Mary Robertson, Complainant,v.Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 29, 2008
0120081220 (E.E.O.C. May. 29, 2008)

0120081220

05-29-2008

Mary Robertson, Complainant, v. Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Mary Robertson,

Complainant,

v.

Pete Geren,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Hearing No. 420-2007-00148X

Appeal No. 0120081220

Agency No. ARANAD06NOV04551

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's January 16, 2008 final decision concerning

her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Materials Expediter ("Router") at the agency's Anniston Army Depot

facility in Anniston, AL. An EEOC Administrative Judge ("AJ") issued

a decision without a hearing on December 12, 2007, which the agency

fully implemented by its January 16, 2008 final decision ("FAD").

Complainant filed a timely appeal on January 7, 2008.1

On December 15, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

she was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American)

and age (72) when she did not receive a monetary award, while such awards

were given to four of her co-workers, all between the ages of 50 and 56,

and two of whom were white.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. The AJ issued a decision without a hearing finding

no discrimination, which the agency implemented.

The AJ found that there were no genuine material facts in dispute, the

investigative record had been adequately developed and that the evidence

presented did not require any evaluation. Finally, the AJ found that

the agency had articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the disparity

in awards that the complainant did not rebut as pretextual in nature.

On appeal, complainant disputes that the agency has provided legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons to substantiate the awards given.

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal

and factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on

an appeal from an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo

review . . ."); see also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9,

� VI.B. (November 9, 1999). (providing that an administrative judge's

"decision to issue a decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo"). This essentially means that we

should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free

to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's,

factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact

of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue

of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.

See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A.

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate

where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and

evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision

without holding a hearing is not appropriate.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He must

generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with

in this case, however, since the agency has articulated legitimate

and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal

Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley

v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997).

To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000);

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, EEOC Request

No. 05950842; Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351

(Dec. 14, 1995).

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we determine that

there are no genuine material issues of fact present in this case.

The agency has set forth non-discriminatory reasons for the distribution

of incentive awards and complainant has failed to rebut those reasons

with evidence of pretext.

According to the agency, incentive awards were given on the basis of

production reports and input from supervisors. (Fact Finding Tr. at

58:5-16 (Mar. 27, 2007).) The crux of complainant's argument is that

a performance-tracking system is inaccurate. Accepting complainant's

argument as true for the purpose of considering a summary judgment

motion, complainant has not proven any discriminatory motives behind

the distribution of incentive awards. Whether a computer program

is flawed does not tend to prove or disprove whether complainant was

discriminated against. Thus, it cannot be a material issue of fact.

The agency cannot be faulted for relying on a problematic system when

such reliance is non-discriminatory, something neither complainant nor

the evidence rebuts.

The agency has articulated that, along with the production records,

performance ratings were used to determine incentive awards. The three

routers who received an incentive award all received "excellent" ratings

while complainant received "successful." (Fact Finding Tr. at 86-91.)

Complainant's first-line supervisor said in comparison to the other

routers, complainant ranked fifth. (Id. at 131:10-14.) The agency has

articulated non-discriminatory reasons that neither complainant nor

evidence in the record rebuts.

To speculate whether the fourth router's performance records and ratings

would warrant an incentive award if she had not performed job duties

that were not her own is inappropriate. The fourth router's performance

ratings exceeded that of complainant (Fact Finding Tr. at 91:15-20).

Yet, both complainant and the fourth router's performance records reflect

substantially less work completed than the other three routers (See

ROI ex. F-3). The fourth router received her incentive award because

she performed the duties of a vacant job, something that she was not

required to do. Complainant has failed to rebut the agency's assertion

of a non-discriminatory reason; complainant cannot show pretext.

For the same reasons discussed with respect to the lack of evidence

of racial discrimination, we affirm the AJ's finding of no age

discrimination. There is no evidence that complainant's age played a role

in the agency's decision-making process. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.

Accordingly, the agency's final decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 29, 2008

__________________

Date

1 On appeal, the agency argues that complainant's appeal should

be dismissed as premature because it was filed before the agency issued

its final order. We disagree. The appeal was perfected when the agency

issued its final order.

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0120081220

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120081220