Locker, Howard et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 29, 2020

13149040 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/149,040 05/31/2011 Howard Locker RPS920110016USNP(710.162) 1693
58127 7590 07/29/2020
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
LEE, PHILIP C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2454
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/29/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte HOWARD LOCKER, JAY WESLEY JOHNSON, and
MASAYUKI KUMAGAI
____________________

Appeal 2019-002429
Application 13/149,040
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20–22, 24, and 31. Appellant has canceled claims
2, 3, 6–10, 12, 13, 16–19, 23, and 25–30. Appeal Br. 16. We have
jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies
Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. LTD as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to an
information handling device running an audio aggregation application.
Spec. ¶ 3. The audio aggregation application is configured to obtain audio
transmitted from one or more secondary (i.e., not the information handling
device) audio devices and generate a composite audio stream. Spec. ¶¶ 3,
17. In a disclosed embodiment, the information handling device may stream
the aggregated audio data to another remote device. Spec. ¶¶ 17–19.
Claims 1, 11, and 20 are independent claims. Claim 1 is
representative of the subject matter on appeal (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv)) and is reproduced below:
1. A system comprising:
an information handling device of an end-user having:
a processor; and
computer readable program code executable by the
processor, the computer readable program code
comprising:
host audio aggregation code running on the
information handling device that obtains, using
short range wireless communication, audio
transmitted by at least one mobile user device
located in proximity to the information handling
device;
the host audio aggregation code generating at
least one central audio stream by mixing the audio
obtained from the at least one mobile user device
with an audio stream obtained from at least one
other audio device selected from the group
consisting of another mobile user device located in
proximity to the information handling device and an
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audio input device of the information handling
device;
the information handling device sending the
at least one central audio stream to at least one other
device remotely located with respect to the
information handling device and the at least one
mobile user device;
wherein the audio obtained from the at least
one mobile user device has not been aggregated
with audio from any other device.

The Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20–22, 24, and 31 stand rejected under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Garcia, Jr. et al. (US
2012/0069134 A1; Mar. 22, 2012) (“Garcia”) and Jones et al. (US 7,277,692
B1; Oct. 2, 2007) (“Jones”). Final Act. 3–12.

ANALYSIS2
In rejecting, inter alia, independent claim 1, the Examiner relies on
the combined teachings and suggestions of Garcia and Jones. Final Act. 3–
5. We begin our analysis with a brief review of these prior art references.
Garcia generally relates to an audio processing computing device that
receives audio signals from other devices, generates a composite audio
signal, and distributes the composite audio signal to the devices. Garcia
¶¶ 2, 4.

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
August 6, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed January 28, 2019
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed November 28, 2018 (“Ans.”);
and the Final Office Action, mailed February 5, 2018 (“Final Act.”), from
which this Appeal is taken.
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Figure 1 of Garcia is illustrative and is reproduced below:

Figure 1 of Garcia shows the exchange of audio information to the
audio processing device (i.e., Focus Device (110)) from the other participant
devices (i.e., Non-Focus Devices (115, 120, 125, 130)). Garcia ¶ 4. Focus
Device (110) receives the audio signals (135, 140, 145, 150) from the Non-
Focus Devices (115, 120, 125, 130), composites the received signals, and
distributes the composite audio (155, 160, 165, 170) to the Non-Focus
Devices (115, 120, 125, 130). Garcia ¶ 4; see also Garcia ¶¶ 31–32, 37. In
addition, Garcia describes the Focus Device (110) may comprise a capture
module to locally capture audio (e.g., from the user of the Focus Device) and
may also capture audio via a network interface (e.g., from Non-Focus
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Device users). Garcia ¶¶ 70, 73; see also Garcia, Fig. 6. Garcia also
describes the devices may comprise wireless communication subsystems “to
facilitate communication functions.” Garcia ¶ 219. Garcia discloses the
wireless communication systems may include a cellular transceiver, a
Bluetooth transceiver, and a Wi-Fi transceiver. Garcia ¶ 219.
Jones generally relates to collecting audio data to create an audio
recording such as for surround sound. Jones, Abstract. In a disclosed
embodiment, Jones describes an architecture wherein audio data is collected
from a plurality of mobile client terminals using Bluetooth connectivity.
Jones, col. 6, ll. 14–28, Fig. 3; see also Jones, col. 6, l. 64–col. 7, l. 3. Jones
describes an embodiment comprising a plurality of location zones with each
location zone comprising a plurality of mobile terminals to capture audio
data. Jones, col. 6, ll. 19–28, Fig. 3. Jones further describes that within a
location zone, one of the mobile terminals is designated as the master
device, responsible for communicating with the other (slave) terminals in the
zone and also for communicating over a network to a central server. Jones,
col. 6, ll. 29–63; see also Jones, col. 7, ll. 35–53 (describing the slave
terminals sending the audio data to the master terminal that sends the
collected audio to the central server).
Appellant argues the Examiner’s reason to combine Garcia and Jones
is unsupported and conclusory. Appeal Br. 16–20; Reply Br. 18–22. In
particular, Appellant asserts that although an ordinarily skilled artisan might
be able to combine the references, the Examiner has not provided a rationale
as to why (or how) one of ordinary skill in the art would make the proposed
combination. Appeal Br. 18–20.
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The Examiner finds it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill to incorporate Jones’s method of a master device collecting audio data
via Bluetooth and send the collected audio to a remote device with the audio
aggregation system of Garcia “in order to enable some of the participants to
connect and communicate via Bluetooth wherein others are using different
communication mediums, thereby increasing the flexibility in Garcia’s
system.” Final Act. 5. In addition, the Examiner explains one of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that Garcia’s devices already have Bluetooth
capability and it would have been obvious to apply Jones’s teaching of
collecting the audio using Bluetooth and send the collected audio (as
aggregated by Garcia) to a remote user (i.e., a network server) to expand the
flexibility of Garcia—i.e., to send the audio to a participant not within
Bluetooth or Wi-Fi range. Ans. 6. The Examiner further explains the
proposed combination merely applies a known technique (i.e., collecting
audio signals over Bluetooth) to a known device (Garcia’s devices) to yield
predictable results. Ans. 6.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held the relevant inquiry in an
obviousness analysis is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with
approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). In
addition, an obviousness analysis can “take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 418.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. As described above, Garcia
teaches a system of aggregating audio signals received from non-focus
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devices and sending the composite audio signal. Garcia also describes the
focus device for collecting and aggregating the audio signals may use a
wireless communication subsystem comprising of various different
technologies. See Garcia ¶ 219. Moreover, Garcia contemplates the devices
connecting to a plurality of networks at the same time. Garcia ¶ 219 (“the
Wi-Fi transceiver can be used in some embodiments to connect to mesh
network while the cellular radio transceiver can be used in some
embodiments to connect to the focus point network”). Jones also teaches
using a plurality of transceiver technologies to collect signals locally and
transmit the collected signals to a remote user (i.e., central network server).
See Jones, col. 6, ll. 19–21, col. 6, ll. 53–59, col. 7, ll. 35–53. As such, we
agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
combine Jones’ teaching of collecting audio samples using Bluetooth and
sending the aggregated audio signal (as taught by Garcia) to a remote user in
order to expand further Garcia’s system to include a mix of local and remote
users (i.e., those within the focus network, and those outside of the focus
network) during an audio conference. See, e.g., Garcia ¶¶ 2, 4–5, 219.
Thus, the Examiner provides “articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” See
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. Moreover, Appellant has not provided
persuasive argument or evidence that the proposed combination uses the
elements of the references in a way other than their established functions to
achieve predictable results. “The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Further, Appellant
does not provide persuasive evidence or reasoning that the proposed
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combination would be “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary
skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.”
Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19).
Appellant also asserts that the prior art fails to teach an information
handling device receiving at least one audio stream from at least one mobile
user device located in proximity to the information handling device. Appeal
Br. 20–23; Reply Br. 22–25. In particular, Appellant argues Garcia
describes the non-focus devices as being remote from the focus device and,
therefore, are not located in proximity to the focus device and the focus
device cannot obtain the audio streams using short range wireless
communication. Appeal Br. 20–23. Appellant argues that Garcia instead
teaches the non-focus devices connect to a network using Bluetooth and use
the network to send their audio signals to the focus device. Appeal Br. 21–
22.
When construing claim terminology during prosecution before the
Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the Specification, reading claim language in light of the
Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We
are mindful, however, that limitations are not to be read into the claims from
the Specification. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad
construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or
patentee.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
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We note the claim language recites that the information handling
device obtains the audio signals from the mobile user device(s) “using short
range wireless communication.” Even if we were to accept Appellant’s
characterization that Garcia only teaches or suggests the focus device
obtains the audio signals from the non-focus devices after connecting to a
network (using Bluetooth, a short range wireless communication approach),
Appellant’s claim is broadly, but reasonably construed to include such an
approach.
Moreover, we note the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of
Garcia and Jones and particularly finds that one of ordinary skill in the art
would have been motivated to use the approach of Jones wherein the master
device obtains the audio signals from the slave devices using a Bluetooth
connection. Final Act. 5; Ans. 7; see also In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining the test for obviousness is whether
the combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the
patentee’s invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art).
To the extent Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Jones’
master terminal teaches the claimed information handling device because
Jones does not aggregate the audio signals from the slave terminals (see
Appeal Br. 23; Reply Br. 25), we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. As
discussed above, the Examiner relies on Garcia for this teaching. See Final
Act. 3–4 (citing Garcia ¶¶ 4, 31–43, Figs. 1, 2).
Appellant also asserts “Jones has nothing to do with remote
conferencing and teaches nothing related to transmission of conference
audio to remote devices.” Appeal Br. 22–23; Reply Br. 24–25. As such,
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Appellant argues an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated
to combine Jones with Garcia. Appeal Br. 23.
As discussed above, we find the Examiner has set forth articulated
reasoning with rational underpinning to support the proposed combination.
See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. In addition, to the extent Appellant is
asserting that Jones is non-analogous art, we disagree.
The correct inquiry for whether a reference is analogous art to the
claimed invention is if (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor as
the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the
reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even
if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention). In re
Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In order for a reference to be
“reasonably pertinent” to the problem, it “logically would have commended
itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Icon
Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Jones is analogous art. See
Ans. 8. Both Jones and Appellant’s invention relate to the collection of
audio signals and the transmission of the collected audio signal(s) to a
remote location. Thus, Jones is (at least) reasonably pertinent to the problem
faced by Appellant and is, therefore analogous art.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 11, and 20. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24, and 31,
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which depend directly or indirectly therefrom and were not argued
separately. See Appeal Br. 16; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15,
20–22, 24, and 31 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4, 5, 11,
14, 15, 20–
22, 24, 31
103(a) Garcia, Jones 1, 4, 5, 11,
14, 15, 20–
22, 24, 31

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED