0120073400
05-21-2008
Maria I. Estrada, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Maria I. Estrada,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120073400
Hearing No. 340200500451X
Agency No. 1F901003804
DECISION
On July 24, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's July
2, 2007, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e
et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.
The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission affirms the
agency's final order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked
as a mail processing clerk, tour 2, at the agency's Boyle Station in
Los Angeles, California, and was on temporary light duty beginning on
October 9, 2003. On November 16, 2003, complainant filed an EEO complaint
alleging that she was discriminated against on the bases of her race
(Hispanic), national origin (Mexican), sex (female), color (Brown),
disability (chronic cervical strain; rotator cuff strain), and age (53
at relevant time) when: (1) on November 15, 2003, management failed to
provide her with a reasonable accommodation; and (2) on November 15,
2003, her position was excessed.1
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing. Over complainant's objections, the AJ assigned
to the case granted the agency's June 30, 2005 motion for a decision
without a hearing. The AJ issued a decision, dated June 26, 2007,
finding no discrimination. On appeal, complainant contends that the
AJ erred in issuing a decision without a hearing, and reiterates her
contention that the agency subjected her to unlawful discrimination.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As an initial matter we note that, as this is an appeal from a FAD
issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the
agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a
decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is
patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given
the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,
there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather
to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.
The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary
judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if
the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of
the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome
of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting
evidence, it is not appropriate for an AJ to issue a decision without
a hearing. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may
properly issue a decision without a hearing only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Petty v. Defense Security Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11,
2003); Murphy v. Dept. of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A04099 (July 11,
2003).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that a
decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of
material fact exists. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such
as this, complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme
fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case
by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action
under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination.
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima
facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the
agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its
conduct. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail,
complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November
13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351
(December 14, 1995).
We find that, assuming, arguendo, complainant established a prima
facie case of race, color, national origin, sex, age, and disability
discrimination, the agency nonetheless articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The record reflects that,
at the relevant time, complainant was assigned to a secondary scheme
position on tour 2. By letter dated November 14, 2003, the agency
informed the employees assigned to secondary scheme positions on tour 2
that all such positions would be eliminated, effective November 28, 2003.
(Report of Investigation, Exhibit 4). The record further reflects that,
of the more than ninety employees affected by this realignment, fifty-two
employees, including complainant, were reassigned to vacant positions
at other facilities. These employees were given the choice of several
possible locations, and on December 27, 2003, complainant was assigned to
her first choice facility. (R.O.I., Exhibit 5). We find that complainant
has proffered no evidence to show that the agency's articulated reasons
for excessing her position were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
With respect to claim (1), assuming without finding that complainant
is an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act,
we find that the agency provided her with a reasonable accommodation.
The record shows that complainant was approved for continuing temporary
light duty on December 5, 2003, and she has proffered no evidence to show
that the agency required her to work outside her medical restrictions.
(R.O.I., Exhibit 3).
Accordingly, we find that viewing the record evidence in a light most
favorable to complainant, there are no genuine issues of material fact,
and the AJ appropriately issued a decision without a hearing finding
no discrimination. Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's
decision and the agency's final order is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0408)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 21, 2008
__________________
Date
1 In her formal complaint, complainant also alleged that she was
subjected to unlawful discrimination when on November 15, 2003, her
rights were violated. We find, however, that this allegation in not a
separate claim of discrimination, but is merely a reiteration of the other
accepted claims. As such, we shall not address this claim individually.
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0120073400
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036
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0120073400