Mary F. Bell, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 27, 2005
01a51854 (E.E.O.C. May. 27, 2005)

01a51854

05-27-2005

Mary F. Bell, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.


Mary F. Bell v. United States Postal Service

01A51854

May 27, 2005

.

Mary F. Bell,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Great Lakes Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A51854

Agency No. 1-J-602-0028-01

Hearing No. 210-2004-00110X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.,

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms

the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Supervisor of Distribution

Operations at the agency's Palatine Processing and Distribution Center in

Illinois, filed a formal EEO complaint on July 3, 2001, alleging that the

agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American),

sex (female), color (Black), disability (hypertension, ulcer, insomnia,

depression, anxiety, severe headaches), and reprisal for prior EEO

activity when:

(1) from November 2000 to January 5, 2001, the Manager of Distribution

Operations (M1) subjected her to a hostile work environment by repeatedly

berating and yelling at her in front of other employees and by issuing

her a seven-day in-house suspension;

on June 12, 2001, management failed to select her for the position of

Manager, Processing and Distribution, EAS-23, at the agency's Rockford

P&DC, under vacancy announcement number 06713;

on June 4, 2002, management failed to select her for either of two

vacant Supervisor of Customer Service, EAS-16, positions under vacancy

announcement number 02-0016; and

on June 19, 2002, management failed to select her for the position

of Manager of Distribution Operations, EAS-18, at the Rockford P&DC,

under vacancy announcement HQ-2925.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

with respect to complainant's hostile work environment claim and the

June 12, 2001, non-selection, finding no discrimination.

As to those two issues, the AJ concluded that after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to complainant, a decision without a hearing

was appropriate as there were no genuine issues of material fact.

The AJ found that assuming, arguendo, complainant established a prima

facie case of race, color, sex, disability and reprisal discrimination,

the actions alleged were not sufficiently severe or pervasive as to

rise to the level of actionable harassment. In so finding, the AJ

noted that while M1 "used inappropriate tone and language to express

her disapproval" with the way complainant supervised employees, the

nature of the disagreement between M1 and complainant was professional.

(AJ Decision 1, 14). Further, the AJ found that the record was devoid of

any evidence showing that M1's behavior was motivated by discriminatory

or retaliatory animus toward complainant's protected classes. The AJ

also found that, with respect to not being selected on June 12, 2001,

complainant failed to show that the agency's articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was pretextual because she failed

to show that her qualifications were superior to those of the selectee.

With respect to the two remaining non-selections claims, the AJ

rejected the agency's motion for summary judgement and a hearing

was held. Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no

discrimination. The AJ found that assuming, arguendo, complainant

established a prima facie case of discrimination on all alleged bases,

the agency, nonetheless, articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions. Specifically, the AJ found that the review committee

members for both positions at issue testified that complainant was not

the best qualified applicant, and that the selectees had more relevant

experience and superior interviews. The AJ concluded that complainant

failed to establish that these articulated reasons were a pretext for

unlawful discrimination.

The agency's final order implemented both decisions by the AJ. On appeal,

complainant contends that the AJ made numerous errors of law and fact, and

reiterates her contention that she was subjected to unlawful harassment

and discrimination.

First, we shall address the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing

on issues (1) and (2). The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue

a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is

patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given

the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,

there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather

to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.

The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary

judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if

the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of

the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).

A fact is �material� if it has the potential to affect the outcome

of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting

evidence, it is not appropriate for an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may

properly issue a decision without a hearing only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Petty v. Defense Security Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11,

2003); Murphy v. Dept. of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A04099 (July 11,

2003).

Here, the Commission finds that a decision without a hearing was

appropriate, as no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to

complainant's hostile work environment claim, or her non-selection for

the position of Manager, Processing and Distribution, on June 12, 2001.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to complainant, we concur

with the AJ's finding that the actions alleged do not rise to the level of

actionable hostile work environment harassment. We also concur with the

AJ's finding that, with respect to her non-selection on June 12, 2001,

complainant failed to show that the agency's articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was pretextual. Namely, that

the selectee was the most qualified applicant for the position at issue,

and had more relevant experience than complainant.

As to the remaining claims, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all

post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as

�such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding

regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual

finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review,

whether or not a hearing was held.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

In a non-selection case, pretext may be demonstrated where complainant's

qualifications were "so plainly superior as to require a finding of

pretext." Cadle v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01997044

(June 3, 2002) (citing Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th

Cir. 1981)). When choosing among highly qualified candidates for a

position, employers generally have broad discretion to set policies

and make personnel decisions, and should not be second-guessed by a

reviewing authority, absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Cadle, supra

(citing Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

259 (1981)).

In the instant case, we concur with the AJ's finding that even assuming,

arguendo, complainant established a prima facie case of race, color,

sex, disability, and reprisal discrimination, the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting complainant for

the positions at issue. The record reflects that, as to the June 4, 2002,

non-selection, the review committee members for the Supervisor of Customer

Services positions testified that of the eight applicants for the two

available positions, complainant received one of the lowest scores for

both her application package and her interview. (Hearing Transcript,

37; 38; 48-53; 92; 245-6; 251). Additionally, the committee members

testified that both of the selectees for the positions at issue were

already performing as Supervisors of Customer Services at the time of

the selection, whereas complainant failed to demonstrate that she had

the necessary knowledge of the functions of the position. (H.T., 60-63;

100; 254).

With respect to the position of Manager of Distribution Operations,

the record shows that the review committee members testified that of

the four applicants for the position, only the selectee demonstrated

that she had the necessary managerial experience, and the ability to

perform the functions of the job and lead during a crisis situation.

(H.T., 136-9; 195; 198; 220-222; 224-226). They also testified that

while complainant had a good deal of supervisory experience, she had

no experience as a manager. (H.T., 145-6; 195; 207; 240). Despite

complainant's contentions on appeal, we find that she failed to proffer

any evidence to show that her qualifications for the positions at issue

were superior to those of the selectees, or that the agency's actions

were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Accordingly,

after a careful review of the record, we affirm the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 27, 2005

__________________

Date