MasterCard International Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 17, 2020

2020003790 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/259,767 09/08/2016 Srinivasa WUDARU 0076412-000610 4624
125578 7590 11/17/2020
MASTERCARD
C/O Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC
P.O. Box 1404
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
CHAKRAVARTI, ARUNAVA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ADIPDOC1@BIPC.com
charles.wieland@bipc.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SRINIVASA WUDARU

Appeal 2020-003790
Application 15/259,767
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and
RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious
and under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject the claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as MasterCard
International Incorporated. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims stand rejected by the Examiner in the Final Office Action
as follows:
1. Claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in view of
Matthews et al. (US 2007/0083444 A1, published Apr. 12, 2007)
(“Matthews”) and Tichelaer et al. (US 2010/0288834 A1, published Nov.
18, 2010) (“Tichelaer”). Final Act. 7.
2. Claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention
is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Final Act. 2.
There are two independent claims on appeal, claims 1 and 11. Claim 1
is directed to a method and claim 11 is directed to a system for carrying out
substantially the same method as recited in claim 1. Claim 1 is
representative and reproduced below (the claim is annotated with bracketed
numbers for reference):
1. A method for automatic generation and usage of a controlled
payment number
(CPN) in a web browsing environment, comprising:
[1] storing, in a memory of a computing device, an
account data entry, wherein the account data entry includes a
structured data set related to a transaction account including at
least an account identifier associated therewith;
[2] receiving, by a receiving device of the computing
device, a first data signal superimposed with web page data
originating from a first computing system, wherein the web
page data includes data related to a web site including at least a
form having a plurality of input fields including a field
associated with a primary account number and additional web
page code;
[3] receiving, by an input device of the computing
device, an instruction for automatic generation of a CPN for use
with the website;
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[4] in response to receiving the instruction, extracting, by
an analytic module of the computing device, at least a
transaction amount from the additional web page code included
in the web page data;
[5] generating, by a processing device of the computing
device, a request for the CPN including at least the account
identifier and the transaction amount extracted from the
additional web page code;
[6] electronically transmitting, by a transmitting device
of the computing device, a second data signal superimposed
with at least the CPN request to a second computing system;
[7] receiving, by the receiving device of the computing
device, a third data signal superimposed with payment data
from the second computing system, wherein the payment data
includes at least a generated CPN, the generated CPN being (i)
linked to the transaction account associated with the account
identifier included in the request and (ii) subject to one or more
transaction controls including a spending limit based on the
extracted transaction amount; and
[8] inputting, by a data supply module of the computing
device, the generated CPN, received from the second
computing system, into the field associated with a primary
account number included in the form included in the web page
data.
CLAIM 1
Claim 1 recites a method of payment accomplished on a webpage
using a controlled payment number (“CPN”). The Specification discloses
that a CPN is a payment number associated with a payment account that is
subject to one or more rules, “such as spending limits, limits on days and/or
times of a transaction, limits on merchants or industries, transaction
spending or frequency limits, etc.” Spec. ¶ 22. The Specification lists patent
and application numbers which describe “[a]dditional detail regarding
controlled payment numbers.” Id.
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The method starts with storing an account identifier in the memory of
a computing device (step [1]). The computing device “may be any type of
computing device suitable for performing the functions” recited in the claim,
“such as a desktop computer, laptop computer, notebook computer, tablet
computer, cellular phone, smart phone, smart watch, wearable computing
device, implantable computing device, etc.” Spec. ¶ 24.
The computing device receives a webpage associated with a website
that includes input fields (step [2]). One of the input fields is for a primary
account number. The webpage is from a “first computing system.” The first
computing system can be a merchant system (Spec. ¶ 58) from which the
user will purchase a good or service using the CPN (Spec. ¶ 20).
The computing device receives from an input device “an instruction
for automatic generation of a CPN for use with the website” (step [3]). We
interpret the instruction to be from a user who is using the input device to
instruct the computing device to automatically generate the CPN2 that is
used to purchase a good or service from the merchant. When the user inputs
the instruction, the computing device extracts the “transaction amount” (i.e.,
the payment amount) from the webpage (step [4]) and generates the request
for the CPN (step [5]). The request includes the user account identifier and
the transaction amount extracted from the merchant’s webpage.

2 “The input devices 210 may be configured to receive input from a user of
the computing device 102, such as the consumer 104, which may be
provided to another module or engine of the processing server 102 (e.g., via
the communication module 204) for processing accordingly.” Spec. ¶ 44. “In
step 316, the input device 210 of the computing device 102 may receive
input from the user (e.g., the consumer 104) indicating that a controlled
payment number is desired for the payment transaction.” Spec. ¶ 53.
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The request is transmitted to a second computing system (step [6]).
The second computing system can be a card issuer system associated with a
financial institution that issues the CPN, such as a bank. Spec. ¶¶ 27, 59. The
request for the CPN and the transmission of the request to the issuer is
accomplished automatically upon the device receiving the input instruction
from the user.
The CPN is received by the second computing system as a part of the
“payment data” in step [7] of the claim and then the CPN is inputted into the
field of the webpage for the primary account number (step [8]), which
completes the payment transaction.

OBVIOUS REJECTION BASED ON MATTHEWS AND TICHAELAER
The Examiner found that Matthews describes all the steps of the
claimed method, including a request for a secondary transaction number
(“STN”), which corresponds to the claimed CPN. Final Act. 8–9. The
Examiner further cited Tichelaer for expressly disclosing a CPN. Final Act.
9. The Examiner determined it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art to use a CPN in Matthews’s method to process chargebacks
by the issuer of the controlled payment number. Final Act. 9–10.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in making the rejection.
Appellant states that, in Matthews, the user logs on to the card provider’s
website, and after authentication, the card provider issues an STN which is
distributed to the user. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant distinguishes Matthews
from the claimed method because the “claim removes any requirement of the
user to leave a merchant’s website in order to request a CPN,” while
Matthews requires the user to leave the merchant’s website to access the
card provider’s website to request the STN. Id. at 18 (referring to step [3] of
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the claim). Appellant also states that the merchant applies the limited
conditions to the STN, while in the claim, the transaction amount is
extracted from the merchant webpage in step [4] and used as the basis for
the transaction controls applied to the CPN. Appellant explains that, as a
result, “the CPN is specific to the currently pending transaction and
restricted to the current transaction amount without requiring user input of
transaction controls,” a limitation not described by Matthews. Id.
The Examiner entirely relied on Matthews for describing steps [3]–[5]
of claim 1, specifically citing paragraphs 38, 46, 48, 51, 53, 57, 140, and 143
of Matthews to meet these limitations. Final Act. 8; Ans. 17–19. Paragraph
48 of Matthews discloses that the cardholder registers for the card provider’s
transaction services, and then the card provider generates an STN and issues
it to the cardholder. Paragraph 57 of Matthews discloses that the cardholder
logs in to the card provider’s web site:
The cardholder 1 is hyperlinked (manually or automatically) to
a card provider’s web site to log in 130 (FIG. 5), which resides
on and is managed by the card provider’s user interface system
4 (e.g., web server), and, upon logging in, obtains a STN 15
that may then be “cut and pasted,” “dragged and dropped” (or
alternatively, automatically filled by the card provider 3 or
downloaded from a digital wallet) into the payment fields 144,
146, 148 (FIG. 7) on the payment web page 2b.
Paragraph 58 of Matthews further describes authenticating the
cardholder during the log-in process and receiving the request for the STN.
Thus, as argued by Appellant, Matthews teaches that the user logs on to the
card provider’s website to obtain the STN.
The Specification specifically distinguishes the type of transaction
described by Matthews: “For example, in many cases a consumer may have
to obtain the controlled payment number before navigating to the merchant
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web site, or must leave the merchant web site to obtain a controlled payment
number, which may be inconvenient and time–consuming for the
consumer.” Spec. ¶ 4. Matthew, like the prior art described in the
Specification, requires the consumer to log-on to the card provider’s website
to generate the STN. Matthew ¶¶ 12, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61. In contrast, the
request to generate the CPN in claim 1 is accomplished automatically in
steps [3]–[6] of claim 1 upon receipt of an instruction by a user.
In response to Appellant’s argument that step [3] of claim 1 is not
described by Matthews, the Examiner stated that an STN is generated upon
request by a cardholder, but does not explain how Matthews meets or
suggests the additional limitation that the STN (or CPN) is automatically
generated without logging into the card provider’s website as in step [3] of
clam 1. Ans. 18.
The Examiner cited paragraphs 140 and 143 of Matthews for
extraction of the transaction amount from the webpage. Final Act. 8.
Paragraphs 140 and 143 refer to reconciliation of transaction data of the
issuer/card provider after a transaction has taken place. See Appeal Br. 19–
20. The Examiner did not adequately explain the relevance of this disclosure
to the extraction of data from a web page as required by step [5] of the
claim.
The Examiner further cited disclosure in Matthews from paragraph 51
that “a merchant’s request for settlement, i.e., to be paid for a transaction,
the financial capture (FINCAP) 10 system receives and captures the
financial information (e.g., transaction amount, date, merchant identification
(SE) number, STN 15, etc.).” However, the capture of the transaction
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amount takes place after the transaction amount and therefore does not
disclose or suggest step [5] of claim 1.
“An examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case
of obviousness.” In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
2011). The Examiner did not meet the burden of establishing that the cited
publications describe or suggest automatic generation of a CPN number and
extraction of a transaction amount from a web page as recited in steps [3]
and [4]. All the rejected claims require these steps. Consequently, the
obviousness rejection of claims 1–20 based on Matthews and Tichelaer is
reversed.

REJECTION BASED ON 101
Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
However, not every discovery is eligible for patent protection. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). “Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. The Supreme
Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether a claim falls
within an excluded category of invention. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012).
In the first step, it is determined “whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If
it is determined that the claims are directed to an ineligible concept, then the
second step of the two-part analysis is applied in which it is asked “[w]hat
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else is there in the claims before us?” Id. (alteration in original). The Court
explained that this step involves
a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (citing from Mayo, 566
U.S. at 75–77).
Alice, relying on the analysis in Mayo of a claim directed to a law of
nature, stated that in the second part of the analysis, “the elements of each
claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” must be
considered “to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–76).
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Eligibility Guidance”). This guidance provides additional direction on how
to implement the two-part analysis of Mayo and Alice.
Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance, looks at the specific
limitations in the claim to determine whether the claim recites a judicial
exception to patent eligibility. In Step 2A, Prong Two, the claims are
examined to identify whether there are additional elements in the claims that
integrate the exception in a practical application, namely, is there a
“meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed.
Reg. 54 (Prong Two).
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If the claim recites a judicial exception that is not integrated into a
practical application, then as in the Mayo/Alice framework, Step 2B of the
Eligibility Guidance instructs us to determine whether there is a claimed
“inventive concept” to ensure that the claims define an invention that is
significantly more than the ineligible concept itself. 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
With these guiding principles in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the claimed subject matter in this appeal is eligible for patent
protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Discussion
Claim 1 is directed to a “method.” A “method” is a “process,” one of
the broad statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Because the claim falls into one of the statutory categories of
patent-eligible subject matter, following the first step of the Mayo/Alice
analysis, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong One
In Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance, the specific
limitations in the claim are examined to determine whether the claim recites
a judicial exception to patent eligibility, namely whether the claim recites an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon.
The Examiner found that the claimed method of extracting transaction
amounts from a webpage (step [2] of claim 1), requesting and receiving
payment data including a CPN (steps [3]–[7]), and inputting the CPN into a
field for a primary account number (step [8]) is a method of organizing
human activity, which is one of the categories of abstract ideas listed in the
Eligibility Guidance. Final Act. 4–5.
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Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in this determination.
Appellant argues that the claim does not fall into any of the specifically
enumerated activities listed in the Eligibility Guidance. Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant also argues that human activity is not involved in automatically
generating the CPN, but instead all the steps are automatic. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred. The claimed method involves a consumer making a payment on a
merchant webpage using a CPN obtained from a financial institution. The
method, as claimed, is therefore sales activity because making a payment for
goods or services involves the sale of the goods or services. See Spec. ¶¶ 20,
58 (supra at 4). “Sales activities” are specifically listed in the Eligibility
Guidance as a method of organizing human activity. 84 Eligibility Guidance
52. In Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017), a method of processing a payment for purchases of
goods from a seller was determined to be a patent-ineligible fundamental
business practice. While a human is involved only in the step of inputting
the instruction to generate the CPN, with the other steps being performed on
a computer, business transactions accomplished on a computer do not
transform an abstract idea into one that is patent-eligible. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at
2352; Inventor Holdings, 876 F.3d at 139. Accordingly, we conclude that
Examiner properly found that the claims recite a method of organizing
human activity, and therefore proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, of the
Eligibility Guidance.

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Step 2A, Prong Two
Prong Two of Step 2A under the 2019 Eligibility Guidance asks
whether there are additional elements that integrate the exception into a
practical application. As explained in the Mayo/Alice framework, we must
look at the claim elements individually and “as an ordered combination” to
determine whether the additional elements integrate the recited abstract idea
into a practical application. Integration into a practical application is
evaluated by identifying whether there are additional elements individually,
and in combination, which go beyond the judicial exception. Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. The October 2019 Update to Subject Matter
Eligibility further explains that “the specification should be evaluated to
determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing
an improvement.” PEG Update 12.3
The Specification states that controlled payment numbers are helpful
to consumers for making purchases, but can be inconvenient and time-
consuming because the consumer “may have to obtain the controlled
payment number before navigating to the merchant web site, or must leave
the merchant web site to obtain a controlled payment number.” Spec. ¶ 4.
The Specification also states that the consumer may not be certain of the
eventual amount of the transaction and may overestimate it, leaving an
amount open that could be compromised, or underestimate the amount,
requiring the consumer “to go back to the provider to modify the limits on

3 Available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df (last accessed July 3, 2020) (“PEG Update”).
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their new controlled payment number in order to be able to conduct the
transaction.” Id. In view of these problems, the Specification states “there is
a need for a technical solution where controlled payment numbers may be
automatically generated at a computing device during the initiation of a
payment transaction that are limited to aspects of the specific transaction for
which they are generated.” Spec. ¶ 5.
The solution described by the Specification is embodied in step [3] of
claim 1 in which an instruction from the consumer to generate a CPN is
received by the computing device which results in the automatic extraction
of the transaction amount from the webpage (step [4]) and the transmission
of a request for a CPN from a payment number issuer. The request includes
the transaction amount (step [5]) to ensure that the CPN is in the exact
amount required to complete the payment transaction.
Appellant argues that these steps of the claim place meaningful
limitations on the “alleged” abstract idea of consumer payment transactions
and integrate the alleged exception into a practical application. Appeal Br.
12; Reply Br. 9. Appellant specifically describes the improvement as the
automatic generation of the CPN and the extraction of the payment
information from the webpage, which facilitate the user’s receipt of the CPN
without leaving the merchant webpage, as well as having the CPN amount
limited to the specific payment transaction. Appeal Br. 12–13.
The concept embodied in steps [3]–[5] of claim 1 is sending an
instruction to the computing device to generate a CPN which results in
extracting the transaction amount from the webpage and then transmitting
this in a request to a computing system, such as an issuer of a CPN. We
consider these steps to be part of the abstract idea of the claim because they
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are involved in the processing of the payment. Requesting a CPN number for
a certain value is acknowledged in the Specification to be a conventional
step in payment transactions. Spec. ¶¶ 1–4. While Appellant has provided
evidence that the steps provide an improvement to the conventional system
in which a CPN is used to make a payment, not every improvement is
sufficient to confer eligibility on the claims. As explained in McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the
“abstract idea exception has been applied to prevent patenting of claims that
abstractly cover results where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery
the result is accomplished.’ [O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113, (1853)]; see
also Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. McRO stated that
therefore, a court must “look to whether the claims in these patents focus on
a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are
instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely
invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314.
Further, as discussed in Dropbox, Inc. et al. v. Synchronism
Technologies, Inc., 815 Fed. Appx. 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020):
The patent has to describe how to solve the problem in a
manner that encompasses something more than the “principle in
the abstract.” See [ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920
F.3d 759, 769 (Fed. Circ. 2019)] (explaining that an invention
may not be patent eligible if the “claims ‘were drafted in such a
result-oriented way that they amounted to encompassing the
‘principle in the abstract’ no matter how implemented’”
(quoting Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018))); see also Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys.,
Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A] result, even an
innovative result, is not itself patentable.”).
Dropbox at 533.
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In this case, the claim steps do not recite how the CPN is
automatically generated, how the transaction amount is extracted, or how the
request is transmitted to the second computing system. The steps are recited
in a “result-oriented way.” Steps [3], [4] and [5] of the claim state the result
which is desired, but not how the result is accomplished. The Specification
discloses generally that the computing device in configured to perform the
claimed functions, but not specifically how. Spec. ¶ 40. In the section of the
Specification titled: “Process for Generation and Usage of a Controlled
Payment Number,” the Specification discloses that “the request may be
submitted via an application program associated with the issuer system 110
used to supply the controlled payment” or in “other embodiments, the
request may be submitted via a plug-in or other modification of the web
browsing application program.” Spec ¶ 53. But neither of these disclosures
explain in any detail how to specifically implement the method.
Because the claim covers steps which are not limited in any
meaningful way as to how they are implemented, we concluded that the
claim encompasses the principle of the payment transaction in the abstract
and therefore are not integrated into a practical application.

Step 2B
Because we determined that the judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B of the Eligibility
Guidance, which asks whether there is an inventive concept. In making this
Step 2B determination, we must consider whether there are specific
limitations or elements recited in the claim “that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
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inventive concept may be present” or whether the claim “simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.” Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56 (footnote omitted). We must also consider
whether the combination of steps perform “in an unconventional way and
therefore include an ‘inventive step,’ rendering the claim eligible at Step
2B.” Id. In this part of the analysis, we consider “the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine “whether
the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
As explained above, the receipt of the instruction to automatically
generate a CPN and extract the transaction amount from the merchant’s
webpage to generate the CPN request as recited in steps [3]–[5] of the claim
are described in the Specification as an improvement to a conventional
system using a CPN. However, the steps of the claim are not recited with
adequate specificity to be more than the abstract idea, itself. The inventive
step cannot reside in the abstract idea, itself. As held in Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 591 (1978) “[t]he process itself, not merely the [abstract idea],
must be new and useful.”
Appellant argues that the extraction of the transaction amount from
the webpage in step [4] is an additional element, which in combination with
the other limitations in the claim are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional activity, and therefore provide the inventive concept under
Step 2B. Appeal Br. 14. Appellant points to paragraphs 7, 8, 55, and 60 of
the Specification for how the transaction is accomplished. Appeal Br. 5. We
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have reviewed these disclosures and do not find that they disclose the
specific way in which the transaction information is extracted. The data
extraction method, itself, therefore appears to be conventional. Likewise, the
Specification describes software available at the time of the invention for
how the request for a CPN is submitted. Spec. ¶ 53.
While there may be an improvement recited in the claim, the
improvement is to the abstract idea and is implemented using well-
understood, routine, or conventional activity. Thus, after considering the
steps of the claim as an ordered combination, we conclude that claim 1 is
direct to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 2–20 recite
the same limitations and are unpatentable under § 101 for the same reasons.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 103 Matthews,
Tichelaer
1–20
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED