Mamie T.,1 Complainant,v.Ryan D. McCarthy, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 20, 2019

0120181885 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 20, 2019)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Mamie T.,1
Complainant,

v.

Ryan D. McCarthy,
Acting Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120181885

Hearing No. 480-2012-00449X

Agency Nos. ARUIJONG11JUN02992,
ARUIJONG10OCT04619

DECISION

On May 6, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
April 18, 2018, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Agency subjected her to a hostile work environment and discrimination based on her protected
classes and in reprisal for protected activity.

BACKGROUND

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

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At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Supply Management
Specialist at the Agency’s Central Issue Facility Branch, Directorate of Logistics, Supply and
Services Division at Camp Stanley in Uijeongbu, South Korea.

Complainant initiated EEO counseling in October 2010, and June 2011. On August 15, 2011,
Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency subjected her to a hostile work
environment and discriminated against her on the bases of race (Asian), national origin (Korean),
sex (female), color (Brown), age (49), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity from June
28, 2010 through October 8, 2010 when:

1. Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) officials failed to honor their written
agreement to assign and pay Complainant within the NSPS YB-2003-02 pay band;

2. Human Resources officials wrongfully denied Complainant’s non-competitive
promotion twice (December 23, 2009 and June 26, 2010) to a GS-09 grade level;

3. CPAC officials failed to pay Complainant at the GS-09 grade level in accordance
with her assigned job duties;

4. in December 2009, CPAC officials acted improperly by advertising Complainant’s
position during her period of active employment;

5. on January 5, 2010, Human Resources officials failed to process Complainant’s
request for partial Living Quarters Allowances (LQA);

6. on or about May 10, 2010, Human Resources officials, along with the Deputy
Garrison Commander, failed to process Complainant’s 2009 performance incentive
award that had been previously approved by Complainant’s supervisors; and

7. on October 4, 2010, Complainant was wrongfully issued a termination of
employment notice by the Deputy Garrison Commander for residing in an
apartment within the same commuting zone as her husband’s living quarters.

Procedural history

The Agency first dismissed the complaint for untimely EEO counselor contact, but then rescinded
the dismissal in February 2012, and accepted the complaint for investigation. However, the record
shows that the Agency initially failed to complete an investigation within the 180 days specified
in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(e). Complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ).

By Order, dated April 19, 2012, the first Administrative Judge (AJ-1) in this matter ordered the
Agency to provide a copy of the complete complaint file, including the report of investigation. AJ-
1 warned that the Agency’s failure to comply could result in sanctions. The Agency sent a copy of
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the complaint file2, but it did not arrive prior to AJ-1’s issuance of an Order to Show Cause, dated
May 9, 2012. In the May 9, 2012 Order, AJ-1 ordered the Agency to show good cause why
sanctions should not be imposed.

The Agency submitted its response to the May 9, 2012 Order. The Agency’s response explained
its delay in submitting the complaint file, namely, that its receipt of the April 19, 2012 Order was
delayed through no fault of its own. But the Agency did not explain why it still had not submitted
a complete complaint file with a completed report of investigation, as required under the April 19
and May 9, 2012 Orders. Subsequently the assigned AJ was changed in this matter.

On February 22, 2018, the subsequent AJ (AJ-2) issued an Order Dismissing Complainant’s
Request for Hearing, Without Prejudice, and Remanding Complaint to the Agency for An
Appropriate Investigation. AJ-2 ordered the Agency to conduct an appropriate investigation, and
submit it to Complainant no later than May 23, 2018. AJ-2 provided that if Complainant wished
to reopen the hearing request, she could then do so by June 6, 2018. AJ-2 noted that if Complainant
failed to file a request to reopen the hearing request, or file an extension, then he would dismiss
the case, with prejudice, without the right to reopen the hearing.

By letter dated February 24, 2018, Complainant’s attorney submitted a request for a final Agency
decision. On March 14, 2018, the Agency responded to AJ-2’s February 22, 2018 Order. The
Agency noted that a complete investigative file was submitted to Complainant and her attorney. It
also informed AJ-2 that Complainant’s attorney had requested a final Agency decision.

On April 18, 2018, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The
decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to
discrimination as alleged.

On June 7, 2018, AJ-2 issued his latest order. AJ-2 stated that as of June 7, 2018, he had yet to
receive any requests from Complainant to reopen her hearing request. Therefore, he dismissed,
with prejudice, her request for a hearing and remanded the matter to the Agency to render a Final
Decision, if it had not already done so, based on the existing record.

Final Agency decision

The investigative record reflects the following pertinent matters relating to the subject claims.

The EEO Investigator included a notation that in early March 2013, Complainant was sent a
declaration to fill out and submit as part of the investigation. On March 6, 2013, Complainant’s

2 This was later received, but it was an incomplete submission lacking several requested
documents. According to AJ-2, “The file was a jumbled, unbound stack of miscellaneous
administrative papers. It did not contain a report of investigation, as required.”
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attorney responded asking that Complainant not to be contacted directly again regarding the
complaint. Neither Complainant nor her attorney submitted the requested declaration.

On June 24, 2009, Complainant was selected, from a pool of over sixty candidates, for the GS-
2003-07 Supply Management Specialist position at the GS-07 level. This position was initially
intended to be filled as a YB-2003-02 pay band position, but the Agency re-announced the position
as a developmental GS-07/09 pay band position.

On June 25, 2009, the Human Resource Specialist (classes unknown) and Complainant’s second
line supervisor (S2) (African American, black, male, over 40) exchanged emails about
Complainant’s selection and promotion. They discussed the possibility that Complainant would
be paid at the YB-2 band, which would have provided an annual salary of $37,477. S2 believed
that Complainant was being converted to the YB-2003-02 pay band. This was a managerial
conversation, and the YB-2 pay band was never offered to Complainant. The discussion ultimately
was irrelevant as Complainant’s selection was into the GS-2003-07 pay scale, and not the YB-
2003-02 pay band.

Effective June 28, 2009, Complainant was converted from her original position, the YB-0186-01
Social Services Technician (salary $28,377), to the GS-2003-07 Supply Management Specialist
(salary $33,477). The SF-50B specified that Complainant was hired under a Family Member Hire
appointment, and that “[t]he appointment will be terminated within two months following the date
the employee ceases to be a dependent, or following the sponsor’s transfer from the commuting
area or separation from the service, unless an authorized exception is granted.” Additionally, the
SF-50B noted that the position was “Ineligible for Foreign Allowances”. The Position Description
for Supply Management Specialist, GS-2003-07, stated that it was a developmental entry-level
position for the starting at GS-07, with the potential to progress to GS-09.

On or around July 10, 2009, Complainant reviewed her SF-50 action and determined that CPAC
officials failed to honor their alleged agreement to her to hire her at the YB-2 level. The record,
however, does not contain any documentation of an offer to pay Complainant $37,477.

On December 23, 2009, Complainant asserted that Human Resource officials refused to process
her Request for Personnel Action (RPA) to promote her to the GS-2003-09 grade level.
Complainant asserted that she received a Special Evaluation from her first and second-line
supervisors, and that the evaluation would enable her to be promoted. However, in December
2009, Complainant had yet to be in her position for the required 52 weeks. She was therefore
ineligible for any promotion. On July 4, 2010, Complainant was given a Within Rate Increase to
$35,112.

In December 2009, CPAC officials submitted a request for a recruitment action through the
Civilian Personnel On-Line (CPOL). The position was similar to the one Complainant occupied,
except that it was seeking a GS-9 candidate. Complainant was brought in as a GS-7 employee. The
listing was cancelled after four days and did not have an impact on Complainant’s position.

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On January 5, 2010, Human Resources officials refused to process Complainant’s request for
partial Living Quarters Allowances (LQA). HR denied the request per Agency regulation 1400.25-
M, Subchapter 315, stating that her excepted service position did not qualify for the allowance.
Specifically, her position was “Ineligible for Foreign Allowances”, such as LQAs.

On or about May 10, 2010, Human Resources officials, along with the Deputy Garrison
Commander (American, Caucasian, white, over 40, male), failed to process Complainant’s 2009
performance incentive award that had been previously approved by S2. S2 stated that Complainant
qualified as a high performer based on her “Commendable” rating during the 2009 Fiscal Year,
but could not offer specifics or documentation demonstrating approval of any incentive awards.
The Deputy Garrison Commander could not recall any specifics citing the three-year time frame
that had already passed.

On October 4, 2010, Complainant was issued a termination of employment notice by the Deputy
Garrison Commander for residing in a separate apartment within the same commuting zone as her
husband’s living quarters. Complainant was initially hired under a Family Member Hire
Appointment. When she was issued the termination notice, Complainant acknowledged that she
only resided with her husband on a weekend basis to avoid the long daily commute, but believed
that she was abiding by the requirement of living within the same commuting area as her spouse.
The Deputy Garrison Commander stated that it was unacceptable, as she was supposed to be living
with her spouse full-time, and did not accept Complainant’s statement that she would give up her
solo apartment.

In its final decision, the Agency assumed Complainant had established her prima facie cases, and
found that it had articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. It concluded that
Complainant had not established the Agency’s reasons to be pretext for discrimination. The
Agency also found that Complainant had not established that she had been subjected to a hostile
work environment. This appeal followed.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant’s attorney argues that the same arguments that would oppose a summary
judgment action should apply to her case. Complainant’s attorney asserts that there are unresolved,
and disputed issues that made a final decision inappropriate. Complainant’s attorney argues that
Complainant should be allowed to present her case before a trier of fact. Complainant’s attorney
did not address the fact that he had previously requested the final decision that he is now contesting
on appeal.

Regarding the merits of her complaint, Complainant’s attorney asserts that the cumulation of the
Agency’s actions resulted in a hostile work environment, even if the individual action(s) itself did
not appear to be hostile. He also argues that the Agency failed to properly investigate
Complainant’s claims. For example, he asserts that the Agency had not given them the opportunity
to identify similarly situated comparators. He then provided a detailed account of each claim and
why the Agency’s finding of no discrimination was inappropriate.
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The Agency maintains that its final decision is fully supported by the record, and that Complainant
did not provide any persuasive arguments on appeal to overturn its decision. The Agency
responded to each of Complainant’s contentions that her claims were inappropriately dismissed
based on a finding of no discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b),
the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that
the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of
record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision
based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

Disparate Treatment

Complainant alleges that she was subjected to disparate treatment. A claim of disparate treatment
is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference
of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, n. 13; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to
persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of
a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists
of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the
agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the factual inquiry
can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were
motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
713-714 (1983).

Unlawful Harassment

Complainant also alleged that she was subjected to unlawful harassment. A harassment claim is
examined under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
See also Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems. Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002
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(Mar. 8, 1994). To establish this claim, a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a
statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal
or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on
her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment
and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for
imputing liability.

The Supreme Court in Harris explained that an “objectively hostile or abusive work environment
[is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive” and the complainant
subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether the harassment is sufficiently
severe to trigger a violation must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.” Id. at 23.

A hostile work environment exists when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the
complainant's employment. Harris, supra; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
78 (1998).

With respect to element (5) of a harassment claim, an agency is subject to vicarious liability for
harassment when it is created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful
Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999).

Reprisal

Complainant also alleges that the Agency retaliated against her. In accordance with the burdens
set forth in McDonnell Douglas, and Coffman v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No.
05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing
that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3)
subsequently, she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between
the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal
No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).

Analysis

Regarding Complainant’s disparate treatment claims, if we assume, arguendo, that Complainant
established a prima facie case of discrimination on each of her claimed bases, the Agency has
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Concerning Clam 1, that
management failed to honor an agreement to assign and pay her at the YB-2003-02 pay band, there
is no documentation of such an agreement. The record did demonstrate some potential
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communication confusion regarding the status of the position as it was initially thought to be
posted as a YB-2003-02 position. Here, the record demonstrates that the position was ultimately
listed as a GS-2003-07 developmental position instead. It is understandable that Complainant
would be frustrated at the pay discrepancy, but there is no indication that this was intentionally
done to harm Complainant. At worst, it appeared to be a communication error once the Agency
decided to announce the position under the GS-2003-07 pay scale.

Regarding the denial of her promotional requests in Claim 2, the Agency had clear guidelines that
all employees must serve 52-weeks in his/her position prior to any promotional eligibility. At the
time of her requests, Complainant had not met that 52-week requirement. Complainant was
encouraged to resubmit her request once she had fulfilled the requirement. Complainant also
argued that she was not paid in accordance to her duties in Claim 3. The record demonstrated that
she was hired as a GS-7 employee, and after a year in service was given a Within Rate Increase.
Aside from a blanket assertion that she was not paid at her desired rate, Complainant did not
provide any specific examples that would demonstrate any discriminatory animus regarding her
pay.

Complainant also noted that the Agency clearly engaged in hostile tactics when officials acted
improperly by advertising Complainant’s position during her period of active employment in
Claim 4. However, the posting was seeking a candidate for a GS-9 position. At the time,
Complainant was a GS-7 employee. Furthermore, the posting was closed after four days with no
impact to Complainant’s position.

Regarding Claim 5, Complainant stated that the Agency failed to process her request for a partial
LQA. However, the record clearly demonstrates that the SF-50, provided on June 28, 2009, states
that the position was “Ineligible for Foreign Allowances”. Therefore, she was ineligible for LQA.
We find that the decision to deny the request had nothing to do with Complainant’s protected
classes or was in reprisal for her protected activity.

Regarding Claim 6, we note that the record is somewhat vague regarding her incentive awards.
The Deputy Garrison Commander noted that he could not recall the incident considering the time
that had passed. S2 also asserted that Complainant was a superb employee deserving of incentive
award, but could not provide and specifics or documentation of an approved 2009 award. The
burden of persuasion remains with Complainant, and in this regard, there is insufficient
documentation to demonstrate that the Deputy Garrison Commander discriminatorily denied
Complainant an incentive award based on her protected classes or in retaliation for protected
activity.

Lastly, regarding Claim 7, Complainant argued that she was discriminatorily terminated from her
position. However, the record demonstrates that Complainant was hired under a Family Member
Hire appointment. The June 28, 2009 SF-50B specified that “[t]he appointment will be terminated
within two months following the date the employee ceases to be a dependent, or following the
sponsor’s transfer from the commuting area or separation from the service, unless an authorized
exception is granted.” Complainant acknowledged that she was not dependent on her military
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spouse for living arrangements and was therefore terminated per the SF-50’s notation. While
Complainant offered to live with her military spouse full-time, she had already violated an
appointment clause. There is no evidence that the Agency terminated Complainant due to her
protected classes.

We note that Agencies generally have broad discretion to carry out personnel decisions and
exercise business judgment. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admn., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6,
1996). Regarding adverse actions, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions for which Complainant has failed to show were pretext for discrimination. Pretext
inquiry is not concerned with bad judgment, impeccability, dislike, or a mistake. Marvin W. v.
Dep’t of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 0120170438 (Dec. 12, 2018). The question is not
whether the agency made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason
is discrimination. Mere assertions or conjecture that an agency’s explanation is a pretext for
intentional discrimination is insufficient because subjective belief, however genuine, does not
constitute evidence of pretext. The focus of pretext inquiry is whether an agency’s actions were
motivated by discriminatory animus. Further, at all times the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with a complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency
was motivated by prohibited discrimination. Complainant has failed in this regard.

Further, the discrimination statutes are not a civility code. What is prohibited is “behavior so
objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at
81. We are mindful that the discrimination statutes do not create a right to work in a pleasant
environment, merely one that is free from discrimination. As a result, employees may experience
unprofessional, inappropriate, and disrespectful treatment. In the instant matter, the record does
not demonstrate objectively offensive behavior by management officials. While the incidents were
undoubtedly frustrating for Complainant, the claims were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create a legally hostile work environment.

Lastly, we note that despite given the clear opportunity by the AJ, Complainant’s attorney decided
not to renew her request for a hearing before an EEOC AJ, despite what was presented in her
arguments on appeal. As a result, we do not have the benefit of an AJ’s credibility determinations
regarding some conflicting statements, such as her 2009 incentive awards. Complainant had to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. Here,
the evidence is, at best, in equipoise. Accordingly, Complainant has not met her burden of
persuasion that she was subjected to discrimination. Complainant v. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., EEOC Appeal No. 0120122134 (Sep. 24, 2014), citing Lore v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120113283 (Sep. 13, 2013) and Brand v. Dep't of
Agric., EEOC Appeal No. 0120102187 (Aug. 23, 2012).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed or referenced herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s finding that it did not
discriminate against Complainant as alleged.
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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted
in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

September 20, 2019
Date