07a50040
09-28-2005
Mary Turton, Complainant, v. Gale A. Norton, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.
Mary Turton v. Department of the Interior
07A50040
September 28, 2005
.
Mary Turton,
Complainant,
v.
Gale A. Norton,
Secretary,
Department of the Interior,
Agency.
Appeal No. 07A50040
Agency No. LMS-99-003
Hearing No. 320-AO-8224X
DECISION
The agency filed an appeal to the Commission pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.110(a), after an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued an Order dated
December 2, 2004.<1> Complainant alleges discrimination on the bases of
sex and retaliation when she was subjected to a hostile work environment.
After an investigation, complainant requested a hearing before an AJ.
The AJ, after a hearing, issued a decision dated December 2, 2004 finding
discrimination. The AJ ordered the following remedy:
The Agency shall remit to Complainant all pay and/or benefits lost as a
result of the Agency's discriminatory/retaliatory actions taken herein,
assuming that, absent discrimination and/or retaliation, she would
not have taken or used 150 hours of annual leave and 150 hours of sick
leave. Accordingly, the Agency shall restore to Complainant 150 hours
of annual leave, and 150 hours of sick leave, and any other benefits
lost as a result of Complainant having used 150 hours of annual leave,
and 150 hours of sick leave. The Agency shall restore the benefits due
Complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60)
calendar days after the date this decision becomes final. Complainant
shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of benefits
due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency.
If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of benefits, the Agency
shall restore the undisputed amount of benefits to Complainant within
sixty (60) calendar days of the date the Agency determines the amount
it believes to be due. Complainant may petition for enforcement for
the amount in dispute. The petition for enforcement must be filed with
the Agency's EEO Director, in accordance with the provisions set forth
below in the section entitled �Compliance with an Agency Final Action.�
Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency
shall pay Complainant's attorney the sum of $102,893.06 for attorney's
fees and costs, less any amount paid for attorney's fees and costs in
the Kann case.
Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final, the
Agency shall pay Complainant $300,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages to
compensate Complainant for the pain and suffering she experienced as a
result of the Agency's violation of Title VII.
The Agency shall provide a minimum of eight hours of live,
focused training to Mr. W, Mr. X, Mr. Y, Mr. Z, and Ms. A on their
responsibilities under the laws enforced by the EEOC, with special
emphasis on Title VII. If Mr. Y, or any other person named above,
is no longer an employee of the federal government, the Agency shall
furnish documentation of his/her departure date.
The Agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against
Mr. W, Mr. X, Mr. Y, Mr. Z and Ms. A. The EEOC does not consider
training to be disciplinary action. If the Agency decides to take
disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. As for Mr. W,
I consider the appropriate discipline to be his removal from federal
service. If the Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it
shall set forth the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline.
The Agency shall report its decision regarding imposing discipline to
Supervisory Administrative Judge Glenn G. Meyers. If Mr. Y, or any other
person named above is no longer an employee of the federal government,
the Agency shall furnish documentation of his/her departure date.
The Agency shall post the notice, appended to this decision as Attachment
A, (after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative)
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
The original signed notice is to be submitted within 10 calendar days of
implementation of this decision to the EEOC Denver District Office at
the following address: Glenn G. Meyers, Administrative Judge, 303 East
17th Avenue, Suite 510, Denver, Colorado 80203-9634. The notices shall
be posted within 30 days of implementation and shall remain posted for
a period of 120 consecutive days.
The agency, on January 11, 2005, issued a decision agreeing with the
AJ's finding of discrimination and part of the AJ's ordered remedies.
The decision fully implements the finding of discrimination and the
remedy as it pertains to restoration of leave, benefits, and training.
The agency, on appeal, challenges only the AJ's award with regard to
non-pecuniary compensatory damages and attorney's fees.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
The record indicates that complainant was working in the Minerals
Management Service Division, Royalty in Kind (RIK) section as an
accountant. The AJ found, inter alia, that complainant's supervisor,
Mr. W, subjected complainant to a hostile work environment for a total
of three years. The AJ found that Mr. W's opinion of women is that they
should be barefoot and pregnant and have no place in the workforce.
He referred to complainant and other women in the office as �dumb
bitches.� In early 1996 until the end of 1997, Mr. W subjected
complainant to comments connoting sexual functions, sexual activity
and/or human genitalia. Mr. W would use the word �come� to convey a
sexual meeting, asking complainant, �Jim's going to come? When is Jim
going to come? Mary, are you going to like it if Jim comes?� Mr. W
also used the word �unzip� asking complainant, �What you going to unzip,
Mary? What you going to unzip?� Mr. W used other words to make vulgar
sexual messages. Specifically, Mr. W would use the word �come� to suggest
ejaculate, �ball� to suggest testicle, �hard� to suggest an erect penis,
and �hole� to suggest a vagina.
Mr. W told complainant he wanted to be touched by a woman: �You know
what I like? I like a woman to rub me, to caress me, and to give me a
back massage. . . I want her to rub me all over. I want her to spend
time making me feel good. I want a woman who can take care of me.�
Mr. W rolled his chair back and leaned into complainant brushing against
her breasts. Mr. W sat slumped in a chair with his pelvis at the edge
of the chair seat and the genital area of his pants conspicuously and
prominently displayed. Mr. W also placed his face near complainant's
breasts under the guise of looking at the images on her shirt, and
casually brushed against her breasts.
Mr. W referred to the women in RIK as �his harem.� In response to
complainant's comment about not liking to take antibiotics, Mr. W
responded: �Oh, I know why you won't - - don't want to take antibiotics.
They'll give you a [vaginal] yeast infection.�
After harassment training, Mr. W told complainant she could disregard
what was said at the training because it �doesn't mean anything, . . . you
can do whatever you want to.� He then told her the following joke: �What
did one lesbian frog say to the other? I guess we do taste like chicken.�
After Mr. W was removed from the area, the AJ found that he continued
to stalk complainant; stared at her in the halls with a glaring, angry,
hostile facial expression; and placed numerous menacing telephone calls
to her home.
Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages
The AJ found that an award to $380,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory
damages was appropriate. However, the AJ reduced that amount to
$300,000.00, the statutory limit. The AJ found that complainant suffered
emotional distress due to the agency's discriminatory actions, with some
of the conditions persisting for over five years. Specifically, the AJ
found that complainant suffered from: weight gain; loss of self-esteem;
vertigo with dizziness; stomach problems including vomiting and diarrhea;
feelings of helplessness and being out of control; depression manifested
by feelings of sadness and frequent crying; fear of contact with people,
particularly older men; social withdrawal; severe swelling in feet;
feelings of being aged; adjustment disorder with depressive features;
sleeplessness; and nightmares.
The agency argues on appeal that the AJ's award of non-pecuniary
compensatory damages was not consistent with the amounts awarded in
similar cases after considering the nature, severity, and duration
of harm. The agency argues that the doctor's diagnosis of complainant
was flawed because it was not based on medical tests and examinations and
was too attenuated in time to be given any weight. Finally, the agency
argues that the AJ did not give sufficient weight to complainant's own
behavior, admissions, and relative lack of credibility, and to evidence
of mitigation.
The Commission has held that evidence from a health care professional
is not a mandatory prerequisite for recovery of compensatory damages for
emotional distress. Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996); Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture,
EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995); Bernard v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998).
In determining compensatory damages, the Commission strives to make
damage awards for emotional harm consistent with awards in similar
cases. We find that $300,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages in this case
is excessive considering the nature, severity, and duration of the harm
as compared to analogous cases.
Insofar as complainant has submitted evidence of emotional distress,
we note that the Commission has awarded compensatory damages in
cases somewhat similar to complainant's in terms of harm sustained.
See Yasko v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A32340 (April 21,
2004)(awarding complainant $100,000.00 in non-pecuniary compensatory
damages after being subjected to sexual harassment resulting in
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, severe intermittent
insomnia, weight gain and stress); Winkler v. Department of Agriculture,
EEOC Appeal No. 01975336 (June 7, 2000)(awarding $110,000.00 in
non-pecuniary compensatory damages for emotional distress after being
subjected to sexual harassment and experiencing major depression,
excessive sleeping, social withdrawal, anxiety, irritability, weeping,
increased suicidal ideation, fright, shock, humiliation, loss of marital
harmony and loss of enjoyment in life).
The Commission finds these cases analogous to the above referenced
cases with respect to the nature, severity, and duration of the harm.
After considering the nature of the agency's action, in conjunction with
complainant's testimony, we find that $110,000.00 is an appropriate
amount of non-pecuniary compensatory damages. Finally, we note that
this award is not �monstrously excessive� and is consistent with the
amounts awarded in similar cases.
Attorney's Fees
The AJ awarded complainant a total of $102,893.06 in attorney's fees
and costs. The AJ found that complainant's attorney marshaled a complex
set of facts over a three-year period and found complainant's attorney
to be highly competent. Thus, the AJ awarded complainant $74,767.50 in
attorney's fees and $13,172.06 in costs for a total award of $87,939.56,
the amount requested in complainant's petition for attorney's fees
and costs. The AJ further found that the case warranted an increase in
the amount of attorney's fees based on complainant's degree of success
and the quality representation. The AJ increased the attorney's fee
award by 20%, or $14,953.50. Thus, the total amount of attorney's
fees awarded ($89,721.00) plus the total amount of costs ($13,172.06)
equals $102,893.06.
The agency argues that the AJ erred in increasing the amount of attorney's
fees sua sponte. The agency argues that the amount of attorney's fees
should be reduced to $74,767.50, the amount complainant requested.
The agency does not challenge the amount of costs. Moreover, the agency
does not challenge that complainant is entitled to the entire amount
of attorney's fees requested. The agency is only arguing that the 20%
enhancement was improper.
Title VII authorizes the award of reasonable attorney's fees, including
for an attorney's processing of a compensatory damages claim. 29 C.F.R. �
1614.501(e). To establish entitlement to attorney's fees, complainant
must first show that he or she is a prevailing party. Buckhannon Bd. and
Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources,
532 U.S. 598 (2001). A prevailing party for this purpose is one who
succeeds on any significant issue, and achieves some of the benefit
sought in bringing the action. Davis v. Department of Transportation,
EEOC Request No. 05970101 (February 4, 1999) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 427, 433 (1983)).
The fee award is ordinarily determined by multiplying a reasonable
number of hours expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate,
also known as a "lodestar." See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B);
Bernard v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July
17, 1998). In determining the number of hours expended the Commission
recognizes that the attorney "is not required to record in great detail
the manner in which each minute of his time was expended." Bernard,
EEOC Appeal No. 01966861. However, the attorney does have the burden of
identifying the subject matters which he spent his time by submitting
sufficiently detailed and contemporaneous time records to ensure that
the time spent was accurately recorded. Id.
Further, a reasonable fee award may be assessed in light of factors such
as: (1) the time required (versus time expended) to complete the legal
work; (2) novelty or difficulty of the issues; (3) the requisite skill
to properly handle the case; (4) the degree to which counsel is precluded
from taking other cases; (5) the relief sought and results obtained; and
(6) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship. See Cerny
v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05930899 (October 19, 1994).
Complainant is only entitled to an award for time reasonably expended.
It does not always follow that the amount of time actually expended is
the amount of time reasonably expended. Elvin v. Department of Labor,
EEOC Request No. 01943425 (August 31, 1995). Rather, "billing judgment"
is an important component in fee setting, and hours that would not be
properly billed to a private client are also not properly billed to
the agency pursuant to a successful EEO claim. Id. Counsel for the
prevailing party should make a "good faith effort to exclude from a fee
request hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary."
See Bernard, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861.
EEOC Regulations provided that in limited circumstances the �lodestar�
amount may be �increased in consideration of the degree of success,
quality of representation, and long delay caused by the agency.� 29
C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B).
The agency argues that the AJ erred in increasing the amount of attorney's
fees sua sponte. Complainant argues that the award was not improper.
Complainant argues that she submitted a petition for attorney's
fees at the AJ's request. Complainant argues that at the time the
petition was submitted, a decision had not been rendered in the case.
Complainant argues that because the issue of damages and attorney's
fees were not bifurcated, it would have been impossible to determine
the level of success in the case, thus making an enhancement request
premature. We agree with complainant. The AJ found that complainant's
high degree of success was a result of her highly competent attorney.
If an attorney achieves �exceptional success�, the attorney's fee
award may be enhanced. See EEOC Management Directive, Ch.11(VI)(B)(1)
(Nov. 9, 1999). The Commission finds that complainant's attorney
achieved exceptional success by securing a compensatory damage of award
of $100,000 and restoration of 26 days of leave. See Savage v. United
States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A32565 (July 14, 2004). We find
that the AJ did not abuse his discretion in awarding the 20% enhancement.
Thus, we find that complainant is entitled to $102,893.06, in combined
attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
The finding of sex discrimination and retaliation is AFFIRMED, but
the remedies are MODIFIED. We REMAND the matter to the agency for
implementation of the Order herein.
ORDER
The Agency shall remit to Complainant all pay and/or benefits lost as a
result of the Agency's discriminatory/retaliatory actions taken herein,
assuming that, absent discrimination and/or retaliation, she would
not have taken or used 150 hours of annual leave and 150 hours of sick
leave. Accordingly, the Agency shall restore to Complainant 150 hours
of annual leave, and 150 hours of sick leave, and any other benefits
lost as a result of Complainant having used 150 hours of annual leave,
and 150 hours of sick leave. The Agency shall restore the benefits due
Complainant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60)
calendar days after the date this decision becomes final. Complainant
shall cooperate in the Agency's efforts to compute the amount of benefits
due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the Agency.
If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of benefits, the Agency
shall restore the undisputed amount of benefits to Complainant within
sixty (60) calendar days of the date the Agency determines the amount
it believes to be due. Complainant may petition for enforcement for the
amount in dispute. The petition for enforcement must be filed with the
Agency's EEO Director.
Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency
shall pay Complainant's attorney the sum of $102,893.06 for attorney's
fees and costs, less any amount paid for attorney's fees and costs in
the Kann case. No double recovery for attorney's fees shall be allowed
in the Kann and Turton case. Thus, only $102,893.06 for attorney's fees
and costs shall ultimately be paid to complainant's attorney for work
performed in both Kann and Turton's cases. There is no separate award of
attorney's fees and costs for work performed in the Kann and Turton cases.
The attorney's fees and costs award of $102,893.06 includes all attorney's
fees and costs (apart from any future awards for work performed in the
instant appeal) for both Kann and Turton.
Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final, the
Agency shall pay Complainant $110,000.00 in non-pecuniary damages to
compensate Complainant for the pain and suffering she experienced as a
result of the Agency's violation of Title VII.
Within 180 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency
shall provide a minimum of eight hours of live, focused training to
Mr. W, Mr. X, Mr. Y, Mr. Z, and Ms. A on their responsibilities under
the laws enforced by the EEOC, with special emphasis on Title VII.
If Mr. Y, or any other person named above, is no longer an employee
of the federal government, the Agency shall furnish documentation of
his/her departure date.
Within 60 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency
shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against Mr. W,
Mr. X, Mr. Y, Mr. Z and Ms. A. The EEOC does not consider training to be
disciplinary action. If the Agency decides to take disciplinary action,
it shall identify the action taken for the record. If the Agency decides
not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth, in the record,
the reason(s) for its decision not to impose discipline. If Mr. Y,
or any other person named above is no longer an employee of the federal
government, the Agency shall furnish documentation of his/her departure
date for the record.
Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, the Agency
shall post the attached NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, (after being signed by the Agency's
duly authorized representative) in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted, as specified
below.
The agency shall send evidence that they have complied with provisions
1 - 6 of this Order to the Compliance Officer as referenced herein.
POSTING ORDER (G0900)
The agency is ordered to post at its Minerals Management Service Division,
Royalty in Kind (RIK) section, Lakewood, Colorado facility copies of
the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the
agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency
within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,
and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer
at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the
Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration
of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid
by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees
to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0900)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion
of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion
of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after
one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your
complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until
such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.
If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,
identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court
appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you
to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �
2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��
791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole
discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not
extend your time in which to
file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 28, 2005
__________________
Date
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This Notice is posted pursuant to an order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dated ____________ which found that
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq.), has occurred at the agency's Minerals Management Service Division,
Royalty in Kind (RIK) section, Lakewood, Colorado facility.
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee
or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,
SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,
promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.
This facility was found to have discriminated against the complainant
on the bases of sex and reprisal. The facility was ordered to provide
complainant pay and benefits lost, non-pecuniary compensatory damages,
attorney's fees, and training for responsible management officials.
This facility will ensure that officials responsible for personnel
decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide by the
requirements of all federal equal employment opportunity laws and will
not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.
This facility will comply with federal law and will not in any manner
restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who
exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or
who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment
opportunity law.
Name and Title
Date Posted: _____________________
Posting Expires: _________________
29 C.F.R. Part 1614
1Patricia Kann, a co-worker of complainant, filed an EEO complaint
alleging mostly the same claims. Thus, the AJ, on October 13, 2000,
consolidated the complaints which were litigated at the same hearing.
The AJ then issued separate decisions on December 2, 2004. However,
since both complainant's were represented by the same attorney, some of
the remedies, i.e., attorney's fees and costs, were issued jointly.