MasterCard International Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 20, 2020

14812222 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/812,222 07/29/2015 Mark AQUILINA 0076412-000383 1568
125578 7590 07/20/2020
MASTERCARD
C/O Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC
P.O. Box 1404
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
BRIDGES, CHRISTOPHER
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ADIPDOC1@BIPC.com
charles.wieland@bipc.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MARK AQUILINA, AVIVA KLEIN, and ALAN BUCKLAND
____________

Appeal 2020-000321
Application 14/812,222
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–11, and 13–18, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. 2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Mastercard International Incorporated. Appeal Br. 2.

2 Claims 3 and 12 have been canceled.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s Specification is directed to “the processing of fleet
transactions, specifically a next generation network for processing fleet
transactions for both open loop and closed loop issuers that simplifies the
communications required by both fleet merchants and the issuers.” Spec.
¶ 1. According to Appellant, fleet cards are traditionally issued by closed
loop issuers, in contrast with open loop issuers that allow transactions by
different issuers. See Spec. ¶ 2. Appellant further describes a fleet
transaction as one performed using a type of payment card known as a fleet
card that is used for transportation related expenses, such as those issued for
the purchase of fuel. See Spec. ¶ 21.
Exemplary claim 1 under appeal reads as follows;
1. A method for processing a fleet card transaction,
comprising:
storing, in a merchant file database, a plurality of
merchant profiles, wherein each merchant profile includes at
least a merchant identifier and at least one loop type identifier;
storing, in a fleet file database, a plurality of fleet
profiles, wherein each fleet profile includes at least an issuer
identifier;
receiving, by a receiving device and from a merchant
device, an authorization request for a payment transaction
transmitted through a payment network, wherein the
authorization request is formatted according to at least one
standard governing the interchange of transaction messages and
includes transaction data including at least a merchant identifier
and a payment card identifier;
identifying, by a processing device, the loop type
identifier corresponding to the received transaction data based
on the included merchant identifier;
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identifying, by the processing device, a fleet profile that
includes an issuer identifier based on the received payment card
identifier;
determining, by the processing device, whether to update
the authorization request based upon the identified fleet profile;
determining, by the processing device, whether to route
the authorization request to one of a closed loop network and an
open loop network based upon the loop type identifier
corresponding to the received transaction data; and
transmitting, by a transmitting device, the authorization
request to a third party entity using the closed loop network or
the open loop network based on the routing determination.
Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1, 2, 4–11, and 13–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 2–8.

ANALYSIS
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Arguments Appellant could have
made, but chose not to make, are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner determines the claims are directed to “a process for
routing a request for a payment transaction authorization which is a
fundamental economic practice and method of human activity similar to
financial transactions between people such as creating contractual
relationships (see buySAFE),3 hedging (see Bilski),4 and mitigating

3 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
4 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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settlement risk (see Alice).”5 Final Act. 3. The Examiner finds the recited
process in independent claim 1 is similar to the concepts held to be abstract
in FairWarning.6 Final Act. 4. The Examiner also finds that the claimed
process is performed using “generic computing elements including data
bases, a receiving device, a merchant device, a processing device suitably
programmed and a transmitting device,” which “do not offer substantially
more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken
alone.” Final Act. 5–6. Furthermore, according to the Examiner, “the
elements involved in the recited process undertake their roles in performance
of their activities according to their generic functionalities which are well-
understood, routine and conventional.” Final Act. 6.
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. See USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under
that guidance (“Step 2A”), the office first looks to whether the claim recites:
(1) Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08. 2017, Jan. 2018)).

5 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
6 FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then (pursuant to
the Guidance “Step 2B”) look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
Appellant identifies, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)
cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). After considering the
argued claims in light of the case law presented in this Appeal and each of
Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in
error. We adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own, to the
extent consistent with our analysis herein. We add the following primarily
for emphasis and clarification with respect to the Guidance.
I. Step 2A
Appellant asserts the claims are directed to “a more intelligent
transaction routing system that improves on problems of traditional fleet
transaction processing networks in a detailed and technical way” and
“routing an authorization request as opposed to requesting the authorization
itself (which persons having ordinary skill in the art readily understand to be
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performed by merchants or associated entities.” Appeal Br. 6–7. Appellant
argues the claims “are directed to a technological improvement to
transaction processing networks that constitutes significantly more than an
abstract idea, as is consistent with court decisions, such as those in Enfish
and DDR Holdings and USPTO guidelines regarding the same.” Appeal Br.
7. Referring to the disclosed fleet transactions being conducted on “closed
loop networks” and “open loop networks,” Appellant argues the claimed
invention solves the problem of different systems by “routing of payment
transactions of both kinds such that a merchant can accept every type of fleet
transaction without requiring specialized on-boarding.” Appeal Br. 8–9.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Prong One
Pursuant to the Guidance, we agree with the Examiner that the claims
are directed to “a process for routing a request for a payment transaction
authorization which is a fundamental economic practice and method of
human activity similar to financial transactions between people such as
creating contractual relationships (see buySAFE),7 hedging (see Bilski),8 and
mitigating settlement risk (see Alice).”9 Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 3–4.
These functions relate to “commercial or legal interaction (including
agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations)” and
“managing personal behavior, relationships and interactions between people
(including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions),”

7 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
8 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
9 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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which are considered “certain methods of organizing human activity.” See
Spec. ¶¶ 6–7, 23–29; see also Guidance, Section III (A)(l) (Prong One:
Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception), 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. Claim 1 recited a series of steps related to “a method for processing a
fleet card transaction” and, therefore, is a process. Specifically, claim 1
recites steps of “storing, . . ., a plurality of merchant profiles,” “storing, . . .,
a plurality of fleet profiles,” “receiving, . . ., an authorization request for a
payment transaction,” “determining, . . ., whether to route the authorization
request to one of a closed loop network and an open loop network,” and
“transmitting, . . ., the authorization request to a third party entity.” See
Claim App. These limitations are classified by the Guidance as steps of
“sales activities or behaviors[,] business relations[,] . . . and following rules
or instructions,” which are “fundamental economic principles or practices,”
“commercial or legal interactions,” and “managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Pursuant to the Guidance, such limitations are the abstract concept of
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.” Id.
As for receiving an authorization, identifying the loop type identifier
and a fleet profile, determining whether to update and route the authorization
request, these limitations also recite mental processes. See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 (listing “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” as
one of the “enumerated groupings of abstract ideas” (footnote omitted)).
The written description describes these limitations similar to the function of
thinking and comparing in the human mind, see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 46, 64–66
(identifying a fleet card issuer, the loop type, determining a transaction
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amount, and updating the request with the new amount), but does not limit
the claimed functions to a particular mathematical function or algorithm.
These limitations are thus so broadly recited that they encompass people
using functions that they can solve in their minds or using pen and paper to
monitor manual tasks related to specific business processes. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (determining that a claim limitation “is so broadly worded” that the
limitation “encompasses literally any method” for performing the limitation,
including “even logical reasoning that can be performed entirely in the
human mind”).
Prong Two
We are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error pursuant to
Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance. Appellant has not shown the claim
includes additional elements that improve the underlying computer or other
technology. Appellant explains “the claimed methods and systems cannot
be performed by generic computing systems, but require specially
configured systems that are capable of receiving, understanding, and
transmitting transaction messages,” which “must also be specially
configured to perform routing to both closed and open loop networks.”
Appeal Br. 9–10. Although Appellant’s alleged improvement to the
underlying technology is described as “a technological improvement to
transaction processing networks that constitutes significantly more than an
abstract idea,” the additional functions simply involve comparing and
matching merchant and fleet profiles with monitoring transactions related to
business activities. Appeal Br. 7–10; Reply Br. 2–4.
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As such, the claimed invention does not improve the computer or its
components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way those
devices function, at least in the sense contemplated by the Federal Circuit in
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), despite
Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 10; Reply Br. 3). The
claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a specific type of data structure
designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in
memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant contends that
the claimed invention uses such a data structure or using the stored data
system to improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise
change the way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this
record to substantiate such a contention. Unlike the inventive concept found
in DDR (“modification of conventional mechanics behind website display to
produce dual-source integrated hybrid display” where “[T]he claimed
solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a
problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”) (see
Appeal Br. 11–12), the claims at issue merely required “off-the-shelf,
conventional, computer, network, and display technology.” See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
However, “merely adding computer functionality to increase the
speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an
otherwise abstract idea.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank
(USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, Appellant’s
purportedly improved abstract concept of determining and routing an
authorization request, using transaction processing and payment networks
(Appeal Br. 7–8), is still an abstract concept under the Guidance. See
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Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (holding that “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea”)
(emphasis omitted). That is, monitoring and recognizing manual activities
by receiving, storing, and transmitting information, even performed on a
computer, are parts of the recited abstract idea, as discussed above. See also
Ans. 10.
As the argued elements are part of the abstract idea, they are not
additional elements that integrate the identified abstract idea into a practical
application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55 (“[E]valuate integration into
a practical application by: (a) Identifying whether there are any additional
elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)”).
Accordingly, we determine the claim does not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Because we determine the “claim recites a judicial exception and fails to
integrate the exception into a practical application,” we proceed with
“further analysis pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO
Step 2B).” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51.
II. Step 2B
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in stating that “‘These features
recited in the claims are only further refinements of the abstract idea’ and
that this ‘does not change the fact that the claim is drawn to abstract ideas.’”
Reply Br. 3. We disagree. The claimed fleet profiles, issuer identifier,
authorization request, loop type identifier which are processed and/stored in
databases, devices, and processors, are part of the recited judicial exception
itself, as discussed above. See Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 6–7, 10; see also
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (“[E]valuate the additional elements
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individually and in combination” in step 2B.); Guidance fn. 24 (“USPTO
guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim features,
limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified
judicial exception.”) (emphasis omitted).
Regarding the claimed additional elements, we agree with the
Examiner that “[t]he claims merely amount to the application or instructions
to apply the abstract idea (i.e. a series of steps for routing a request for a
payment transaction authorization) on one or more computers,” which
“amount to nothing more than requiring a generic computer system (e.g.
databases and electronic devices) to merely carry out the abstract idea
itself.”. Ans. 7. The Examiner properly cites to the decisions in Versata,10
OIP,11 and buySAFE12 to establish that the recited additional elements
perform the recited functions in well-understood, routine, and conventional
manner without demonstrating an inventive concept. Final Act. 5. As stated
by the Examiner, and in view of Appellant’s disclosure, such limitations “are
nothing more than the instruction to implement the abstract idea (i.e. a series
of steps for routing a request for a payment transaction authorization) in a
particular, albeit well-understood, routine and conventional technological
environment.” See Final Act. 5–6; see also Figs. 4, 7; Spec. ¶¶ 35, 36, 38,
46, 66–72; Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“But what petitioner characterizes as

10 Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, (Fed. Cir.
2015) (arranging, storing, and retrieving information “are well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry”).
11 OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claims patent eligible).
12 buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (the invocation of computers and generic
functionality adds no inventive concept).
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specific hardware . . . is purely functional and generic. Nearly every
computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’
capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission
functions required by the method claims.”). Similarly, the other features
recited in claim 1, such as storing profiles, receiving authorization request
including payment information, and transmitting the request do not improve
functioning of computer itself, nor provide a technical improvement outside
of the advantages that payment transaction systems are known to provide.
See Final Act. 5; Ans. 10.
Additionally, we observe the Examiner has made the above findings
as required by the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. See also In re
Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363 (declining “to impose a heightened burden on
examiners beyond the notice requirement of § 132”). In rejecting the
pending claims under § 101, the Examiner notified Appellant that the claims
recite steps that describe the abstract concept of “routing a request for a
payment transaction authorization,” a method of organizing human activity
or mental processes, and that the claims do not include additional elements
that would amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final
Act 4. In particular, the Examiner found “[t]he computing elements of the
instant process, when taken alone, each execute in a manner routinely and
conventionally expected of these elements,” in accordance with Berkheimer
v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Final Act. 5. The
Examiner specifically cited Court decisions to establish the recited database-
related functions, storing and retrieving information, and transmitting data
over a network constitute elements that are well-understood, routine and
conventional to a skilled artisan.
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Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–11, and
13–18 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–11,
13–18
101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–11, 13–
18