Luis M. Mejia, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 5, 2008
0120082094 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 5, 2008)

0120082094

08-05-2008

Luis M. Mejia, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Luis M. Mejia,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120082094

Agency No. 4F-926-0149-06

Hearing No. 480-2007-00012X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's February 25, 2008 final action concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a Sales and

Services Associate, PS-05, at the agency's University Station in Irvine,

California.

On May 16, 2006, complainant initiated EEO contact. Informal efforts

to resolve his concerns were unsuccessful.

On June 27, 2006, complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, complainant claimed that he was the victim of unlawful employment

discrimination on the bases of race (Hispanic-Dominican), color (Black)

and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) on May 16, 2005 and ongoing, he was denied overtime;

(2) on May 9 and 12, 2006, the Station Manager screamed at him;

(3) on May 16, 2006, he was issued a Letter of Warning (LOW) for failure

to follow instructions;

(4) on June 7, 2006, he was accused of screaming at his supervisor;

(5) on June 9, 2006, he was accused of leaving a bottle of wine at work;

and

(6) on September 25, 2006, he was accused of taking money from his cash

drawer.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

On March 13, 2008, the AJ issued a decision without a hearing. Therein,

the AJ dismissed claim (1) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(2) on the

grounds of untimely EEO Counselor. The AJ determined that complainant's

initial EEO contact occurred on May 16, 2006, which it found to be

beyond the 45-day limitation period. The AJ further determined that

complainant had or should have had reasonable suspicion of unlawful

employment discrimination prior to his May 16, 2006 EEO contact.

The AJ further dismissed the portion of claim (2) concerning the May

12, 2006 incident and claims (4) through (6) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(5) on the grounds that complainant alleged that proposed

agency actions to be discriminatory. The AJ determined that the record

indicated that complainant did not suffer adverse harm because the agency

did not take a concrete personnel action against him. Specifically, the

AJ noted that two investigations were conducted concerning complainant's

claims (a) that his supervisor screamed at him on May 9, 2006, when he was

accused of leaving a bottle of wine at work and (b) when he was accused

of taking money from his cash drawer, but that no discipline was issued.

The AJ then proceeded to address the portion of claim (2) concerning

the May 9, 2006 incident and claim (3) on the merits, finding no

discrimination. Therein, the AJ determined that complainant did not

establish a prima facie case of national origin, color and reprisal

discrimination because complainant did not show that he was treated

differently than similarly situated individuals outside of his protected

classes.1 The AJ nevertheless found that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action which complainant

failed to show were a pretext for discrimination.

Regarding the harassment claim, the AJ found that complainant failed to

prove he was subjected to harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive

so as to render his work environment hostile.

The AJ noted that the Station Manager (SM) he denied screaming at

complainant on May 9, 2006 (portion of claim (2)). The SM further stated

that on May 16, 2006, he was the deciding official to issue complainant a

LOW for failure to follow instructions (claim (3)). The record reflects

that on May 9, 2006, complainant was observed parking his personal vehicle

in an area which he was previously instructed not to park approximately

one week earlier. The SM further stated that complainant "had been

told not to park in the area where he was parked. I asked him why he

was parked there. He stated he was just leaving." The SM stated that

he had disciplined other employees by issuing them a LOW for failure

to follow instructions. The SM also stated that complainant's national

origin and prior protected activity were not factors in his decision to

issue him a LOW.

On February 25, 2008, the agency issued a final action implementing the

AJ's dismissal of the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 16, 2006

incident and claims (1) and (4) through (6), and finding no discrimination

regarding the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 9, 2006 incident

and claim (3).

ANALYSIS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equipment Corporation, 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is

"material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of a case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary

judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative

proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a

determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary

disposition.

AJ's dismissal of claim (1)

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)

day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation

is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,

but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have

become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that he was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented

by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

The AJ properly dismissed claim (1) on the grounds of untimely EEO

Counselor contact. The last alleged discriminatory event occurred on

May 16, 2005, but that complainant did not initiate contact with an

EEO Counselor until May 16, 2006 which was beyond the forty-five (45)

day limitation period.

The Commission has found that because the limitation period for contacting

an EEO Counselor is triggered by the reasonable suspicion standard,

waiting until one has "supporting facts" or "proof" of discrimination

before initiating a complaint can result in untimely Counselor contact.

See Bracken v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 0590065

(March 29, 1990). The Commission finds that complainant had, or should

have had, a reasonable suspicion of unlawful employment discrimination

at the time of the alleged discriminatory event, and that he should have

contacted the EEO office within forty-five days. Complainant has failed

to provide sufficient justification for extending or tolling the time

limitation.

AJ's dismissal of the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 16, 2006

incident and claims (4) through (6)

The AJ dismissed the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 16, incident

and claims (4) through (6) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5)

on the ground that complainant alleged a proposed agency action to

be discriminatory. The AJ determined that the record indicates that

complainant did not suffer adverse harm because the agency did not take a

concrete personnel action against him. Specifically, the AJ noted that

two investigations were conducted concerning complainant's claims (a)

that his supervisor screamed at him on May 9, 2006, when he was accused

of leaving a bottle of wine at work; and (b) when he was accused of

taking money from his cash drawer, but that no discipline was issued.

Upon review, we find that the matters raised in a portion of claim (2)

and claims (4) through (6) address proposed agency actions, and there

is no evidence to support a finding that the proposed actions were ever

implemented.

AJ's finding of no discrimination regarding the portion of claim (2)

concerning the May 9, 2006 incident and claim (3)

The Commission finds that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions as discussed above. Complainant

has not shown that the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext

for discrimination. Therefore, we find that the AJ properly found no

discrimination regarding the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 9,

2006 incident and claim (3).

Accordingly, the agency's final action implementing the AJ's dismissal of

claim (1), the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 16, 2006 incident,

and claims (4) through (6), and the finding of no discrimination regarding

the portion of claim (2) concerning the May 9, 2006 incident and claim

(3) is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 5, 2008

Date

1 The AJ noted that in his complaint, complainant listed his race as

"Hispanic-Dominican." The AJ noted, however, that the Commission

recognizes the term "Hispanic" to be an indication of national origin,

not race.

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2

0120082094

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120082094