Mark Leslie. Caunter

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 1, 2019

12129328 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/129,328 05/29/2008 Mark Leslie CAUNTER QC072273 1911
12371 7590 10/01/2019
Muncy, Geissler, Olds & Lowe, P.C./QUALCOMM
4000 Legato Road, Suite 310
Fairfax, VA 22033
EXAMINER
POUNCIL, DARNELL A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/01/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
meo.docket@mg-ip.com
meo@mg-ip.com
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MARK LESLIE CAUNTER
____________

Appeal 2018-009064
Application 12/129,328
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and
GARTH D. BAER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–67. We have jurisdiction over the pending
rejected claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Qualcomm Incorporated as the real party
in interest. (Appeal Br. 3.)
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THE INVENTION
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is directed to completing
a viral marketing campaign with a common goal, in which a reward may be
given if at least two wireless devices participate in completing at least one
part of a campaign application. (Abstract.)
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject
matter on appeal:
1. A method of executing at least a portion of a campaign
application, the method comprising:
receiving, at a first wireless device, the campaign
application, the campaign application having a plurality of parts
to be completed sequentially by a plurality of different wireless
devices;
completing, by the first wireless device, a first part of the
plurality of parts of the campaign application;
receiving, at the first wireless device, a selection of a
second wireless device of the plurality of different wireless
devices to complete a second part of the plurality of parts of the
campaign application; and
transmitting, by the first wireless device, after completing
the first part of the plurality of parts of the campaign
application, a first campaign application information to the
second wireless device,
wherein each of the plurality of different wireless devices
receives a reward based on whether the plurality of different
wireless devices collectively has completed the plurality of
parts of the campaign application.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1–67 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature,
a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
(Non-Final Act. 2.)
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The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9–12, 14–17, 19, 21, 22, 24–
32, 34–40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 58, 61, and 65–67 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gould et al. (US 2007/0265915 A1, pub.
Nov. 15, 2007) (hereinafter “Gould”) and Allen et al. (US 2010/0279764
A1, pub. Nov. 4, 2010) (hereinafter “Allen”). (Non-Final Act. 6.)
The Examiner rejected claims 3, 8, 13, 18, 23, 28, 33, and 38 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gould, Allen, and Koonce (US
2008/0091517 A1, pub. Apr. 17, 2008). (Non-Final Act. 12.)
The Examiner rejected claims 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59,
60, and 62–64 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gould,
Allen, and in view of Official Notice. (Non-Final Act. 12.)
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief present the following
issues2:
Issue One: Whether the Examiner erred in finding claims 1–67 are
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. (Appeal Br. 10–
21.)
Issue Two: Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Gould and Allen teaches or suggests the limitations:
receiving, at a first wireless device, the campaign
application, the campaign application having a plurality of parts
to be completed sequentially by a plurality of different wireless
devices; . . .

2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the positions of the
Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Oct. 13, 2017); the Reply Brief
(filed Sept. 24, 2018); the Non-Final Office Action (mailed June 5, 2017);
and the Examiner’s Answer (mailed July 26, 2018), for the respective
details.
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receiving, at the first wireless device, a selection of a
second wireless device of the plurality of different wireless
devices to complete a second part of the plurality of parts of the
campaign application;
and . . .
wherein each of the plurality of different wireless devices
receives a reward based on whether the plurality of different
wireless devices collectively has completed the plurality of
parts of the campaign application,

as recited in independent claim 1, and the limitations commensurate in scope
recited in independent claims 6, 11, 16, 21, 26, 31, 36, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55,
58, and 61. (Appeal Br. 21–26.)
Issue Three: Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination
of Gould and Allen, in view of Official Notice, teaches or suggests the
limitations of dependent claims 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, and
62–64. (Appeal Br. 26–28.)
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make
are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We adopt the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own, and we add the following
primarily for emphasis.
First Issue
The Examiner concludes claims 1–67 are patent-ineligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because the claims are “directed to the concept of viral
marketing with the completion of a common goal, a group receiving a
reward, which is considered an abstract idea.” (Non-Final Act. 2.) The
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Examiner characterizes the claims as abstract because the claims are directed
to “certain methods of organizing human activity.” (Non-Final Act. 4.)
The Examiner further concludes that there is nothing in the claims that is
significantly more than this abstract idea because
the claims “are directed to the use of conventional or generic
technology in a nascent but well-known environment, without
any claim that the invention reflects an inventive solution to
any problem presented by combining the two.” [citation
omitted]

(Non-Final Act. 5.)
Appellant argues that
one of the benefits of different wireless devices completing
different parts of the campaign application is that “the viral
marketing campaign can reach more users because the users
themselves have an incentive to recruit even more users to the
assist in the completion of the common goal.”

(Appeal Br. 14, quoting Spec. ¶ 29, citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).) Appellant contends that “there is an
‘improvement to computer functionality’ that results from different wireless
devices completing different parts of the campaign application” (Appeal Br.
14), and particularly that
[t]he functionality of the wireless device 105/106 is thereby
improved because the amount of memory and processing power
that would otherwise be required to participate in completion of
the campaign application 210, i.e., the amount of memory
required to store all parts of the campaign application 210 and
the amount of processing resources requires to process all parts
of the campaign application, is greatly reduced.

(Appeal Br. 15, citing Fig. 2, Spec. ¶¶ 35, 39.)
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An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Here,
independent claims 1 and 21, and their dependent claims relate to a method,
independent claims 6, 16, 26, 36, 46, 48, 55, and 58, and their dependent
claims relate to a machine, and independent claims 11, 31, 50, and 61, and
their dependent claims relate to a product — each a machine, process, or
manufacture. However, the Supreme Court has long held that “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 598–99
(2013)). The “abstract ideas” category embodies the longstanding rule that
an idea, by itself, is not patentable. Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17.
In Alice, the Supreme Court sets forth an analytical “framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.” Id. at 217. The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether
the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,”
such as an abstract idea. Id. Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and
thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical concepts (Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible
include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products”
(Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making
water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7
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(quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and
manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the Alice/Mayo analysis is to consider the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there
are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)).
In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’ —
i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73.) A claim that recites an abstract idea must include additional
features to ensure that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. A transformation into
a patent-eligible application requires more than simply stating the abstract
idea while adding the words “apply it.” Id.
Further to the Alice/Mayo analytical framework, after the mailing of
the Answer and the filing of the Briefs in this case, the USPTO published
revised guidance on the application of Section 101. See 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(hereinafter “Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
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organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, does the Office then look to whether
the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance.
In evaluating the claims at issue, we consider claim 1 as
representative, consistent with how Appellant and the Examiner analyze the
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2016). The claimed method as a
whole recites a method of executing at least a portion of a campaign
application in order “to deploy[] a viral marketing campaign” (Spec. ¶ 1),
and accordingly recites a method of organizing human activity.
Omitting the portions of the claim invoking use of generic technology
(which are discussed separately below), the remaining limitations of claim 1
(both “receiving” steps, as well as the “completing” and “transmitting”
steps) elaborate on the actions performed by the wireless device user, who
performs the actions in the hope of “receiv[ing] an award.” (Ans. 9.) These
steps also benefit the owner of the “campaign application,” who at a
minimum expects the application to engage the attention of prospective
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customers, and possibly expects the engagement to lead to data collection or
sales.
Apart from the use of generic technology (discussed further below),
each of these limitations additionally describes the information gathering
activities performed by a first wireless device user who inputs information to
complete a “first part of the plurality of parts” and selects “a second wireless
device” to receive the “first campaign application information”; then the
second wireless device user is enticed to repeat the information gathering
process.
As stated in the Revised Guidance, commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations;
advertising; marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations) are
an example of organizing human activity. (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.) The behavior of the wireless device users who receive a portion of
the “campaign application” fall under this description.
Similarly, the information supplied by the wireless device users falls
under this description. Analogous authority includes, e.g., Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing collecting information, analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, and presenting the results of collecting and analyzing
information, without more, as matters within the realm of abstract ideas); see
also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing
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information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.”
(Quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing cases).)
In sum, the subject matter of claim 1 is a fundamental economic
practice, which is one of the certain methods of organizing human activity
identified in the Revised Guidance. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner
that the subject matter of claim 1 recites an abstract idea, as do the remaining
claims.
Further, pursuant to the Revised Guidance, we consider whether there
are additional elements set forth in claim 1 that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55. As indicated above, the abstract idea of claim 1 is carried out using
various generic technological components to facilitate the collection of user
input and the transmission of the campaign application: first and second
wireless devices.
None of these additional elements integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application. In particular, regarding the claim limitations reciting
these devices may improve the fundamental economic practice of
interactions between the wireless device users and the owner of the
campaign application, but are not an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Thus, the subject matter here is distinguished from that considered in
such authorities as BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There, the court held eligible claims
directed to a technology-based solution to filter Internet content that
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overcame existing problems with other Internet filtering systems by making
a known filtering solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet
Service Provider (ISP)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized
filtering at the ISP. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Notably, this customizable
filtering solution improved the computer system’s performance and,
therefore, was patent-eligible. See id. But unlike the filtering system
improvements in BASCOM that added significantly more to the abstract idea
in that case, the claimed invention here uses generic computing components
to implement an abstract idea as noted previously.
Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016). There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules
that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters. Id. at 1315. Notably, the
recited process automatically animated characters using particular
information and techniques—an improvement over manual three-
dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 1316.
But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely uses generic computing components to advance a
marketing campaign. This generic computer implementation using mobile
devices does not improve a display mechanism as was the case in McRO.
See SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1167 (distinguishing McRO).
Although Appellant contends that “wireless device 105/106 only
stores, and only completes, the current part 225 of the campaign application
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210” (Appeal Br. 15, citing Fig. 2), “merely adding computer functionality
to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent
eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1057 (Fed. Cir.
2017). The savings efficiency afforded by each wireless device only storing
and completing its portion of the campaign application is part of the abstract
idea, and is only a conclusory, unpersuasive assertion that the subject matter
provides any improvements to technology. (Appeal Br. 13–15; Reply Br. 3–
6.)
Nor does the subject matter of claim 1 contain additional elements
that implement the judicial exception with a “particular machine,” because
the claims do not specify any particular technology. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(b). Further, the method does not transform matter; at best it
transforms information. See MPEP § 2106.05(c). Nor does claim 1 have
any other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), or any of the other
considerations set forth in the Revised Guidance regarding a determination
of whether additional elements integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, the
claim “merely includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a
computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea.”
Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the subject matter of claim 1 (and the
remaining pending claims) is directed to an abstract idea, and the additional
elements recited therein do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application.
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Turning to the second step of the Alice inquiry, we do not agree with
Appellant that additional elements of claim 1 add “significantly more” to the
basic abstract idea encompassed by the claim sufficient to transform the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at
223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
Appellant’s contention that “wireless device 105/106 only stores, and
only completes, the current part 225 of the campaign application 210” is an
improvement on the basic abstract idea itself. “It is clear from Mayo that the
‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself.” Aatrix Software, Inc.
v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Moreover, “[p]atent law does not protect claims to an ‘asserted advance in
the realm of abstract ideas . . . no matter how groundbreaking the advance.’”
Id. at 1359 (citation omitted.) Unlike Core Wireless, in which “the claims
are directed to an improvement in the functioning of computers,” (Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2018), Appellant’s improvement is part of the abstract idea, despite the
claim limitations reciting a first and second wireless device.
The record supports the Examiner’s finding that additional elements
— a wireless device (recited in claim 1), and both a transceiver and a
processor (although neither recited in claim 1 but contained in the wireless
device) — are well-understood, routine, and conventional, specified at a
high level of generality. (Non-Final Act. 5; see also Fig. 1, Spec. ¶¶ 30–31.)
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of
claim 1. Appellant provides no arguments that would differentiate the
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remaining claims. Thus, the foregoing analysis of claim 1 is exemplary of
that for claims 2–67. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(2016). Therefore, we
also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of those claims.
Second Issue
In finding the combination of Gould and Allen teaches or suggests the
claim 1 limitations at issue, the Examiner relies on the disclosure of Gould
of a system for encouraging wireless device users to transmit a message
containing a marketing message in exchange for an incentive to be awarded
when the user sends the message. (Non-Final Act. 6–7, 14–15; Ans. 8–9;
Gould Fig. 2, ¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 48, 50, 69.) The Examiner further relies on the
disclosure of Allen of a group award for completing a group game or
challenge, in which players who are social network contacts form the group.
(Non-Final Act. 7; Ans. 9; Allen Abstract, ¶¶ 7, 15, 44.)
Appellant argues that “Gould does not disclose or suggest that the
next recipient is selected ‘to complete a second part of the plurality of parts
of the campaign application’ (emphasis added), as required by independent
claim 1.” (Reply Br. 8.) Appellant further contends that
because neither Gould nor Allen discloses or suggests a
“campaign application having a plurality of parts to be
completed sequentially by a plurality of different wireless
devices,” as discussed above, Allen cannot disclose or suggest
“wherein each of the plurality of different wireless devices
receives a reward based on whether the plurality of different
wireless devices collectively has completed the plurality of
parts of the campaign application,” as also recited in
independent claim 1.

(Reply Br. 8.)
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner finds,
and we agree, that
the reference of Gould teaches or suggests sending sequentially
a message to at least one or more recipients as stated in [0069],
“When any recipient passes along an overall message to one or
more further or additional recipients, the recipient is rewarded
with the appropriate incentive.”

(Ans. 8.) The Examiner further finds, and we agree, that Allen teaches
“completing [a] task as a group and the group receiving the reward once the
task is completed.” (Non-Final Act. 7, citing Allen Abstract, ¶¶ 7, 15, 44
(emphasis omitted).)
The Examiner’s finding regarding Gould quoted immediately above
establishes both the sequential message sending, in which the most current
recipient, passes the message to an additional recipient (via entering the
recipient’s phone or other electronic address) in field 120 and may add
additional text in field 130. See Gould Fig. 2, ¶ 61. The Examiner’s
findings regarding Allen quoted immediately above are confirmed by Figure
1 of Allen (referenced in Allen ¶ 44), which illustrates that a “Reward” of
“50 Status Points Each” is offered in reward display 126 “[o]nce the group
members complete the tasks” (Allen ¶ 49).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive as non-obviousness cannot
be established by attacking references individually where, as here, the
ground of unpatentability is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Rather, the test for obviousness is whether the combination of references,
taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee’s invention to a person
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having ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 and independent claims 6, 11, 16, 21, 26, 31, 36, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52,
55, 58, and 61 commensurate in scope with independent claim 1, and
dependent claims 2–5, 8–10, 12–15, 17–19, 22–25, 27–30, 33–34, 35, 37–
41, 43, and 65–67 not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 25–28.
Third Issue
Appellant argues that “even if the Examiner’s Officially Noticed
allegations were correct, these allegations do not render obvious the features
of dependent claims 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, and 62–64.”
(Appeal Br. 26–27.) Particularly, Appellant contends that:
1. regarding claim 42, “even if ‘two different types of data on one server
is well known,’ this allegation does not render obvious the feature of
‘wherein the campaign application is received from a server from
which the reward is distributed to the plurality of different wireless
devices’”; and
2. regarding claim 64, “even if ‘mobile devices having [a] contact list is
well known,’ this allegation does not render obvious the feature of
‘wherein the second wireless device is selected from a list of contacts
stored on the first wireless device.’”
(Appeal Br. 27.)
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Regarding claim 42,
the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “two different types of data on one
server is well known to those of ordinary skill in the art” and that
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it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at
the time of the invention, to have modified the method of Gould
and Allen so as to have included the campaign application is
received from a server from which the reward is distributed to
the plurality of different wireless devices in order to keep
equipment cost more economical.

(Non-Final Act. 13.)
Regarding claim 64, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “mobile
devices having [a] contact list is well known to those of ordinary skill in the
art” and that
it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at
the time of the invention, to have modified the method of Gould
and Allen so as to have included wherein the second wireless
device is selected from a list of contacts stored on the first
wireless device in order to quickly and efficiently contact
someone thereby making it easier to send and receive parts.

(Non-Final Act. 14.) Appellant neither shows any factual evidence that
contradicts the Examiner’s use of Official Notice, nor shows any factual
evidence that contradicts the Examiner’s cited motivation to combine the
references. Instead, Appellant contends “[t]here is simply no support on the
record.” (Appeal Br. 27, 28.) Attorney arguments or conclusory statements
are insufficient to rebut a prima facie case. See, e.g., In re Geisler, 116 F.3d
1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 42 and 64,
and claims 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, and 63 not argued
separately.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–67 § 101 1–67
1, 2, 4–7, 9–12,
14–17, 19, 21, 22,
24–32, 34–40, 41,
43, 44, 46, 48, 50,
52, 55, 58, 61, 65–
67
§ 103 Gould, Allen 1, 2, 4–7, 9–
12, 14–17, 19,
21, 22, 24–32,
34–40, 41, 43,
44, 46, 48, 50,
52, 55, 58, 61,
65–67

3, 8, 13, 18, 23,
28, 33, 38
§ 103 Gould, Allen,
Koonce
3, 8, 13, 18,
23, 28, 33, and
38

42, 45, 47, 49, 51,
53, 54, 56, 57, 59,
60, 62–64
§ 103 Gould, Allen,
Official Notice
42, 45, 47, 49,
51, 53, 54, 56,
57, 59, 60,
62–64

Overall Outcome 1–67

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED