LuAnn Watkins, Complainant,v.Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 10, 2002
01a12062 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 10, 2002)

01a12062

07-10-2002

LuAnn Watkins, Complainant, v. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


LuAnn Watkins v. Department of the Air Force

01A12062

.

LuAnn Watkins,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. James G. Roche,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12062

Agency No. 9V1M00223

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms

the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that on February 1, 2000, complainant was not referred

for promotion consideration for a temporary position as Information

Management Specialist. When complainant was not referred, she sought

EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on March 10,

2000, claiming that she was discriminated against on the bases of race

(African-American) and reprisal for prior EEO activity. On April 4,

2000, an investigation was initiated to address the issues raised in

the complaint. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was

informed of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When

complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29

C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of race discrimination because she was unable to

demonstrate that other employees were treated differently than she was

under similar circumstances. The agency further concluded that assuming

complainant had established a prima facie case of race discrimination,

it determined that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was presented

for its actions. In reaching this conclusion, the agency noted it did

not consider complainant for the promotion because it used a Promotion

Referral System (PRS) to rank and identify candidates for vacant

positions. Moreover, the PRS only refers the ten most highly ranked

employees as candidates. The record reflects that since complainant

was ranked 19th by the PRS she was not forwarded for consideration for

the position.

The agency also found that complainant had failed to establish a prima

facie case of reprisal. The agency determined that complainant had

shown that: (1) she had engaged in prior protected activity; (2) the

responsible management official was aware of her prior protected activity;

and (3) she was disadvantaged by the responsible management official's

action. The agency determined, however, that complainant had failed to

show that there was a casual connection between the protected activity and

the alleged discriminatory action. Specifically, the agency concluded

that complainant would not have been referred for the position whether

she had filed a previous EEO complaint or not because the agency used a

predetermined ranking system to identify candidates for vacant positions.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Complainant contends the real reason she was not referred for the position

was discrimination. Complainant claims that she is a more qualified

candidate for the promotion because she believed that the selectee had

poor work skills and performance. Complainant further asserts that

following the filing of her prior EEO claims, her Supervisor gave her

lower evaluations score, which effected her ranking in the PRS.

Upon review, the Commission finds that the record supports a determination

that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

actions. Specifically, the agency contends that the Supervisor did not

consider complainant for the promotion because her name was not included

on the list of candidates referred by the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO).

The record reveals that CPO referred candidates for vacant positions

based on the PRS, a ranking system. In accordance with agency procedure,

the CPO used the PRS to identify the top ten highly ranked employees

and referred them to the agency when vacant positions became available.

The PRS list contained nine Caucasian candidates and one American Indian

candidate. An employee's PRS ranking is based on evaluations submitted by

the Supervisor. Complainant asserts that the Supervisor purposefully gave

her a low evaluation score because of her race and prior EEO activity.

However, complainant has failed to provide sufficient evidence that

the Supervisor's motivation for giving her a low evaluation score was

discrimination. Complainant was ranked 19th on the PRS list, therefore

was not even considered as a qualified candidate for the vacant position.

The record also reflects other individuals outside of complainant's

protected class were also not considered for the promotion because they

did not have the requisite top ten PRS ranking. The Commission notes that

complainant has not proven that as a result of the agency using the PRS,

she was treated any differently from similarly situated employees.

The Commission further finds that complainant failed to present evidence

that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reason for not

considering her for the promotion was pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, the FAD finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

7/10/02

Date