Marine Welding and Repair Works, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 20, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 553 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

MARINE WELDING AND REPAIR WORKS 553
Marine Welding and Repair Works , Inc.; Williamson
Engine and Supply, Inc.; Greenville Manufacturing
and Machine Works, Inc.; Greenville Propeller
Works, Inc. and Industrial , Technical and Profes-
sional Employees Division of National Maritime
Union of America , AFL-CIO. Cases 26-CA-2756,
26-CA-2843, 26-CA-286 1, and 26-CA-2875
March 20, 1973
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On February 20, 1969, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issued an Order in the above -entitled
proceeding, finding, inter alia, that the Respondent
had discriminatorily discharged Freddie Lee Walker,
Dewitt B. Harrison, and Isiah Layton in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Art and directing that
Respondent make whole the above-mentioned em-
ployees for any loss of earnings resulting from the
discrimination. Thereafter, on March 1, 1971, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit entered its decree enforcing the Board's
Order.'
On January 26, 1972, the Regional Director for
Region 26 issued a backpay specification and, on
February 16, 1972, the Respondent filed an answer
thereto. On February 24, 1972, the Regional Director
issued an amended backpay specification, and on
March 2, 1972, the Respondent filed an answer
thereto. Upon appropriate notice issued by the
Regional Director, a hearing was held before
Administrative Law Judge Max Rosenberg on
March 15 and 16, 1972, for the purpose of determin-
ing the amounts of backpay due the three claimants.
On October 19, 1972, the Administrative Law Judge
issued his Supplemental Decision, attached hereto, in
which he found that the discriminatees were entitled
to the following payments together with interest at 6
percent per annum less any lawfully required tax
withholding: Dewitt B. Harrison, $6,507, Isiah
Layton, $4,180.88, and Freddie Lee Walker, $10,-
819.62.2
Thereafter, the Respondent and the General
Counsel filed exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge's Supplemental Decision and supporting
briefs. The General Counsel also filed an answering
brief to the Respondent's exceptions.3
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Supplemental Decision in light of the
exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the
rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administra-
tive Law Judge except as modified below.
We affirm the Administrative Law Judge's conclu-
sion that the backpay for Layton and Walker should
be abated by 2 percent and 7 percent, respectively.
However, we agree with Respondent that such
abatement should be based on the gross backpay for
each calendar quarter in the backpay period, rather
than on the total net backpay as calculated by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Also with regard to Layton, we find merit in
Respondent's contention that Layton's interim earn-
ings for the third quarter of 1968 were understated by
$500.85 in the amended backpay specification. The
record shows that Layton earned $1,353.46 for that
quarter whereas the corresponding figure in the
amended backpay specification is erroneously set at
$852.61. We therefore will adjust Layton's interim
earnings, and net backpay, accordingly.
With regard to Walker, the amended backpay
specification sets forth a period of February 14-17,
1969, for which no backpay is due as Walker was in
jail during this time and thus unavailable for
employment. However, Respondent contends that
this period be expanded by 3 days, pointing out that
Walker entered confinement on February I I rather
than February 14. As the record supports Respon-
dent's contention, we will adjust Walker's gross and
net backpay for the first quarter of 1969 accordingly.
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge found that
Walker had been disabled by an automobile accident
for a period of time beginning April 8, 1970, and
ending July 3, 1970, and for that period no backpay
was due because Walker was unavailable for employ-
ment. He therefore recommended that Walker's net
backpay be abated accordingly. The General Coun-
sel excepted arguing that the record supported a
finding that this period terminated on May 6, 1970.
We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions.
Walker testified that the accident kept him from
working for 3 or 4 weeks. The Administrative Law
Judge relies chiefly on a letter to Respondent from
Walker's doctor which said that Walker "was later
released on the 3rd of July as having no permanent
impairment of physical function." However, this
language is not at all dispositive as to whether
1 Marine Welding and Repair Works, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 439 F.2d 395 (C.A. 3 Attached to the General Counsel 's answering brief were certain pages
8, 1971) of the amended backpay specification updated to reflect new data on gross
2 Subject to possible abatement as a result of future compliance backpay and interim earnings brought to the General Counsel 's attention at
proceedings . the hearing.
202 NLRB No. 85
554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Walker was unable to work or did indeed refrain
from working through July 3, 1970.4 Therefore, we
see no reason to abate Walker's net backpay as
recommended by the Administrative Law Judge.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Marine Welding and Repair Works, Inc.; William-
son Engine and Supply, Inc.; Greenville Manufac-
turing and Machine Works, Inc.; and Greenville
Propeller Works, Inc., Greenville, Mississippi, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall pay to
Dewitt B. Harrison, Isiah Layton, and Freddie Lee
Walker as net backpay the sums of $6,507, $3,456,
and $10,312, respectively, less any tax withholding
required by the laws of the United States and the
State of Mississippi, plus interest thereon at the rate
of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the
formula prescribed in Isis Plumbing and Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716.
4 Walker's doctor was never called as a witness to explain or clarify the
language in his letter.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MAx ROSENBERG, Administrative Law Judge: This
backpay proceeding came on to be heard before me in
Greenville, Mississippi, on March 15 and 16, 1972,
pursuant to an amended backpay specification filed by the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
and an answer filed thereto by Marine Welding and Repair
Workers, Inc.; Williamson Engine and Supply, Inc.;
Greenville Manufacturing and Machine Works, Inc.; and
Greenville Propeller Works, Inc., herein called the Respon-
dent. This backpay litigation finds its origin in a Board
Decision and Order, rendered on February 20, 1969,1
which ordered Respondent to compensate Freddie Lee
Walker, Dewitt B. Harrison, and Isiah Layton for any loss
of pay which they may have suffered as a result of
Respondent's discrimination practiced against them in
violation of 'Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended. Thereafter, on March 1, 1971, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
entered a decree enforcing the backpay provision of the
Board's Order.2
Following the court's decree, a controversy arose over
the amount of backpay owed to the discriminatees. In
consequence of the dispute, the Regional Director for
Region 26 issued his amended backpay specification and
1 174NLRB661.
2 439 F.2d 395.
3 Respondent 's request that I reverse my ruling, made at the hearing, and
deny the Intervenor's motion invoking a privilege relating to the production
of certain records of the Mississippi Employment Security Commission, and
its further request that the hearing be reopened to afford time to the
notice of hearing on February 24,1972. On March 2, 1972,
Respondent interposed its answer to the foregoing affirma-
tive pleadings.3
Respondent contests the backpay assessments for the
three discriminatees, as set forth in the amended backpay
specification, on various grounds. I turn to a consideration
of the issues raised by Respondent to abate its financial
liability to them.
A. Dewitt B. Harrison
Harrison's backpay period commenced on August 26,
1967, and ended on August 13, 1971, when Respondent
offered to reinstate him to his former position. In his
amended backpay specification, the General Counsel,
utilizing the weekly average of hours worked by employees
Dennis Ross and James Stevenson to compute Respon-
dent's ultimate liability to Harrison during this period,
asserted that Harrison was entitled to the sum of $6,507,
plus the allowable accrued interest. The sole challenge
raised by Respondent to the backpay claimed for Harrison
relates to the use of Ross' average weekly hours of work in
making the computations, with Respondent contending
that the latter's weekly hours were not representative of
those worked by Harrison.
Harrison, Stevenson, and Ross were employed as field
mechanics for Respondent with Ross serving as foreman of
the gang. During the investigation of this backpay
proceeding, an agent of the Board visited Respondent's
offices to ascertain from Respondent's records the amount
of money, if any, which was due and owing to Harrison.
The agent was referred to W. R. Burchfield, Respondent's
office manager. In the course of their conversation, the
agent inquired whether Burchfield could produce the
records of employees whose weekly hours of work
approximated those of Harrison. Burchfield thereupon
presented to the agent the timesheets of Ross and
Stevenson, together with the assurance that they reason-
ably contained the approximate and representative weekly
hours which Harrison would have toiled had he been
retained in Respondent's employ. Respondent argues that
it was error for the General Counsel to utilize Ross' hours
of work because he was a highly skilled mechanic whose
services were employed on an overtime basis in excess of
those of Harrison. Instead, Respondent urges that the
average weekly hours worked by Stevenson should have
been used in calculating the backpay. While it is true that
Ross was assigned more overtime work than Harrison, it is
also established on this record that Harrison worked
considerably more hours per week than Stevenson.4 Thus,
on the basis of Respondent's own records, Harrison is
shown to have averaged 113.5 percent of Stevenson's
weekly hours. In short, I find and conclude that, under the
circumstances here presented, it was just and equitable for
the General Counsel to have relied on the averaged weekly
hours of both Ross and Stevenson in determining the
General Counsel , on Respondent 's urging, to initiate proceedings in the
District Court for enforcement of the subpena which it served on the
Intervenor, are hereby denied.
4 Although readily available, Respondent did not see fit to introduce into
evidence Ross' payroll records in order to establish in what amount his
average weekly hours exceeded those of Harrison.
MARINE WELDING AND REPAIR WORKS 555
amount of backpay to which Harrison was entitled, and I
accept and adopt the computations set forth in the
amended backpay specifications regarding the net backpay
due to Harrison.
B. Isiah Layton
The backpay period for Layton extends from September
6, 1967, to August 13, 1971. Respondent asserts that the
computations contained in the specification respecting
Layton 's backpay are in error for the reasons that they are
not based upon hours representative of what he would
have worked , that there were periods in which he removed
himself from the labor market , that he incurred willful
losses of work , and that he failed to make reasonable
efforts to seek interim employment.
In computing Layton 's backpay entitlement , the General
Counsel compared the hours worked by employees Hilbert
People and Albert Macon with those worked by Layton for
a period of five calendar quarters immediately preceding
the latter 's discharge . Based thereon, he calculated that
Layton would have toiled the same number of hours as
People and Macon during the backpay period had he not
been unlawfully discharged. Accordingly, the General
Counsel concluded that Respondent's backpay liability to
Layton amounted to $4,266. The evidence shows that, for
the five calendar quarters prior to Layton's discharge,
People averaged 57.23 hours per week and Macon worked
an average of 56 . 11 hours per week , thus making their
cumulative weekly average a total of 56.67 hours. During
the same period , Layton worked an average of 55 .48 hours,
or approximately 98 percent of the average of Macon and
People . In light of this uncontroverted evidence , I find and
conclude that Layton's backpay entitlement should be
abated by 2 percent, leaving a net backpay amount of
$4,180.68.
Respondent claims that no backpay is due Layton for
the period of September 6, 1967, the date of his discharge
by Respondent, to October 3, 1967, when he commenced
working for the Houston Contracting Company, because
he had taken time off during this period due to an eye
injury and/or did not undertake an adequate search for
work . I find these claims patently lacking in merit for the
record is clear that Layton suffered the injury prior to his
unlawful separation from Respondent 's employ, and that
he sought employment at the Freeman junkyard and at the
Houston Contracting Company during the above-men-
tioned period.
Respondent also claims that Layton should be denied
backpay for the period from December 25, 1967, to
February 1, 1968, because he removed himself from the
labor market. Respondent further asserts that Layton
received interim earnings during this period which should
be considered as an offset to any backpay due.
Layton obtained a job with the Houston Contracting
Company on October 3, 1967, and worked for that entity
until Christmas of that year when , for seasonal reasons, the
project was closed down. Shortly thereafter, Layton
received a telephone call from a foreman of the Columbus
& Greenville Railway Co. who inquired into Layton's
employment status. Upon learning that Layton was out of
work, the foreman stated that he would provide Layton
with a job when the railway resumed operations after its
normal seasonal hiatus . Layton began to work for the
railway in February 1968 and continued in its employ
thereafter , except for seasonal furloughs . Layton's testimo-
ny is undenied and I find that he sought employment with
other companies from December 25, 1967, to February 1,
1968, without success , and never rejected any proffer of
employment during that period . While on the stand,
Layton testified that he "thought " he worked for a
company in Greenville known as Jennings & Jennings on
two occasions, and vaguely placed one such instance in the
period of December 25, 1967, to February 1, 1968, with
which we are here concerned. The General Counsel's
specification lists an incidence of employment with that
firm as falling in the first calendar quarter of 1969 rather
than 1968 . Although Respondent was on notice at the
outset of the hearing as to the name of this company, it
made no effort to confirm testimonially its assertion that
Layton had additional interim earnings derived from
employment with Jennings & Jennings in the first quarter
of 1968 which should be offset against any backpay due. I
therefore find no merit in Respondent 's assertions regard-
ing the backpay abatement for the period from December
25, 1967, to February 1, 1968.
Next , Respondent argues that any monetary award to
Layton should be limited to a cutoff date of February 1,
1968, because, at the time he then acquired employment
with the Columbus & Greenville Railway Co ., he "did not
want to return to his position with Respondent ." Respon-
dent's argument does not comport with the recorded
evidence for, when Layton was asked whether he would
have gone to work for Respondent during the periods of
his furlough from the railway, Layton affirmatively replied,
"Yes sir, I imagine so, I would ." I therefore reject this
contention for denying Layton backpay after February 1,
1968.
Respondent further asserts that Layton should not be
entitled to backpay for various periods between January 1,
1969, and August 13, 1971, when he was unemployed
because his quest for work was less than diligent . Again, I
find no merit in this assertion , for the record is replete with
evidence that Layton regularly searched for a job , accepted
employment when offered , did not reject work, and
registered for employment in a diligent manner with the
Mississippi Security Commission.
Finally, Respondent contends that Layton should be
deprived of any backpay liability for an 8-day period
between December 16 and 31, 1968, when he absented
himself from his employment with Columbus & Greenville
Railway Co . It also complains that Respondent should not
be assessed for backpay liability for the dates of April 23,
1968, August 22 and 23, 1968, January 2, 1969, and
September 18 and 19, 1969, inasmuch as Layton was
absent from work with the railway company on those days.
C. A. Arnett, the general manager of Columbus &
Greenville Railway Co., testified that Layton suffered an
industrial injury which caused his absences for the 8-day
period in December 1968, and that Layton was not
compensated for his losses of work under application
statutes . Arnett further averred that he was unable to
determine from his records whether Layton's absences
556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from the job on the other dates were due to injuries or
other causes. Under the circumstances, and particularly in
view of the fact that Respondent failed to demonstrate that
Layton would not have been compensated for similar
absences had he remained in Respondent's employ during
the backpay period , I find no persuasive reason for
reducing Layton's net backpay award for the dates in
question.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Layton is entitled
to the adjusted backpay sum of $4,180.68 in order to make
him whole for the illegal discrimination practiced against
him by Respondent during the period from September 6,
1967, to August 13, 1971.
C. Freddie Lee Walker
Walker's backpay period runs from May 6, 1967, to
August 2, 1971.5 As in the case of Layton, Respondent
challenges the net backpay figure computed for Walker in
the amended backpay specification. In sum , Respondent
contends that a comparison of the average weekly hours
worked by Walker during the five calendar quarters
immediately preceding his discharge by"Respondent were
substantially less than the allegedly representative weekly
average hours worked in that period by Hilbert People and
Albert Macon. The record shows that, in the five calendar
quarter period, People and Macon worked 57.16 and 57.15
hours, respectively, while Walker logged 53.15. Translated
percentagewise , Walker would have worked only 93
percent of the average weekly hours of People and Macon
during the backpay period. I therefore find and conclude
that Respondent's net backpay bill to Walker should be
decreased by 7 percent, leaving an adjusted net liability of
$10,819.62, rather than $11,634.
Respondent's next attack upon the propriety of the
General Counsel's backpay computations for Walker is
embodied in its claim that his backpay period should be
terminated on March 16, 1968, and/or, on February 11,
1969, because his employment with Respondent would
have ceased on those dates due to the interplay of Walker's
misconduct and Respondent's personnel policies.
During the times material herein, Respondent operated
on a 6-day work schedule, and programmed Saturday as a
workday. Under the current work rules, as explicated by
Walker on the stand, "If you didn't go [to work] on
Saturday, you didn't go back on Monday, you were fired."
By this he meant that, normally, an employee must report
for duty on Saturday if he expected to retain his
employment on the succeeding week. Prior to his unlawful
discharge in May 1967, Walker was picked up by the local
police on an intoxication charge and was lodged in jail. He
was released at approximately 1 p.m. on a Saturday
afternoon by a Bill Williamson, an officer of Respondent,
who had performed similar services for at least four other
employees. Although his absence from work on this
occasion took place on a Saturday, no disciplinary action
was taken against him by Respondent. According to
Walker's undisputed testimony, Williamson never threat-
ened to discharge Walker for failing to report to the job on
Saturday, and Respondent had never discharged an
employee for being jailed.
On the evening of March 16, 1968, Walker served as a
ticket-taker at a record hop sponsored by a local radio
station in Greenville . During the evening, a male visitor
insisted on entering the premises without paying the
requisite fee. When Walker objected, a heated discussion
ensued, after which the interloper repaired outside the hall
and returned with a friend. Together, they proceeded to
assault Walker, in consequence of which he drew a pistol
and shot one of his assailants. He was arrested by the local
police that evening and was held in custody until 7 p.m. on
March 18, 1968. So far as appears on this record, Walker's
arrest and incarceration did not occur on a Saturday.
Earl J. McClendon, a captain of the Greenville,
Mississippi, police department, who was called as a witness
on behalf of Respondent, testified that he could not be
certain as to the ultimate disposition of the charges against
Walker except that some were dismissed and others were
reduced to misdemeanors which were appealed after
conviction. He further testified that, according to his
records, Walker was ordered held in custody for 6 days,
from 7 p.m. on February 11, 1969, to February 17, 1969, as
a result of the shooting incident in 1968, until he could
satisfy certain fines. This span of custodial containment
covered a Saturday. McClendon also testimonially report-
ed that it was common practice for Respondent's officials
to obtain the release of its employees on a personal
recognizance of the officials, and he recounted that such an
instance had occurred about a month before the trial
herein.
Respondent elicited no evidence in this hearing which
would even remotely suggest that it had ever terminated
any employee who had been jailed on a weekend and had
failed to report for work on the following Monday.
Viewing Respondent's contention that Walker's backpay
should be cut off on March 16, 1968, and/or on February
11, 1969, against the backdrop of the evidence which it has
adduced, I am not convinced that Respondent would have
severed Walker from its employment rolls on either date
under its work rule that employees must report for duty on
a Saturday or suffer discharge on the following Monday
because of the absence. It is undenied and I find that
Respondent did not visit upon Walker the discipline of
discharge, prior to his termination on May 6, 1967, when
he was jailed for insobriety on a Saturday which would
have debarred him from returning to work on the
succeeding Monday. Furthermore, in the absence of any
probative evidence that Respondent studiously enforced its
absenteeism rule against employees who were jailed on
Saturdays, I am not convinced that Walker would have
been discharged by Respondent on February 11, 1969,
when he began serving a 6-day sentence for his failure to
satisfy a court-imposed fine, a period which included a
Saturday.
Respondent argues that Walker should be disqualified
for backpay for certain calendar quarters in 1969, 1970,
and 1971, because he incurred a willful loss of employment
with the Thompson Hayward Chemical Company. It is
5 The period was tolled on this latter date, rather than on August 13, three discriminatees, because Walker voluntarily quit his interim employ-
1971, when Respondent made its unconditional offer of reinstatement to the ment with Benton Bagging Co . on August 2, 1971.
MARINE WELDING AND REPAIR WORKS 557
undisputed and I find that, during the backpay period for
Walker, he sought and obtained employment with Thomp-
son in early 1968. Thompson engages in the sale and
transportation of chemical fertilizers and its operations are
seasonal in nature. Walker was laid off on September 14,
1968, when the season ended, and was recalled to work on
January 25, 1969. On June 26, 1969, while on duty, Walker
accidentally dropped a 55-gallon drum of fertilizer on his
foot which caused a fracture. This happenstance immedi-
ately came to the attention of Robert Maddox, Thomp-
son's plant manager. It is undenied and I find that, as a
result of the accident, Walker was incapacitated for a
period of 6 weeks, during which period he was not
compensated by Thompson.
On July 5, 1969, Walker was discharged by Thompson.
Respondent claims that Walker's loss of interim work with
Thompson was deliberate and willful because "he failed to
return to work when he had been instructed to do so."
Plant Manager Maddox testimonially assigned the reason
for Walker's separation as "was not dependable." Howev-
er, Maddox's testimony then took a curious turn. He
related that, on a Friday after the accident, Walker did not
report for work, in consequence of which Maddox visited
Walker's home and instructed the latter to visit a
physician. Not hearing from Walker on the following
Tuesday, Maddox again called upon Walker and learned
that the employee had another doctor's visit scheduled for
that day. Maddox agreed that Walker should seek
additional medical treatment and instructed Walker to
return to work that very day. When Walker failed to report
for duty, he was terminated. A few days following the
discharge, Walker went to the Thompson plant to obtain
his paycheck and he engaged in a conversation with
Maddox. During the dialogue, Maddox informed Walker
that the latter had been terminated because Thompson
needed the services of a regular driver.
In light of Walker's uncontradicted testimony that his
injury forced his idleness for 6 weeks, as well as the
testimony of Maddox that he was aware of the nature and
extent of Walker's infirmity, I am not persuaded by
Respondent's argument that Walker incurred a willful loss
of interim earnings with Thompson which should warrant
the deprivation of backpay.6
Respondent also contends that a period of disability
which Walker experienced commencing on April 8, 1970,
should be deducted from any backpay claimed for him.
During the backpay period, Walker worked as a part-time
taxicab driver. On April 8, 1970, while seated in a cab at a
curb in Greenville, Walker's vehicle was struck by another
automobile causing a whiplash injury to his neck. Walker
sought treatment from a local doctor and was required to
wear a "collar." According to, Walker , he was cautioned
not to work for a period of approximately 4 weeks . Walker
turned his accident claim over to an attorney who obtained
a settlement from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier and
remitted the sum of $800 to Walker . It is Walker's
testimony that he did not provide the attorney with any
figures relating to his interim loss of earnings and afforded
no other information to his legal representative prior to the
settlement.
At the hearing , Respondent submitted into evidence a
letter from Walker's physician which indicates that the
period of Walker's disability extended from April 8, 1970,
to July 3, 1970, a period of approximately 8 weeks. As the
General Counsel was unaware until the conduct of the
hearing that Walker had sustained this injury , he there-
upon amended the specification so as not to demand any
gross backpay for a 4-week period following April 8, 1970.
In light of the revelations contained in the doctor 'ss letter, I
deem it just and equitable that the General Counsel, in
subsequent compliance proceedings , recompute the gross
backpay for Walker for the period from May 13, 1970,
through July 3, 1970.
Respondent finally contends that Walker had additional
earnings as a result of driving a taxicab which were not
reflected in the amended backpay specification, and that
Walker failed reasonably and continuously to seek other
interim employment . With respect to the first contention,
Respondent was unable to come up with any cogent or
persuasive evidence that Walker 's income while driving a
taxicab were greater than that set forth in the specification.
Regarding the second contention , the record amply
demonstrates that Walker , on his own initiative , visited
several potential employers in the Greenville area , visited
and registered with the Mississippi Unemployment Com-
mission and, on occasion, was successful in obtaining
interim employment . I therefore find these contentions
lacking in merit.
Accordingly, summarizing the calculations made in the
amended backpay specification , as adjusted herein, I
recommend that Respondent 's obligation to make whole
the discriminatees shall be satisfied by payment to them of
the respective sums set forth below , together with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum , calculated in
the manner set forth in Local 138, International Union of
Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 151 NLRB 972, less any
lawfully required tax withholding.
Dewitt B. Harrison $ 6,507.00
Isiah Layton $ 4,180.88
Freddie Lee Walker $10,819.627
6 It should be noted that the General Counsel makes no claim for
backpay during the time Walker was incapacitated due to his injury at
Thompson's.
7 Subject to possible abatement as a result of future compliance
proceedings.