Marine Officers Association, Teamsters Union Local No. 54 (Riverway Co.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 1360 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Marine Officers Association, Teamsters Union Local
No. 541 and Riverway Co. Case 14-CC-1421
March 31, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS FANNING AND ZIMMERMAN
On June 18, 1981, Administrative Law Judge
Abraham Frank issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions and a supporting brief as did the
Charging Party.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge only to the extent consistent herewith.
For either a 6- or 9-year period prior to June 30,
1977, Riverway Co., the Employer and Charging
Party, and Marine Officers Association, Teamsters
Union Local No. 54, the Respondent Union, were
parties to collective-bargaining agreements. In
April and May 1977, the parties met to negotiate
changes in the then existing contract. The repre-
sentatives of the Employer balked at the Union's
demands and stated the Company's intent to look
into other means of performing the work. Pursuant
to this intent, the Employer chartered out its boats
without crews. The boats were then chartered back
to the Employer with full crews. The last of the
boats was chartered out and rechartered to the
Employer in December 1977. The crews were un-
represented by a labor organization.
In November 1979, union representatives met
with members of the Employer's management. At
that time they expressed a desire to represent the
Employer's pilothouse personnel. The Union was
told that the Employer no longer retained any em-
ployees on its boats. Thereafter, on April 18, 1980,
the Union picketed one of the boats which was
pulling a line of the Employer's barges. A similar
incident occurred on April 20, 1980.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the
1977 labor dispute between the Union and the Em-
ployer continued to exist and was unresolved at the
time that the Union picketed the Employer and
that the Union had not acquiesced to the Employ-
er's change in method of operation. He found that
as of April 18 and 20, 1980, the Employer contin-
'The name of the Union appears as amended at the hearing.
260 NLRB No. 182
ued to perform essentially the same business serv-
ices for its customers that it had historically per-
formed pursuant to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with the Union that had expired in 1977. The
Administrative Law Judge, in recommending that
the complaint be dismissed, determined that the
Union could lawfully seek to regain the work for-
merly performed by its members.
The record evidence reveals that the Employer
involved herein chartered out all of its motor ves-
sels in April to June 1977. The collective-bargain-
ing agreement between the Union and the Employ-
er expired on June 30, 1977.2 At the time that the
Employer chartered out its vessels, the Union ap-
parently engaged in a form of limited protest.
There was sparse evidence as to the nature or du-
ration of the protest. For a period of close to 3
years thereafter the Union was silent. It was only
in the latter stages of 1979 followed by the picket-
ing of April 1980 that the Union confronted the
Employer concerning the earlier change.
As stated previously, the Administrative Law
Judge determined that the Union never acquiesced
to the Employer's change and that a labor dispute
between the parties still existed. We cannot agree.
The Union had full knowledge of the Employer's
change at the time that it was implemented. The
Union, by sitting on its rights for almost 3 years
after the complained-of conduct, must be deemed
to have acquiesced to the Employer's change in
operations. There comes a point in time when the
allegedly wronged party must either protest the al-
leged wrong or be deemed to consent to the
wrong. 3 The Union can no longer claim that its
picketing had a work-preservation objective.
Having acquiesced to the Employer's changes of
1977, the Union no longer had a labor dispute with
the Employer. Absent a continuing dispute with
the Employer over the loss of unit work, the
Union's dispute, if any, lies with the employers
who control the nonunion personnel on the motor
vessels-Conti-Carriers and Terminals, Inc., C & G
Operating Co., and Republic Marine. As such, the
Union, by engaging in picketing of the Employer's
2 In both the official transcript and its brief, the Employer maintains
that the contract contained a clause allowing it to charter its vessels. Nei-
ther the alleged clause nor the contract was introduced into evidence or
marked for identification purposes at the hearing. However, we note that
the clause was set out in an earlier Board Decision involving this same
Employer and tangentially this same Union Upper Mississippi Towing Cor-
poraoion, et at, 246 NLRB 262, 267 (1979) While we take administrative
notice of the clause as set out in the Board's earlier Decision, we see no
need to reach the merits of the Employer's argument in light of our deci-
sion herein.
' We express no view as to the specific point in time when the Union
would be deemed to have acquiesced to the Employer's change in oper-
ations. As is often the case, parties are given a "reasonable" amount of
time to assert their rights The Union's delay in the present situation was
unreasonable.
1360
MARINE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
barges on April 18 and 20, 1981, violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, since its object was to
force or require the Employer to cease doing busi-
ness with the employers who control the personnel
on the motor vessels.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Riverway Co. is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. Marine Officers Association, Teamsters Union
Local No. 54, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By picketing on April 18, 1980, and again on
April 20, 1980, the barges and boats of Riverway
Co., Marine Officers Association, Teamsters Union
Local No. 54, violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
Act.
4. The aforesaid violations of the Act are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Marine Officers Association,
Teamsters Union Local No. 54, has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, we shall order
that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Marine Officers Association, Teamsters Union
Local No. 54, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from threatening, coercing,
or restraining Riverway Co., or any other person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is
to force or require Riverway Co., or any such
other person, to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
of, or to cease doing business with, Conti-Carriers
and Terminals, Inc., C & G Operating Co., and Re-
public Marine.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4
'In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board"
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice
to the Regional Director for Region 14 for posting
by Riverway Co., Conti-Carriers and Terminals,
Inc., C & G Operating Co., and Republic Marine
at all locations where notices to their employees
are customarily posted, if the companies are willing
to do so.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
MEMBER FANNING, dissenting:
I am persuaded by the Administrative Law
Judge that there is no supportable basis for finding
a violation in this case. Accordingly, like him, I
would dismiss the complaint in its entirety for the
same reasons advanced by him.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
To all members of Marine Officers Association,
Teamsters Union Local No. 54
To employees of Riverway Co., Conti-Carriers and
Terminals, Inc., C & G Operating Co., and Repub-
lic Marine
After a hearing at which all sides had the opportu-
nity to present their evidence, the National Labor
Relations Board has found that we violated the law
and has ordered us to post this notice; we intend to
carry out the Order of the Board and abide by the
following:
WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain
Riverway Co., or any other person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce, where in either case an object of such
conduct is to force or require Riverway Co.,
or any such other person, to cease using, sell-
ing, handling, transporting, or otherwise deal-
ing in the products of, or to cease doing busi-
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ness with Conti-Carriers and Terminals, Inc.,
C & G Operating Co., or Republic Marine.
MARINE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL No. 54
DECISION
ABRAHAM FRANK, Administrative Law Judge: The
original charge in this case was filed on April 21, 1980,
and the complaint alleging violations of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, issued on May 7, 1980. The
hearing was held on June 12, 1980, at St. Louis, Missou-
ri. All briefs filed have been considered.
At issue in this case is the question whether Respond-
ent engaged in secondary picketing of barges owned by
the Charging Party.
FINDINGS OF FACT ANI) CONCLUSIONS o0 LAW
1. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCI.USIONS
The Charging Party, Riverway Co., hereinafter River-
way, a Minnesota corporation, previously known as
Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation (UMTC), with its
main office in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is engaged in the
business of providing barge transportation of commod-
ities for customers in interstate commerce. C & G Oper-
ating Co. (C & G) and Conti-Carriers and Terminals,
Inc. (Conti), are engaged in the barge transportation
business, including the operation of towboats. Each of
these companies derives revenue from the transportation
of goods in interstate commerce in the amount of $50,00()
annually. I find that each company is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
The Respondent, Marine Officers Association, Team-
sters Local No. 54, hereinafter MOA, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. lHI: FACTS
A. Background
For a 6- or 9-year period prior to June 30, 1977, the
Charging Party, under the name of UMTC, and MOA
were parties to collective-bargaining agreements. Except
for the last few months of that period, UMTC was en-
gaged not only in the business of transporting goods by
barge, but also in the business of operating towboats for
that purpose. In connection with the latter activity, the
agreement between UMTC and MOA covered basically
the pilothouse personnel, including masters, mates, pilots,
and engineers and mates in the engine room.
On April 8, 1976, MOA filed a petition to represent
the nonsupervisory personnel on UMTC towboats. On
December 23, 1976, MOA requested leave of the Board's
Regional Director to withdraw its petition. The request
was approved on January 5, 1977.'
' There is no evidence that MOA at any time thereafter sought to rep-
resent these employees, contrary to the suggestion in the General Coun-
sel's brief.
In April or May, 1977, UMTC and MOA met for the
purpose of negotiating changes in the existing contract.
V. Lee McMahon, an attorney, represented UMTC.
McMahon testified that, after receiving MOA's demands,
he told the union negotiators he was shocked and said,
"Now, we're going to have our next meeting next Tues-
day. I don't ask for an answer today but when you come
back next Tuesday, I want to know if you're serious
about these demands because if you are, I want to tell
you over the weekend and until we meet with you, we
are going to spend our time looking into other means of
getting this work done. We're going to be looking at the
costs."
At the next meeting, Captain Jackson, speaking for
MOA, informed McMahon that the Union was firm.
McMahon said that the Company would be actively en-
gaged in finding some other way of operating before the
current contract expired.
Beginning approximately in May 1977, UMTC "bare-
boat" chartered out all of its motor vessels. A bareboat
charter, as distinguished from a "fully found charter,"
delivers to the charterer a boat without personnel for the
use of the charterer under specified terms and conditions.
During the latter part of May 1977, UMTC bareboat
chartered the vessels Steve T. and Gale C. to C & G.
During the first part of June 1977, UMTC bareboat char-
tered the vessels Harriet Ann and Henry G. to Jemco
Towing. In May or June 1977, UMTC bareboat char-
tered the Evey T. to River City Towing.
On December 12, 1977, Riverway bareboat chartered
the Laura Lee to C & G. The charter of the Laura Lee,
in evidence, is typical of all other charters of towboats
by Riverway or UMTC to the above various companies.
The term of the charter is for I year, renewable thereaf-
ter from month to month and may be canceled by either
party upon 30 days' written notice.
On the same date, C & G rechartered the Laura Lee to
Riverway in a "Fully Found Time Charter." Under this
charter, C & G agreed to let and time charter the tow-
boat to Riverway on a "fully found" basis, i.e., with all
personnel, including the captain, officers, and crew of
the tugboat. The recharter from C & G to Riverway,
like the charter from Riverway to C & G, is for a term
of I year, renewable thereafter from month to month,
cancellable by either party upon 30 days' written notice.
Under the terms of the recharter, all of the employees on
the tugboat are employees of C & G, and C & G is an
independent contractor. Riverway agreed to pay C & G
for its services in manning and operating the tugboat the
sum of $1,950 per day.
All of the towboats bareboat chartered by UMTC or
Riverway to the above various companies were rechar-
tered by Riverway from such companies on a fully found
time basis. The above Fully Found Time Charter from C
& G to Riverway, in evidence, is typical of all other
fully found time charters.
McMahon did not clearly recall whether members of
MOA engaged in picketing at the time UMTC changed
its method of operations. However, he did recall that in
the area below Cape Giradeau, Missouri, and Cairo there
was some type of resistance by MOA members either
1362
MARINE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
contemporaneous with or as a result of UMTC's change-
over in operations.
In November 1979, McMahon met with Robert
Younge, president of MOA, and Joseph Marello, secre-
tary-treasurer. Younge and Marello told McMahon that
they wanted to represent the pilothouse people in River-
way's boats, the people they had always represented.
They wanted Riverway to voluntarily recognize their
Union. They were getting a lot of pressure from their
membership and were going to have to do something
about it. McMahon told the union officials that River-
way had no personnel, that it had bareboat chartered out
all of its motor vessels.
B. Riverway's Current Business Operations
In June 1977, Riverway owned 390 barges. At the
time of the hearing Riverway owned about 439 barges.
Since June 1977, Riverway has been in the barge busi-
ness, but does not operate the towboats that haul its
barges. However, Riverway continues to own the tow-
boats chartered to the above various companies and re-
chartered fully found to Riverway since it does not itself
employ personnel to operate towboats.
Riverway solicits business from customers desiring to
move bulk commodities by barge. Riverway charges its
customers a fee for the use of its barges plus a fee for the
cost of transportation. The daily cost of the boats rechar-
tered to Riverway fully found remains the same whether
the rechartered boats push one barge or ten or a hun-
dred. Having contracted to move certain cargo at a
price, Riverway arranges for the actual transportation by
contacting either a boat owned by Riverway and rechar-
tered to Riverway fully found or a boat of another com-
pany unrelated by charter to Riverway. In dispatching a
boat to move one or more barges, Riverway's dispatch-
ing department determines which boat is closest and can
be utilized at the best and most convenient price.
C. The Picketing
During times material herein the Sam B. Thomas, a
line boat towing barges up and down the river, was
chartered on a fully found basis from Republic Marine
Company to Conti for a 2-year period, beginning in Oc-
tober 1979. The crew operating the Sam B. Thomas are
not represented by any union and are not employees of
Conti. Conti, however, pursuant to its contract right
under its charter with Republic Marine Company, dis-
patches the Sam B. Thomas to perform towing jobs at
the direction of Conti. To maximize its revenue, Conti
attempts to arrange for a complete tow of barges when-
ever possible. On occasion, Conti will tow barges for Ri-
verway and other barge companies.
Riverway Harbor Service of St. Louis, Inc. (Riverway
Harbor), is engaged in the business of "fleeting" barges,
and for that purpose operates five harbor tugs. The term
"fleeting" refers to the practice of collecting and storing
barges of various companies for purposes of redistribu-
tion. In collecting and storing barges or allocating them
in tows for movement within the St. Louis Harbor or to
points up the Missouri, Illinois, or upper Mississippi
Rivers, Riverway Harbor leases about II fleeting areas
in the St. Louis harbor.
Riverway Harbor's name was changed from Universal
Towing Company about the same time in 1977 that Ri-
verway changed its name from UMTC. Riverway owns
80 percent of the stock of Riverway Harbor. Ervin Carl-
son, president of Riverway, is on the board of directors
of Riverway Harbor. Tom Grupp, treasurer and a
member of the board of directors of Riverway Harbor, is
a financial officer of Riverway.
On April 16, 1980, acting on a report that the Steve T.
was going to be picketed in the St. Louis harbor, Donald
S. Bruner, president of Riverway Harbor, called the
union hall and spoke to Younge. Younge told Bruner
that the Union was going to picket all of UMTC's boats.
Bruner said he thought the dispute had been settled sev-
eral years ago in court. Younge said it had not been set-
tled as far as MOA was concerned, that they still had a
strike sanction going. Bruner reminded Younge that Ri-
verway Harbor had a contract with MOA and that
Younge would be affecting the jobs of MOA members
by picketing Riverway Harbor's fleeting areas. Younge
said he would stay away from Riverway Harbor Serv-
ice's fleets; that he knew MOA had a contract with Ri-
verway Harbor and it would be illegal to do any picket-
ing that would harm Riverway Harbor's employees.
On April 18, 1980, informed that a boat was picketing
Riverway Harbor's fleet, Bruner visited the site in his
Company's speedboat. He observed that the Sam B.
Thomas, with a line of barges in tow, was entering a fleet
of Riverway Harbor. The picketboat was about 25 to 50
yards off the side of the tow. The picketboat would go
to the upper end of the tow and turn around and return,
moving back and forth along the side of the tow.
Younge was on the picketboat. Bruner asked Younge
what he was doing. Younge said he was picketing the
barges. Bruner said, "You know you can't get near to
my fleet." Younge replied, "Well, we're not in your
fleet." Bruner said that was a matter of opinion, but
Younge was awful close to Bruner's fleets. At the time
of the picketing the Sam B. Thomas had Riverway
barges in its tow.
The picket boat carried the following sign:
MARINE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL
NO. 54
Has a labor dispute with Riverway, formerly Upper
Miss. Corp. We have no dispute with and are
making no appeals to any other employer or em-
ployees.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 54 affiliated
with I.B. of T.C.W. & H. of A.
On Sunday, April 20, the Laura Lee with Riverway
barges in tow was backing into a Riverway Harbor fleet.
On this occasion the MOA picketboat with the same sign
moved back and forth alongside the tow of barges. The
crew of the Laura Lee are not represented by a labor or-
ganization.
Bruner observed the same type of picketing by MOA
on several subsequent occasions. However, on all of the
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
occasions when Bruner witnessed picketing by MOA,
the towboats had Riverway barges in tow, which were
being moved either up or down the river or into or out
of the Riverway Harbor's fleets. Bruner observed no
picketing of Riverway barges when they were tied off in
Riverway Harbor's fleets.
As a result of the picketing, a pilot employed part time
by Riverway Harbor, but regularly employed as an air-
line pilot, quit his employment with Riverway Harbor.
No other employee of Riverway Harbor ceased work.
The General Counsel and Respondent stipulated that
there was a labor dispute between the Charging Party
and Respondent on or about June 30, 1977, and there
was no resolution to that dispute.
ANALYSIS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
It is an unfair labor practice under Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act for a labor organization to
"threaten coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce . . . where an object thereof is . . . forcing or re-
quiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any
other person .... " This clause, however, may not be
construed to make unlawful, "where not otherwise un-
lawful, any primary strike or primary picketing."
Under the above clause, a union lawfully may take
action to regulate the relations between an employer and
his own employees for the purpose of preserving unit
work for his employees, provided the union's conduct is
not tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives else-
where, National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, et
al. v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 644 (1967); and provided
further, that the employer against whom such action is
taken has itself the power to satisfy the union's demand
without involving neutral employers for objectives pro-
scribed under subsection (B) above. N.L.R.B. v. Enter-
prise Association of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler,
Pneumatic Tube, Ice Machine & General Pipefitters of New
York and Vicinity, Local Union No. 638 [The Austin Com-
pany, Inc.], 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
The primary nature of a union's effort to preserve unit
work in the manner set forth in National Woodwork,
supra, and its obligation to refrain from pressuring em-
ployers without the right to control such work as in En-
terprise Association, supra, are distinguishable from those
situations in which an employer, confronted with a pri-
mary strike or primary picketing, subcontracts the work
in dispute to an otherwise independent contractor. In
such cases the latter employer, having involved itself in
the labor dispute with the primary employer, is not pro-
tected by the provisions of Section 8(b)(4)(B), but is an
ally of the primary employer and the union may lawfully
seek to regain or obtain the work theretofore performed
by the employees it represented. Macmillan Science Co.,
Inc., 231 NLRB 1332 (1977); Kable Printing Company,
225 NLRB 1253 (1976); Thermo-Craft Press, Inc., 233
NLRB 6 (1977).
It is the position of the General Counsel that the
Union had no labor dispute with Riverway at the time of
the picketing, that the Union's dispute was with the op-
erators of the nonunion crews of the towboats over
which Riverway had no control. I find no merit in this
argumemt. The evidence shows and the General Counsel
stipulated at the hearing that a labor dispute existed be-
tween the Union and Riverway (UMTC) in June 1977
and that it had not been resolved. It is of no consequence
that the contract between the Union and UMTC termi-
nated in June 1977. The labor dispute was not thereby
mooted. "Labor relations are a continuum and the parties
are entitled to any legal protection which may have
arisen under the contract." United Marine Division Local
333 (MOTC Acquisition Corp.), 226 NLRB 1214, 1215, fn.
5 (1976).
In 1977, in reply to the Union's demand for new con-
tract terms, which UMTC considered excessive, UMTC
announced that it was "actively engaged in finding some
other way of operating before the current contract ex-
pired." Thereafter, UMTC or Riverway bareboat char-
tered out all of its towboats and rechartered them fully
found as a means of continuing its business without em-
ployees of its own and without the necessity to accept
the Union's terms for a new contract. Although the
Union at that time engaged in some form of protest as a
result of Riverway's change in operations, the record is
not clear as to the nature of that protest. There is no evi-
dence, however, that the Union at any time acquiesced
in the Company's change in operations, which resulted in
the loss of jobs for its members and loss of representation
rights. In November 1979, the Union informed counsel
for Riverway that the Union wanted to represent the
people it had always represented as it was getting pres-
sure from its membership and would have to do some-
thing about it. Riverway's response was that it had no
personnel of its own.
Riverway continues to perform precisely the same
business services for its customers that it has historically
performed under contracts with MOA as the collective-
bargaining representative of its employees. It bills cus-
tomers for the use of its barges and the cost of transport-
ing bulk commodities by towboats. It is the owner of the
towboats it operated as part of its barge and transporta-
tion business, including the towboat operated by C & G
for the use of Riverway. Its bareboat and fully found
charters with respect to its own towboats may be termi-
nated upon 30 days' written notice. Riverway Harbor,
Conti, Republic Marine, and C & G are engaged in fleet-
ing and towing activities clearly related to, and an inte-
gral part of, the normal, day-to-day business of River-
way. In these circumstances, picketing of Riverway
barges is not unlawful even though it may affect the em-
ployees of Riverway Harbor, Republic Marine, and C &
G, and the business activities of Conti. Local 761, Inter-
national Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO [General Electric Company] v. N.L.R.B., 366
U.S. 667 (1961); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO [Carrier Corporation] v. N.L.R.B., 376 U.S. 492
(1964); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union and its Local 4-449, AFL-CIO (Anchortank, Inc.),
238 NLRB 290 (1978). Moreover, in view of its unre-
solved dispute with Riverway, MOA may lawfully seek
to regain the work formerly performed by its members.
The fact that Riverway has contracted out this work to
ostensibly independent contractors does not compel a
1364
MARINE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
different result. Thermo-Craft Press. supra, and cases cited
above.
I find also that Respondent's picketing was directed
only at Riverway and conforms to the criteria for lawful
primary picketing at a common situs set forth in Lodge
68 of the International Association of Machinists (Moore
Drydock Company), 81 NLRB 1108 (1949).
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent has not vio-
lated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by its picketing activities, di-
rected at Riverway, as alleged in the complaint, and 1
shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety.
[Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from pub-
lication.]
1365