MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 21, 2021

2019004311 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 21, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/361,748 11/28/2016 Michael J. Higgins-Luthman MAG04-P2929/423885 7445
153508 7590 01/21/2021
HONIGMAN LLP/MAGNA
650 TRADE CENTRE WAY
SUITE 200
KALAMAZOO, MI 49002-0402
EXAMINER
CATTUNGAL, ROWINA J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2425
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/21/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
asytsma@honigman.com
patent@honigman.com
tflory@honigman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MICHAEL J. HIGGINS-LUTHMAN and YUESHENG LU

Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before CARL L. SILVERMAN, MICHAEL T. CYGAN, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, which constitute all pending
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Magna
Electronics Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to a vehicle vision system in which
electrical power drawn by a vehicle lighting system is varied to adjust fuel
consumption of the vehicle. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 6, 29, 30; Fig. 1.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and reads as follows (emphasis
added):
1. A vehicle vision system for a vehicle, said vehicle vision
system comprising:
an image sensor disposed at a vehicle equipped with said
vision system and having a field of view and capturing image
data of a scene exterior of the equipped vehicle;
a monitor monitoring electrical power consumption of
the equipped vehicle;
at least one lighting system that draws electrical power
from the equipped vehicle when operated;
a control comprising an image processor, said image
processor processing image data captured by said image sensor;
and
wherein said control, at least in part responsive to
processing of captured image data by said image processor,
and at least in part responsive to said monitor monitoring
electrical power consumption of the equipped vehicle, and
while said at least one lighting system is operating and drawing
electrical power from the equipped vehicle, adjusts the
electrical power drawn by said at least one lighting system
while said at least one lighting system is operating in order to
adjust fuel consumption by the equipped vehicle.
Appeal Br. 27 (Claims Appendix).

Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748

3
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Miller US 2004/0078133 A1 Apr. 22, 2004
Watanabe US 2005/0275562 A1 Dec. 15, 2005
Kesterson US 2007/0273495 A1 Nov. 29, 2007
Breed US 2008/0294315 A1 Nov. 27, 2008
Labuhn US 2009/0138168 A1 May 28, 2009

Claims 1–7, 17, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Breed and Kesterson. Final Act. 7–17.
Claims 8, 9, 13, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Breed, Kesterson, and Watanabe. Final Act. 17–21.
Claims 10, 11, and 14–16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Breed, Kesterson, and Labuhn. Final Act. 21–25.
Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Breed, Kesterson, Labuhn, and Miller. Final Act. 25–26.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has
erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Appeal Brief. As discussed below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s
contentions of Examiner error.
Appellant argues, inter alia, the Examiner errs in finding that
Kesterson teaches the claim 1 limitation “a monitor monitoring electrical
power consumption of the equipped vehicle” (also referred to as “disputed
limitation”). Appeal Br. 12–14; Reply Br. 4–7.
Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748

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In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Breed and
Kesterson teaches the limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 7–9. The Examiner
finds Breed teaches many of the claim limitations but Breed does not
explicitly disclose “a monitor monitoring electrical power consumption of
the equipped vehicle; wherein said control at least in part responsive to said
monitor monitoring electrical power consumption of the equipped vehicle,
adjusts the electrical power drawn in order to adjust fuel consumption by the
equipped vehicle.” Id. at 8.
In the Answer, the Examiner states, without clear context, that “the
only support in the disclosure . . . that the fuel efficiency of [a] vehicle is
related to the power consumption of the lighting system” is in Specification
paragraphs 6, 30, and 31. Ans. 22–23. The Examiner finds Breed’s
switching to low beams reduces the power in the headlights because it is
well known, according to the Examiner, that dimming of headlights reduces
the overall power to the headlights. Id. at 24 (citing Breed ¶¶ 17–20, 391;
Fig. 22).
The Examiner finds Kesterson “directly relates to the disclosure of
fuel efficiency of the vehicle related to power consumption by turn[ing]
on/off the lighting.” Id. at 25. In reaching this finding, the Examiner relies
on the manual switching in Kesterson which results in lower power
consumption. Id. at 24–25 (citing Kesterson ¶¶ 53, 124, 80; Fig. 18).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues Kesterson’s
aftermarket DRL system only monitors for the activation of the OEM DRL
system and makes no disclosure or suggestion of the claimed “monitoring
power consumption.” Reply Br. 6–7.
Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748

5
We now refer to the disputed limitation discussed, supra, which
requires, a monitor monitoring electrical power consumption of the
equipped vehicle. Breed describes automatic adjustment of high to low
beam, but provides no teaching of a monitor as recited in the disputed
limitation. The Examiner appears to accept this and relies on Kesterson for
the disputed limitation.
On the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument
because the Examiner provides insufficient evidence to support the finding
that Kesterson teaches the disputed limitation. Kesterson teaches a system
for employing an automobile turn signal as a Daytime Running Light (DRL)
which may reduce power consumption if the turn signal light is lower power
than a traditional daytime running light. Kesterson, ¶¶ 123–124; Fig. 20.
The Examiner does not identify a monitor in Kesterson that monitors
electrical power consumption of the equipped vehicle. The switches
identified in Kesterson, cited by the Examiner, are insufficient to support a
finding that Kesterson teaches the disputed limitation.2 Moreover, in the
context of the claim, the monitor of the disputed limitation is utilized by the
claimed control
wherein said control, at least in part responsive to
processing of captured image data by said image processor, and

2 We note the Examiner’s statement in the Answer that “the only support in
the disclosure . . . that the fuel efficiency of [a] vehicle is related to the
power consumption of the lighting system” is in Specification paragraphs 6,
30, and 31. Ans. 22–23. The issue before the Board is § 103. To the extent
there is other basis to reject the claims, we leave further review to the
Examiner in the event of further prosecution. Although the Board is
authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should
be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02.
Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748

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at least in part responsive to said monitor monitoring electrical
power consumption of the equipped vehicle, and while said at
least one lighting system is operating and drawing electrical
power from the equipped vehicle, adjusts the electrical power
drawn by said at least one lighting system while said at least
one lighting system is operating in order to adjust fuel
consumption by the equipped vehicle.
(Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Examiner does not provide prima facie support for
the rejection. “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the
prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained to conclude the
Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1, as well as independent claims 17 and 20
that recite similar limitations, as obvious.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we do not sustain the obviousness
rejection of claim 1 and independent claims 17 and 20 which recite the
disputed limitations, and dependent claims 2–16, 18, and 19. Cf. In re
Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Because our decision with regard to the disputed limitation is
dispositive of the rejections made, we do not address additional arguments
raised by Appellant.

Appeal 2019-004311
Application 15/361,748

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 17,
20
103(a) Breed, Kesterson 1–7, 17, 20
8, 9, 13,
18, 19
103(a) Breed, Kesterson,
Watanabe
8, 9, 13, 18,
19
10, 11,
14–16
103(a) Breed, Kesterson,
Labuhn
10, 11, 14–
16
12 103(a) Breed, Kesterson,
Labuhn, Miller
12
Overall
Outcome
1–20

REVERSED