Mac O.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Nov 29, 2017

0120152431 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 29, 2017)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Mac O.,1
Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Capital Metro Area),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120152431

Hearing No. 430-2015-00006X

Agency No. 4K-230-0089-14

DECISION

On July 20, 2015, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
June 18, 2015, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision in part and REVERSES the Agency’s final decision, in
part.

BACKGROUND

On February 18, 2014, the Agency hired Complainant as a City Carrier Assistant (CCA) at the
Montrose Heights Post Office in Richmond, Virginia. CCA’s are non-Career employees whose
work hours can vary. They could be expected to work up to six days per week and up to twelve
hours per day, including holidays, Saturdays, and some Sundays. On April 10, 2014, while still
in probationary status, Complainant was terminated.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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On May 1, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint in which he alleged that various
individuals in his chain of command2 discriminated against him on the basis of religion
(Seventh-Day Adventist) and retaliated against him for protected EEO activity3 when:

1. He was denied an accommodation not to work during his Sabbath from March 1, 2014
through April 5, 2014;

2. On March 14, 2014, his paycheck was short work hours and his request for copies of his
PS Form 1260s went unanswered;

3. On March 18, 2014, he was suspended for a day and since then, his work hours were
decreased;

4. On March 3, March 20, and April 8, 2014, he was forced to work in unsafe conditions
when he was provided a caravan to deliver curbside mail;

5. From March 3 through April 10, 2014, he was not provided the proper tools, training or
direction to complete his route timely; and

6. On April 10, 2014, he was terminated from his employment.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
investigative report (IR) and notice of his right to request a hearing before a Commission
Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew
his request. Consequently, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency
subjected him to disparate treatment as alleged. The Agency also found that Complainant failed
to show that he had been subjected to discriminatory harassment, even though Complainant
himself had never raised that issue. However, the decision did not raise or address
Complainant’s claim that he was denied a religious accommodation.

2 Complainant identified the following individuals as the responsible management officials: two
acting Customer Service Supervisors (ACSS1 and ACSS2); the Customer Service Manager
(CSM); and the Postmaster.

3 Complainant identified the instant EEO complaint as his protected activity and reprisal as a
basis only with respect to incident (6). However, on February 27, 2014, shortly after he
completed his orientation and training, he submitted a written request to the CSM and to the
Postmaster to have Saturdays off for the purpose of religious observance. IR 192. This too is
considered protected EEO activity. Throughout his affidavit, he maintained that the CSM and
other named management officials took action against him because he had requested a religious
accommodation on multiple occasions. Accordingly, we will consider reprisal to be a basis for
incidents (2) through (5) as well as six.
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Incident (1): In addition to his personal request submitted on February 27, 2014, see supra n.3,
Complainant also submitted a letter from the pastor of his church to the Postmaster dated March
5, 2014. IR 193. The pastor explained that Seventh-Day Adventists refrain from all educational,
recreational, and work-related pursuits from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday. He asked that the
Postmaster allow Complainant to maintain his commitment to his religious conviction by
allowing him this time off or a transfer to post offices in the area that were closed during those
hours. Complainant averred that although he worked on Saturdays as directed, he had asked the
CSM to give him Saturdays off on multiple occasions, and that each time, the CSM turned down
his request without offering any possible accommodations. IR 76-81, 103, 170. The CSM
admitted that she was aware of his religious accommodation requests but maintained that she
could not grant those requests because of the Agency’s operational needs. She pointed out that
when Complainant applied for the CCA position, he was informed that he might have to work up
to six days per week and up to twelve hours per day. IR 103-05, 154-55. She further averred
that if she granted Complainant’s request, the Agency would have to pay overtime to employees
that were already on the clock. IR 106. When asked by the EEO investigator what actions were
taken on Complainant’s request for a religious accommodation, the CSM replied that she was not
aware of any actions taken. IR 105.

Incident (2): Complainant averred, in essence, that his hours were decreased, that he had not
been paid for all of the hours that he worked, and that the CSM refused to provide him with
copies of the Form 1260s that documented the hours that he worked. IR 82-83. The CSM
averred that for most employees, it took a while after they started working to get them into the
payroll system, and that during this interim period, Complainant was given pay adjustments. IR
108-09. She also averred that on one occasion, when she tried to issue Complainant a pay
adjustment, Complainant’s brother, who was serving as his representative, instructed him not to
sign for it. IR 110. ACSS1 averred that he had observed the CSM showing Complainant his
work hours, and that Complainant had received a Form 1260 every morning. ACSS1 also stated
that employees were advised to sign their 1260s in duplicate and to keep a copy for themselves.
IR 156, 196-200.

Incident (3): Complainant acknowledged that on March 18, 2014, he was not actually
suspended. Rather, about an hour before his shift was scheduled to begin on that day, he was
called and told that he would not be needed that day. He averred that the call “sounded like,” he
was being suspended or disciplined. IR 84-86. The CSM and ACSS1 responded that there were
no set hours for CCAs, and that on that particular day, all of the full-time and part-time career
carriers were covering their routes. IR 111, 157.

Incident (4): Complainant averred that on March 3, March 20, and April 8, 2014, he was
subjected to unsafe working conditions when he was assigned a caravan for curbside mail
delivery. IR 88-89. The CSM replied that for city deliveries, the Agency provides two types of
vehicles, caravans and long-life vehicles (LLVs), and that curbside deliveries account for only
five percent of the route. She also stated that Complainant was trained in vehicle safety
regarding LLVs, as were other new employees, and that in the event that a carrier did not have a
LLV when asked to make curbside deliveries, the carrier should call management. IR 112-14.
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ACSS1 averred that Complainant had never mentioned unsafe conditions to him. He also
pointed out that it was sometimes necessary for the Montrose Heights Post Office to work with
the vehicles that they had available, noting as an example a rural carrier who used her own car to
make deliveries. IR 158.

Incident (5): Complainant averred that for the length of his probationary tenure, he was never
provided with the tools and training he needed to do his job properly, and that he was being set
up to fail by management. In particular, he stated that there were not enough scanners in the
facility and that he was without one very frequently, and that he was never given keys to the
cluster-type mail boxes assigned on his route. He also repeated his assertion that LLVs were not
provided when he needed to make curbside deliveries. IR 91-92. The CSM, ACSS1, and
ACSS2 all stated that as with all new employees, Complainant was assigned an on-the-job-
instructor (OJI) for his first three days on the delivery routes, that cluster box keys were always
available, and that the Post Office had a shortage of scanners, necessitating that they be shared.
IR 114, 124, 159, 172.

Incident (6): Complainant received a notice dated April 10, 2014, informing him that he would
be terminated. The notice, signed by ACSS2 and approved by the CSM, specified that he was
being terminated because he had been involved in a vehicular accident earlier that day in which
he was at fault. Complainant had driven his vehicle into a ditch while making deliveries. IR 160.
The CSM averred that if a probationary employee was involved in an at-fault accident, he or she
would be fired, and that Complainant was made aware of this policy during orientation. IR 117.
ACSS2 averred that even if Complainant had not been involved in an accident, she would have
terminated him anyway based on his performance. Complainant was rated as unsuccessful in
three of the five job performance factors for the first thirty days of his probationary period. IR
95, 173, 182, 194-95, 204.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency’s decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part
1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the
parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).

Denial of Religious Accommodation – Incident (1):

Under Title VII, employers are required to accommodate the religious practices of their
employees unless a requested accommodation is shown to impose an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C.
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§ 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1). The traditional framework for establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination based on religious accommodation requires an employee to demonstrate
that: (1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with their
employment; (2) he or she informed the Agency of this belief and conflict; and (3) the Agency
nevertheless enforced its requirement against Complainant. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1984).

Once Complainant establishes a prima facie case, the Agency must show that it made a good
faith effort to reasonably accommodate Complainant’s religious beliefs and, if such proof fails,
the Agency must show that the alternative means of accommodation proffered by Complainant
could not be granted without imposing an undue hardship on the Agency’s operations. Pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(a)-(e), the Commission’s “Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Religion” (the Guidelines), alternatives for accommodating an employee’s religious practices
include, but are not limited to, voluntary substitutes and swaps, flexible scheduling, and lateral
transfers and job changes. Undue hardship does not become a defense until the employer claims
it as a defense to its duty to accommodate. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S.
60, 68-69 (1986). In order to show undue hardship, an employer must demonstrate that an
accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

An Agency’s obligation to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of its employees, if
this can be done without undue hardship, applies equally to probationary and permanent
employees. Brewer v. U. S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880283 (Aug. 12, 1988). The
employee in Brewer was a part-time probationary letter carrier who claimed that the Agency
failed to provide religious accommodation by forcing him to work on Saturdays. Like
Complainant, he was a Seventh-Day Adventist whose observance of the Sabbath fell on
Saturday. Just as in the instant case, the employee did not inform anyone at the Agency prior to
being hired that he would be unable to work on Saturdays for religious reasons. The employee
was told that he would have to work on Saturdays and did so. After several months had passed,
the employee approached his supervisor telling her that he could no longer in good conscience
continue to work on Saturdays. The Supervisor passed the employee’s request on to the
Postmaster, who told the employee to put his request in writing. Upon receiving the employee’s
written request to be excused from working on Saturdays, the Postmaster fired him. Although
the Postmaster promised the employee that he would attempt to find him a position at a larger
facility that could give him the accommodation he needed, the Postmaster never did so. The
Commission ultimately concluded in Brewer that the Agency failed to show that granting the
employee’s accommodation would result in an undue hardship.

The scenario in the instant case is virtually identical to that in Brewer. As in that case,
Complainant was a probationary employee and a Seventh-Day Adventist who sought to have
Saturdays off so that he could observe the Sabbath in accordance with the tenets of his faith.
And, just as in Brewer, his request was denied and he was compelled to work on Saturdays in
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order to avoid being fired. The CSM’s stated justification for not granting Complainant’s
request for Saturdays off was that the Post Office would incur overtime.

The Commission has held that accommodations that would require an employer to regularly pay
premium wages such as overtime to substitute employees impose more than a de minimis cost on
the employer and could constitute an undue hardship. Owings v. U. S. Postal Service, EEOC
Appeal No. 01841576 (June 24, 1986). However, it bears repeating that the Agency cannot raise
the issue of overtime or any other financial or logistical issue as an undue hardship until it
demonstrates that it made a reasonable effort to find an accommodation that would enable
Complainant to practice his religion without having to worry about losing his job. See
Philbrook, supra. In this case, neither the Postmaster nor the CSM made any effort to look into
the possibility of schedule swaps or any other type of accommodation, and the CSM admitted as
much. IR 105. Consequently, the Agency cannot support its assertion that granting Complainant
his requests to have Saturdays off would have caused an undue hardship by forcing it to incur
overtime. We therefore find, based on the evidentiary record before us, that Complainant
established that the Agency had denied his request for a religious accommodation when the CSM
refused to allow him to have Saturdays off between March 1, 2014 and April 5, 2014.

Disparate Treatment on the Bases of Religion and Reprisal – Incidents (2) through (6):

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was
subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference
of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima
facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802 n. 13. In this case, Complainant is a member of a protected religious group and had
engaged in protected EEO activity by asking for a religious accommodation. With regard to
incidents (2) through (5), he showed that his hours were reduced, he was required to deliver mail
under conditions that he believed were unsafe, and he did not have scanners and other tools he
needed for the job. As to incident (6), he showed that he was terminated during his probationary
period. All of this occurred at the same time that he had been requesting Saturdays off for
religious observances. This is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based
on religion and reprisal.

The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). In this case,
the CSM and the other named management officials provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanations for all five incidents. As to incident (2), the CSM and ACSS1 stated that
Complainant was given pay adjustments until he was placed into the payroll system and that he
needed to retain personal copies of the Form 1260s. Concerning incident (3), they maintained
that Complainant was not needed on March 18, 2014, since all of the delivery routes that day
were covered. Regarding incident (4), the CSM denied that Complainant was forced to operate a
caravan in unsafe conditions and that because delivery vehicles were sometimes in short supply,
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carriers had to make do with whatever was available. With respect to incident (5), the CSM,
ACSS1 and ACSS2 all stated that Complainant was given the same training given to other new
employees, that there were not enough scanners to go around, and that carriers sometimes forgot
their cluster box keys. Finally, with regard to incident (6), the CSM and ACSS2 both maintained
that Complainant was terminated because of his poor performance during the first thirty days of
his probationary period and because he was involved in a vehicular accident that was his fault.

To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Complainant may
demonstrate pretext by showing such weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the
Agency’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable fact finder could rationally
find them unworthy of credence. See Opare-Addo v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No.
0120060802 (Nov. 20, 2007), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No.
0520080211 (May 30, 2008). When asked by the EEO investigator what evidence he had that
his religion or his requests for religious accommodation were motivating factors in the actions
taken by the responsible management officials, Complainant merely restated the elements of his
prima facie case, even admitting with respect to incidents (2), (3), and (4) that he was not certain
whether his religion played a role in those incidents. IR 83, 87, 90, 93, 96. Beyond these
assertions, however, he has not presented affidavits, declarations, or unsworn statements from
witnesses other than himself or documents which contradict the explanations provided by the
Postmaster, the CSM, ACSS1, or ACSS2, or which call their veracity into question.
Accordingly, we find, as did the Agency, that Complainant did not establish that any of the
Agency officials relied on unlawful considerations of Complainant’s religion or his request to
have Saturdays off for religious reasons in taking the actions described in incidents (2) through
(6).

Furthermore, the Commission finds that under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) Complainant’s claim of hostile work environment must fail.
See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar.
8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by our determination that
Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by
discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept.
21, 2000).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we REVERSE the
Agency’s final decision to the extent it pertains to incident (1) and AFFIRM the Agency’s final
decision as it pertains to incidents (2) through (6).

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ORDER (C0610)
The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:
1. Within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that this decision is issued, the Agency
shall complete a supplemental investigation, and issue a decision, in order to determine
Complainant’s entitlement to compensatory damages incurred as a result of the Agency’s
unlawful denial of his request for Saturdays off as an accommodation to his religious
observances between February 18 and April 10, 2014. The Agency shall afford
Complainant the opportunity to submit evidence in support of his claim for damages
within the 90-day time frame, and Complainant shall cooperate with any additional
evidentiary requests made by the Agency. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date
that the Agency determines the amount of compensatory damages owed Complainant, the
Agency shall pay that amount.
2. Within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that this decision is issued, the Agency
shall provide appropriate remedial EEO training to the responsible management officials
identified in this decision as the Postmaster and the CSM, including at least eight (8)
hours of in-person or interactive training on an Agency’s obligation to provide
accommodations to its employees for religious observances. If any of the responsible
management officials have left the Agency’s employ, the Agency shall furnish
documentation of their departure date(s).

3. Within sixty (60) calendar days from the date this decision is issued, the Agency shall
consider taking disciplinary action against the responsible management officials
identified as the Postmaster and the CSM. The Commission does not consider training to
be disciplinary action. The Agency shall report its decision to the Compliance Officer. If
the Agency decides to take disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the
Agency decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s) for its
decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible management officials have left
the Agency's employ, the Agency shall furnish documentation of their departure date(s).
The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance in digital format as provided in
the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall be
submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Further,
the report must include evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G0617)
The Agency is ordered to post at its Montrose Heights Station facility copies of the attached
notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative,
shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar
days of the date this decision was issued, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The
Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
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by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer as
directed in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10
calendar days of the expiration of the posting period. The report must be in digital format, and
must be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0617)
Compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its
compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective
action. The report shall be in the digital format required by the Commission, and submitted via
the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The Agency’s report
must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant
may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The
Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the
right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below
entitled “Right to File a Civil Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42
U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be
terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the

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Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
Agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0610)
This decision affirms the Agency’s final decision/action in part, but it also requires the Agency
to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint. You have the right to
file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion of your complaint which
the Commission has affirmed and that portion of the complaint which has been remanded for
continued administrative processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one
hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency,
or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final decision on
your complaint. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the
person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her
full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action,
filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

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RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission.
The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not
alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right
to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

November 29, 2017
Date