Mark R. Malouse, Complainant,v.Dr. Donald C. Winter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 3, 2008
0120070712 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 3, 2008)

0120070712

09-03-2008

Mark R. Malouse, Complainant, v. Dr. Donald C. Winter, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Mark R. Malouse,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. Donald C. Winter,

Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120070712

Hearing No. 130-2005-00254X

Agency No. 043937510481

DECISION

On November 14, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

October 10, 2006 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the

Commission affirms the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Pharmacist at the agency's Branch Medical Clinic in Gulfport,

Mississippi. On July 8, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging

that he was discriminated against in reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity when:

1. management denied him civilian physical training (PT) time,

temporary additional duty (TAD) assignments, and annual leave until he

completed the pharmacy Standard Operating Procedure (SOP);

2. management denied him permission to close the pharmacy for lunch

breaks, civilian PT time, and special events;

3. on June 8, 2004, management advised him that an incoming military

pharmacy technician would not be assigned to the pharmacy full-time;

4. on October 7, 2004, complainant's supervisor (S1) rescinded her

approval of complainant's 30-minute annual leave request and directed

him to stay after his duty hours to issue a prescription;

5. from October 13-15, 2004, S1 denied complainant's requests for

30 minutes of annual leave on three separate occasions;

6. during the week of November 1, 2004, S1 denied complainant's

request for annual leave; and

7. on October 29, 2004, S1 issued complainant a Letter of Reprimand

(LOR) for refusing to follow instructions.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on June 14 and July 26,

2006. The AJ subsequently issued a decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ found that assuming, arguendo, complainant established a prima

facie case of reprisal discrimination, the agency nonetheless articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically,

the AJ found that complainant was denied PT time and TAD because of his

failure to complete the SOP, despite being given ample time to do so,

and that once complainant completed the SOP, he was once again granted

PT time and TAD assignments. The AJ further found that complainant was

denied annual leave during major mobilizations and demobilizations,

which was the policy of complainant's facility. The AJ found that

agency policy also required the pharmacy to remain open during lunch,

and could not close until the last patient was served. The AJ found

that the military pharmacy technician was assigned to duties outside

the pharmacy prior to complainant's protected EEO activity. Finally,

the AJ found the issuance of the LOR was in line with agency policies

and procedures. The AJ concluded that complainant failed to show that

any of the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for unlawful retaliation.

The agency's final order adopted the AJ's finding that complainant failed

to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged. On appeal,

complainant reiterates his contention that the agency's actions were

motivated by reprisal for his prior protected EEO activity.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997);

Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December

14, 1995).

Here, we concur with the AJ's finding that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. We also concur

with the AJ's finding that complainant failed to show that any of these

articulated reasons were a pretext for unlawful reprisal. We find that

complainant has proffered no evidence that the agency's actions were

motivated by retaliatory animus. Accordingly, we discern no basis to

disturb the AJ's decision, and the agency's final order is affirmed.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 3, 2008

__________________

Date

2

0120070712

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120070712