Martinsburg Conscrete Products Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 23, 1980

248 N.L.R.B. 1352 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Martinsburg Concrete Products Co. and General
Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local Union No.
992, a/w International Brotherhood of Team-
sters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers or
America, Independent. Cases 5-CA-10876 1 and
5-CA-1 1213
April 23, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On January 22, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the
General Counsel each filed exceptions and a sup-
porting memorandum.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
memoranda and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings, 2 and conclusions of the Administrative
Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,
as modified herein.3
Although the Administrative Law Judge failed to make specific ref-
erence to this case number in his Decision, all issues in both cases were
fully litigated at the hearing with the full understanding of all parties in-
volved.
2 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
I The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law
Judge's failure to make express findings and conclusions of law with re-
spect to two complaint allegations of 8(a)(5) and (1) violations by Re-
spondent. We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions.
Par. 8 of the complaint issued in Case 5-CA-10876 alleges that Re-
spondent "acted in derogation of the Union's status as collective-bargain-
ing agent by directly soliciting the views of its employees concerning the
Union." Credited testimony in the record establishes that, subsequent to
notification by the Union of its intent to negotiate a new collective-bar-
gaining agreement, Respondent's president directed the preparation in its
office of letters rejecting the Union which were presented to unit em-
ployees for their signatures by Respondent's general manager We find
that, by preparing the rejection letters and presenting them to the em-
ployees for their signatures, Respondent sought to undermine the Union's
position as the employees' representative and thereby violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. See Nassau Glass Corporation, 222 NLRB 792
(1976); Suburban Homes Corporation, 173 NLRB 497 (1968).
Par. 6(b) of the complaint in Case 5-CA-11213 alleges that Respon-
dent, since on or about July 10, 1979, refused to meet with the Union
concerning the grievance filed on behalf of James Saville, a discharged
employee. Respondent, in its answer to this complaint, has admitted the
conduct alleged, and has defended such conduct on the ground that no
contract was in effect between Respondent and the Union when Saville's
grievance was filed, the previous contract having expired on April 30,
1979. Although Respondent contends in its exceptions that the failure of
the General Counsel to introduce any testimonial evidence at the hearing
in support of complaint par. 6(b) warrants its dismissal, we find Respon-
dent's prior admission on the record to be sufficient proof of the facts
248 NLRB No.172
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Martinsburg Concrete Products Co., Martinsburg,
West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraphs l(c) and (d)
and reletter the subsequent paragraph accordingly:
"(c) Attempting to avoid its bargaining obliga-
tion by preparing letters rejecting the Union and
presenting them to unit employees for their signa-
tures in derogation of the Union's status as exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of all em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
"(d) Refusing to meet with the Union to discuss
unit employees' grievances after the expiration of
the collective-bargaining agreement with the Union
on April 30, 1979."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
alleged. With respect to the legal issue involved, it is well-established that
an employer's continuing postcontract bargaining obligation includes the
duty to meet with a collective-bargaining representative and discuss unit
employees' grievances. The Hilton-Davis Chemical Company, Division of
Sterling Drug, Inc., 185 NLRB 241 (1970). Accordingly, we find that Re-
spondent, by refusing to meet with the Union to discuss Saville's griev-
ance, violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act.
We shall modify the recommended Order to provide that Respondent
cease and desist from the unlawful conduct hereinabove discussed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Gener-
al Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local Union
No. 992, a/w International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Independent, as the exclu-
sive representative of all employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate bargaining unit:
All concrete truckdrivers employed at our
Martinsburg, West Virginia, plant, excluding
all supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to produce, on demand
of the Union, our written records revealing the
number of hours worked by all employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit for the period
of May 1, 1978, through April 19, 1979.
MARTINSBURG CONCRETE PRODUCTS CO. 1353
WE WILL NOT attempt to avoid our bargain-
ing obligation with the Union by preparing let-
ters rejecting the Union and presenting them
to unit employees for their signatures in dero-
gation of the Union's status as their exclusive
collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet with the
Union to discuss unit employees' grievances
filed after the expiration of our collective-bar-
gaining agreement with the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, upon request, bar-
gain collectively with the Union as the exclu-
sive representative of all employees in the ap-
propriate unit described above, with regard to
rates of pay, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
WE WILL produce, on demand of the Union,
our written records revealing the number of
hours worked by all employees in the appro-
priate bargaining unit for the period of May 1,
1978, through April 19, 1979.
MARTINSBURG CONCRETE PRODUCTS
Co.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. RIcci, Administrative Law Judge: A hear-
ing in this proceeding was held at Martinsburg, West
Virginia, on November 19, 1979, on complaint of the
General Counsel against Martinsburg Concrete Products
Co., herein called the Respondent or the Company. The
complaint issued on May 30, 1979, based upon a charge
filed on April 23, 1979, by General Teamsters & Allied
Workers, Local Union No. 992, affiliated with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehou-
semen and Helpers of America, Independent, herein
called the Union. The issue presented is whether the Re-
spondent illegally refused to bargain with the Union in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Briefs were filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of
the witnesses, I make the following:'
I A post-hearing motion by the General Counsel to correct the record
transcript is granted except for its reference to a word on p. 62 of the
transcript
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
In Martinsburg, West Virginia, the Respondent, a
West Virginia corporation, is engaged in the manufacture
of concrete. During the preceding 12 months, a represen-
tative period, it purchased and received at this location
goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 from
points located outside the State. I find that the Respon-
dent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that the Union in this case is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Case in Brief
For 10 years this Company has been in a contractual
relationship with Teamsters Local 992 with respect to its
truckdrivers, usually five or six men, who deliver con-
crete to purchaser customers. Their last collective-bar-
gaining agreement, covering a 2-year period, by its terms
expired on April 30, 1979. Recognition of the Union as
exclusive bargaining agent for these drivers was really
brought about initially by James Myers, owner and presi-
dent of the Company, in order to make it possible for
him to sell cement to a subsidiary of General Motors
which does construction work of one kind or another in
the area. As Myers said at the hearing:
I originally was instrumental with Mr. Harold
Miller [Local 992's business agent in 1969] . . .
having the employees represented by the Teamsters.
[T]he representation of the employees by the union
was instigated by me. I recognized the union for the
employees . . . when General Motors Parts Depart-
ment was being built.... All subcontractors had to
be union members and they asked me to bid on the
job.... I had called them [the Teamsters office in
Hagerstown] about this and said we have to be
union. I met with Mr. Harold Miller at that time
and we negotiated a contract, wages and the em-
ployees never negotiated anything.
However it may have come about-regardless of
which party "instigated" the original relationship-it is a
reality, both in fact and in law, that the Union was estab-
lished as the bargaining agent of the cement truckdrivers
in question. While the record does not show how the
money was paid-by the employees directly or via pay-
roll deductions-they all paid initiation fees and member-
ship dues to the Union. When the last contract expired in
April 1979 the Respondent refused to continue union
recognition and rejected the Union's request for bargain-
ing towards contract renewal. The complaint calls this a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
During the last month of the final contract the drivers
learned that for some time they had been underpaid, re-
ceiving only $5.25 per hour instead of the $6 per hour
1354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
called for by the union contract then in effect. The
Union asked the Company to produce its records to es-
tablish how many hours the men had worked during that
precise year, its purpose being to process a grievance on
the matter. The Respondent refused to furnish the infor-
mation; the refusal is also called an unfair labor practice
in the complaint.
The Respondent defends its refusal to continue recog-
nition on the ground that the employees had decided
they no longer wished to be represented by the Union.
As to the refusal to come forth with the requested work
data, it is justified on the ground that the contract had
expired.
B. The Critical Evidence: Credibility
Called as a witness by the General Counsel at the start
of the hearing, Myers began by saying the very first
mention of this entire business about the Union in 1979
took place when one of the drivers, David Clark, came
to him to say he had been appointed steward by the
Union's new business agent, Racie Sherman, and that
Sherman wanted to negotiate a new contract. Myers
continued that the next thing that came out of Clark's
mouth at that very first conversation was "a lot of the
employees does not want to have the Teamsters Union."
Myers response, as he stated, was: "Why don't you get a
consensus of the employees of what they want and come
back to me and tell me." The witness continued that
shortly thereafter Clark came back to say the men had
voted and did not wish to be represented. With this,
Myers then testified that Sherman did call him on the
phone before April 30, 1979, and that he refused the bar-
gaining request.
Clark's testimony is entirely different. He said that
Sherman visited his home in April to show him the ex-
piring contract and to discuss a new proposed contract.
As they looked at the old contract, it was seen that for a
year the men were being underpaid. Clark testified that
the next day he went to Myers and told him about the
underpayment. The owner's answer was it must have
happened because he was very busy, but that he would
look at his records. When he did, still in that first con-
versation, according to Clark, Myers admitted Clark was
right, and then said, "Let's call a meeting, get all the
drivers that were there at the time. He said, we'll discuss
this."
Continuing, Clark testified that, as told to do, he did
gather the men in the old office, where Myers spoke to
the whole group. Clark testified, "he said, I brought it to
the attention that we were supposed to be making six
dollars an hour, and that he didn't know it, but that he
says that he would pay us our six dollar an hour, give us
all back pay for the year we were supposed to be making
it." The men then spoke up to complain about having
been kept in the dark with respect to the Union's activi-
ties, and about the precise terms of the contract which
had governed their conditions of employment. At this
point Myers made further statements to the men, as
Clark testified:
He said the Union also wanted to negotiate a
new contract, and he said, his views of the union
and he didn't like it because of what they pulled on
about General Motors that a non-union contractor
come in there and take the work away from our
company, which we were union.
He said that you the drivers have a meeting and he
said between yourselves I'm not going to be around,
and you let me know what you decide. He said if
you're for the Union, he said, whatever you say I'm
with you. If you want the union we'll keep it. If
you don't we won't keep it.
He said that the union tells him he has to pay eight
or nine dollars an hour that he would pay it, but he
said that the hours that we keep and that we work a
lot of hours. He said that the hours that he couldn't
afford to pay that kind of money, and if the business
couldn't function he would have to close it down
because he couldn't make the payments.
Shortly after this, Myers had his office secretary, Rose
Martin, prepare a number of statements saying the men
no longer wished to be represented by the Teamsters. He
gave them to Noll, the general manager, with instruc-
tions to hand a copy to each man with instructions to
sign it or not sign it, as they wished. Noll did that, and
all five of the drivers then covered by the contract
signed the rejection statements. At one point Myers said
he had no recollection of ever "having a meeting with
the men" about this entire subject. He then qualified his
answer by saying he "never called any of the employees
into my office individually or jointly." Finally, he
changed again and admitted speaking with them "as a
group." He recalled their telling him about the wage dis-
crepancy, but denied any threat of discontinuing the
work if the Union's demands were too high.
It is a straight question of credibility between these
two witnesses. Did the owner threaten the men with
plant closing if they chose to remain "union," while tell-
ing them it was for them to decide? Considering the
record as a whole, there are many pertinent matters to
be considered. One of these is a further conflict in testi-
mony between Myers and Business Agent Sherman.
Sherman telephoned the Company during April, as the
contract was about to expire, and asked to meet for bar-
gaining purposes. Myer's version of this talk is that the
only thing he told Sherman was he would not do so be-
cause he did not believe the men wished to be so repre-
sented. As Sherman testified, Myers told him his reason
was because "the union is no god-damned good and I
don't want the union . . . Mr. Myers said, the union
would not force General Motors to use a union contrac-
tor and by not using a union contractor I would get the
concrete work." Sherman continued that when he ex-
plained the Teamsters had tried to accomplish that but
failed, Myers said the employees "do not want the Union
anyway . . . you can take your contract and stick it up
your ass...." Myers, testifying again later after Sher-
man, denied saying the Teamsters was no good, or ever
mentioning General Motors. As to the last tidbit, Myers
corrected Sherman; he quoted himself as having said
only "to go screw himself."
MARTINSBURG CONCRETE PRODUCTS CO. 1355
I credit both Clark and Sherman against Myers. One
reason for this resolution is the owner's demeanor as a
witness. Also, a number of times he evaded direct an-
swers; repeatly he injected justification for his answers.
But more important, he said a number of things that are
clearly incredible.
On February 14, 1979, the Union wrote a letter, ad-
dressed to Myers personally giving formal notice pursu-
ant to the contract of its intention to negotiate a new
agreement and advising that it was preparing proposals
and would later arrange to meet with him. On March 15
the Union wrote to the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service, giving the usual notice pursuant to law that
it was in process of bargaining with the Respondent; a
carbon copy of this letter was also addressed to Myers
personally. And on April 12 Sherman, as the Union's
business agent, wrote, again directly to Myers, requesting
a meeting "as soon as possible" for purposes of bargain-
ing. Each of these three letters was received at the Re-
spondent's office, as evidence by the receipt signature of
Rose Martin, the office secretary. She was for 10 years
Myers' employee there and he admitted it was her signa-
ture on each receipt. Shown the three letters as a wit-
ness, Myers said he had never seen a single one of them
before the day of the hearing.
Sherman wrote a fourth letter, dated April 16, ad-
dressed in like fashion and also signed for by Martin.
This is when Sherman asked for records showing how
many hours the drivers had worked during the previous
12 months, when they had been underpaid. This one
Myers said he did receive, but he was careful to place it
after being told, as he claimed, that the employees had
decided to reject the Union. Why his secretary should
bring that one to his attention but not the others, Myers
did not attempt to explain. He cannot be believed on this
record at all.
While Myers denied there was any mention of the
General Motors business when he rejected Sherman's re-
quest for bargaining on the telephone, he did not ques-
tion the business agent's story about General Motors dis-
continuing the use of "union" subcontractors, and the
Union's fruitless efforts to prevail upon General Motors
to go back to its old ways. It was for this very reason-
to do business with General Motors-that Myers had
gone "union" in the first place. Since he negotiated with
the Teamsters without the employees having any say in
the matter, as he himself related, this means that even the
wages he agreed to in the successive contracts were
pinned to the General Motors' subcontracting work.
Could it be that the real reason why the Respondent did
not pay the men their second year raise called for by the
last union contract was because it had lost the General
Motors' business? Myers' statement, at the hearing, that
when the men demanded the money that was due them,
he did not know whether they were right or wrong, sits
very poorly with him. It was his very personal contract.
With this as background, what are the probabilities that
he did tell Sherman the Union was "no damn good" be-
cause it had not backed him to continue the General
Motors' account? What are the chances he said the same
thing to Clark, the employee? Why did he become so
angry with Sherman on the telephone, speak so offen-
sively, if his only thought was a doubt as to the majority
will of the employees? His credibility is not enhanced by
the explanation that he was provoked by Sherman's insis-
tence upon representing employees who had rejected the
Union, if only because the men never voted to reject the
Union until sometime early in May, and he was talking
to Sherman in April!2
Myers even added that a reason why he refused to
bargain with the business agent was because he consid-
ered Clark, the truckdriver and only a steward of the
Union, to be the voice of the Teamsters. This was the
man who 10 years earlier had been careful to deal only
with Miller, as he stressed, the Teamsters' official agent
at that time.
What really happened here, as I find it, is that Myers
did receive the Union's three letters preceding Clark's
demand for the past underpayment, and, when the men
expressed resentment at not having been told of their
contract rights, conceived the notion of having them
reject the Union and in this way rid himself of what had
become an inconvenience in his business. When "being
union" helped him, he liked it, and personally saw to it
that his drivers were formally represented. When it cost
him more than he cared to pay the men in wages, he
thought he had an equal right to remove it. What he
overlooked is the rule of law, now so well established as
to require no citation of authority, that it is the employ-
ees who decide whether or not they wish to be repre-
sented by a union, and not their employer. And to ensure
his objective, he told the men he would discontinue that
part of his business if the Union's demands were not ac-
ceptable to him. As the Supreme Court long ago said:
"Petitioner cannot, as justification for its refusal to bar-
gain with the union, set up the defection of the union
members which it had induced by unfair labor practices
even though the result was that the union no longer had
the support of the majority." Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
Asked which way they wished to indicate their prefer-
ence-for or against the Union-after being told the em-
ployer is opposed to the idea, the employees are boxed
into an impossible position. As the General Counsel cor-
rectly states in her brief: "Thus the situation was inher-
ently coercive and threatening, since it tended to encour-
age the employees to reject the Union." Cf. Sunflower
Novelty Bags, 225 NLRB 1331, 1336 (1976).
To lend credence to his story that the secretary did
not call his attention to three successive letters informing
him of the Union's desire to continue bargaining, Myers
spoke at length about the extent of his business-with
plants in several cities. He indicated this one depot-a
subsidiary-with about 25 employees, was a minor con-
cern of his. Some of the drivers here involved had
I Myers said he met with the men as a group and that he told them he
would "go along" with whatever their decision might be. He pointedly
denied meeting with them before April 30. But he was no less clear that
his telephone conversation with Sherman was before April 30. Saville,
another driver witness, testified the meeting with Myers came "sometime
in April," and that Myers "came in and he said he would like to talk to
the five truck drivers. He asked if everyone else would leave Myers and
Bowers also stayed. He's the foreman over us" From the prehearing affi-
davit of employee Robert Foltz: "I believe Mr Myers called a meeting
of the employees after the union man called Clark
1356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
worked for him for some years; they certainly under-
stood how easily he could get along with just five em-
ployees less. It is not surprising, therefore, that all five
quickly signed the rejection letters which Myers had his
secretary write, and which Noll, the supervisor, asked
them to sign. When the owner has his own secretary
write separate union withdrawal letters and tells his gen-
eral manager, "Give this to the employees, have them
sign it if they wish to," it is the employer polling the em-
ployees and not objective evidence of a change of heart
emanating from the employees. And if the employees did
express resentment at having been kept in the dark about
what their contract wages was supposed to be, Myers
was as much responsible for that as was the Union. He
had taken pains to bargain with the Union in the past
without participation by the employees, as he himself tes-
tified.
This was a straight threat of discrimination-in fact of
outright discharge, to coerce an antiunion vote in the
men. It was he, Myers, who first told the men to take a
"consensus," to vote on the matter. It was the Company
which wrote out the rejection slips and which told the
men to use them. Against such a total picture of invita-
tion and intimidation after the Union's demand for con-
tinued bargaining had been received, the statements by
several of the drivers at the hearing that they really in-
tended to withdraw from the Union when they signed in
May, means nothing.
The presumption of continuing majority (Eastern
Washington Distributing Co., 216 NLRB 1149 (1975)-has
not been rebutted by objectively indicated proof. I there-
fore find that by refusing to bargain with the Union on
request in April 1979 the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.3
I also find that the Respondent's refusal to produce its
records, at the Union's request, on the question of how
many hours the employees had worked during the last
contract year, was a further violation of Section 8(a)(5).
Myer's testimony in defense that, when he received the
April 19 letter calling for that information, he did not
produce it because the Company did not have it only
serves to discredit him all the more in this case. He said
the payroll records were all in the custody of the Com-
pany's accountant, somewhere else. Maybe, and I doubt
it, records of a year before-say, May 1978-were with
the accountant. But for sure the records of how much
work was being done and how much the men were
being paid in April 1979 were right there in the office.
Most important of all, Myers very well knew the essence
of what the Union was probing, and it was how much
backpay the men were losing because Myers himself was
dishonoring the current contract. It would be pointless
to even talk about his further argument that when the
accountant did return the records to him, it was too late
A precise description of the bargaining unit underlying this case does
not appear in the complaint and the collective-bargaining agreement in-
volved does not define it exactly. The record in its entirety shows, how-
ever, that the unit is as follows:
All concrete truck drivers employed at the Respondent's Martins-
burg, West Virginia, plant, excluding all supervisors as defined in the
Act.
for the Union to do anything about it because by that
time the contract had expired!
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set out in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
the Respondent described in section I, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. By refusing to bargain on request with the aforesaid
Union, as the exclusive representative of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, the Respondent has violated
and is violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The
appropriate bargaining unit is:
All concrete truckdrivers employed at the Respon-
dent's Martinsburg, West Virginia, plant, excluding
all supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. By refusing to produce, at the Union's request, its
written records of the number of hours worked by em-
ployees covered in the appropriate bargaining unit for
the period May 1, 1978, through April 19, 1979, the Re-
spondent has violated and is violating Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of facts, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following:
ORDER 4
The Respondent, Martinsburg Concrete Products, Co.,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with the aforesaid Union, upon
its request, as the exclusive representative of all employ-
ees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
(b) Refusing to produce, on request of the said Union,
its written records of the number of hours worked by
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit for the
period beginning May 1, 1978, through April 19, 1979.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Recognize and, upon request, bargain collectively
with General Teamsters & Allied Workers, Local Union
4 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
MARTINSBURG CONCRETE PRODUCTS CO. 1357
No. 992, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Independent, as the exclusive representative of
all employees in the appropriate unit described above,
with regard to rates of pay, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Produce, for inspection by the Union on demand,
its written records revealing the number of hours
worked by all employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit for the period beginning May 1, 1978, through April
19, 1979.
(c) Post at Martinsburg, West Virginia, facility copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of
I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 5, after being duly signed by its representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."