Magnolia Petroleum Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 21, 1952

98 N.L.R.B. 1217 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 12171
We shall direct an election among these employees to be held during
the peak of the next fishing season at a time to be selected by the Re-
gional Director, when there is peak employment and a representative
number of persons in the proposed unit may be employed, subject.
to the limitations set forth in the amended direction of election. If a
majority of those voting select the Petitioner, they will be taken to
have expressed their desire to constitute a separate appropriate unit
represented by the Petitioner. We will not direct that an election be
held among nonresident fishermen and related workers in these cate-
gories inasmuch as the Petitioner does not seek to represent nonresi-
dents apart from residents, and no question appears to exist concerning,
their separate representation at this time.
Order
IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that the Decision and Direction of Election in
the instant proceeding, issued by the Board on June 15, 1951, and
amended on July 12, 1951, be, and it hereby is, vacated and set aside
insofar as it is inconsistent with this Supplemental Decision and
Amended Direction of Election.
[Text of Amended Direction of Election omitted from publication
in this volume.]
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY and OIL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION, CIO. Case No. 16-CA-348. April 21, 1952
Decision and Order
On September 14, 1951, Trial Examiner Louis Plost issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
"Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-member panel
[Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Styles].
98 NLRB No. 190.
1218 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in the case,2 and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions
and modifications : 3
We find that Hotchkiss' remarks, as testified to by Prescott, in-
volved threats of loss of economic benefits if a union came in, as well
as interrogation, as found by the Trial Examiner.
The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that Duncan's discharge
from his job as a truck driver violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3)
of the Act. On the afternoon of October 16,1950, while loading gaso-
line for a trip to Snyder, Duncan discovered a mechanical defect in
his truck's starter. He called his foreman, Johnson, who sent a
mechanic, and also went himself to the loading station. Johnson had
admittedly been asking employees what they expected to get out of
the Union. He started a conversation with Duncan about the Union,
and told Duncan it would be a mistake to join and that the Union
would cause a tightening of discipline by the Respondent. Duncan,
whose working day was lengthened by the starter defect, remarked
that membership in the Union might stop "these 15 hour days." John-
son, becoming angry, replied that Duncan's 15 hour days could be
stopped without a Union, that Hotchkiss had been wanting to get
rid of Duncan, and that he "thought that would do it." In the face
of this clear threat, Duncan told Johnson that he did not wish to
lose his job. He then took the truck to Snyder. On October 17 John-
son called Hotchkiss, apparently to get approval for Duncan's dis-
missal, and reported, untruthfully, that Duncan had refused to go
to Snyder. Johnson also reported that Duncan had driven an un-
necessarily long route to Merkel 6 weeks before. Hotchkiss thereupon
authorized Duncan's dismissal without further investigation. John-
son then told Duncan that Hotchkiss had ordered his discharge but
had refused to say why, and that Hotchkiss had also said it would
not do any good for Duncan to see him because there was nothing
Duncan could do about the discharge.
Duncan went to see an official at the Respondent's Dallas office after
he was discharged, but was unable to get any explanation for his dis-
missal. On December 29, 1950, he wrote to the Respondent at Fort
2 The Respondent ' s request for oral argument is hereby denied because the record, excep-
tions , and brief , in our opinion , adequately present the issues and the positions of the
parties.
3 The Intermediate Report inadvertently attributes to Neely Johnson, Respondent's
.Sweetwater transport foreman, the quoted remark : "To hell with the Company ; if I had
got a raise this morning I would have gone the short way." Johnson testified that this
remark was made by Duncan . This inaccuracy does not affect our conclusions.
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1219
Worth asking why he had been dismissed. On January 17, 1951, the
Respondent answered merely that he had been "discharged for in-
subordination."
The record shows no insubordination. The long route was approved
in advance. The immediate incident leading to the discharge shows
an exchange of words over the Union; a taunt by Foreman Johnson,
who had also engaged in other unlawful union interrogation, that
Duncan's problems could be settled without the Union; a ,threat of
discharge attributable only to Johnson's pique at Duncan's reference
to the Union, promptly followed by action; and a refusal to give Dun-
can any valid reason for the discharge.
We are convinced on the record as a whole, as was the Trial Examin-
er, that Nolan W. Duncan was discharged for union membership and
activity, and that, accordingly, the Respondent violated Section 8 (a)
(1) and (3) of the Act.
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Magnolia Pe-
troleum Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Oil Workers International Union,
CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by dis-
criminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of their employment, except to the extent permitted
by the proviso to Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
(b) Inquiring into the union membership of any of its employees,
or in any other manner interrogating or questioning its employees
with respect to their union membership or sympathies.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Oil Workers International Union,
CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid'or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Nolan W. Duncan immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for
1220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him, in the manner provided in the section of the Intermediate
Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, time cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due.
(c) Post at its distributing stations for bulk deliveries at Fort
Worth, Sweetwater, Abilene, and Electra, Texas, copies of the notice
attached to the Intermediate Report and marked "Appendix A." 4
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Sixteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent,
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it
for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed December 27, 1950, by Oil Workers International
Union, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director for its
Sixteenth Region (Fort Worth, Texas), as agent for the Board, issued a com-
plaint dated June 13, 1951, against Magnolia Petroleum Company, Fort Worth,
Texas, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. A copy of the charge was duly served
on the Respondent, by the Board's Regional Offive, on December 28, 1950. A
copy of the complaint, the afore-mentioned charge, and a notice of hearing were
duly served on the parties on June 13, 1951.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance
that the Respondent on October 17, 1950, discharged a certain named employee
because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union; and has at
all times since refused said employee reinstatement, all in violation of Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act and has also engaged in certain other conduct violative of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
The Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint dated June 22, 1951.
The motion averred that the Board lacked jurisdiction in the matter because
4 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of
a Trial Examiner" in the caption thereof, the words "A Decision and Order. " If this
Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the notice shall be
further amended by inserting for the words "A Decision and Order," the wards "A Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order "
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1221
the alleged unfair labor practices occurred more than 6 months prior to the filing
and service of the charge.
The Respondent admitted that the discharge alleged to be discriminatory
occurred on October 17, 1950. The dates of the charge and the service thereof
as fixed by the complaint were admitted. The undersigned denied the Respon-
dent's motion to dismiss the complaint.
Under date of June 22, the Respondent filed an answer wherein it denied that
it had engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint,
admitted the jurisdiction of the Board over its operations, admitted that the
Union was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and while admit-
ting the discharge in question, averred that it was made for cause.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Sweetwater, Texas, on June 26 and
27, 1951, before Louis Plost, the undersigned Trial Examiner. The General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union were all represented at the hearing. The
representatives of the parties, herein referred to in the names of their prin-
cipals, were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, to introduce evidence bearing on the issues, to argue orally
on the record, and to file briefs and/or proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law with the undersigned. Over objection, the undersigned granted a motion
by the Respondent to amend the answer and also granted an unopposed motion
by the General Counsel to strike certain allegations in the complaint. The Gen-
eral Counsel and the Respondent argued orally on the record. A date was fixed
for the filing of briefs and/or proposed findings and conclusions. A brief has
been received from the General Counsel.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The General Counsel and the Respondent stipulated :
Respondent is and has been since 1925 a corporation duly organized under
and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas, having its prin-
cipal office and place of business in the City of Dallas , Texas, and is now and
has been at all times herein mentioned continuously engaged at said place
of business , hereinafter referred to as the Dallas office in the purchase, pro-
duction, refining, and marketing of petroleum and petroleum products.
Respondent for several years last past, and at all times material hereto, has
operated refineries, natural gasoline plants, and pipe lines and has marketed
its products in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico, and
other states of the Union. In connection with its operations, it has also
transported petroleum and petroleum products by truck and in that con-
nection has maintained a truck terminal at Sweetwater, Texas, which truck
terminal is hereinafter referred to as the Sweetwater terminal.
Respondent in the course and conduct of its business causes and has con-
tinuously caused a substantial amount of materials, of a value in excess of
one million dollars per annum, used in the production, refining, and market-
ing of petroleum and petroleum products to be purchased, delivered and trans-
ported in interstate commerce from and through the states of the United
States mentioned in paragraph 1 above to other states of the Union, and be-
tween themselves ; and causes and has continuously caused a substantial part
of the products purchased, produced, refined and marketed by it as a part of
998666-vol 98-53--78
1222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
its business, of a value in excess of one million dollars per annum, to be sup-
plied, delivered and transported in interstate commerce to and through the
states of the United States mentioned in paragraph 1 above, from other
i"tates of the Union, and between themselves.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
• Oil Workers International Union, CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, admitting employees of the Respondent
to membership.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
Synopsis
On October 8, 1950, certain of the Respondent's employees held their initial
organizational meeting in a campaign of self-organization. Allegedly, immedi-
ately thereafter the Respondent, by means of verbal illegal interference, sought
to discourage and thwart this activity and further on October 17 discharged one
of its employees because of his union membership and activity.
The Respondent denies that it engaged in any of the alleged illegal conduct,
admits the discharge, but avers it was made for cause.
A. Interference, restraint , and coercion
• Employee A. O. Harris testified that he joined the Union in October 1950; that
"a day or two" after the Union held "the second meeting at Breckenridge" (the
record is clear that the first meeting was held at Breckenridge on October 8,
1950), he was quizzed by C. N. Hotchkiss, the Respondent's transport supervisor
for the district, regarding his union activities. Harris testified :
To the best of my remembrance, at that time Mr. Hotchkiss asked me what
we did out at Breckenridge or what we expected to get out of joining the
union. That's the best of my remembrance.
Q. (By Mr. Jenkins) What did you say to him about that, if anything?
A. The best I can remember I didn't : I told him that I wasn't sure what
we were asking for at that early stage of our joining the union, and that I
didn't know whether we would benefit any or not.
Q. What did he say, if anything, in reply to that?
A. Well, we talked a minute or two longer on that, and Mr. Hotchkiss told
me or asked me, or in the conversation that came out he told me if I didn't-
the way I took it as a group, not as an individual, that if we didn't like our
jobs, why didn't I quit.
Hotchkiss testified that "I asked them [the employees] why they had went,
[to the union meetings] what we had done to them to make them go."
Hotchkiss testified :
Q. Which men did you ask?
A. Well, I don't know. I asked several of the men there in Fort Worth.
I don't know any particular one. I asked Mr. Harris that same question,
and I am sure he came in my office one day and set down there, we were
sitting there talking about our work, and this drifted around to the union.
That was one of the main topics of conversation some times on both sides,
and I asked Mr. Harris, I feel sure I did, that why it was necessary that
they join the union, what was the trouble.
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1223
Employee Lee Prescott testified that at one of several safety meetings held
during the Union's organizational campaign :
Mr. Hotchkiss told us as a group that the Magnolia Petroleum Company
did not object to us joining any union that we wanted to, but any time the
damn union dictated to Magnolia Petroleum Company they would stand
the trucks in the lot and ship it on a tank car.
Prescott further testified that after the close of one of the safety meetings
held during this time at Fort Worth, Texas :
Mr. Hotchkiss asked us what we would benefit from a union, and if
we did and everything went through we would only get what the union
got us in a contract, we would not get any company favors of any kind,
and then he asked us if any of us could do better.
Hotchkiss testified that he was told by the Respondent's foremen at Electra,
'Texas, that the Union was organizing the Respondent's truck drivers ; that
he then telephoned the foreman at Abilene, Texas, and asked if he had heard
of the Breckenridge meeting; that thereafter he attended various safety meet-
ings and that one Hensley, the Respondent's personnel manager, held a series
of meetings with employees.
Hotchkiss testified :
As far as I know, the purpose of those meetings was to find out what
the company grievances were, men's grievances, not why they were joining
the union.
Q. Almost simultaneously with the inauguration of these meetings you
were asking the men what the company had done to them to make them
want to join the union?
A. Yes, I asked them what the company had done to them to make them
want to join the union. I asked them what I had done to make them want
to join the union.
Hotchkiss, however, testified that he could not recall talking to Prescott
.about the Union.
The Respondent in its answer pleads that Hotchkiss' statements to employees
.are protected free speech and do not constitute threats within the meaning
of the Act.
The undersigned finds no merit in this contention.'
The complaint alleges that on or about October 10, 1950, and thereafter,
Neely Johnson, transportation foreman, asked various employees working under
his supervision what they expected to get out of the Union.
This allegation is admitted in the Respondent's answer.
The record discloses that Neely Johnson is in charge of the Respondent's
Sweetwater station, has supervision of all drivers operating from Sweetwater,
directs the operation, and recommends hiring and firing. The undersigned finds
Neely Johnson to be a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, whose conduct
with respect to labor relations is chargeable to the Respondent.
Inasmuch as interrogation of employees with respect to their union affiliations,
sympathies, and/or activities has long been established to be a violation of the
Act, the undersigned finds on the record considered as a whole that by the conduct
of C. N. Hotchkiss and Neely Johnson, as above found, the Respondent has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act.
'See N. R B. v. Kropp Forge Company, 178 F. 2d 822. Certiorari denied October 9,
-1950.
1224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. The discriminatory discharge of Nolan W. Duncan
Nolan W. Duncan testified that he was first employed by the Respondent as a)
truck driver in 1944. After approximately 3 months he voluntarily quit and was
rehired by the Respondent some 18 months later, again as a truck driver. He
remained at this job until his discharge on October 17, 1950 . Duncan was hired
on both occasions by C. N. Hotchkiss , whom the Respondent stipulated to be its
transportation supervisor and a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. He
was recommended for the job by Neely Johnson , stipulated to be the Respondent's
transportation foreman at Sweetwater , Texas, and who was Duncan 's imme-
diate foreman while he was employed by the Respondent.
During the course of his employment Duncan was given a certificate of safe•
driving by the Respondent. The certificate covered a period of 4 years. Duncan
further testified that he was never arrested for traffic violations, was never
reprimanded for insubordination, and was never told by Neely Johnson that his
work was in any manner unsatisfactory.
Duncan testified that on October 8, 1950, he, together with "all of the drivers,"
went to Breckenridge , Texas, and conferred with one Price, a representative of
the Union. On the following day the drivers signed application cards for union
membership.
On October 16, while his truck was being loaded , Duncan discovered a mechani-
cal defect in the truck and telephoned the office for a repair mechanic. While
the truck was being repaired, Neely Johnson, whom Duncan had telephoned at
his home, arrived and remained until the truck was repaired and Duncan left
with the load . According to Duncan , during the repair and loading of the truck,
the following occurred :
Well, Neely Johnson came out and crawled upon the truck, upon the tank
where I was finishing loading my truck.
Q. When you were finishing loading he crawled up?
A. Yes. I don't remember the starting of the conversation, but anyway,
he asked me , told me, said , "Duncan, I feel like you boys are making a mis-
take by joining the union ," and I told him that I didn't feel like we was, and
he said, "Well," he says, "you know we get by with lots of little things that
Hotchkiss is going to pin down on us, and we won 't get by with that any-
more."
And he said-I said, well, I didn't feel that way about it, didn't feel
like I was making a mistake or I sure wouldn't have signed up, and he
said, "Well, how do you think the union will benefit you?"
I said, "Well, I don't know for sure, but if it will stop these 15-hour
days, that will help some." And then he got irritated and said, "Well,
sir, as far as the 15-hour days are concerned," he said, "yours can be
stopped without a union," he said, "This load doesn't have to go to Snyder."
I said, "Neely, you are getting mad and you don't have no right to. You
just asked me the question and I answered it the way I felt."
He went ahead and stated, said, "Hotchkiss has been a-wanting to get
rid of you "
Q Hotchkiss has been wanting to get rid of you?
A. And he thought that would do it.
Q. He thought that that would do it?
A. Yes.
Trial Examiner PLOST. Did he say that to you?
The WITNESS. Yes, sir. And I asked him why he was wanting to get
rid of me, and he said lie didn't know. And I said, "Neely, if that is true,
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1225
if Hotchkiss is wanting to get rid of me, I would like to talk to him. Will
you call him and have him come out here and we will all three get in the
office and talk this over , because I don't want to lose my job."
Q. (By Mr. Jenkins ) What did he say when you told him to get Hotch-
Ikiss to come out there because you didn't want to lose your job?
A. He said he would call him.
Q. He said he would call him?
A. And I told him I didn 't want to lose my job, and he says , Well-I
-says, "I want to keep working for Magnolia ," and he says , "I believe you
do, too," so I went ahead and made my load on to Snyder.
On the next day, October 17, Duncan came in at 5 p. in. and was informed
'by Johnson that Hotchkiss had ordered his discharge . Duncan testified :
I said, "Did he tell you why?" and he said, "Yes, but he wouldn't tell
'me." And he said, "I told him that you was going to want to know why
you was discharged and he said well, he wouldn 't tell ." He says, "Duncan
is liable to come to Fort Worth," and he said, "Well , tell him that it
won't do him no good, because it is already went through the proper chan-
nels and there's nothing he can do about it."
After his discharge Duncan called on Luther Y. Newman, the Respondent's
assistant sales manager in charge of personnel , at the Respondent 's Dallas office
and asked the reason for his discharge . Newman told Duncan he "would have
to go through the Fort Worth office ," and then remarked that "all he knew was
rumors" that since Duncan had moved to his farm he had complained about his
hours of work.
Duncan then wrote to the Respondent 's Fort Worth office, asking the reason for
his discharge . Three months later he received a reply which stated :
You are advised that you were discharged for insubordination.
The Respondent sought to show that in his official capacity Hotchkiss was
aware of various causes for Duncan's discharge , and that he had this knowledge
over a long period of time.
Hotchkiss testified that on his periodic trips to Sweetwater he and Johnson
discussed Duncan's work and the fact was "brought up on Mr. Duncan was giving
us quite a bit of trouble on his truck . He wasn't satisfied with nothing we could
do for it." Hotchkiss testified that the truck was bought in 1948; that Duncan
first drove it ; that his complaints continued into 1949; that finally the truck
was taken to Wichita Falls, Texas, and a new motor was installed in it. He
testified , "we took his word for it"; and that prior to taking the truck to Wichita
Falls "for a period of months our mechanic was hunting for that, that trouble."
He testified as follows : "I would say that the truck was taken to Wichita Falls
in the spring of 1949, as far as I can place it."
Having clearly sought by his testimony to create the impression that Duncan
caused needless expense by his complaints regarding the truck he drove, although
he volunteered the statement that "He ( Duncan) made as good time as the
other drivers did," a statement he promptly qualified with , "other men drive
his truck and they made no objection to it," Hotchkiss' testimony with respect to
Duncan's truck created an entirely different impression when he was questioned
on cross by the General Counsel . Hotchkiss then testified :
Q. (By Mr . Jenkins ) Now, in regard to this truck that you talked about
that Mr . Duncan was driving , what kind of a truck was it?
A. There was a 1948 Model WB-22-P White tractor.
1226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. (By Mr. Jenkins) I see. Now, did that truck have the same gear ratio
as the other trucks that were being operated there?
A. When it first started out it did not have. Then it was changed to that.
Q. When was the gear ratio changed?
A. When we discovered that the White Company through error at the
factory had put the wrong rear end in it but had marked it correctly.
Q. When did you discover that?
A. About the time that a new engine was placed in the truck. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The undersigned is mindful that Hotchkiss testified the engine was changed
at Wichita Falls in the "spring of 1949."
Hotchkiss further testified in response to questions by the General Counsel :
Q. Well, now, when he complained about the truck back in May 1950,
did you discharge him then?
A. What is your question?
Q. When he complained about the truck in May 1950, did you discharge
him then?
A. No.
Q. When he complained about the truck later on in June of 1950, did
you discharge him then?
A. No.
Q. When he went down and had some new engines put in, did you
discharge him then?
A. No.
Q. You did have the gear ratio of the truck corrected?
A. That's right.
Hotchkiss further testified that in "May of 1950," he made a routine inspec-
tion of Duncan 's truck and found that the governor was not sealed . This was
contrary to orders issued the drivers. Hotchkiss testified :
A. Well, I raised the hood on this truck and I saw that the seal was off
of it, and I asked him why, if he knew it had been run without it, and he
said yes, he did, but he said the mechanic hadn't put it back on. I said,
"Well, why didn't you report it to Johnson?" He said, well, he just left
that up to Leech.
Hotchkiss admitted that at the time he did not consider the matter sufficient
grounds for discharge.
Hotchkiss further testified on direct examination :
Q. On or about that time , April , May or June 1950 , did Mr . Johnson,
the local foreman , report to you some specific instances of his relations
with Mr. Duncan in his work?
A. He did.
Q. As a result of that did you or did you not give Mr. Johnson any
instructions to warn Mr. Duncan?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did or did not Mr. Johnson report to you that he had?
A. Mr. Johnson reported to me that he had had a private conversation
or interview with Mr. Duncan, which was customary, and had told him
that his services were unsatisfactory, that he had been with the company,
for a number of years, which we liked to respect, we would like for him
to make an improvement and for that reason we wanted to talk it over
with him and try to effect an improvement.
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1227
According to Hotchkiss ' testimony this occurred in late June 1950, and in
late June or early July, he received another report from Johnson that "Mr.
Duncan was a different man altogether ," and that he "had improved very
much." However, according to Hotchkiss , the improvement was short -lived,
for in August 1950 Johnson again "reported to me that Duncan was slipping
back into his old ways , it looked like we would have to dismiss him."
Hotchkiss testified that he talked to Johnson "once a week by telephone," and
that when he received the last-mentioned report he said to Johnson, "Let's
be easy with him, he's been with us a long time , give him a little more time."
On September 20, Hotchkiss was in Sweetwater . He testified , "I am certain
we discussed Duncan on account of that difficulty we had been experiencing
and we had talked about over the phone ." However, he could recall "nothing
more than a general discussion on an operation."
At no point in his testimony does Hotchkiss disclose any reason for John-
son's complaints with respect to Duncan , the nature of the "difficulty" the
Respondent was experiencing because of Duncan, _ or wherein Duncan's work,
actions, or conduct was at fault. Nothing is revealed by the record except
a series of vague and meaningless statements to the effect that two super-
visors allegedly told each other that they were not satisfied with an employee
except ( a) the complaints Duncan made about his truck , ( b) the unsealed
governor.
On the entire record, including his observation of the witnesses , the under-
signed finds that neither the fact that Duncan complained about the perform-
ance of the truck he drove for the Respondent or the fact that he drove with
an unsealed governor , entered into his discharge as a cause thereof.
Hotchkiss testified that on October -17 or 18, Johnson called him by tele-
phone and informed him that on September 7 Duncan drove to a certain point
over a longer route than necessary , and that Duncan had refused to make a
trip to Snyder , Texas.
Hotchkiss testified that he asked Johnson for details and was given details
of both occurrences ; that he discussed the case with his superiors and "I called
him back and told him to discharge."
Hotchkiss admitted that no investigation was made prior to Duncan's dis-
charge, and further testified :
Q. Nov, when you had your conversation with Mr . Johnson and told
him to discharge Duncan , did you tell him to tell Duncan why he was being
discharged?
A. To the best of my recollection , I told Mr. Johnson to tell him his
services were unsatisfactory.
Q. His services were unsatisfactory?
A. That 's right.
Q. Now , at that time did Johnson say anything to you about the fact
that Duncan was apt to come to Fort Worth?
A. I believe he told me that he expected Duncan to come to Fort Worth
and find out what was the matter.
Q. What did you say to that?
A. I told him that Duncan knew why he had been discharged, that he
had been talked to and that this trouble had been complained to him pre-
viously and he could come if he wanted to but I didn 't think he would gain
anything by it.
It would therefore appear from Hotchkiss ' testimony that he ordered Duncan's
discharge because he was first told on October 17 or 18 that Duncan had driven
a longer route than necessary on September 7, and also that on the day of the
telephone call Duncan had refused to make a trip to Snyder.
1228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Nothing else can be read into Hotchkiss' testimony with respect to the reasons
for Duncan 's discharge.
Neely Johnson testified to the various causes which impelled him to ask for
Duncan 's discharge.
Johnson testified that in 1949 Duncan "wasn't getting along with the men";
complained that he was "not getting equal runs with the other drivers" ; that
Duncan had a surly disposition ; was not friendly with the other drivers ; did
not speak and "would go away to himself." Johnson testified:
Well , when we were drinking coffee he wouldn't sit in a booth with us.
He would sit at the counter. When they would eat he would sit somewhere
else.
Johnson testified that he observed this conduct by Duncan "practically from
the time he started " ; and that he talked to Duncan and "I told him that we
would have a little more co-operation."
Johnson testified further :
Trial Examiner PLOST . When was the first time you talked to him
about it?
The WITNESS . December.
Trial Examiner PLOST. Of '49?
The WITNESS. Yes, Sir.
Trial Examiner PLOST . You saw him acting that way for two years be-
fore you talked to him?
The WITNESS. Well, not as bad.
Trial Examiner PLOST. Sir?
The WITNESS. He wasn't acting that way much of the two years.
On cross-examination Johnson denied making the above statement and testified
that he did not remember when he first spoke to Duncan regarding his surly dis-
position. He also testified :
Q. Do you have any company rule which requires a driver to drink coffee
with the other drivers?
A. We do not.
Q. Do you have any company rule that requires him to talk to the other
drivers all the time?
A. We do not.
Q. Is there anything about not talking to other drivers that interferes
with his actual delivery of the merchandise for the company?
A. It does not.
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Johnson, that for a period of approximately five
years Duncan operated that truck without any accident or being arrested for
speeding or any major catastrophe?
A. It is.
Q. Isn't it a fact that he delivered the merchandise to the customers?
A. It is.
Johnson further testified that Duncan complained to him about his runs, "he
said be wasn't-he was getting a dirty deal, he wasn't getting what the other
drivers were." The complaint was made in 1949, and in December 1949 at which
time, according to Johnson's testimony, he "gave him (Duncan) proof that he
was" getting equal treatment. Duncan complained again in April 1950, but the
"reprimand" was admittedly made only once, after the first complaint in Decem-
ber 1949, and apparently consisted of the "proof" given Duncan by Johnson.
Johnson testified that Duncan complained about the performance of his truck
and was reprimanded after the first complaint, but testified that the "reprimand"
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1225
of December 1949 (above mentioned) covered all the complaints against Duncan
and was the only reprimand he gave Duncan because of his allegedly improper
complaints and disposition.
Johnson further testified that after the 1950 vacation periods had been set,
Duncan, who was entitled to a 2-week vacation, came to him in April "with a
request to go plow, take a week's vacation to plow."
Duncan admitted that he took his vacation out of turn. He testified that he
told Johnson be wanted time "in order to plow" and asked for the vacation time
"providing it was all right."
Duncan testified that Johnson at the time told him "it was all right" and that
neither Johnson nor Hotchkiss mentioned the incident thereafter.
Johnson testified that Duncan took his second week's vacation in August
"under the same circumstances."
Johnson further testified that sometime in August 1950, he met with the drivers
to discuss a newly issued rule book and at the time "Duncan picked up his
orders, his log book, and said, 'It won't do a damn bit of good,' and walked out."
Duncan testified that he had no recollection of the incident.
Johnson testified that sometime in May 1950, he telephoned to Hotchkiss at
Fort Worth and reported on Duncan's conduct ; that Hotchkiss instructed him
"to talk to Duncan" ; that accordingly, "I told Duncan that his work wasn't
satisfactory, and Duncan promised to do better" ; that after his promise Duncan
"was good" but that later in June and in August he warned or reprimanded
Duncan again ; that in all he warned Duncan on three occasions, in May, June,
and August, however, Johnson testified :
I don't know whether you could call it a warning in August or not.
As to the June occasion Johnson testified :
Well, as I remember, Mr. Duncan had been reprimanded on his -actions
again and at that time that I had kept Hotchkiss from firing him and he said,
"Well, what have I done?" I said, "Duncan, you know what you have done."
As elsewhere reported herein Duncan testified that this conversation was sub-
stantially as reported by Johnson but took place at the Cosden loading dock in
Sweetwater on October 16, 1950, not in June as reported by Johnson.
Johnson further testified that on the morning of September 7, 1950, Duncan,
Driver-Foreman Ross, and he were loading their trucks. Duncan had deliveries
to make in Merkel, Texas, and San Angelo, Texas, and : "Well we were waiting
there, Ross and I and Duncan figured those routes."
Duncan stated that he intended driving a different route. This route was some
21 miles longer than the one "figured" during the conversation, and John-
son remarked : "To hell with the company ; if I had got a raise this morning I
would have gone the short way."
With reference to the incident Duncan testified :
After I had loaded I started in the office to get my loading slip to go on,
and I had billed out.
Q. Had you billed out?
A. Yes, and he said, "Dune, where are you going first?" I said, "Well,
I am loaded for San Angelo," and he says, "Which way are you going?"
And I don't remember the route I made that day, but I told him that Mr.
A. C. Ross was loading by me, and he said, "Thats a long way, isn't it,
Dune?" I said, "Yes, I really hadn't thought about it, but I guess it is."
But I said, "I will just go ahead and go the long way ; if the company
would give us the raise I'd have went the short way," and laughed about it.
Q. What did Mr. Johnson say?
A. Well, he laughed and said, "You go ahead the way you want to Dune."
1230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. C. Ross, who is employed by the Respondent as a driver and also acts as
relief foreman at the Sweetwater station, and who is a member of the Union,
testified :
Well, I was on the dock with Neely and Duncan at the time, and I had
my back turned part of the time and I didn 't hear every bit of it, but I
heard the biggest part of the conversation, and Neely turned to me and
he says, "Ross , which of the ways is the shorter way," and I figured it up
in my head , the mileage , and I said the way, the one way is 21 miles shorter
than the other one, or approximately 21 miles shorter. And so then Duncan
started towards the office and he said , "Well," says, he says, "I am going
the long way," and he said , "if-" let's see, he said, "I am going the long
way and if I got a raise," he says, "I'd go the short way," just like that.
Q. What did Mr. Neely Johnson say to that , if anything?
A. Well, I don't recall hearing him say anything against that.
Q. Anything else?
A. I don't remember, no.
Ross testified , and Johnson admitted, that at the time the route to be taken
between points when making deliveries was left to the drivers' judgment.
Johnson also testified :
Trial Examiner PLOST. When did you figure out this route to go the
way you indicated, to Merkel and then back to Merkel and all that?
The WITNESS. Before Mr. Duncan had billed out.
Trial Examiner PLOST. Did you tell that to Duncan?
The WITNESS. Before he was billed out, yes, sir.
Trial Examiner PLOST. You told him that was the route he was to travel?
The WITNESS. I told him that was the shorter route.
Trial Examiner ProsT. Did you tell him to travel that route?
The WITNESS. Not definitely.
Duncan testified that he traveled the longer route; that he turned in the log
of the trip which was then approved by Johnson without comment.
Johnson testified :
Q. Now, when men turn in their log sheets every day, do you check to
see whether they have taken the long or short route?
A. I do.
Q. Every single log?
A. I do.
Q. All right, and when Mr. Duncan turned in his log for the trip which
he made on September 7, did you O. K. that log or did you send it back
to him?
A. The log was O. K.'d.
Q. You O. K.'d it. And when you O. K.'d that log, did you make any
written comment about it to the company?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Now, that was on September 7, and it was never reported to the com-
pany until on October 17, is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Concluding Findings on the "Long Route" Trip of September 7
Considering the admitted fact that drivers were permitted to choose the
routes they traveled between delivery points and the fact that Johnson passed
Duncan's log report showing the use of the longer route and made no mention
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1231
of the incident to Hotchkiss until nearly 6 weeks later, together with the cor--
roboration of Duncan's testimony by Ross, and upon the entire record, the-
undersigned is convinced and finds that Duncan's version of the incidents,
including the conversation surrounding the "long route" trip of September 7,
is the accurate version thereof. The undersigned therefore credits Duncan's
testimony and finds that Johnson told Duncan, "You go ahead the way you
want to Dune." The undersigned further finds that Duncan's use of the longer
route, herein referred to, was not considered insubordination by the Respondent
on September 7, but was first seized upon as an excuse for Duncan's discharge
on October 17.
Johnson further testified that in the afternoon of October 16, he received a
telephone call to the effect that Duncan's truck was loaded but needed repairs
before it could be moved ; that he sent a mechanic and himself arrived and
remained with Duncan until the truck was repaired and the latter started on
his trip; that while the truck was being repaired "Duncan said he was getting
tired of these 15 hour days." Duncan was scheduled to take a load of gasoline
to Snyder, some 39 miles distant. Johnson testified :
Q. Did you tell him to go to Snyder?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that the occasion when his complaint came up?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that the connection in which he made this reply to you about the
15 hours?
A. It is.
Q. What if anything did you tell him to do with reference to going on to
Snyder?
A. I told him he would either have to go to Snyder or take the truck
to the yard.
Duncan's testimony regarding this incident elsewhere cited herein differs
from Johnson's account in that Duncan testified that Johnson asked him, "Well
how do you think the Union will benefit you?" and that his reply was "Well
I don't know for sure, but if it will stop these 15 hour days, that will help
some." According to Duncan, it was also at this time that the conversa-
tion with respect to Johnson's keeping Hotchkiss from discharging Duncan took
place.
There is no dispute that Duncan left for Snyder as soon as the truck was
repaired and delivered the load there.
Ross testified to a conversation with Johnson regarding the above-related
incident:
He (Johnson) said to me, he said that "Duncan and I had a quarrel
this morning," one day or two ago, he didn't say any definite time, and
he said, "I was kidding him about the union a little bit," and that was
the time that they were referring to before, you know, about their quarrel
when the truck moved in, and he said that Duncan and him had had this
quarrel and he was kidding him and one word brought on to another and
Duncan said, "Well, if it wasn't for these 15-hour days, why-if it was-"
I am loused up. If it wasn't-"If we was in the union maybe we wouldn't
have these 15-hour days," that's what it was, and so then Mr. Duncan
said, well, said, "I wish you would get in touch with Mr. Hotchkiss," and
says, "We will thrash this thing out."
Q. He started off by telling you, though, that he had been kidding Duncan,
about the union?
A. That's the way it started, and that's all he told me.
1232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Johnson did not deny Ross' testimony, which the undersigned credits.
According to Johnson, after Duncan left he then telephoned Hotchkiss and
complained of Duncan 's actions , telling him Duncan refused to go to Snyder and
also for the first time telling Hotchkiss about the trip which Duncan made
wherein he traveled a longer route than necessary.
The record is clear that at the time Johnson allegedly made this report,
Duncan had already left for Snyder and Johnson had signed his driving log for
the trip.
Johnson testified with respect to the "long route" :
Trial Examiner PLOST. Now, then, you are now testifying that because
Mr. Hotchkiss on the 16th of October, or Mr. Duncan on the 16th of October
complained to you about the length of the day that he was working, that
you the next day an hour before he was discharged told Mr. Hotchkiss about
this incident of his taking the long route around on a certain delivery?
The WITNESS. Yes, Sir.
Trial Examiner PLOST . Is that right?
The WITNESS . Yes, Sir.
Conclusion as to Duncan 's Alleged Refusal to Make a Trip to Snyder, Texas
Considering the undenied testimony of employee Ross, as found above, and
also considering that Duncan's account of the October 16 conversation presents
a logical , natural sequence which begins with mechanical failure leading to
a time loss and "a 15 hour day," a taunt regarding the Union , which leads to
an angry answer , a near quarrel , and a virtual threat of discharge , while on
the other hand Johnson 's account of the event portrays only a claimed refusal
of duty, and considering also that Johnson first testified he explained to Dun-
can that there was no storage for the load in Sweetwater and then "I told him
lie would either have to go to Snyder or take the truck to the yard ," upon which
remark the Respondent strains to show an order and a refusal to obey, and
considering that at no point does Johnson directly testify that Duncan refused
to go to Snyder , and considering that Duncan did leave for Snyder as soon as
the truck was repaired and did deliver the load there, and considering that
Duncan places Johnson's claim that he prevented Hotchkiss from discharging
Duncan in this conversation , while Johnson places it in June and being mindful
of Hotchkiss ' testimony to the effect that sometime in August he was informed
by Johnson that "Duncan was slipping back into his old ways," and that he at
that time told Johnson, "Let's be easy with him, he's been with us a long time,
give him a little more time ," which is hardly a statement one would expect
from a man who had "been kept from firing " the same employee in June, there-
fore on all the circumstances and on the entire record in the case the under-
signed is persuaded that Duncan 's account of his conversation with Johnson at
the Oosden refinery in Sweetwater , Texas, and the incidents surrounding the
subsequent trip to Snyder and his discharge are the correct version thereof.
. The undersigned , on the entire record , credits Duncan and does not credit
Johnson.
Concluding Findings
The record does not sustain the Respondent 's contention that Duncan was
discharged because he engaged in certain conduct objectionable to it, which con-
duct was not disclosed , described , or defined in any testimony adduced by the
Respondent ; because he complained about the performance of a truck, later
found to have been defective when sold to the Respondent and turned over to
Duncan to operate ; because he permitted the governor on a truck 's engine to be
unsealed , admittedly , not an act meriting discharge ; because he had a sullen
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 1233
disposition , manifested by his preference for eating at a restaurant counter in-
stead of in a booth together with his supervisor ; because he requested a change
in his set vacation , which was granted him ; because he drove a "long route" on
September 7, 1950, which was not reported by his supervisor until October 16, or
because he refused to make a trip to Snyder , Texas, which was admittedly made
and which the record shows was known to have been made when allegedly re-
ported as refused.
Moreover , the record is clear that the Respondent refused to give Duncan any
reason for his discharge until 3 months after the event.
The undersigned finds, on the entire record considered as a whole , including his
observation of the witnesses , that none of the reasons advanced by the Respond-
ent as cause for the discharge of Duncan entered into his discharge as a cause
therefor.
Inasmuch as all the reasons for Duncan 's discharge advanced by the Respond-
ent are not sustained by the evidence , and have been rejected by the undersigned,
there remains only the reason advanced by the General Counsel for Duncan's
discharge , namely Duncan 's union membership and activity.
The undersigned found Duncan to be an honest and forthright witness whose
testimony appeared to be truthful , while on the contrary Neely Johnson was
evasive and contradictory , his testimony being neither straightforward , coherent,
or plausible , therefore the undersigned credits Duncan and does not credit Neely
Johnson where the testimony of the two men is in conflict.
Upon all the circumstances in the case , the entire record considered as a whole,
and his observation of the witnesses , the undersigned is convinced that the Gen-
eral Counsel 's contention that Nolan W. Duncan was discharged because of his
membership in and activities on behalf of the Union is well sustained by the
record and finds that on October 17, 1950, the Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Duncan . The undersigned further finds that by said illegal conduct the
Respondent has discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of
the said Nolan W. Duncan, has discouraged membership in a labor organization,
and has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
The undersigned further finds that by C. N. Hotchkiss ' admitted questioning of
various of the Respondent 's employees regarding their reasons for joining the
Union and his statements as disclosed by the testimony of Lee Prescott, which
the undersigned credits, and his statements to Harris that if the union-minded
employees "didn't like" their jobs , "why didn't I [they] quit ," and by Neely John-
son's admitted questioning of employees , the Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act , more particularly Section 8 (a) (1) thereof.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring
in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I,
above, have a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The undersigned has found that the Respondent discriminated in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment of Nolan W . Duncan. The undersigned
will therefore recommend that the Respondent offer him immediate and full
1234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position 2 without prej-
udice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make him whole for
any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of such discrimination by pay-
ment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would have earned
as wages from the date of his discriminatory discharge to the date of the offer
of reinstatement, less his net earnings 2 during such period .4
In view of the Respondent's discriminatory discharge of Duncan and its
other acts of interference, restraint, and coercion, there is danger that the
commission of unfair labor practices generally is to be anticipated from the
Respondent's unlawful conduct in the past. The undersigned will therefore
recommend that the Respondent not only cease and desist from the unfair
labor practices found, but also cease and desist from in any manner inter-
fering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act 6
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The operations of Magnolia Petroleum Company constitute trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States within the meaning of Section 2 (6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Oil Workers International Union, CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in,
and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Nolan
W. Duncan thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, the Re-
spondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in OIL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION, CIO, by discrimination in the hire or tenure of employment of any
2 The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827.
2 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440, 492-498.
4 Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from. a sum equal to that which the
employee would normally have earned for each quarter or portion thereof, his net earnings,
if any, in other employment during that period Earnings in one particular quarter shall
have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter. The quarterly periods
described herein shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and October. It is
recommended further than Respondent make available to the Board upon request payroll
and other records, in order to facilitate the checking of the amount of back pay due-
(F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.)
5 May Department Stores, 326 U. S. 376.
THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, INC . 1235
of our employees or any condition of their employment, by inquiring into
their union membership or activities, or in any other manner interrogating.
or questioning them with respect to their union membership or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or-
ganizations, to join or assist OIL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from
any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Nolan W. Duncan immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to any senior-
ity or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for
any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
union or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against
any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor
organization.
MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated --------------------------- By ----------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not
be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, INC. and CHICAGO NEWSPAPER GUILD,
AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD-CIO, PETITIONER. Case No . 13--RC-
.2319. April 21,1952
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Irving M. Friedman,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are
free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
1 After the close of the hearing, the Employer moved to supplement the record by includ-
ing therein copies of contracts between the American Newspaper Guild or its local sub-
divisions and newspapers throughout the country. The Petitioner objects to the receipt
of such evidence on the grounds, among others, that there is no showing that the evidence
was unavailable at the time of the hearing and that both parties agreed to strike from the
record similar contracts offered in evidence at the hearing by the Petitioner. In view of
the position taken by the parties at the hearing and the objection of the Petitioner, the
motion to supplement the record is hereby denied.
98 NLRB No. 189.