Markinna Allen, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 10, 2011
0120093068 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 10, 2011)

0120093068

08-10-2011

Markinna Allen, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Great Lakes Area), Agency.




Markinna Allen,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Great Lakes Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120093068

Hearing No. 440-2009-00059X

Agency No. Y1-520-0024-08

DECISION

On July 18, 2009, Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency’s

June 18, 2009, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.

The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final

order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether substantial evidence supports the

EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) conclusion that Complainant failed to

demonstrate that she was subjected to discrimination on the bases of race,

disability, and reprisal.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as

a Distribution Clerk at the Agency’s J.T. Weeker International Service

Center (ISC), Central Pouching Unit, in Chicago, Illinois. Report of

Investigation (ROI), Ex. 11, at 209. Complainant’s duties as a Clerk

required her to lift packages weighing between 40 and 70 pounds. Hr'g

Tr., at 20. In August 2006, while lifting packages, Complaint sustained

an injury to her lower back. Id. at 16. On July 28, 2008, Complainant’s

doctor found that Complainant was suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome and low back pain. ROI, at 29. As a result, beginning on July

28, 2008, Complainant was placed on medical restrictions that limited

her from engaging in repetitive wrist motions and from continuously

standing for more than one hour at a time. ROI, at 20. Complainant was

also placed on a 15-pound lifting restriction. Id.

On September 9, 2008, Complainant asked the Plant Manager if she could

be detailed to an open position in the international records unit that

had been vacated by a retired employee. ROI, Ex. 9, at 207. On September

10, 2008, Complainant’s Supervisor (S1) reassigned Complainant to

light-duty working work manual letter duties, a sedentary assignment,

requiring Complainant to sort outgoing international mail. ROI, at 20. On

September 17, 2008, the Plant Manager denied Complainant’s request to

be detailed to the international records unit, noting that Complainant

had a poor attendance record. ROI, Ex. 9, at 207.

On October 15, 2008, Complainant was reassigned from her manual letter

assignment to the flat sorter machine. Hr'g Tr., at 54. The flat sorter

assignment required Complainant to key in country code numbers on a key

pad to ensure delivery of international mail. Hr'g Tr., at 69. Complainant

felt that the assignment violated her medical restrictions. Hr'g Tr., at

21, 29. On October 11, 2008, in response to S1’s request, Complainant

submitted light-duty documentation noting that she could not lift more

than 10 pounds, engage in repetitive wrist motion, and was restricted

from standing for more than one hour at a time. ROI, at 20. On October

29, 2008, Complainant was reassigned again to a different assignment;

however, she left the Agency before performing the assignment because she

felt that she could not perform the duties due to her restrictions. ROI,

at 34; Hr'g Tr., at 55-57. Thereafter, Complainant resigned from the

Agency. ROI, at 25.

On July 21, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint and subsequently

amended her complaint on November 10, 2008, alleging that the Agency

discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American),

disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. on April 14, 2008, the Plant Manager denied her a detail to the

international records unit;

2. on August 4, 2008, she had not been provided with reasonable

accommodation;

3. on August 8, 2008, she was instructed to perform duties outside of

her medical restrictions; and

4. on October 18, 2008, she was sent home and told that there was no

work available for her within her restrictions.1

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right

to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

Complainant timely requested a hearing, which the AJ held on May 19,

2009. The AJ issued a decision in favor of the Agency on June 2, 2009.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ’s

finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her

to discrimination as alleged.

With respect to claim 1, the AJ noted that the Plant Manager assigned a

coworker to the international records unit without any competition. AJ’s

Decision, at 16. The AJ noted that the Plant Manager was not considering

Complainant for any detail position because of her poor attendance

record.2 Id. The AJ also noted that the selected coworker had already

been assigned to the detail when Complainant asked for it; therefore, the

position was not vacant. Id. The AJ noted that although the coworker’s

assignment created the perception of favoritism, there was no evidence

that it was motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. Regarding claims

2 and 3, the AJ noted that S1 reasonably accommodated Complainant for

her disability. Id. at 17. In particular, the AJ noted that S1 allowed

Complainant to work at her own pace and not do anything that violated her

medical restrictions. Id. at 18. The AJ noted that whenever Complainant

advised S1 that she could not perform a certain function, S1 promptly

reassigned her to perform a different task. Id. The AJ noted that when

Complainant told S1 that she could not perform her duties in Central

Pouching, she was assigned to manual letters. Id. Further, the AJ noted

that when Complainant was no longer able to sort international mail,

S1 found her a different assignment keying in country codes. Id.

The AJ also noted that Complainant wanted to be assigned away from a

floor position to an administrative position. Id. at 19. The AJ noted

that such an administrative position would have required Complainant to

perform repetitive motions such as typing, writing, and lifting. Id. at

19-20. Additionally, the AJ noted that the Agency was not required to

provide Complainant with an accommodation of her choice. Id. at 20. The

AJ further noted that Complainant failed to identify a vacant funded

position that the Agency could provide her. Id. Regarding claim 4, the

AJ noted that Complainant was not denied work on October 18, 2008, but

refused to work the light-duty assignment provided to her. Id. at 20-21.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On Appeal, Complainant contends that she was receiving cortisone shots

in her hands and could not perform the duties of the assignments to which

the Agency reassigned her. Complainant’s Appeal Brief, at 1-2. Further,

Complainant contends that the detail to the international records unit was

not posted and open for all employees. Id. at 2. Complainant also contends

that another employee was awarded a detail and allowed to be absent for

an extended period of time while she was not. Id. at 3. Additionally,

Complainant contends that she was forced resign because the Agency failed

to provide her with an effective reasonable accommodation. Id. at 4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual

findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations

Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding

whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's

conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether

or not a hearing was held.

An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness

or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),

Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment (Claim 1)

To prevail in a case such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part

evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a

prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse

employment action under circumstances that would support an inference

of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576

(1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case,

however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory

reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail,

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).

Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case

of discrimination based on race, disability, and reprisal, we find

that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions, as set forth above. Specifically the Agency explained

that the Plant Manager was not considering Complainant for any detail

position because of her poor attendance record prior to any request for

reasonable accommodation. Complainant now bears the burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s articulated reasons

were a pretext for discrimination. Complainant can do this directly

by showing that the Agency’s proferred explanation is unworthy of

credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

In an attempt to show pretext, Complainant contends that the international

records unit detail she requested was not posted and open for all

employees. Complainant also contends that another employee was awarded a

detail and allowed to be absent for an extended period of time while she

was not. Although the detail was non-competitively awarded, Complainant

has not presented any evidence to prove that discriminatory animus was the

motivation for the assetted pre-selection. Further, the record reflects

that the selected employee was already detailed to the position when

Complainant asked to be detailed to it. Hr'g Tr., at 36. Also, there is

no dispute that the other employee that Complainant cites was absent for

an extended period of time because she had cancer. Complainant’s Appeal

Brief, at 3. Therefore, the Commission finds that substantial evidence

in the record supports the AJ's determination that Complainants failed

to prove that the Agency's explanation was pretext for discrimination.

Reasonable Accommodation (2, 3, and 4)

To establish that complainant was denied a reasonable accommodation,

complainant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability,

as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified”

individual with a disability, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and

(3) the agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC

Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under

the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002).

The term “qualified individual with a disability,” with respect to

employment, is defined as a disabled person who has the skill, educational

background, and work experience required for a position held or desired

and who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).

Assuming, without so finding, that Complainant was disabled within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, we conclude that Complainant has

not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence that she was a qualified

individual with a disability. It is undisputed that Complainant could

no longer perform the essential functions of her Distribution Clerk

position with or without reasonable accommodation. However, with respect

to whether Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability, the

inquiry is not limited to the position actually held by the employee,

but also includes positions that the employee could have held as a result

of job restructuring or reassignment. See Van Horn v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

EEOC Appeal No. 01960159 (Oct. 23, 1998). The record reflects that S1

reassigned Complainant to light-duty working manual letter duties in

an attempt to accommodate her. Hr'g Tr., at 78. Complainant requested

to be reassigned from the manual letter assignment because it bothered

her hands. Id. Thereafter, S1 reassigned Complainant again to another

assignment requiring her to key in country code numbers on a key pad to

ensure delivery of international mail. Complainant could not perform the

duties of the keying reassignment because it bothered her hands. Hr'g

Tr., at 54. As a result, S1 attempted to reassign her again; however,

Complainant left the Agency before performing the reassignment, feeling

that she could not perform the duties due to her disability. ROI, at 34;

Hr'g Tr., at 55-57.

We note Complainant does not dispute that she could not perform the

duties of the assignments that she was reassigned to due to her strict

medical restrictions. Complainant’s Appeal Brief, at 1-2. Further,

Complainant did not identify any vacant funded positions for which

she was qualified and could have been reassigned. Although Complainant

may have wanted to be assigned to an administrative position, such a

position would have required Complainant to use her hands performing

repetitive motions including typing, writing, and lifting. Hr'g Tr.,

at 87. We also note that, notwithstanding Complainant’s contention,

the record reflects that Complainant left work voluntarily of her own

accord because she could felt that she could not perform the duties of

her light-duty assignment.

We therefore conclude that Complainant failed to carry her burden of proof

to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was a qualified

individual with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act. Thus, substantial evidence supports the AJ’s conclusion that the

Agency did not fail to provide Complainant a reasonable accommodation

under the Rehabilitation Act.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the

Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 10, 2011

Date

1 The AJ framed claim 4 as Complainant was sent home on October 18, 2008;

however, the Report of Investigation framed the claim as Complainant

was sent home on October 11, 2008.

2 The Plant Manager referred to Complainant’s attendance record

related to her back injury. The AJ noted that there was no evidence

that Complainant had requested reasonable accommodation related to her

back injury prior to the April 2008 request for reassignment.

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0120093068

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120093068