Mary E. Lynch, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 9, 2002
01A10323 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 9, 2002)

01A10323

04-09-2002

Mary E. Lynch, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Mary E. Lynch v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A10323

April 9, 2002

.

Mary E. Lynch,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A10323

Agency No. 99-0946

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD),

dated September 13, 2000, concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The

appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following

reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a part-time temporary Infection Control Nurse, at the agency's VA

Medical and Regional Office Center (Center), White River Junction,

Vermont. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a

formal complaint on April 2, 1999, alleging that she was discriminated

against on the basis of disability (latex allergy) when she was terminated

from employment, effective February 6, 1999.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether complainant was discriminated against on the basis of disability

when the agency failed to provide complainant with a reasonable

accommodation for her disability and this failure resulted in her

termination.

BACKGROUND

Complainant was hired in 1989, and had worked in several different

positions at the Center prior to her last position. Complainant had

a history of asthma for many years and also had allergies to food,

dust, and cats. In 1997, complainant consulted with several doctors,

including allergists, concerning her sensitivity to latex.<2> Complainant

advised her doctors that she had allergic reactions to latex. One of

complainant's doctors found no evidence of the allergy and another found

that she was latex allergic.<3> Complainant notified the agency of her

allergy and her anaphylactic reaction to latex.<4> Beginning in 1997,

complainant began to take various forms of leave after learning of her

latex sensitivity and essentially never returned to the Center after

January 28, 1998. Complainant was terminated, effective February 6, 1999.

On January 6, 1998, complainant filed a claim for worker's compensation

with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. In support of her

claim, complainant submitted numerous documents and medical reports which

discussed the history of the development of complainant's condition,

the results of laboratory and diagnostic tests, and physical examination

findings.<5> On April 5, 1999, the hearing officer referred the matter

to a specialist for a medical opinion because of conflicting medical

testimony. The specialist reported that he believed that the patient's

symptom complex, work environment and history were consistent with a

diagnosis of latex sensitivity, but that a definite diagnosis would

require further testing.

Complainant stated that she wanted the Center to convert to powder-free

latex gloves<6>; and was not able to return because the environment had

not become latex safe. The Center offered the following accommodations

to complainant: the use of masks, respirators, latex-free gloves,

reassignment to a different position in a latex-free office environment

outside of the hospital in a building with a separate air system,

minimization of her visits to known latex-rich areas, and reassignment

to an alternate position in the medical care cost recovery program with

no loss in salary or benefits. Complainant refused these accommodations

because she believed that she might still be inadvertently exposed to low

levels of latex carried into her area or bathrooms by other personnel,

including housekeeping or medical staff; and that latex may still be

present in her office, including in the mouse pad, the computer screen,

carpet backing, pencil erasers, and other items.

Complainant stated that she did not contact the Center or return to

work because she was waiting for the Center to notify her that it had

eliminated powdered latex gloves or had become completely latex safe.

There was testimony that there was no current way to totally eliminate

latex from a medical environment and that those hospitals that did go

nearly�latex-free,� did it at the cost of many millions of dollars.

By a letter dated September 29, 1998, the Acting Chief-of-Staff (ACS)

requested complainant to contact him no later than October 9, 1998,

regarding her employment intentions. By a note, dated September 28,

1998, sent by complainant to ACS's home, complainant stated she was

awaiting an appeal date with OWCP regarding her denied claim, but did

not provide any other information concerning her employment intentions.

This note crossed in the mail with ACS's letter. Complainant testified

that she thought her note satisfied ACS's inquiry and she did not further

respond. By letter dated January 4, 1999, the Hospital Director (HD)

notified complainant that she would be terminated from her position,

effective February 6, 1999.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to state a

prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of the agency's failure

to accommodate her allergy to latex because complainant's condition

did not appear to meet the definition of disability; that she did not

demonstrate that her allergy to latex substantially limited a major

life activity; and that she was not otherwise qualified to perform the

essential functions of an infection control nurse because of her fear

of inadvertent exposure to latex. Further, the agency stated that it

made diligent efforts to offer reasonable accommodations to complainant,

and that no reasonable accommodation would eliminate her fear of exposure

to latex. Concerning the termination, the FAD stated that the evidence

supported a finding that complainant did not respond to the agency's

notice of proposed termination. Also, that complainant failed to prove

that the agency's actions were a pretext for discrimination, or that

the agency terminated her employment due to discriminatory animus.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends that she did not refuse to return to work

under any condition but that she was unable to return to an environment

where exposure to the powder of the latex gloves continued to exist;

where the environment was not free of ambient latex particles; that

she is allergic to latex; that the allergy could substantially limit

the major life activity of breathing; that the agency failed to make

a reasonable effort to engage in the informal interactive process and

that the agency lacked good faith. The agency states that the appeal

raises matters that either does not require comment or were otherwise

fully addressed in the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Complainant's allegations constitute a claim of disparate treatment in

the termination of her employment which is properly analyzed under the

three-tier order and allocation of proof as set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Hochstadt v. Worcester

Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318, aff'd, 545

F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); and Prewitt v. United States Postal Service,

662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying the scheme to cases brought under

the Rehabilitation Act). The burden of proof under this scheme remains

at all times on the complainant.

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.,

prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and requires agencies

of the Federal government to make reasonable accommodation to the known

physical. or mental limitations of qualified employees with disabilities,

unless the agency can demonstrate that accommodation would prove to

be an "undue hardship." 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(b) and (c). A "person

with a disability" is one who: (1) has a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits or restricts one or more of his or her major

life activities; or (2) either has a record of such impairment or is

regarded as having the impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a). "Major life

activities" include such functions as caring for one's self, performing

manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,

and working. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a)(3). To establish a prima facie

case of discrimination based on a failure to accommodate a disability,

complainant must show: (1) that she is a "person with a disability"

for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, as defined in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.203(a); (2) that she is a "qualified person with a disability," in

that she is qualified for and can perform the essential elements of the

position at issue with or without reasonable accommodation, as specified

in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(a)(6); and (3) that she received an adverse

employment action as a result of her disability. Arneson v. Heckler,

50 FEP Cases 451 (8th Cir. 1989); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473

(11th Cir. 1983); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, supra. In addition,

initially, complainant must make at least a facial showing that her

disability can be accommodated. Treadwell v. Alexander, supra at 477-78.

In that the gravamen of complainant's claim is that the agency failed to

provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability which resulted in

her termination, the Commission will assume, arguendo, that complainant

established a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to

accommodate. However, the record indicates that the agency offered the

following accommodations to complainant: the use of masks, respirators,

latex-free gloves, offered to reassign her to a different position in

a latex-free office environment outside of the hospital in a building

with a separate air system, offered to minimize her visits to known

latex-rich areas, and offered reassignment to an alternate position in the

medical care cost recovery program with no loss in salary or benefits.

However, complainant refused these accommodations because she believed

that she might still be exposed to inadvertent low levels of latex

carried by other personnel, and that latex may still be present in

the office where she was to work. Basically, complainant wanted the

facility to be entirely latex-free. The agency is not obligated to

provide complainant with her chosen accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement

Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, EEOC Order No. 915.002, question 9 at 17 - 18

(March 1, 1999). It must provide only a reasonable accommodation that

allows complainant to perform the essential functions of her job. Id.

We find that the agency made reasonable efforts to provide appropriate

accommodations for complainant's disability. In that we find that the

agency made reasonable efforts to provide appropriate accommodations,

we need not address complainant's contention on appeal that the agency

did not act in good faith and did not make a reasonable effort to engage

in the informal interactive process.

Concerning the termination, the record reflects that complainant was

terminated for failure to respond to the agency's notice of proposed

termination and did not otherwise advise the agency as to her intentions

concerning her continued employment. We find that the agency met its

burden to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

The Commission further finds that complainant failed to present evidence

that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reason for its

actions were a pretext for discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 9, 2002

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992

to apply the standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

to complaints of discrimination by federal employees or applicants

for employment.

2 Latex is derived from natural rubber which comes from the milky

sap of certain species of plants. Natural rubber is made into natural

rubber latex through a manufacturing process. The degree to which a

person having a natural latex sensitivity/allergy reacts to the natural

latex is dependent on the sensitivity of the patient, how the natural

rubber protein enters the body (e.g., inhalation of powder or direct skin

contact), and other factors, such as, frequency and magnitude of exposure.

Department of Veterans Affairs, Directive 7701, July 8, 1998.

3 Complainant had seen four or more doctors during the relevant time

period.

4 An anaphylactic reaction could manifest itself as a swelling of the

eyes, swelling of the mouth, swelling of the tongue, swelling of the back

of the throat, or chest wheezing. A victim could experience a drop-off

of oxygenation, a rise in respiratory rate, a change in blood pressure,

as well as other symptoms.

5 The OWCP initially denied complainant's claim but she appealed the

decision. The results of the appeal are not reflected in the record.

6 Certain types of latex gloves release a powder that causes the latex

protein to become an air-borne allergen that can be breathed in and can

cause allergy and asthma symptoms.