MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 19, 2020

2019006681 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/308,400 06/18/2014 Paul Michael MUSSER 37537.0018U2- 2663
126944 7590 11/19/2020
MasterCard
c/o Ballard Spahr LLP
999 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600
Atlanta, GA 30309-4421
EXAMINER
KWONG, CHO YIU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspatentmail@ballardspahr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PAUL MICHAEL MUSSER and DAVID AARON LASKIN
Appeal 2019-006681
Application 14/308,400
Technology Center 3600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We refer to the Specification, filed June 18, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action, mailed October 5, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed April 2,
2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 11, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and Reply Brief, filed September 9, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Mastercard
International, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a multi-party transaction payment network
bridge. Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below with formatting altered and
bracketed labels added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
[(a)] receiving transaction data associated with a payment
card transaction, wherein the transaction data comprises
[(i)] a cardholder identifier,
[(ii)] a merchant identifier,
[(iii)] a transaction type identifier, and
[(iv)] a transaction amount;
[(b)] determining, based on the transaction data, that the
cardholder identifier matches any one of a plurality of non-
governmental organization (NGO) network cardholder
identifiers;
[(c)] determining, based on the transaction data, that the
merchant identifier matches any one of a plurality of interbank
network merchant identifiers;
[(d)] responsive to determining that the cardholder
identifier matches a NGO network cardholder identifier and the
merchant identifier matches an interbank network merchant
identifier, determining that the payment card transaction is a
cross-network transaction;
[(e)] responsive to determining that the payment card
transaction is a cross-network transaction, selecting one or more
cross-network interface rules from a rules database, wherein the
one or more cross-network interface rules are selected based at
least on
[(i)] the cardholder identifier,
[(ii)] the merchant identifier and
[(iii)] the transaction type identifier;
[(f)] determining whether the payment card transaction is
approved or denied based on the one or more cross-network
interface rules and at least one of:
[(i)] the transaction amount
[(ii)] the merchant identifier, the cardholder identifier,
or
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[(iii)] the transaction type identifier; and
[(g)] transmitting, to an interbank network acquirer
associated with the merchant identifier, an indication of
whether the payment card transaction is approved or declined.
REJECTION
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract
idea) without significantly more. Final Act. 2–5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
OPINION

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Examiner’s Determinations
The Examiner determines:
As a whole, the claimed invention processes transaction
between financial networks based on preset rules. Thus,
[claims] 1–20 [are] directed to processing transaction between
financial networks based on preset rules. Processing
transaction between financial networks based on preset rules is
an idea of itself similar to the concepts that have been identified
as abstract by the courts, such as mitigating settlement risk in
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Alice Corp.[3] and hedging in Bilski[4] both for the similar
endeavor of conducting transaction.
Final Act. 3. The Examiner further determines
The independent and dependent claim(s) does/do not include
additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception because claims do not include
an improvement to another technology or technical field, an
improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, or
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an
abstract idea to a particular technological environment. The
recited additional elements when considered both individually
and as an ordered combination do not amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea.
Id. The Examiner finds the claimed steps are performed by generic
computer components including a processor, network interface, and storage
medium implementing functionalities that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional to the industry. Id. at 3–4 (citing Symantec,5 Flook,6 Bancorp,7
M.P.E.P. § 2106.05(d), and the USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum).
Appellant presents various arguments. Appeal Br. 5–16. We address
these arguments individually in the Analysis section, below.

3 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
4 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
5 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward
information).
6 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978));
7 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Principles of Law
A. SECTION 101
Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter.
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–
77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski, 561
U.S. at 611 (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic
concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Flook, 437 U.S. at 594–95); and mental processes
(Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be
patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding
rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
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(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing
Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October 2019
Guidance Update”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance
Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the
availability of the October 2019 Guidance Update). “All USPTO personnel
are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the
guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019
Guidance Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites
the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

Analysis
STEP 2A, PRONG 1
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54.
Limitation (a) recites “receiving transaction data associated with a
payment card transaction, wherein the transaction data comprises [(i)] a
cardholder identifier, [(ii)] a merchant identifier, [(iii)] a transaction type
identifier, and [(iv)] a transaction amount.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim App’x.
Appellant’s Specification indicates that the receiving step of limitation (a)
entails data gathering:
Initially, at block 4010, payment network bridge 3000 receives
a cross network transaction. The cross network transaction may
be initially received by the network interface 3300, which
forwards the transaction to either the payment network
processing engine 3112 or NGO network processing engine
3114, as is appropriate. The cross network transaction data
includes: a cardholder identifier (which may be a Primary
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Account Number (PAN) or other unique payment card
identifier), a merchant identifier, an issuer identifier, an
identifier for the type of transaction taking place (a transaction
type identifier), and a transaction amount.
Spec. ¶ 44. Appellant does not describe the cross network transaction other
than by its information content, i.e., the types of transaction information
contained in the data rather than technical details concerning how the
transaction information is represented by the data or the structure of the data.
Receiving transaction data associated with a payment card transaction
is a “fundamental economic practice,” which is included in the abstract idea
grouping: “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.” 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Moreover, receiving transaction data to
process a payment card transaction constitutes a “commercial or legal
interaction (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations;
advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations),”
which also is included in the abstract idea grouping: “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity.” Id. Furthermore, gathering or receiving data
constitutes a mental process, e.g., a mental observation. The 2019 Guidance
further recognizes mental processes, including observations, as constituting
a patent-ineligible abstract idea.8 Id. Accordingly, limitation (a) recites an
abstract idea.

8 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “An abstract
idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction .... The
Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the
patentability analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract
ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC
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Limitation (b) recites “determining, based on the transaction data, that
the cardholder identifier matches any one of a plurality of non-governmental
organization (NGO) network cardholder identifiers.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim
App’x. Appellant’s Specification describes a “[c]omparison between the
cardholder identifier (or issuer identifier) and the merchant identifier allows
payment network bridge 3000 to determine that the transaction is a cross
network transaction.” Spec. ¶ 45.
Determining how to communicate with parties to a transaction
including whether those parties are on a particular network (e.g., an NGO) is
a business sales activity performed as part of a financial transaction that
reasonably constitutes a commercial or legal interaction included in the
abstract idea grouping of certain methods of organizing human activity.
Furthermore, determining a match between a received identifier and an
identifier associated with a particular group (e.g., known NGO network
cardholder identifiers) reasonably is characterized as a mental observation

v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one
abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim
non-abstract.”); see also Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d
1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were
directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Thus, the patentability analysis
in this Appeal does not turn on exactly how various limitations are
characterized as being abstract, i.e., as either an abstract “mathematical
concepts,” “mental processes,” or “certain methods of organizing human
activity.” For example, in the alternative to being characterized as
commercial or legal interactions that are certain methods of organizing
human activities, limitations (a) through (g) also can be considered to be
observations, evaluations, judgments, and/or opinions, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind considered to be mental processes. However,
the end result remains the same in this Appeal--the claims as a whole still
recite an abstract idea.
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that can be performed in the human mind as a mental process. The
2019 Guidance recognizes organizing human activity and mental processes
as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52. Accordingly, limitation (b) recites an abstract idea.
Limitation (c) recites “determining, based on the transaction data, that
the merchant identifier matches any one of a plurality of interbank network
merchant identifiers.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim App’x. Appellant’s
Specification discloses this determination is made on the same basis as the
determination that the card holder identifier matches an NGO network
cardholder identifier as recited by limitation (b) discussed above.
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above in connection with
limitation (b), limitation (c) likewise recites an abstract idea. 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Limitation (d) recites “responsive to determining that the cardholder
identifier matches a NGO network cardholder identifier and the merchant
identifier matches an interbank network merchant identifier, determining
that the payment card transaction is a cross-network transaction.” Appeal
Br. 18, Claim App’x. Determining that two parties to a transaction are
reachable on different networks (i.e., the transaction is a [a]cross-
network[s]) reasonably constitutes a business sales activity performed as part
of a financial transaction. Such activity is a commercial or legal interaction
included in the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of organizing
human activity. Furthermore, reaching a conclusion based on the
satisfaction of a set of conditions (i.e., the affirmative results of the
determinations of limitations (b) and (c)) is a concept that can be performed
in the human mind. e.g., a mental observation or evaluation. The 2019
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Guidance recognizes both certain methods of organizing human activity and
mental processes as constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, limitation (d) recites an abstract
idea.
Limitation (e) recites “responsive to determining that the payment
card transaction is a cross-network transaction, selecting one or more cross-
network interface rules from a rules database, wherein the one or more
cross-network interface rules are selected based at least on [(i)] the
cardholder identifier, [(ii)] the merchant identifier[,] and [(iii)] the
transaction type identifier.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim App’x. Appellant’s
Specification does not provide details about making the selection.
Nevertheless, selecting rules applicable to approving a transaction is a
business sales activity performed as part of a financial transaction that
reasonably constitutes a commercial or legal interaction included in the
abstract idea grouping of certain methods of organizing human activity.
Furthermore, selecting rules governing a particular situation is a concept that
can be performed in the human mind, i.e., a mental process such as an
observation or evaluation. The 2019 Guidance recognizes certain methods
of organizing human activity and mental processes as constituting patent-
ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly,
limitation (e) recites an abstract idea.
Limitation (f) recites “determining whether the payment card
transaction is approved or denied based on the one or more cross-network
interface rules and at least one of: [(i)] the transaction amount, [(ii)] the
merchant identifier, the cardholder identifier, or [(iii)] the transaction type
identifier.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim App’x. Appellant’s Specification
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indicates that the determining step of limitation (f) encompasses “whether
the transaction complies with NGO payment network interface rules” such
as a transaction amount, the parties involved in the transaction, and
purchase, geographic and time restrictions, and limitations. Spec. ¶ 47.
Determining that a transaction request complies with rules for completing
the transaction is a business sales activity performed as part of a financial
transaction. Such activity reasonably constitutes a commercial or legal
interaction included in the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of
organizing human activity. Furthermore, observing or evaluating whether a
request satisfies one or more rules is a concept that can be performed in the
human mind, e.g., a mental observation. The 2019 Guidance recognizes
certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes as
constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. Accordingly, limitation (f) recites an abstract idea.
Limitation (g) recites “transmitting, to an interbank network acquirer
associated with the merchant identifier, an indication of whether the
payment card transaction is approved or declined.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim
App’x. Providing the results of a transaction authorization check to a
requestor is a business sales activity performed as part of a financial
transaction. Such activity reasonably constitutes a commercial or legal
interaction included in the abstract idea grouping of certain methods of
organizing human activity. Furthermore, transmitting data also constitutes a
mental process. More specifically, transmitting data constitutes expressing
an opinion that is recognized as a mental process. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52. The 2019 Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing
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human activity and mental processes as constituting patent-ineligible
abstract ideas. Id. Accordingly, limitation (f) recites an abstract idea.
In addition to determining that each of the claimed limitations recites
an abstract idea, we note that our reviewing court has found claims to be
abstract ideas when they recited similar subject matter. Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(processing of payments is a fundamental economic practice); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (tracking financial transactions); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (processing financial transactions through a
clearinghouse); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir.
2016). See also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873
F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (verifying payment information, as well as
“financial transactions . . . and data collection related to such transactions”
“are directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one.”); buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Claims reciting
sending and receiving communications over a computer network to facilitate
online commercial transactions are directed to “contractual relations, which
are intangible entities” and “constitute[] ‘a fundamental economic practice
long prevalent in our system of commerce.”’).
For the reasons discussed above, each of limitations (a) through (g)
recites one or more judicial exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter
under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance. See RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d
at 1327 (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not
render the claim non-abstract.”)
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STEP 2A, PRONG 2
Under step 2A, prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance, we next analyze
whether independent claims 1, 8, and 15 recite additional elements that
individually or in combination integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–55. The
2019 Guidance identifies considerations indicative of whether an additional
element or combination of elements integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application, such as an additional element reflecting an
improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other
technology or technical field. Id. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Addressing receiving limitation (a) and transmitting limitation (g),
even if we were to interpret these limitations narrowly such that the
transaction and indication of whether the payment card transaction is
approved or declined exist in an electronic format and are received and
transmitted by a computer on an electronic data network, these limitations
still would not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application.
Even under such a narrow interpretation, the steps of limitations (a) and (g)
merely would constitute insignificant extra-solution activity, i.e., pre-
solution and post-solution activities.
An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data
for use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining
information about credit card transactions, which is recited as
part of a claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the
gathered information by a series of steps in order to detect
whether the transactions were fraudulent.
MPEP § 2106.05(g). As such, even if we consider limitation (a) as reciting
an additional element under prong 2 rather than an abstract idea under prong
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1, that limitation at most recites the insignificant extra-solution activity of
gathering data.
Similarly, limitation (g) additionally can be characterized as merely
being directed to the insignificant extra-solution activity of transmitting data.
In particular, communicating or transmitting information is insignificant
post-solution activity. 2019 Guidance 55 n.31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g);
buySAFE, Inc., 765 F.3d at 1355 (computer receives and sends information
over a network). As such, even if we consider it as an additional element
under prong 2 rather than as reciting an abstract idea under prong 1,
limitation (g) recites at most the insignificant extra-solution activity of
transmitting data.
Claim 1 impliedly recites elements corresponding to the computing
and communication elements of apparatus claims 8 and/or Beauregard-type
claim 15. See Final Act. 3–5; Ans. 6–7. For purposes of this analysis, we
address whether additional elements, including (1) first network interface
receiving transaction data, (2) a processor configured to perform steps of
limitations (b) through (f), (3) a second network interface transmitting an
indication that the transaction is approved or declined per limitation (g),
(claim 8) and, in the case of claim 15, (4) a non-transitory computer-
readable storage, individually or in combination, integrate the judicial
exceptions identified above into a practical application.
In connection with the processor and network interfaces, we agree
with the Examiner in finding the Specification describes these elements at a
high-level of generality as a generic processor or computer and as network
interfaces performing the steps identified above in prong 1 of our analysis.
See Final Act. 3; Ans. 7, see also Spec. ¶ 40 (describing the processing and
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networking “structures may be implemented as hardware, firmware, or
software encoded on a non-transitory computer readable medium, such as
storage media. Further details of these components are described with their
relation to method embodiments.” (Emphasis added)). Furthermore,
Appellant’s Specification discloses “[p]rocessor 3100 may be any central
processing unit, microprocessor, micro-controller, computational device or
circuit known in the art. It is understood that processor 3100 may
communicate with and temporarily store information in Random Access
Memory (RAM).” Spec. ¶ 28. Although further naming some functions that
are provided by the processor including, for example, a payment purchase
engine, (Spec. ¶ 29), little detail is provided of what these functions are or
how the corresponding functionalities are provided. Likewise, little detail is
provided about how payment network processing engine 3112 or NGO
network processing engine operate. See Spec. ¶¶ 30–32.
Addressing these additional elements, the Examiner finds, and we
agree,
The processor and network interface [used in performing the
claimed steps are] recited at a high-level of generality (i.e., as a
generic computer components performing steps of the recited
abstract idea) such that it amounts no more than mere
instruction to apply the exception using a generic computer
component. . . . Mere instruction to apply an exception using a
generic computer cannot provide an inventive concept. Such
additional elements are determined to not contain an inventive
concept according to MPEP 2106.05(f). It should be noted that
(1) the “recitation of claim limitations that attempt to cover any
solution to an identified problem with no restriction on how the
result is accomplished and no description of the mechanism for
accomplishing the result, does not provide significantly more
because this type of recitation is equivalent to the words ‘apply
it’”, and (2) “use of a computer or other machinery in its
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ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks ( e.g., to receive,
store, or transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose
computer or computer components after the fact to an abstract
idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or mathematical
equation) does not provide significantly more”. (See MPEP
2106.05 (f)) Thus, the combination of the additional elements in
the claims do not apply the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception.
Ans. 7.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the “elements of
claim 1 clearly set forth how a cross-network transaction is processed, rather
than merely claiming at a high level all methods of processing transactions
writ large.” Appeal Br. 9. We find insufficient evidence that, in approving a
transaction involving different networks, the claims require the additional
elements function other than as required by the steps determined to
constitute the underlying abstract concepts. For example, Appellant does
not provide sufficient persuasive evidence that the claims address any
technical problem or provide an improvement in processing transactions
across networks. That is, other than specifying the processing of a payment
card transaction from a NGO network involving a merchant on an interbank
network, Appellant does not explain why integrating or coordinating
transaction processing using two networks involves any technical problem or
solution other than having two network interfaces and routing data
accordingly.
Although Appellant argues “The problem the claims seek to address is
indeed a technical problem, because existing methods of processing cross-
network transactions involving NGO-issued payment cards (e.g., for use on
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a closed-loop network) require a separate payment network and separate
point of sale system to interface with the NGO system/network” (Appeal
Br. 10) Appellant does not explain what technical problem is involved or
what solution is implemented by the claims. Instead, we agree with the
Examiner in finding Appellant fails to explain how cross-network
interfacing affects the functionality of the processor or network interfaces.
See Ans. 4, 8–9.
We also are unpersuaded by Appellant’s reliance on and citations to
prior cases determining claims involving financial transactions recited
patent-eligible subject matter. In particular, we find unpersuasive
Appellant’s contention that the recited steps for approving a transaction
involving an NGO-issued payment card and a traditional payment network
are analogous to additional elements of Smith9 that integrated a recited
judicial exception into a practical application (Appeal Br. 12). Although not
binding authority, Smith is an informative decision that provides instructive
guidance and Board norms on patent eligibility issues. See PTAB Standard
Operating Procedure 2, Rev. 10 § III, at 11.10 In Smith, however, the
claimed timing mechanisms and associated temporary restraints on
execution of trades were the additional elements that provided a specific
technological improvement over prior derivative trading systems. See Smith,
2019 WL 764497, at *5. That is not the case here.
The only additional elements beyond the abstract idea recited by
Appellant’s claims are the at most implied (claim 1) or recited (claim 8)

9 Ex parte Smith, Appeal 2018-000064, 2019 WL 764497 (PTAB Feb. 1,
2019) (informative).
10 This document is available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf (last visited May 21, 2019).
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processor and network interfaces or storage media (claim 15). For the
reasons discussed herein, these additional elements, when considered
individually and as an ordered combination, do not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application consistent with the USPTO’s Guidance. See
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (instructing the Examiner to (1)
identify whether there are any additional elements in the claim beyond the
judicial exception; and (2) evaluate those additional elements individually
and collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application)
To the extent Appellant contends that the recited claim elements of a
“‘cross-network transaction;’ the ‘one or more cross-network interface
rules;’ and the recitation of ‘determining whether the payment card
transaction is approved or denied based on the one or more cross-network
interface rules and at least one of: the transaction amount, the merchant
identifier, the cardholder identifier, or the transaction type identifier’” are
additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical application
(see Appeal Br. 12), we disagree. Rather, those claim elements are part of
the abstract idea of processing a transaction between financial networks
based on present rules. See Final Act. 3. Even applying Appellant’s
description of the claims as “directed to a payment network bridge that
facilitates the processing of a ‘cross-network transaction’ on a traditional
payment network by using, for example, ‘cross-network interface rules’”
(Appeal Br. 7–8), for the reasons discussed above, selecting rules as recited
by claim limitation (e) is part of the abstract concept, not an additional
element. Therefore, Appellant’s reliance on Smith is not germane to our
decision and is, therefore, unpersuasive.
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Appellant’s reliance on Finjan11 (Appeal Br. 12–13) is also
unpersuasive. The question in Finjan was “whether [the claimed] behavior-
based virus scan . . . constitutes an improvement in computer functionality.”
Finjan, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1304. The court noted that “[i]n Enfish, for
instance, the court determined that claims related to a database architecture
that used a new, self-referential logical table were non-abstract because they
focused on ‘an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on
economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary
capacity.”’ Id. at 1304–05 (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, as discussed above, Appellant does not
persuasively argue how the claimed method improves computer
functionality.
Similarly, the reasons claim 1 in McRO was found patent-eligible do
not apply to Appellant’s claims. “The claimed improvement [in McRO] was
to how the physical display operated (to produce better quality images),
unlike (what is present here) a claimed improvement in [an associating]
technique with no improved display mechanism.” SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In other words, in
McRO, data was used to improve the technology, i.e., the display
mechanism. Here, although claim 1 recites selecting one or more cross-
network interface rules in determining whether to approve or deny a
transaction, we determine that selecting and applying rules are abstract
concepts for the reasons discussed above under prong 1 of analysis of
limitations (e) and (f), not additional elements. Here, the additional
elements are the processor, network interface, and storage media, none of

11 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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which is shown to have improved operation by virtue of the recited method
steps.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant does not persuade us that
claims 1, 8, and 15 are directed to an improvement in the function of a
computer or to any other technology or technical field. MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Nor does Appellant persuasively demonstrate that these claims are directed
to a particular machine or transformation, or that the claims add any other
meaningful limitations for the purposes of the analysis under Section 101.
MPEP §§ 2106.05(b), (c), (e). Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us
that claims 1, 8, and 15 30 integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical
application within the meaning of the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
STEP 2B
Under the 2019 Guidance, only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
The Examiner finds
[The additional] limitations . . . are [performed] by the
generically recited computer, network interface, processor and
storage medium. [These] limitations are merely instructions to
implement the abstract idea on a computer and require no more
than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions
including receiving data over a network ([r]eceiving or
transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to
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gather data, Symantec), transmitting data ([r]eceiving or
transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to
gather data, Symantec) and calculate[ing] a score ([p]erforming
repetitive calculations, Flook. . . (recomputing or readjusting
alarm limit values); Bancorp. These generic computer functions
are factually determined to be well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry as
referenced by MPEP 2106.05(d) II according the USPTO
[Berkheimer] Memorandum.
Final Act. 4.
Appellant contends the claims are patent-eligible because “as
evidenced by the Office Action’s withdrawal of the rejections under
35 U.S.C. § 103, the claims recite specific, unconventional elements that are
not widely prevalent or practiced in the art.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant
argues the additional claim elements “confine the present claims to a
particular useful application (e.g., enabling a payment network to facilitate
cross-network transactions between a closed-loop NGO network and a
traditional interbank network).” Id. Appellant further argues the recitation
of “the ‘cross-network transaction;’ the use of the ‘one or more cross-
network interface rules;’ and the recitation of ‘determining whether the
payment card transaction is approved or denied based on the one or more
cross-network interface rules and at least one of: the transaction amount, the
merchant identifier, the cardholder identifier, or the transaction type
identifier’” have not been shown to be and are not well-understood, routine,
conventional claim elements. Id. (citing Berkheimer12 and Ex parte Poisson,
Appeal No. 2012-011084 (PTAB Feb. 26, 2015)).

12 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner
error. In particular, we are unpersuaded the claims are patent-eligible
merely because the rejection under 35 U.S. 103 has been withdrawn and no
prior art rejection is pending. “It has been clear since Alice that a claimed
invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply
the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than
that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “What is needed is an inventive concept in the non-
abstract application realm.” SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1168. A novel and
nonobvious abstract idea is still patent ineligible. Synopsys, 839 F.3d at
1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”).
We agree with the Examiner that all claim elements, with the
exception of the recited processor, network interfaces, and a storage medium
(i.e., a memory device), correspond to concepts determined to be abstract
ideas for the reasons discussed above in connection with Prong 1 of our
analysis. These abstract concepts need not be shown to be well-understood,
routine, and conventional. If otherwise, our analysis would need to include
evidence that the entirety of the claimed subject matter was, not merely old
and obvious (as required of rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103), but
well-understood, routine, and conventional to sustain a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101. This is not the case.
Similarly, Berkheimer does not require the Examiner make a factual
finding that all claim elements are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. Rather, a Berkheimer factual finding is required for additional
elements or a combination of additional elements outside of the identified
abstract idea. See Berkheimer Memo 2 (“the Berkheimer decision . . . does
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provide clarification as to the inquiry into whether an additional element (or
combination of additional elements) represents well-understood, routine,
conventional activity”).
Appellant provides insufficient evidence that the computer
components (i.e., processor, network interfaces, and storage medium) and
functionalities required to execute the claimed steps are anything other than
well-understood, routine, and conventional. Instead, Appellant’s disclosure
of a wide range of suitable processors13 and network interfaces14 combined
with the lack of details describing the non-transitory computer-readable
storage medium of claim 15 and absence of implementation details of the
recited functions (such as might have been indicated by inclusion of a
detailed flow chart depicting unconventional computer operations and/or
routines for performing each of the claimed steps), persuades us that the
omitted details are well-understood, routine, and conventional. See
Berkheimer Memo at 3 (explaining that a specification that describes
additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements
are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe
the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331

13 See. e.g., Spec. ¶ 28 (“Processor 3100 may be any central processing unit,
microprocessor, micro-controller, computational device or circuit known in
the art.”).
14 See., e.g., Spec. ¶ 37 (“Network interface 3300 may be any data port as is
known in the art for interfacing, communicating or transferring data across a
computer network, examples of such networks include Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), Ethernet, Fiber Distributed Data
Interface FDDI), token bus, or token ring networks.”).
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(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in
implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component
(software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the
abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
Consistent with the Berkheimer Memorandum, the claims merely
recite generic computer components (e.g., computer devices having
processors, network interfaces, and storage) performing generic computing
functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional (e.g., receiving
an input from a network, determining, from the data, it is from a source on
one network requiring services on another network, applying rules for
processing the data, and transmitting a result on the other network), See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (the “use of a computer to obtain data, adjust account
balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions
are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to
the industry”) (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71–73); see
also Benson, 409 U.S. at 65 (noting that a “computer operates then upon
both new and previously stored data. The general-purpose computer is
designed to perform operations under many different programs.”);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (noting that using generic computing components like a
microprocessor or user interface does not transform an otherwise abstract
idea into eligible subject matter); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan
Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (indicating
components such as an “interface” are generic computer components that do
not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)
(citing Alice and Mayo); accord Berkheimer Memo 3–4. Thus, Appellant’s
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reliance on Berkheimer is misplaced. Accordingly, for the reasons
discussed, we find that the structure and functioning of the additional
elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we determine that claims 1, 8, and
15 do not recite additional elements that, either individually or as an ordered
combination, amount to significantly more than the judicial exception within
the meaning of the 2019 Revised Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(d).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 8, and 15 together with the rejection of dependent claims 2–7, 9–
14, and 16–20, which are not argued separately with particularity.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without
significantly more.
In summary:

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
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AFFIRMED