Mario Milevoi And Lucia Milevoi, Joint Owners

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 16, 1987

282 N.L.R.B. 779 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

MARIO MILEVOI & LUCIA MILEVOI 779
Mario Milevoi and Lucia M levoi , Joint Owners and
Service Employees International Union, Local
32E, AFL-CIO. Case 2-CA-21624
16 January 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 25 September 1986 Administrative Law
Judge Harold B. Lawrence issued the attached de-
cision. The Respondents filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondents, Mario, Mi-
levoi and Lucia Milevoi, Joint Owners, Bronx,
New 'York, their officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
1 The Respondents have excepted to some of the judge's credibility
findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra-
tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of
all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re-
versing the findings
We are also satisfied that the Respondents' contention that the judge
was biased is without merit. In our opinion, there is nothing in the record
to suggest that his conduct and rulings at the hearing and his decision
were based on either bias or prejudice.
2 In adopting the judge's conclusion that the Respondents violated Sec.
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to retain employees Reyes and Mi-
jerillo, we do not rely on the judge's finding that Reyes, as a married
man, met the Respondents ' purported criteria of its asserted management
policy of employing a husband-wife team as superintendent and porter in
its buildings Nevertheless, we conclude based , on the judge's other find-
ings that the Respondents ' asserted reason for refusing to retain Reyes
and Mijerillo was pretextual.
plaint issued on 21 May 1986, alleging that Mario Mile-
voi and Lucia Milevoi, the Respondents, purchased an
apartment building at 1695 Grand Concourse, Bronx,
New York, and became successor employers of the
building 's maintenance personnel , operating the, same
business as the previous owners. Respondents are alleged
to have violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act) by informing the
superintendent and porter then employed at the building
by the former owner that they could not work for Re-
spondents because of their membership in the Union, by
discharging them on assuming title to, the property and
refusing to reinstate them at any time thereafter, and by
refusing to recognize the `Union as the collective-bargain-
ing representative of the building employees. (At the end
of the hearing, without formally moving to amend, the
complaint, the General Counsel announced a reinterpre-
tation of the discharging allegation to the effect that
what was meant was a refusal to hire because of union
membership.' Inasmuch as the case was so understood by
both sides from the very beginning and was tried on that
basis, the 'complaint is deemed amended accordingly.)
The Respondents' answer denied all allegations of
wrongdoing and statutory violation and denied, knowl-
edge or information with respect to allegations concern-
ing the previous owner and relating to the Union's status
as a labor organization. (The latter denial was retracted
at the hearing.) In addition, it alleged affirmatively that
Respondents had not assumed the preexisting collective-
bargaining agreements between the Union and their
predecessor in title; that they had never employed nor
discharged the superintendent and the porter; that they
had never expressed in words or actions any discrimina-
tory sentiments towards any union; and that they had, in
contemplation of taking title to the building, hired a hus-
band-wife team to be the superintendent and the porter
in the building, pursuant 'to their theory that apartment
buildings can be better, serviced by such teams, resident
at the premises, than by employees who do not have
similar attachments.
The' parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to in-
troduce relevant evidence. Posthearing briefs have been
filed on behalf of the General Counsel and on behalf of
the Respondents.
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the
briefs filed by the General Counsel and counsel for the
Respondents, J make the following
James Wasserman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Godfrey P. Schmidt, Esq., of New York, New York, for
the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HAROLD B. LAWRENCE, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was heard by me at New York, New York, on
21 July 1986 and 6 August 1986. The charge was filed
on 17 April 1986 by Service Employees International
Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO (the Union). The com-
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
There is no issue regarding jurisdiction. In accordance
with allegations of the complaint that were admitted in
the answer, I find that Respondents have owned and op-
erated various apartment buildings and annually derive
gross revenues in excess of $500,000 from their real
estate operations; that purchases of fuel oil and other
supplies, valued in excess of $10,000 per year, are deliv-
ered to them by firms located in New York State that
282 NLRB No. 114
780 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obtain them from points outside New York State; and
that they are an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At
the hearing it was stipulated , and I accordingly fmd, that
the Union is and at all pertinent times was a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The General Counsel's Case
Mario Milevoi and Lucia Milevoi , the Respondents,
have been operating apartment buildings for many years.
On 11 April 1986' they took title to the building known
as 1695 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York. The next
day, Mario Milevoi (Milevoi) told Luis Reyes, the super-
intendent employed by the former owner, that his serv-
ices would not be continued by Respondents . He asked
Reyes to deliver a similar message to the porter, Felix
Mijerillo (referred to as "Murillo" in the complaint,
which is deemed corrected to reflect his correct name).
Reyes was requested to vacate the apartment in the
building that he occupied as an incident of his employ-
ment.
The General Counsel contends that Respondents re-
fused to continue the employment of Reyes and Mijerillo
at the building because they were members of the Union.
The evidence consists of statements attributed to Milevoi
by Reyes , testimony by the union business agent respect-
ing Milevoi's refusal to respond to union requests that he
assume the collective-bargaining agreement between the
Union and the former owner or sit down and negotiate a
new one, and evidence of a similar recent violation by
the Respondents at another building owned by them.
Reyes testified that Milevoi visited the premises on
several occasions prior to 12 April but was extremely in-
definite about the dates. Milevoi conceded that he had
been at the building twice before the closing and on the
day after. Reyes testified that on one of these visits Mile-
voi had been accompanied by two other men and re-
turned, alone, for a conversation in the superintendent's
apartment in which he offered Reyes the sum of $2000 to
leave the job without creating a fuss.
Reyes testified:
Q. What did he say to you and what did you say
to him?
A. He came to me and he said he wanted to talk
to me man to man. He say he was planning to buy
the building . He had in mind to buy the building
and he was willing to give me $2000 for me to
leave the job, the apartment without telling any-
body, without telling the union and my former boss
George Astor.
Reyes testified that he replied that he would think
about it, but instead reported it to the union business rep-
resentative , Charles T. Ayers. In his own testimony,
Ayers confirmed that Reyes had made such a report to
him but he was uncertain whether Reyes had specifically
mentioned the amount that Milevoi had offered. Ayers
1 All dates are in 1986 except otherwise stated.
sent Milevoi a letter, dated 7 March , inviting him, as the
new owner of the premises, to assume the collective-bar-
gaining agreement that the Union had had with Milevoi's
predecessor. Receiving no response , he sent another
letter on 18 March , inviting negotiations with the Union
as the representative of the employees at the building.
He gave Reyes a copy of the contract and assumption
forms, together with his business card, which Reyes tried
to give to Milevoi when he saw him a week or two later.
Milevoi refused to accept them . Reyes quoted Milevoi as
expressing a strongly antiunion attitude:
Q. What did he say to you when you offered it?
A. He said to me that he wasn 't interested in
that . I told him I pick this up from the union and
they asked me to give you this. This is a contract
because I belong to a union . He say he have noth-
ing to do with a union . That he will not accept it.
He wouldn't take it.
He say he will give this case to his lawyer. The
case to his lawyer . He told me that the union was
going to give him a hard time and he will give the
case to his lawyer.
Reyes also quoted Milevoi as saying that none of his
buildings were union buildings, a fact confirmed by Mile-
voi in his own testimony , and that he had nothing
against Reyes personally but did not want a union build-
ing. Milevoi rejected a suggestion by Reyes that Reyes
would work for him "even without a union" because the
Union would give him a hard time.
On 12 April, the day after the title closing, Milevoi ap-
peared at the building with a new superintendent whom
he had hired for the building and a superintendent from
another of his buildings , who proceeded to change locks
on the premises . Milevoi told Reyes he had bought the
building and asked for, and received, the keys. Reyes
again inquired about working for him and Milevoi again
rejected the idea . He told Reyes to inform Mijerillo to
stop working. It is uncontroverted that Reyes and' Mijer-
illo were never employees of the Respondents.
The General Counsel thus established a prima facie
case that Respondents , acting through Milevoi, informed
Reyes and Mijerillo that they would not be employed
because of their union membership , that they were not
employed precisely for that reason, and that Milevoi re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union under cir-
cumstances in which that obligation existed . (The succes-
sorship question is discussed below.) Respondents , there-
fore had the burden of showing that Reyes and Mijerillo
were excluded from continued employment not because
of their union membership , but for a lawful reason.
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 , 1089 (1980); enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982),
approved in NLRB Y. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983).
B. The Respondent's Case
The essence of Respondents ' defense is that Reyes and
Mijerillo were not kept on because their retention would
have been inconsistent with the system by which Re-
spondents manage their apartment buildings.
MARIO MILEVOI & LUCIA MILEVOI 781
The answer, subscribed and sworn: tu: the Respondetts
themselves , alleges that they had discovered, in -the
course of managing other apartment houses, that hus-
band-wife teams in which the husband is the superintend-
ent and the wife is the porter make operation and main-
tenance "more attentive to the needs of the tenants" and
eliminate disputes among themselves and disputes with
the tenants. According to the answer, "such a one-family
team gives to the tenants the advantage, of a family-to-
family relationship with that team." It was alleged that
Respondents therefore arranged in advance of the clos-
ing to install a husband-wife team at 1695 Grand Con-
course as soon as title had passed.
In his opening statement at the hearing, Respondents'
counsel declared:
The real motivation was that they wanted to give
scope to a plan of theirs to use instead of ordinary
porter and superintendent of the building a husband
and wife team who would be paid an aggregate that
was very close, if not exactly identical, to the Union
rates. But they felt that having a family run a big
apartment house was something that was better
than having just two employees.
Milevoi's initial testimony was directly in line with the
theory set forth in the answer and in the statement by
Respondent's counsel. He testified that the installation of
such husband-wife teams had been Respondents' practice
for at least the last 9 years.
The Respondents thus disputed the allegation that they
were successor employers in part on the basis that,
having declined to retain the previous owner's employ-
ees for a lawful business reason, they cannot be deemed
to have taken over the operation in its entirety. (A fur-
ther basis for denying successorship is discussed below.)
Respondents may operate their ,properties in any
manner not violative of the Act, but, having incurred the
burden of showing a legitimate reason for their action,
they also incurred the risk that I might find the reason
asserted to be pretextual and not the true basis for their
action, and that I might consequently infer that the , true
reason was the one alleged by the General Counsel. That
is what happened in this case, for I found Respondents'
explanation of their conduct utterly unpersuasive.
To begin with, the management principle supposedly
adhered to by Respondents - was quickly exposed as a
sham. Luis Reyes is a young man who is married and has
a young child. Milevoi knew this, having been in his
apartment to talk' to him when Reyes' family was there.
Reyes obviously met Milevoi's purported criteria, yet he
was not retained. Asked to explain this departure from
the supposed practice, Milevoi testified to an exception
to the management principle not previously mentioned in
his answer or in his testimony up to that: point. He testi-
fied that he installed husband-wife teams only in his
larger buildings. He was vague about where the bounda-
ry lay between husband-wife buildings and the superin-
tendent-porter buildings, suggesting at different times
buildings of 30 or 40 units, of 32 units, and of 30 units.
Wherever he drew the line, however, his testimony
ran afoul of two facts that could not be evaded. The first
wasm-that.1695_ Grand Concourse is a building with 72
apartment units and is therefore a husband-wife building
in which Reyes could have been employed consistently
with Respondents' asserted management practices. The
second was that upon acquisition of a building in 1985
that had 80 or more rental units, Respondents replaced a
union superintendent and porter with another superin-
tendent without regard to the latter's marital status and,
in a proceeding brought against them for violation of the
Act, never mentioned the husband-wife principle in their
answer or testimony. (Mario Milevoi and Lucia Milevoi,
Joint Owners, and Service Employees International Union,
Local 32E, AFL-CIO, Case 2-CA-20883, 3D(N10-39-
86, May 14, 1986.)
After both sides had rested, Respondents' counsel at-
tempted, during final argument, to restore credibility to
Respondents' defense by engrafting a further exception
on the management principle, namely, that the married
superintendent also had to speak the Croatian language.
Final argument at a hearing is a late point at which to
raise even the most cogent afterthought, but, in the inter-
est of a full airing of the facts, I recalled Milevoi to the
stand to allow him to furnish an evidentiary underpin-
ning for the argument by counsel. Milevoi proceeded to
testify that though Reyes was married, he had not been
retained because he did not speak the Croatian language.
Speaking Croatian was a necessary qualification for the
job because it facilitated communication between Milevoi
and the superintendent and resulted in better service to
the tenants. He conceded, however, that the tenants
spoke English, not Croatian,, and he did not venture to
say whether he staffed the smaller buildings with Cro-
atian-speaking superintendents.
Milevoi's testimony did not resolve the difficulty,
however, for it appeared that there is even an exception
to the Croatian language exception. Milevoi, conceded
that all the husband-wife teams in the larger buildings
are not Croatian. One is Maltese. After having to make
that admission, Milevoi downgraded the importance of
Croatian-speaking superintendents:
MR. WASSERMAN: ' Is that the reason that you
pick this guy because he spoke Croatian?
THE WITNESS: Well, it's not 100 percent. Really
the reason is good that, we can understand each
other, what I want, I like to explain these people
where they go there. I tell them how I want to run
the building, what I want to do in the building and
no misunderstanding.
MR. WASSERMAN: Is that 75 percent of your mo-
tivation or 50 percent or 5 percent?
THE WITNESS: I would say at least language is at
50 percent ... .
The engrafting of these exceptions on the purported
management principle that Milevoi claimed precluded
the retention of Reyes and Mijerillo amounted to nothing
more than the furnishing of shifting reasons for Respond-
ents' action and a powerful reason to adopt the General
Counsel's interpretation of Respondents' motivation. It
rendered Respondents' defense completely incredible.
Even Milevoi's account of his conversation with Reyes
782 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on 12 April, at the time he discharged him, is implausi-
ble. He makes no mention at all of Reyes' repeated offer
to work for him, which Reyes testified he made. Reyes'
suggestion would have seemed to be natural , but Milevoi
testified instead to a conversation that makes little sense:
I said Ray, I said I 'm sorry you don't work-you're
not going to work any more for me and this is
going to be my new super, which is another man. I
asked him for the key politely which he did give it
to me. He asked me why. I said I going to have a
team, wife and husband, they're going to do. He
said give me some time that I can clean my tools. I
said take your time. Whatever you want. As a
matter of fact he asked me one room which I did
give it to him. He had a lot of material stuff, which
he have. A key, which he have. He keep it still
even matter of fact today his material place what-
ever he got.
Milevoi thus told Reyes, a married superintendent
with a young child, that he was being replaced because
the ' new owner needed a married superintendent, and
Reyes' only response was to ask for time to clean his
tools and a place to store some things. Reyes' version is
much more plausible.
I tended generally to credit Reyes' testimony over that
of Milevoi . He impressed me as sincere , earnest, and
truthful, notwithstanding his lack of precision respecting
dates and the possibility that he was in error about some
of the facts. Milevoi's testimony on dates was not any
better. For example, he testified at one point that he vis-
ited the building twice before taking title and appeared
with the new superintendent at the building on 12 April,
the day after the closing; later he testified that he visited
in February, March, and at the end of April. The first
time, he said he was accompanied on the visit following
the closing by two persons; the second time he only
mentioned "the super."
Reyes testified that Milevoi was accompanied on the
earlier visits by other persons; Milevoi denied it. Even if
Milevoi is correct, however , it does not affect my assess-
ment of Reyes' credibility with respect to the central
facts of the case. As it was, on at least one point of fact
on which Milevoi controverted Reyes he ended up con-
ceding the truth of a portion of what Reyes had said: he
conceded that he had offered money to Reyes, asserting
that he had offered to pay Reyes" "moving expenses" up
to the sum of $2000.
In connection with that offer, Milevoi's testimony con-
flicted with statements contained in a affidavit which he
had furnished to a Board investigator as recently as 8
May, which is in evidence and bears his initials on every
page. He testified:
Q. Did you ever specify the amount of money
you would pay if he moved quickly?
A. No whatsoever. I never used the dollar and
cents, dollar number. Never money whatsoever,
dollar and cents how much money.
However, in his affidavit , Milevoi had stated:
I did tell the old super that I would pay the old
super up to $2,000 to cover his expenses in moving.
Milevoi's attempt to gloss over the contradiction by
insisting that the monetary offer was only to pay "ex-
penses" amounted to an evasion of the issues by center-
ing the debate on the question of the true nature of his
offer. As noted above, I credit Reyes' version that it was
a flat offer to pay a fixed sum in exchange for his leaving
the job quietly.
(The General Counsel noted another variance between
Milevoi's testimony and his affidavit, when he testified
he did not know a person whom he named in the affida-
vit as having referred the new superintendent to him.)
Reyes' credibility in attributing antiunion statements to
Milevoi is enhanced by Milevoi's testimony that no
union personnel are employed in any of Respondents'
buildings and by the fact that Milevoi has been proven to
have made similar statements on other occasions. In the
1985 proceeding referred to above, which was tried
before me, I found that Milevoi had, on acquiring title to
a building located at 1188 Grand Concourse, Bronx,
New York, told the superintendent that he did not want
the Union in the building and discharged him because he
was a union member. No exceptions were filed by Re-
spondents to my decision and my Order directing rein-
statement of the superintendent became the final Order
of the Board on 1 July. Though the decision in the earli-
er case was influenced by factors that do not exist in the
instant case, I found that Milevoi had done and said
things that are similar to his statements and actions in the
present case. Though those circumstances are the only
proven conduct on Respondents' part that parallel the
conduct alleged here, I believe it discloses a pattern of
activity on Respondents' part that may be taken into
consideration in determining whether they are guilty of
the offenses alleged in the complaint. Milevoi's state-
ments and behavior are identical and of fairly recent oc-
currence.
Accordingly, I do not credit Milevoi's explanation of
the failure to retain Reyes and Mijerillo in their jobs. As
expounded in the answer and in Milevoi 's testimony, it is
inherently self-contradictory, inconsistent with objective-
ly established facts, and riddled through with shifting
reasons (or "exceptions") presented one at a time as diffi-
culties with the explanation became apparent. I find the
reason advanced by Respondents for their actions to be
pretextual and that they refused to continue Reyes and
Mijerillo in their jobs because they belonged to the
Union, thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act. I find, in addition, that they violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act when Milevoi told Reyes that he and Mijer-
illo could not continue working at the building because
of their union membership.
The corollary to these findings is that Respondents
continued the business of their predecessor and were a
successor employer. It was unlawful for them to replace
employees solely because of their union membership.
They could not evade their obligation , as a successor
employer, to deal with the Union as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees at the building
by the simple expedient of getting rid of the employees.
MARIO MILEVOI & LUCIA MILEVOI
Howard .Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Emplojees,-417-
U.S. 249 (1974); Potter's Chalet Drug, 233 NLRB 15
(1977); Columbia Marine Service, 191 NLRB 197 (1971).
Respondents, however, resist the finding of successor-
ship on the additional ground that their operation was es-
sentially different from that of the former owner of the
building. According to Milevoi, the former owner ne-
glected cleaning and maintenance of the property; the
Respondent, on the other hand, kept the property clean
and well maintained and provide the tenants with the
services to which they were entitled. I cannot agree with
Respondents that this difference, assuming it to be true,
constitutes an entirely different type of operation from
that which preceded it. The Respondents have made an
assertion to that effect, but have not proved it. They
have simply asserted that they do better the same thing
the former owner did or was supposed to do, but ne-
glected to do. Milevoi's testimony about Respondents'
superior maintenance practices goes to the'method of the
operation, but not to its nature. Respondents are doing
the same thing the former owner did, providing habitable
living space in an apartment building to tenants who pay
rent for it. Their acquisition of 1695 Grand Concourse
and assumption of its management resulted in no substan-
tial alteration of the employing enterprise.
As a successor employer, Respondents were not bound
by the collective-bargaining agreement between the
Union and the former owner, but they were obligated to
recognize the Union and deal with it as the employees'
collective-bargaining representative. I do not credit Mile-
voi's testimony that the Union's two letters were never
received, nor his denial that Reyes tendered a copy of
the contract and an assumption agreement . Quite aside
from that, however, the fact remains that he knew the
Union represented Reyes and Mijerillo. He refused to
continue their employment for that very reason . His re-
fusal to deal with the Union violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents, Mario Milevoi and Lucia Milevoi, are
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Service Employees International Union, Local 32E,
AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by refusing to retain Luis Reyes and Felix Mijerillo
in their employment as superintendent and porter, re-
spectively, of an apartment 'building that Respondents
purchased because they were members of the Union.
4. Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
advising Reyes that he and Mijerillo could not keep their
jobs because they were members of the Union.
5. Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by refusing to recognize the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees at
1695 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York, from and
after 11 April 1986.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
783
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)
of the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondents be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act. '
I shall recommend that the Respondents be directed to
make Luis Reyes and Felix Mijerillo whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits that they may have suf-
fered by reason of the refusal of the Respondents to
permit -them to continue in their jobs because of their
union membership from and after 12 April 1986, with
backpay to be computed in the manner prescribed in F.
W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in Flor-
ida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977), and Isis Plumbing
Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). The calculation of the back-
pay owed to Luis Reyes must take into account the
rental value of the apartment at 1695 Grand Concourse,
Bronx, New York, which he was compelled to ' vacate
when his employment as superintendent at the premises
came to an end. The extent to which he received use of
the apartment rent-free or at reduced rental as part of his
compensation must be taken into account.
I shall further recommend that the Respondents be di-
rected to recognize and bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees employed at 1695 Grand Concourse, Bronx,
New York.
On these fmdings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following - recommend-
ed2
ORDER
The Respondents , Mario Milevoi and Lucia Milevoi,
Bronx, New York, their agents, representatives, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to hire or reinstate any employee because
that employee is a member of Service Employees Inter-
national Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO or any other
union.
(b) Telling any employee that he or she may not work
for Respondents because he or she is a member of Serv-
ice Employees International Union, Local 32E, AFL-
CIO, or any other union.
(c) Refusing to recognize Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of their employees at
1695 Grand Concourse , Bronx, New York, or to negoti-
ate with the Union with regard to wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment of the employees.
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 .48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
784 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
representative of their employees at 1695 Grand Con-
course , Bronx, New York, with respect to wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment of the employ-
ees.
(b) Offer Luis Reyes and Felix Mijerillo immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them, in the manner
set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at the building at 1695 Grand Concourse,
Bronx, New York, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being
signed by the Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspic-
uous places including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to employ any person because
that person is a member of Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO, or any other union,
or state to any person that we will not employ that
person for such a reason.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize Service Employees
International Union, Local 32E, AFL-CIO as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of our employ-
ees at premises 1695 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New
York.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union with re-
spect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment of all employees at 1695 Grand Concourse,
Bronx, New York.
WE WILL offer Luis Reyes and Felix Mijerillo immedi-
ate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights
and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them.
MARION MILEVOI AND LUCIA MILEVOI,
JOINT OWNERS