Mary E. Harris, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 14, 2003
01A30786_r (E.E.O.C. Aug. 14, 2003)

01A30786_r

08-14-2003

Mary E. Harris, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.


Mary E. Harris v. United States Postal Service

01A30786

August 14, 2003

.

Mary E. Harris,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A30786

Agency No. 1F-957-0011�01

Hearing No. 370-A1-2426X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final order concerning

her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The record reveals that complainant was formerly employed with the

agency as a distribution clerk. In a letter dated December 24, 1998,

the agency noted that complainant last reported to work on June 10, 1998,

and directed complainant to provide acceptable medical documentation to

support her continued absence from work or medical documentation stating

when she can return to work. The agency enclosed a medical release

form for complainant to submit to a treating physician that had to be

submitted to the agency's Area Medical Officer by January 11, 1999.

The letter concluded by stating that failure to provide acceptable

medical documentation could result in management removing complainant

from employment with the agency.

In a letter dated February 23, 1999, the agency notified complainant

that she would be removed from the agency on April 3, 1999 for

failure to follow instructions by failing to provide acceptable

medical documentation/absent without leave (AWOL). The agency noted

that complainant failed to provide the requested medical documentation

and therefore was charged with absent without leave beginning January

12, 1999. In a letter dated April 27, 2000, complainant requested

reinstatement to her position, but in a letter dated November 7, 2000,

the agency denied complainant's request for reinstatement. The letter

noted that complainant was removed for failure to follow instructions.

Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on January 16, 2001, alleging that the agency discriminated

against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female),

and disability when on November 7, 2000, it denied her request for

reinstatement.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of her

right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested a hearing. On December 14, 2001, the AJ issued a notice that

he was considering a decision without a hearing.

The AJ issued a decision without a hearing dated September 26, 2002,

finding no discrimination. The AJ found that the agency provided a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not reinstating complainant

when it responded that she was not reinstated because the agency has

a policy of not reinstating former employees terminated "for cause."

The AJ found that complainant failed to provide any evidence that the

agency's articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination.

In a final order dated October 10, 2002, the agency fully implemented

the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, the issuance of

a decision without a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an

administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider a decision without

a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately

developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Upon review of the record, we find that the issuance of a decision

without a hearing was appropriate because complainant did not provide

evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that she

established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, sex,

or disability. The burden of proof in discrimination cases is generally

allocated according to the standards established in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973). Initially in disparate

treatment claims such as this, complainant must establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by demonstrating, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that she was subjected to an adverse employment action

under circumstances which, if left unexplained, raise an inference

of unlawful motivation. See Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). In this matter, complainant

alleges that a white female employee who was injured on the job was

reassigned from her floor position and given various office positions.

Complainant contends that an inference of unlawful discrimination can

be made from the agency's treatment of this employee. However, we

note that the employee offered by complainant as a comparative was not

terminated, but was accommodated after an on-the-job injury. Thus, we

find that complainant was not similarly situated to the cited employee.

Complainant did not identify any similarly situated employees outside

of her protected classes who were treated more favorably under similar

circumstances. Complainant failed to provide any other evidence from

which an inference of discrimination on the bases of sex, race, or

disability could be inferred. Accordingly, we find that complainant

failed to establish a prima facie claim of unlawful discrimination.<1>

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to affirm the agency's final order,

because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a

hearing was appropriate, and a preponderance of the record evidence does

not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_August 14, 2003_________________

Date

1Because we find that complainant failed to

provide any evidence from which a prima facie case of discrimination

could be established, we will not address the Administrative Judge's

determination that the agency offered legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its actions which were not rebutted by complainant as pretext.