Margaret E. DeBow, Appellant,v.F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 29, 1999
01974591 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 29, 1999)

01974591

06-29-1999

Margaret E. DeBow, Appellant, v. F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Margaret E. DeBow, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01974591

v. ) Agency No. DAY96AF002OE

) Hearing No. 220-96-5145X

F. Whitten Peters, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Air Force, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the basis of race (Black), in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. Appellant alleges she was discriminated against when: (1)

on July 20, 1995, she received an annual performance appraisal rating

of �Fully Successful� with appraisal factor scores ranging from six to

eight; and (2) on or about July 20, 1995, she received a Contracting and

Manufacturing Civilian Career Program (CMCCP) Technical Appraisal, with

ratings of five (�Fully Successful�) and �P� (Presumptive, equivalent to

five). The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as a GS-346-12 Logistics Management Specialist assigned to the agency's

Specialized Support Branch, Operations and Analysis Division, Directorate

of Process Management, Air Force Security Assistance Center. The record

reflects that on July 20, 1995, appellant's supervisor (AS), the Chief

of the Specialized Support Branch, provided appellant with an AF Form

860 A, Civilian Performance and Promotion Appraisal (CPPA) rating of

�Fully Successful�. AS rated appellant as exceeding the standard in

one critical and one noncritical element, and as meeting the standard

in the remaining eight critical elements and two noncritical elements.

In appraising appellant on the CPPA, AS testified that although appellant

was new to the branch, she met the requirements for a �Fully Successful�

rating, but several factors such as failure to follow instructions and

unwillingness to work with others in the branch impacted appellant's

ability to perform at a higher level.

Moreover, the record reflects that on July 20, 1995, AS rated

appellant on the CMCCP, Technical Appraisal, which consisted of a

managerial/supervisory section and a GS-1102 Contracting section. In

preparing this appraisal, AS stated that due to appellant's limited

experience in the Contracting career field, she received the �Presumptive�

rating (equivalent to �Fully Successful�) in twenty-seven evaluative

factors where appellant had not performed the relevant tasking or AS

could not make a reasonable decision as to appellant's abilities in

the taskings. She also received the equivalent of �Fully Successful�

in the other rating areas.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on September

21, 1995. At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant received

a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a

Recommended Decision (RD) finding no discrimination.

The AJ found that as the agency presented evidence which would be

required if appellant had properly met her burden in establishing a

prima facie case of discrimination, she would proceed directly to the

ultimate question of discrimination vel non. As such, the AJ noted that

appellant's disagreement with AS's assessment of her performance on the

CPPA and CMCCP appraisals is not probative evidence of discrimination.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the appraisals appellant received, namely,

that AS had the discretion to judge the performance of employees, and

appellant's ratings accurately reflected her job performance during the

period in question. In addition, the AJ found that appellant presented

no credible evidence that the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for the ratings she received on either appraisal were a pretext

to mask illegal discrimination. The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD.

Neither party has made contentions on appeal.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. Since the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the burden is

on appellant to show that the agency's reasons are a pretext to mask

race discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248 (1981). Under Title VII, an employer has discretion to

judge the performance of employees, so long as the judgment is not based

on unlawful criteria. In the absence of such evidence, the Commission

will not second guess the acting supervisor's assessment of appellant's

performance. Cf. Burdine, at 259 (employer has discretion to choose among

equally qualified candidates for hiring or promotion). Appellant argues

that her appraisal does not reflect her very high level of performance.

We find, however, for the same reasons as the AJ, that appellant failed

to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were a pretext

for discrimination based on appellant's race. We thus discern no basis

to disturb the AJ's findings of no discrimination. Therefore, after a

careful review of the record and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

June 29, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations