain malware—an
explicit antecedent basis similar to that recited for “the website content” that
potentially contains malware in claims 21 and 36. Given this context and
antecedent basis, the term “potentially containing malware” in the second-
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

24
to-last clause of claim 53 modifies the term “instructions”— not “website
content”—when reading the claim as a whole. Accord Tr. 9–10 (confirming
this construction).
Given this construction, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on
Joshi and Wolff for collectively at least suggesting the recited limitations. In
reaching this conclusion, we note the Examiner’s reliance on Wolff for
teaching the limitations in claim 53’s last clause (Final Act. 76–77) is
undisputed, as is the cited references’ combinability. Nor are we persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on Joshi for at least suggesting the recited
portable computer based system functionality, including that of the first and
second web browser processes. See Final Act. 74–76.
As noted previously, Joshi discloses (1) a first web browser process,
namely the software-based functionality associated with creating an instance
of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the Protected Context, and
(2) a second protected web browser process, namely the software-based
functionality associated with creating an instance of Internet Explorer
running in the Isolated Context. Accord Final Act. 74–75.
We also see no error in the Examiner’s finding that Joshi’s first web
browser process can access a first memory space, namely that associated
with the client’s real files and resources—including critical system files—in
the Protected Context. See Final Act. 74; Ans. 26–27.6 Nor do we see error

6 Although this cited portion of Examiner’s Answer pertains to independent
claims 21 and 36, the Examiner’s discussion nonetheless applies to
commensurate limitations recited in independent claim 53. See Ans. 45.
Appellant likewise relies on arguments made with respect to independent
claims 21 and 36 in connection with the arguments made for independent
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

25
in the Examiner’s finding that Joshi’s second protected web browser process
can access a second protected memory space, namely that associated with
virtualized resources in the Isolated Context. See Final Act. 74–75; Ans.
26–27.
As Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 54–55), the District Court
construed the term “first memory space” to mean “memory space distinct
from a second memory space.” Cioffi v. Google, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-103-
JRG-RSP, 2014 WL 4293978, at *14 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (unpublished). The
court, however, emphasized that although the memory spaces are distinct
from one another, the Defendant in that case failed to demonstrate that the
recited first memory space must have no common memory storage area with
the second memory space. Id. at *13. Notably, because the Defendant
failed to establish that the first memory space must be physically separate
from the second memory space, the court rejected the Defendant’s proposed
construction. Id.
The import of this authority is that although the recited memory
spaces are distinct from each other, they need not be physically separated
from each other. See Cioffi, 2014 WL 4293978, at *13. Nor does the
court’s construction preclude the two memory spaces from having at least
some common storage area, so long as they are distinct. See id.; accord
Ans. 26–27 (noting the District Court’s construction). In other words,
memory spaces can overlap, yet still be distinct.

claim 53. See Appeal Br. 131. Accordingly, we refer to the discussion in
the Briefs and Answer regarding commensurate limitations in independent
claims 21 and 36 in our discussion regarding the rejection of independent
claim 53.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

26
This point is consistent with plain meaning of the term “distinct” that
is defined, in pertinent part, as “not identical; separate; different.” Distinct,
THE OXFORD AMERICAN DESK DICTIONARY 166–67 (Frank Abate ed. 1998)
(“Oxford Dictionary”). That is, distinct memory spaces, namely those that
are not identical or different, can still overlap. In other words, the fact that
the memory spaces overlap does not mean that they are identical or the same
to render them indistinct; rather, they remain distinct despite their overlap.
Moreover, overlapping memory spaces can also be considered “separate”
under the alternative dictionary definition of the term “distinct,” for these
memory spaces are at least partially separated from each other, at least with
respect to their non-overlapping portions. Although the recited memory
spaces need not be separated physically under the District Court’s
construction, they can nonetheless be distinct from each other by being
separated at least partially with respect to their non-overlapping portions, or
even separated logically as the Examiner indicates. See Ans. 27.
Appellant’s contention, then, that Joshi’s respective memory areas
associated with Joshi’s Isolated and Protected Contexts are ostensibly not
distinct because applications running in Joshi’s Isolated Context can access
shared memory in the Protected Context (Appeal Br. 90) is unavailing and
not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Even assuming, without
deciding, that the shared resources to which Joshi refers in column 12, lines
9 to 21 are shared memory spaces associated with both the Protected and
Isolated Contexts as Appellant seemingly suggests, that does not mean the
respective memory spaces are indistinct; rather, they are still distinct despite
their overlap.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

27
We reach this conclusion despite Dr. Dunsmore’s view to the
contrary. See Third Supplemental Declaration of H.E. Dunsmore, Ph.D. In
Support of Patent Owner’s Response to Final Office Action, dated Nov. 19,
2019 (“3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.”) ¶¶ 25–27. Although we appreciate Dr.
Dunsmore’s insights in this regard, Joshi nonetheless at least suggests two
distinct memory spaces associated with the Protected and Isolated Contexts,
respectively, particularly given Joshi’s preventing the virtual environment
associated with the Isolated Context from accessing actual system resources
via various techniques, including copying those resources. See Joshi col. 17,
ll. 35–59. That Joshi can redirect the restricted environment for certain
resources, including shared sections, to copies of requested resources—not
the actual resources themselves— in column 17, lines 52 to 55 underscores
that critical files are protected from corruption despite sharing resources,
including memory. Given this functionality considered in light of that
associated with the respective Internet Explorer Contexts that is made
possible by the security solution, Joshi not only suggests two distinct
memory spaces as claimed, but also that that critical files in the first memory
space associated with the Protected Context are protected from corruption.
That Joshi repeatedly refers to restricting services available to external,
potentially malicious content by protecting resources, including locally-
stored files (see Joshi, col. 5, ll. 25–33; col. 11, ll. 55–66), only underscores
Joshi’s functionality that protects critical files from corruption. Accord Ans.
27–28 (noting this functionality).
Appellant’s arguments in this regard are unavailing. In connection
with claim 21, Appellant contends that if all memory accessible to all
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

28
programs in the Protected Context overlaps with memory accessible by
programs running in the Isolated Context, then Joshi’s system ostensibly
does not protect a system file residing on the first memory space from
corruption by website content potentially containing malware executing in
the second protected web browser process as claimed. Appeal Br. 86–87.
First, our emphasis on Appellant’s term “if” underscores a speculative
assumption about the broad scope and extent of Joshi’s memory overlap—if
it exists at all. Second, our emphasis on both instances of the term “all”
underscores that Appellant’s contention presupposes that all memory
accessible to all programs in the Protected Context overlaps with memory
accessible by programs running in the Isolated Context. See Appeal Br. 86–
87. On this record, there is no persuasive evidence substantiating that
assumption. Moreover, to the extent that Appellant contends that Joshi must
be limited to that particular scenario to preclude other scenarios, including
those where only some memory accessible to only some programs in the
Protected Context overlaps with memory accessible by programs running in
the Isolated Context, we disagree.
We also see no error in the Examiner’s finding that Joshi’s first web
browser process, namely the software-based functionality associated with
creating an instance of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the
Protected Context, can initialize the second protected web browser process,
namely the software-based functionality associated with creating an instance
of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the Isolated Context. See
Final Act. 75; Ans. 29–35.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

29
As Joshi explains, an ActiveX control or plugin is implemented from
a web browser process running in the Protected Context that takes, as a
parameter, a URL to a page that should be rendered in the Isolated Context.
Joshi, col. 34, ll. 14–22. At startup, a child window of the browser’s
window is created, and the ActiveX control (1) creates a process in the
Isolated Context by, for example, using the security solution COM proxy,
and (2) passes that process the window handle to the child window just
created. Joshi col. 34, ll. 20–29. The Isolated Context process may
(1) create an Internet Explorer web browser control, and (2) cause it to
render itself into a child window of the window created by the ActiveX
control in the Protected Context. Joshi col. 34, ll. 28–33. In this way, the
security solution effectively overlays the area of the web browser that is
used to external or untrusted content with a window that runs in the Isolated
Context and is able to display web content. Joshi col. 34, ll. 33–36. The
control can also command the Isolated Context process to cause the web
browser control to load the URL that was passed to the original (Protected
Context) control. Joshi col. 34, ll. 37–42.
Our emphasis underscores that although an ActiveX control or plugin
creates a process in the Isolated Context, the ActiveX control or plugin is
implemented from the web browser process running in the Protected
Context. See Joshi, col. 34, ll. 14–25. In other words, by implementing the
ActiveX control or plugin from the web browser process running in the
Protected Context, Joshi’s first web browser process, namely the software-
based functionality associated with creating an instance of the Internet
Explorer web browser running in the Protected Context, effectively
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

30
initializes the second protected web browser process, namely the software-
based functionality associated with creating an instance of the Internet
Explorer web browser running in the Isolated Context.
Notably, claim 53 does not specify how the second protected web
browser process is initialized, nor does the ’529 patent define the term
“initialize” to so limit its interpretation. We, therefore, construe the term
“initialize” with its plain meaning, namely “set or prepare for the start of an
operation.” Initialize, Oxford Dictionary, at 305. Given this construction,
the claim does not preclude Joshi’s first web browser process associated
with the Protected Context initializing the second protected web browser
process associated with the Isolated Context despite using an ActiveX
control or plugin to achieve that end.
We reach this conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that
ActiveX controls and plugins are programs or instances of code that are
separate from the Internet Explorer browser as Appellant and Dr. Dunsmore
indicate. See Appeal Br. 92–93; see also Reply Br. 34; Second
Supplemental Declaration of H.E. Dunsmore, Ph.D. In Support of Patent
Owner’s Response to First Office Action, dated May 30, 2019 (“2d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl.”) ¶¶ 43–50, 120–123; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 61–68,
142–151. Although we appreciate Dr. Dunsmore’s insights in this regard,
the claim nevertheless does not preclude implementing an ActiveX control
or plugin from the web browser process running in the Protected Context to
initialize a second protected web browser process associated with the
Isolated Context. See Joshi col. 34, ll. 18–29.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

31
That is, the fact that Joshi’s first web browser process associated with
the Protected Context calls, invokes, triggers, or otherwise initiates, an
ActiveX control or plugin that creates a process in the Isolated Context
means that the first web browser process effectively triggers or initializes the
second protected web browser process associated with the Isolated Context.
In other words, by invoking, triggering, or otherwise initiating an ActiveX
control or plugin, Joshi’s first web browser process effectively initializes the
second protected web browser process associated with the Isolated Context
by at least setting or preparing for the start of that operation consistent with
plain meaning of the term “initialize.” Appellant’s arguments to the
contrary (Appeal Br. 90–102; Reply Br. 33–34) are, therefore, unavailing
and not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
We also see no error in the Examiner’s finding that Joshi’s first web
browser process, namely the software-based functionality associated with
creating an instance of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the
Protected Context, can pass data, including a “window handle” and URL, to
the second protected web browser process, namely the software-based
functionality associated with creating an instance of the Internet Explorer
web browser running in the Isolated Context. See Final Act. 75; Ans. 35–37.
As Joshi explains, an ActiveX control or plugin is implemented from
a web browser process running in the Protected Context that takes, as a
parameter, a URL to a page that should be rendered in the Isolated Context.
Joshi, col. 34, ll. 14–22. At startup, a child window of the browser’s
window is created, and the ActiveX control (1) creates a process in the
Isolated Context by, for example, using the security solution COM proxy,
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

32
and (2) pass that process the window handle to the child window just
created. Joshi col. 34, ll. 20–29. The control can also command the Isolated
Context process to cause the web browser control to load the URL that was
passed to the original (Protected Context) control. Joshi col. 34, ll. 37–42.
Although Joshi’s first web browser process uses an ActiveX control to
pass data, namely the “window handle” and URL, to the second protected
web browser process, the ActiveX control is implemented from the web
browser process running in the Protected Context. See Joshi, col. 34, ll. 14–
25. In other words, by implementing the ActiveX control or plugin from the
web browser process running in the Protected Context, Joshi’s first web
browser process, namely the software-based functionality associated with
creating an instance of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the
Protected Context, effectively passes data to the second protected web
browser process, namely the software-based functionality associated with
creating an instance of the Internet Explorer web browser running in the
Isolated Context.
Notably, claim 53 does not specify how the first web browser process
passes data to the second protected web browser process. Given this
limitation’s scope, breadth, and high level of generality, nothing in the claim
precludes Joshi’s first web browser process from passing data to the second
protected web browser process via an ActiveX control used by the first web
browser process. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 103–
09; Reply Br. 34–36) are unavailing and not commensurate with the scope of
the claim.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

33
We reach this conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that
ActiveX controls and plugins are programs or instances of code that are
separate from the Internet Explorer browser as Appellant and Dr. Dunsmore
indicate. See Appeal Br. 104–09; see also Reply Br. 34–36; 2d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 43–50, 124–131; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 28–32,
152–159. Although we appreciate Dr. Dunsmore’s insights in this regard,
the claim nevertheless does not preclude implementing an ActiveX control
or plugin from the web browser process running in the Protected Context to
pass data to a second protected web browser process associated with the
Isolated Context. See Joshi col. 34, ll. 18–29.
Accordingly, on the record before us, we see no error in the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions in connection with the obviousness
rejection of claim 53 over Joshi and Wolff.

Secondary Considerations
In determining obviousness of the claimed invention, objective
evidence of secondary considerations pertaining to nonobviousness must be
considered, including evidence of commercial success, long-felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, and copying. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135,
139 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1966)). “If rebuttal evidence of adequate weight is produced, the holding of
prima facie obviousness . . . is dissipated. Regardless of whether the prima
facie case could have been characterized as strong or weak, the examiner
must consider all of the evidence anew.” In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,
1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

34
Although evidence of secondary considerations must be considered
and “may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record,”
Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
it does not control the obviousness conclusion. Newell Cos., Inc., v. Kenney
Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Indeed, a strong case of
obviousness cannot be overcome by a far weaker showing of objective
indicia of nonobviousness. Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enter., Inc., 632 F.3d
1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Nevertheless, “[o]bjective indicia of nonobviousness play a critical
role in the obviousness analysis.” Leo Pharm. Products, Ltd. v. Rea, 726
F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). These indicia are not just a cumulative or
confirmatory part of the obviousness analysis, but rather constitute
independent evidence of nonobviousness that can be the most probative
evidence in that regard “in avoiding the trap of hindsight when reviewing,
what otherwise seems like, a combination of known elements.” Id.
Here, Appellant contends that there is evidence of secondary
considerations of non-obviousness, namely (1) commercial success;
(2) long-felt, but unmet, need; (3) the lack of independent and/or
simultaneous invention; (4) unexpected results; and (5) skepticism.7 Appeal
Br. 55–69; Reply Br. 31. We address each in turn.

7 Although Appellant omits skepticism from the particular secondary
considerations of non-obviousness enumerated in the bolded headings on
pages 55 to 69 of the Appeal Brief, Dr. Dunsmore and the Examiner
nonetheless address this additional consideration. See Dunsmore Decl.
¶¶ 57–58; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 90–91; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶¶ 112–113; see also Ans. 23. We, therefore, address this additional
consideration.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

35

Commercial Success
In connection with the proffered evidence of commercial success,
Appellant notes that the Requester’s commercially successful Chrome
browser was found to practice and infringe claim 49 of the ’529 patent.
Appeal Br. 56. According to Appellant, Dr. Dunsmore, and Dr. Rubin,
another technical expert, the ’529 patent’s key inventive concept is “per-
process sandboxing,” where a second web browser process within a secure
web browser process is “sandboxed” from the rest of the secure web browser
process. Appeal Br. 56 (citing 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 58, 61–69; 3d
Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 76, 79–87; Supplemental Declaration of Dr. Aviel
D. Rubin, Ph.D. In Support of Patent Owners’ Response to Second Non-
Final Office Action, dated May 30, 2019 (“Supp. Rubin Decl.”) ¶¶ 23–26,
30–33, 47–54). See also Supplemental Declaration Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132
of H.E. Dunsmore, Ph.D. In Support of Patent Owner’s Response to Final
Office Action, dated Oct. 1, 2018 (“Dunsmore Supp. Decl.”) ¶¶ 147–150.
Appellant indicates that in the underlying District Court litigation, the
Requester explained that the Chrome browser’s commercial success was due
to four aspects, namely (1) speed, (2) simplicity, (3) security, and (4)
stability, where each aspect contributed equally to Chrome’s commercial
success. Appeal Br. 56–57. Given this equal contribution, 25% of
Chrome’s success was therefore attributed to the browser’s security—a fact
consistent with the views of both Dr. Rubin and Mr. Walter Bratic who,
while not a technical expert, is a Certified Public Accountant and testified as
to Chrome’s developmental history and commercial success. See Appeal Br.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

36
57; see also Supp. Rubin Decl. ¶ 51; Declaration of Walter Bratic In Support
of Patent Owners’ Response to Second Non-Final Office Action, dated May
30, 2019 (“Bratic Decl.”) ¶¶ 4–5, 31. Despite his views on Chrome’s
developmental history and commercial success, Mr. Bratic nonetheless
admits that he is not a technical expert and, therefore, does not have an
ultimate opinion on whether the ’529 patent’s inventive aspects are a key
contributor to the Chrome browser’s security to establish a nexus between
the ’529 patent and Chrome’s commercial success. Bratic Decl. ¶ 4.
According to Appellant and Dr. Rubin, Chrome’s most important
security feature is the browser’s multi-process architecture where the second
web browser process is “sandboxed” from the first. Appeal Br. 57; Supp.
Rubin Decl. ¶ 52. Appellant contends that because (1) the ’529 patent’s
claims provide the key security feature for the Chrome browser, and (2) the
browser’s security is responsible for 25% of the browser’s commercial
success, there is a nexus between the infringing Chrome browser and the
inventive aspects of the ’529 patent claims. Appeal Br. 57.
But after considering this evidence along with other proffered
secondary considerations evidence, the Examiner concludes that the
evidence of non-obviousness does not outweigh the evidence of
obviousness. See Ans. 17–24. On this record, we see no error in that
determination.
We add that Appellant’s evidence does not pertain to its own
commercial success, but rather to that of another, namely Google. See
Appeal Br. 57. Accord Tr. 23 (conceding this point). Where, as here,
Appellant attributes its own commercial success to that of another, and
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

37
Appellant proffers no evidence showing its own commercial success apart
from that of another, the probative value of such evidence is diminished.
Although Appellant’s evidence regarding Google’s commercial success may
tangentially relate to Appellant’s claimed invention, its probative value is
nonetheless reduced and weighed accordingly when considering the totality
of evidence on this record.
This is not a case where another party deliberately copied Appellant’s
invention and profited from that malicious act. See 2d Supp. Dunsmore
Decl. ¶ 72 (acknowledging unawareness of evidence of direct copying of the
patented invention); 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 94 (same). Rather, this is a
case where the claimed invention’s purported commercial success is tied
solely to that of another—a fact that reduces the associated evidence’s
probative value.
In addition, it is well settled that a nexus must be shown between the
proffered evidence of commercial success and the claimed invention. Tokai,
632 F.3d at 1369. But if commercial success is due to an element in the
prior art, no nexus exists. Id.
So even assuming, without deciding, that Google’s commercially
successful Chrome browser has elements that are common to the claimed
invention as Appellant contends, at least some of those elements—including
those regarding security—were nonetheless known in the art as the
Examiner indicates, particularly given the claimed invention’s scope,
breadth, and high level of generality. See Ans. 18–19. Although we
appreciate Dr. Dunsmore’s insights (Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 38–45; Dunsmore
Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 147–150; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 71–78; 3d Supp.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

38
Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 93–100), as well as insights from Dr. Rubin (Supp.
Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 47–54) and Mr. Bratic (Bratic Decl. ¶¶ 7–31) regarding the
Chrome browser’s developmental history and commercial success, this
evidence nevertheless does not outweigh the evidence of obviousness on this
record.
For the reasons noted above, as well as those indicated by the
Examiner, we do not find the proffered evidence of commercial success,
considered with other proffered secondary considerations evidence of non-
obviousness, outweighs the evidence of obviousness on this record.

Long-Felt Need
We also see no error in the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s
evidence of a long-felt, but unmet, need for web browser security that drove
the Chrome browser’s development after the claimed invention’s effective
filing date, considered with other proffered secondary considerations
evidence of non-obviousness, does not outweigh the evidence of
obviousness. See Ans. 17–24.
To establish a long-felt need, three elements must be proven. First,
the need must have been a persistent one that was recognized by ordinarily
skilled artisans. In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538 (CCPA 1967). Second,
the long-felt need must not have been satisfied by another before Appellant’s
invention. See Newell, 864 F.2d at 768 (“[O]nce another supplied the key
element, there was no long-felt need or, indeed, a problem to be solved . . .
.”). Third, the invention must, in fact, satisfy the long-felt need. See In re
Cavanaugh, 436 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1971).
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

39
Here, Appellant contends that there was a long-felt, but unmet need
for web browser security that drove the Chrome browser’s development
after the claimed invention’s effective filing date. See Appeal Br. 63–65.
According to Appellant, proffered evidence, including Dr. Dunsmore’s
testimony and an internal Google memorandum, demonstrate a long-felt, but
unmet need for effective browser security that was purportedly solved by the
’529 patent. Appeal Br. 65.
Dr. Dunsmore explains that web browser security for a long time was
“very problematic” because no solution was good at protecting system files
from corruption by malicious content while simultaneously allowing for
efficient browser operation, and this long-felt, but unmet need drove Chrome
browser development. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 47; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶ 80; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 102. According to Dr. Dunsmore,
developing multi-process architectures with Google’s security sandboxing
features was beyond the grasp of Chrome’s developers several years after
the ’529 patent was filed. 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 81; 3d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 103. Dr. Dunsmore adds that Google acquired the
GreenBorder company to develop its Chrome security features. Dunsmore
Decl. ¶ 48; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 81; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 103.
Based on this history, Dr. Dunsmore concludes that Google’s
(1) inability to craft a solution, and (2) need to acquire a speciality group of
engineers to develop a viable security solution represents the difficulty of the
’529 patent’s claimed invention in 2006. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 48; 2d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 81; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 103. Dr. Dunsmore adds
that later development of browsers by Apple and Microsoft that “appear to”
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

40
incorporate the ’529 patent features similarly evidences the long-felt need
that was met by the ’529 patent’s claimed invention. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 49;
2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 82; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 104.
Given this testimony, there was apparently a persistent need for web
browser security that was recognized by ordinarily skilled artisans. See
Gershon, 372 F.2d at 538. But this long-felt need was satisfied by another
before Appellant’s invention. See Newell, 864 F.2d at 768 (“[O]nce another
supplied the key element, there was no long-felt need or, indeed, a problem
to be solved . . . .”). Given the scope and breadth of the problem, namely
web browser security, the need was satisfied by at least Joshi before
Appellant’s invention for the reasons noted previously. And to the extent
Appellant contends that this long-felt, but unmet need, must be limited to
“per-process sandboxing” to exclude other web browser security features
(see Appeal Br. 63–65), Appellant’s claimed invention is not only not
limited to that particular security feature, it was nonetheless in the prior art,
including Joshi, as noted previously and as the Examiner indicates. See Ans.
22.
Nevertheless, even if we were to accept Appellant’s contention that
Joshi did not satisfy the purported long-felt need—which we do not—it is
apparent from Dr. Dunsmore’s testimony that, if anything, it was Google
Chrome, and later, browsers from Microsoft and Apple, that satisfied that
need—not Appellant’s claimed invention. See Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 46–49;
see also Dunsmore Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 151–154; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶¶ 79–82; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 104. In short, this third-party
satisfaction reduces the probative value of Appellant’s evidence in this
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

41
regard. See Cavanaugh, 436 F.2d at 496 (“[E]ven if we accept that there
was a problem, it was still incumbent upon appellant, if he wished by this
method to rebut the inference of obviousness arising from the similarity of
his process to the prior art, to bring forward evidence of his satisfaction of
the need.”) (emphasis added). Where, as here, Appellant attributes its own
satisfaction of a long-felt need to that of another, and Appellant proffers no
evidence showing its own satisfaction of that need apart from that of
another, the probative value of such evidence is diminished. Although
Appellant’s evidence regarding Google’s satisfying a long-felt need may
tangentially relate to Appellant’s claimed invention, its probative value is
nonetheless reduced and weighed accordingly when considering the totality
of evidence on this record.
Therefore, on this record, we do not find the proffered evidence of a
long-felt, but unmet, need for web browser security, considered with other
proffered secondary considerations evidence of non-obviousness, outweighs
the evidence of obviousness.

Independent Development/Simultaneous Invention
We also see no error in the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s
evidence of the lack of independent and/or simultaneous invention,
considered with other proffered secondary considerations evidence of non-
obviousness, does not outweigh the evidence of obviousness. See Ans. 17–
24.
Dr. Dunsmore avers that Chrome’s development and Google’s effort
to patent aspects of the Chrome browser supports non-obviousness.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

42
Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 52; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 85; 3d Supp. Dunsmore
Decl. ¶ 107. According to Dr. Dunsmore, U.S. Patent 8,291,078 (“’078
patent”), assigned to Google, not only discloses and claims the same
limitations as those in the ’529 patent, but the ’078 patent’s four named
inventors are, or were, Google employees working on developing the
Chrome browser. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 52–53; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶¶ 85–86; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 107–108. Dr. Dunsmore avers that,
after the ’529 patent’s filing date, Google stated internally that multi-process
architecture was one of the key inventions in Chrome. Dunsmore Decl.
¶ 54; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 87; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 109. Dr.
Dunsmore acknowledges, however, that the ’078 patent8 is drawn only to
multi-process architecture—not security. Dunsmore Supp. Decl. ¶ 156.
The Examiner, however, not only finds that per-process sandboxing
was known in the art, including Joshi, but also distinguishes the ’078
patent’s disclosed and claimed invention from that of ’529 patent in various
key respects. See Ans. 22–23. Appellant does not persuasively rebut these
findings and conclusions.
On this record, we do not find the proffered evidence of the lack of
independent and/or simultaneous invention, considered with other proffered
secondary considerations evidence of non-obviousness, outweighs the
evidence of obviousness.

8 The ’078 patent is also referred to by its first-named inventor, Fisher. See
Final Act. 53. But see Dunsmore Supp. Decl. ¶ 156 (referring to “the
Fischer patent”). Because the ’078 patent identifies the first-named inventor
as Darrin Fisher, we presume Dr. Dunsmore’s spelling of “Fischer” refers to
this inventor and is, therefore, a typographical error.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

43

Unexpected Results
We also see no error in the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s
evidence of purportedly unexpected results, considered with other proffered
secondary considerations evidence of non-obviousness, does not outweigh
the evidence of obviousness. See Ans. 17–24.
We reach this conclusion acknowledging that non-obviousness can be
supported with unexpected results, namely where the claimed invention
exhibits some superior property or advantage that ordinarily skilled artisans
would have found surprising or unexpected. See Forest Labs., Inc. v.
Sigmapharm Labs., LLC, 918 F.3d 928, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1966)).
Here, Dr. Rubin avers that the state of the art in 2004 was sandboxing
the entire browser. Supp. Rubin Decl. ¶ 58. According to Dr. Dunsmore,
Google’s engineers characterized the state of the art as “two poles,” namely
total browser solutions and sandboxing explicit code, and the goal of
Google’s security teams was a solution between those “poles,” namely a per-
process sandboxed browser. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 56; 2d Supp. Dunsmore
Decl. ¶ 89; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 111. Dr. Dunsmore adds that by
separating the web browser into separate processes and sandboxing the
process that handles web content—a technique that is said to be “the heart of
the rejected claims”—the Chrome browser’s architecture was able to block
70% of the known critical browser vulnerabilities from executing arbitrary
code. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 56; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 89; 3d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 111. According to Dr. Dunsmore, this result is significant
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

44
and was not implemented by others until years after August 2004.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 56; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 89; 3d Supp. Dunsmore
Decl. ¶ 111.
The Examiner, however, did not find this evidence persuasive.
Notably, the Examiner found that the evidence failed to show that the results
noted by Appellant were unexpected, not only in view of the stated goal of
the Chrome browser’s engineering team, but also the fact that separating the
web browser into separate processes and sandboxing the process that
handles web content was known in the art. See Ans. 23. For the reasons
noted above and those indicated by the Examiner, Appellant does not
persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
We add that even if the results proffered by Appellant exhibited some
superior property or advantage that ordinarily skilled artisans would have
found surprising or unexpected—which they do not—Appellant’s evidence
does not pertain to its own purportedly unexpected results, but rather to
those of another, namely Google. See Appeal Br. 57. Where, as here,
Appellant attributes its own purportedly unexpected results to those of
another, and Appellant proffers no evidence showing its own unexpected
results apart from those of another, the probative value of such evidence is
diminished. Although Appellant’s evidence regarding Google’s allegedly
unexpected results may tangentially relate to Appellant’s claimed invention,
its probative value is nonetheless reduced and weighed accordingly when
considering the totality of evidence on this record.
On this record, we do not find the proffered evidence of the purported
unexpected results, considered with other proffered secondary
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

45
considerations evidence of non-obviousness, outweighs the evidence of
obviousness.

Skepticism
We also see no error in the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s
evidence of skepticism, considered with other proffered secondary
considerations evidence of non-obviousness, does not outweigh the evidence
of obviousness. See Ans. 17–24.
We reach this conclusion acknowledging that evidence of industry
skepticism weighs in favor of non-obviousness. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
829 F.3d 1317, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If industry participants or ordinarily
skilled artisans are skeptical about whether or how a problem could be
solved or the claimed solution’s workability, this skepticism favors non-
obviousness. Id. Moreover, ordinarily skilled artisans’ doubt or disbelief
regarding the likely success of a combination or solution weighs against
combining elements in references to achieve the claimed invention. Id.
Here, Dr. Dunsmore avers that Google’s internal documents
demonstrate the skepticism related to the ’529 patent’s claimed invention,
and show that most Google engineers did not view the claimed features as
obvious. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 58; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 91; 3d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 113.
The Examiner, however, found that the evidence did not show that
Google or others expressed disbelief with respect to the claimed invention.
Ans. 23 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 716.05
(9th ed. rev. 10.2019 June 2020)). Appellant does not squarely address—let
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

46
alone persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in this
regard.
On this record, we do not find the proffered evidence of Google’s
purported skepticism, considered with other proffered secondary
considerations evidence of non-obviousness, outweighs the evidence of
obviousness.

Obviousness Conclusion
Based on the record before us, we see no error in the Examiner’s
conclusion that the evidence of obviousness on this record outweighs the
evidence of non-obviousness when considered as a whole. Therefore, based
on the totality of the evidence before us, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 53 over Joshi and Wolff. Nor
are we persuaded of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
dependent claim 64 not argued separately with particularity.9

Claim 60
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 60 reciting the data
for display of website content is rendered using a video processor.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 131–33;
Reply Br. 39), Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s
findings at least to the extent that Joshi suggests a video processor in

9 Although Appellant nominally argues claim 64 separately, Appellant
reiterates arguments made for claim 53. See Appeal Br. 128–29. We,
therefore, group these claims accordingly.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

47
computer 10 that outputs data from the first and second web browser
processes to the computer’s display. See Final Act. 77; Ans. 45 (referring to
the response made in connection with claim 31 that recites similar video
processor limitations), 39–40.
As the ’529 patent explains, video processor 170 is used to (1) format
information for display, and (2) transmit the display information to video
display device 180 that user 160 views. ’529 patent col. 10, ll. 57–59; Fig.
1. Video processor 170 typically includes an associated video memory area
that may be dedicated to the processor or shared with other resources. Id.
col. 10, ll. 59–62. The video processor may not only be part of processor
120, but also can comprise a processor integrated circuit (IC) located on a
video graphics card communicatively coupled to a computer motherboard,
or even comprise circuitry on the motherboard itself. Id. col. 10, l. 64 – col.
11, l. 1. Moreover, the video processor’s functions can be split between the
processor, motherboard, or separate graphics card. Id. col. 11, ll. 2–4.
Given this functionality, Joshi at least suggests rendering data for
display of website content using a video processor as claimed. First, Joshi is
replete with references to displaying website content for viewing that
content visually. See, e.g., Joshi col. 35, ll. 6–9 (noting that security is
achieved by running part of the user interface that displays insecure content,
and indicate visually the untrusted portions); id. col. 34, ll. 33–36
(“Effectively what the security solution has done is overlaid the area of the
web browser that used to contain external or untrusted content, with a
window that runs in the Isolated Context and is able to display web
content.”) (emphasis added); claim 27 (reciting simultaneously displaying
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

48
content executed in restricted and local environments); Fig. 10 (noting that
after launching Internet Explorer in step 1010, a page is displayed in the
Isolated Context in step 1040).
Notably, Joshi’s computer 10 on which the website content is viewed
is shown with a monitor and screen in Figure 1—a depiction strikingly
similar to video display 180 shown in Figure 1 of the ’529 patent. Given
this monitor’s visual display of the computer’s output and its depiction in
Figure 1, ordinarily skilled artisans would understand that Joshi’s monitor is
a video monitor, or that such a monitor would have been at least an obvious
variation. This understanding is consistent with the plain meaning of the
term “display” in the art, namely “[t]he visual output device of a computer,
which is commonly a [cathode-ray tube] CRT-based video display.”
Display, Microsoft Computer Dictionary, at 166 (emphasis added).
Given Joshi’s suggestion of using a video display monitor to display
website content, Joshi likewise at least suggests rendering data associated
with that content using a video processor as claimed. We reach this
conclusion noting that the recited video processor need not be a standalone
processor located on a dedicated graphics card, but can rather be circuitry on
the computer’s motherboard. See ’529 patent col. 10, l. 57 – col. 11, l. 4.
Although Joshi does not detail computer 10’s internal circuitry or display
functionality, ordinarily skilled artisans would nevertheless understand that
displaying website content on that computer’s video monitor would involve
rendering data associated with content using a video processor as claimed, or
that such a rendering would have been at least an obvious variation. We
reach this conclusion noting that prior art references, such as Joshi, do not
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

49
have to explain every detail to render a claimed invention obvious because
the references speak to those skilled in the art. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 60.

Claim 61
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 61 reciting, in
pertinent part, upon closing the second protected web browser process,
deleting at least one file selected from the group consisting of (1) a
temporary internet file; (2) a cookie; and (3) a file corrupted by malware.
Our emphasis underscores a key temporal element, namely that the file is
deleted upon closing the second protected web browser process.
The Examiner finds that Joshi’s Isolated Context uses copies of files
needed to execute the second web browser process, and ordinarily skilled
artisans would conclude that these files and the environment’s virtualized
view are no longer needed when the second web browser process is
terminated. Final Act. 77–78 (citing Joshi col. 17, ll. 37–55). The Examiner
also finds that Wolff deletes files automatically when malicious content is
detected. Final Act. 78 (citing Wolff ¶¶ 24, 29). The Examiner then
concludes that given Joshi’s and Wolff’s collective teachings, an ordinarily
skilled artisan would have been prompted to delete the files in the Isolated
Context and remove malicious content when the second web browser
process is terminated. See Final Act. 78; Ans. 43–45.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

50
But as Appellant indicates, the Examiner’s rejection presupposes that
ordinarily skilled artisans would be prompted to remove potentially
malicious content from Joshi’s Isolated Context upon closing the second
Internet Explorer instance—an unsubstantiated assumption. See Appeal Br.
126–28; Reply Br. 39.10 We reach this conclusion despite Wolff’s system
deleting malicious content automatically in paragraphs 24 and 29, for this
deletion occurs upon detecting malicious content—not upon closing a
protected web browser process as claimed. Accord Appeal Br. 126–27; 2d
Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 211; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 215 (noting this
point).
Dr. Dunsmore avers that it would be “counter-intuitive” to delete
Joshi’s virtualized resources automatically every time Internet Explorer was
closed in the Isolated Context, and reload those same resources when
Internet Explorer is opened again. 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 210; 3d
Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 214. According to Dr. Dunsmore, automatically
deleting and reloading virtualized resources under the Examiner’s proposed
combination would ostensibly “grind the user’s web browser experience to a
halt” every time the user changed contexts between trusted and untrusted
web content. 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 210; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶ 214.
Although we appreciate Dr. Dunsmore’s insights in this regard, there
is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate the purported

10 Because the limitations of claim 61 are commensurate with those in claim
27, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions are similar with respect to
those claims’ particular limitations, Appellant’s arguments regarding claim
27 are relevant to claim 61.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

51
deleterious slowdowns caused by deleting and reloading virtualized
resources under the proposed combination, let alone corroborate that theory.
Accordingly, the probative value of Dr. Dunsmore’s opinion regarding these
purported deleterious effects on the user’s “web browser experience” is
diminished.
But what we can say is that there is no persuasive evidence on this
record substantiating the Examiner’s finding that Joshi and Wolff
collectively would have taught or suggested deleting a file corrupted by
malware automatically upon closing the second protected web browser
process as claimed. Our emphasis underscores that the Examiner relies
solely on the third type of file in the recited group, namely a file corrupted
by malware, in concluding the recited deletion would have been obvious.
See Final Act. 77–78; Ans. 43–45.
Although we find problematic the Examiner’s conclusion that deleting
a file corrupted by malware automatically upon closing the second protected
web browser process would have been obvious over Joshi and Wolff, the
same cannot be said for other files in the group, namely cookies and
temporary internet files. Indeed, the very nature of temporary files,
including temporary internet files, is that they are temporary: they are used
only when needed, and deleted when not needed.
A noted computer dictionary defines the term “temporary file,” in
pertinent part, as “[a] disk file written by an application program while it is
running, to hold some of its working data, but which is automatically deleted
when the application terminates.” Temporary File, Dick Pountain, THE
PENGUIN CONCISE DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 441 (2003) (emphasis added;
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

52
internal annotations omitted). Another computer dictionary defines the term
“temporary file” similarly as “[a] file created by an executing program to
store working or intermediate data, such as the information required to
reconstruct previous document states when the Undo command is chosen.”
Temporary File, Bryan Pfaffenberger, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COMPUTER
DICTIONARY 369–70 (10th ed. 2003). Notably, that dictionary adds that
“[n]ormally, these files are deleted when the application is closed, but some
applications are not well-mannered in this respect.” Id. at 369 (emphasis
added).
Our emphasis underscores that temporary files, including temporary
internet files, are (1) created by an executing program or application; (2)
used only when needed; and (3) deleted automatically when the associated
application terminates. Indeed, the same can be said for cookies, for they,
too, are temporary files that are deleted automatically upon closing an
associated application, namely a web browser. See Wiley EE Dictionary, at
780 (defining “temporary cookie” as “[a] cookie that is deleted or otherwise
disappears when a Web browser is closed, or after a comparatively short
time”) (emphasis added).
Given this well-known web browser deletion functionality, Joshi at
least suggests deleting a file, namely a temporary internet file or a cookie,
automatically upon closing the second protected web browser process,
namely Internet Explorer in the Isolated Context. See Joshi col. 33, l. 5 –
col. 34, l. 41. In short, the recited temporary internet file or cookie deletion
would have been at least an obvious variation given the known file deletion
functionality of Joshi’s Internet Explorer web browser.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

53
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner to the extent that the claimed
invention would have been obvious, but for different reasons. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 61. But because
our determination changes the thrust of the Examiner’s rejection, we
designate our affirmance of the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of this
claim as a new ground of rejection. See In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302–
03 (CCPA 1976).

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER JOSHI, WOLFF, AND
HASBUN (“GROUND 10”)

We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 63 reciting executing
instructions from the first web browser process and second protected web
browser process on first and second cores, respectively, of a multi-core
processor.
Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 133–37,
140–41; Reply Br. 40–41),11 Appellant does not persuasively rebut the
Examiner’s reliance on Joshi, Wolff, and Hasbun for collectively at least
suggesting the recited limitations. See Final Act. 83–85; Ans. 45–49.
According to Appellant, if an ordinarily skilled artisan were to start
with Joshi’s web browser processes, there would ostensibly be no motivation
to look to prior art that applies to operating system (OS) and OS control
(scheduler) processes, such as those in Hasbun. Appeal Br. 137. Appellant

11 Because the limitations of claim 63 are commensurate with those in claim
30, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions are similar with respect to
those claims’ particular limitations, Appellant’s arguments regarding claim
30 are relevant to claim 63.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

54
adds that ordinarily skilled artisans would not reasonably expect success in
applying Hasbun’s OS-specific disclosure with Joshi’s web browser-specific
application as the Examiner proposes. Id.
But as the Examiner indicates, Hasbun’s distinction between trusted
and untrusted processes is reasonably analogous to Joshi’s distinction
between trusted and untrusted content, where trusted content is executed in a
trusted environment, namely the Protected Context, and untrusted content is
executed in an untrusted environment, namely the Isolated Context. Ans. 47
(citing Joshi col. 14, ll. 54–58; col. 35, ll. 36–39; Hasbun ¶¶ 4–5, 12).
Therefore, implementing Joshi’s trusted and untrusted execution
environments on respective cores of a multi-core processor as the Examiner
proposes has a rational basis on this record, particularly given Hasbun’s
teaching of executing distinct sets of processes in different domains in
different processing cores 200a and 200b, respectively. See Hasbun
Abstract; ¶¶ 16, 21–22; 34–35; Figs. 1, 3.
We reach this conclusion noting, as does the Examiner (Ans. 47–48),
that nothing in Hasbun limits its core-based execution to solely OS-based
processes to preclude its application to trusted and untrusted web browser
processes as Appellant seemingly suggests. See Appeal Br. 134–37. Rather,
the Examiner’s proposed combination uses prior art elements predictably
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Moreover, where, as
here, (1) a technique, such as executing different processes on respective
cores of a multi-core processor, has been used to improve one device, such
as that in Hasbun; and (2) an ordinarily skilled artisan would recognize that
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

55
it would improve similar devices, such as those in Joshi that execute distinct
web browser processes, in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. See KSR, 550 U.S. at
417. There is no persuasive evidence on this record proving that applying a
multi-core processing technique, such as that in Hasbun, to Joshi’s system as
the Examiner proposes would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise
beyond the level of ordinarily skilled artisans.
We reach this conclusion despite Dr. Dunsmore’s view that ordinarily
skilled artisans would have no motivation to combine Hasbun and Joshi. See
2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 240; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 238.
According to Dr. Dunsmore, Hasbun does not split applications like Internet
Explorer into separate OS processes, nor does Hasbun refer to using more
than one processor for parallel execution to increase speed or efficiency
despite the Examiner’s statements to the contrary. 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶¶ 240–241; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 238–239. Dr. Dunsmore further
avers that adding multi-core processing does not necessarily improve
efficiency, but in some environments, can actually slow a program down
when the program is broken up into individual processes for simultaneous
execution. 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶ 241; 3d Supp. Dunsmore Decl.
¶ 239.
Although we appreciate Dr. Dunsmore’s insights in this regard, the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding the proposed combination
are not persuasively rebutted for the reasons noted previously. On this
record, the Examiner’s proposed combination uses prior art elements
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

56
predictably according to their established functions—an obvious
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 63.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER JOSHI, WOLFF, AND
JACOBS (“GROUND 9”)

We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 65 reciting an
intelligent cellular telephone with a built-in secure web browser. Despite
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 120–22, 139–40; Reply
Br. 40),12 Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on
Joshi, Wolff, and Jacobs for collectively at least suggesting the recited
limitations. See Final Act. 82–83; Ans. 41–43.
Appellant contends that Jacobs’ “single comment” in paragraph 30
that advertising-supported email software can be operated on intelligent
cellular telephones with built-in web browsers does not motivate ordinarily
skilled artisans to combine Jacobs with Joshi as the Examiner proposes.
Appeal Br. 121. According to Appellant, not only were the Windows and
MacOS operating systems on which Jacobs and Joshi rely unavailable on
cellular telephones in 2004, Joshi’s two web browser programs are not a

12 Because the limitations of claim 65 are commensurate with those in claim
35, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions are similar with respect to
those claims’ particular limitations, Appellant’s arguments regarding claim
35 are relevant to claim 65.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

57
single secure web browser including two web browser processes. Appeal
Br. 121–22.
Dr. Dunsmore likewise avers that ordinarily skilled artisans would
not—and indeed could not—combine the teachings of Joshi and Jacobs
because (1) Jacobs is non-analogous art; and (2) the Windows and MacOS
operating systems on which Jacobs and Joshi rely were unavailable on
cellular telephones in 2004. 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 198–199; 3d
Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 202–203.
Although we appreciate Dr. Dunsmore’s insights in this regard, the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding the proposed combination
are not persuasively rebutted on this record. First, prior art is analogous if it
is (1) from the same field of endeavor regardless of the problem addressed,
or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor
is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here,
Jacobs is at least reasonably pertinent to Appellant’s problem, at least with
respect to displaying content on an intelligent cellular telephone with a built-
in secure web browser. See Jacobs ¶ 30. That Jacobs’ paragraph 30 states
explicitly that a client device can be an intelligent cellular telephone with a
built-in secure web browser only underscores its pertinence to Appellant’s
problem in this regard.
In addition, although Appellant and Dr. Dunsmore emphasize
Jacobs’s email software in connection with Jacobs’s alleged shortcomings
(see Appeal Br. 121; 2d Supp. Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 198–199; 3d Supp.
Dunsmore Decl. ¶¶ 202–203), Jacobs’ paragraph 30 refers to email messages
as exemplary primary content delivered to client devices by using the term
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

58
“e.g.,” thus underscoring that email is merely one example of content
delivered to those devices with web browsers.
Nevertheless, even assuming, without deciding, that the Windows and
MacOS operating systems were unavailable on cellular telephones in 2004
as Appellant and Dr. Dunsmore indicate, that does not mean that these
operating systems were necessarily unavailable as of either Joshi’s, Wolff’s,
or Jacobs’s presumed effective filing dates that are before 2004.
But leaving this inconsistency aside, the Examiner’s rejection is not
based on bodily incorporating Jacobs into Joshi, nor is it premised on
physically substituting Jacobs’ intelligent cellular telephone for Joshi’s
computer 10. See Ans. 41–42. Rather, the Examiner’s rejection is based on
what the cited references collectively would have suggested to ordinarily
skilled artisans. See id.
On this record, we see no error in the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions in this regard, for it is well settled that “a determination of
obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an
actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nor is the test for obviousness
whether a secondary reference’s features can be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). Rather, as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 41), the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art. Id.
Nor is there persuasive evidence on this record proving that
displaying web content on an intelligent cellular telephone, such as that in
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

59
Jacobs, would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level
of ordinarily skilled artisans. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Notably, Appellant does not
squarely address—let alone persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s reliance on
Hasbun for evidencing that implementing first and second web browser
processes as in Joshi on a personal computer 10 or a intelligent cellular
telephone as in Jacobs would have been within the level of ordinary skill in
the art. See Ans. 42. Although Hasbun was not cited in the rejection, we
nonetheless see no error in the Examiner’s relying on its teachings merely
for this limited evidentiary purpose—a limited evidentiary reliance that is
not squarely addressed, let alone persuasively rebutted.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 65, and claims 57–59 not argued separately with particularity.

THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION (“GROUND 12”)
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 60
over Joshi, Wolff, and McCrory. Final Act. 86. Despite nominally arguing
this rejection separately, Appellant reiterates similar arguments made in
connection with claims 30 and 53, and alleges that the additional cited
references fail to cure those purported deficiencies. See Appeal Br. 142–43;
Reply Br. 41. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons
previously discussed.

Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

60
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 21, 25–27, 29–36, 40–44,
46–53, 57–61, and 63–65 is affirmed in part. We designate our affirmance
of the Examiner’s rejection of claim 61 as a new ground of rejection.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
21, 31,
36, 47,
48, 50
102 Joshi 21, 31,
36, 47,
48, 50

34, 51 103 Joshi 34, 51
25, 26,
35, 40–
42, 52
103 Joshi, Jacobs 25, 26,
35, 40–
42, 52

27, 29,
32, 33,
43, 46,
53, 60,
61, 64
103 Joshi, Wolff 53, 60,
61, 64
27, 29,
32, 33,
43, 46
61
30, 49 103 Joshi, Hasbun 30, 49
44 103 Joshi, Angelo 44
57–59,
65
103 Joshi, Wolff,
Jacobs
57–59, 65
63 103 Joshi, Wolff,
Hasbun
63
31, 50 103 Joshi, McCrory 31, 50
60 103 Joshi, Wolff,
McCrory
60
Overall
Outcome
53, 57–
61, 63–65
21, 25–
27, 29–
36, 40–
44, 46–52
61
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

61

REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME
Requests for extensions of time in this ex parte reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

NEW GROUND OF REJECTION
This Decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides:

When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within
two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following
two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination
of the appeal as to the rejected claims:

(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the
claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or
both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the
prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection
is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not
previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner,
overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should
the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board
pursuant to this subpart.

(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under
§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must
address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points
believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new
ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is
sought.
Appeal 2021-003751
Reexamination Control 90/013,969
Patent US RE43,529 E

62
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.

AFFIRMED IN PART
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

For Appellant:

BOISBRUN HOFMAN, PLLC
1255 West 15th Street, Ste. 400
Plano, TX 75075

For Third Party Requester:

FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
GARRETT & DUNNER LLP
901 New York Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001-4413