Mary Jordan, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific/Western Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 22, 1999
01972000 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 22, 1999)

01972000

02-22-1999

Mary Jordan, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific/Western Areas), Agency.


Mary Jordan v. United States Postal Service

01972000

February 22, 1999

Mary Jordan, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01972000

) Agency No. 4F-907-1102-95

William J. Henderson, ) EEOC No. 340-95-3986X

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service )

(Pacific/Western Areas), )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision that it had not

discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission

accepts the appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

Appellant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging discrimination based on

race (African-American), sex (female), and reprisal (prior EEO activity),

when she was placed on an emergency suspension and subsequently issued

a fourteen (14) calendar day suspension, effective February 6, 1995.

Following the agency's investigation, appellant requested a hearing before

an EEOC administrative judge. Finding that there were no material facts

in dispute, on September 27, 1996, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e)(3), finding no discrimination.

The record reveals that appellant was placed on emergency suspension

and later issued a fourteen (14) day suspension for unsatisfactory work

performance, i.e., failure to follow instructions, insubordinate conduct,

conduct unbecoming a postal employee, and for being AWOL. In his

decision, the AJ found that appellant had failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination on the bases of race or sex. Specifically,

appellant failed to identify a similarly situated employee, not in her

protected classes, who engaged in similar conduct but was not disciplined.

Assuming, arguendo, that appellant established a prima facie case, the AJ

found that the record established that appellant had a series of lesser

disciplinary actions such that the emergency suspension and fourteen

day suspension were supported as progressive discipline. Furthermore,

although the AJ found that appellant had established a prima facie case

of discrimination based on reprisal, she failed to demonstrate that the

discipline was imposed because of her prior EEO activity, as opposed

to her insubordinate conduct. In sum, the AJ found that appellant had

failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's

reasons for its actions were pretext for prohibited discrimination.

On November 29, 1996, the agency issued a final decision adopting the AJ's

finding of no discrimination. It is from this decision that appellant

now appeals.

As appellant's complaint constitutes a claim of disparate treatment, the

agency properly analyzed it under the three-tiered analytical framework

outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

See also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Hochstadt

v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324

(D. Mass.), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). Applying this legal

standard to appellant's complaint, the Commission finds that the agency

successfully rebutted any initial inference of discrimination raised

by appellant by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

the actions at issue. Specifically, appellant was issued an emergency

suspension and subsequently placed on a fourteen day suspension when she

called her supervisor a "bitch" and when she was charged with sixteen

hours of AWOL.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that appellant

failed to establish that the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext

for discrimination. We find that appellant's contentions on appeal are

without merit. Specifically, appellant failed to present sufficient

evidence that there was a material issue in dispute. Accordingly, it is

the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the

agency's final decision that it did not discriminate against appellant,

as alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

February 22, 1999

___________________ ____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations