Locals 406, 406A, 406B and 406C

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1958

120 N.L.R.B. 1741 (N.L.R.B. 1958)

LOCALS 406 , 406A, 406B AND 406C 1741
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Biltmore, Pacific, California Chair are, each of them , engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
2. Teamsters , Carpenters , and Upholsterers are, each of them, labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging employees of Pacific , California Chair, and
Cinecraft, not to use, process , handle or work on products of Biltmore and/or to
perform services for their respective employers , with the object of (a) causing such
employers to cease doing business with Biltmore and (b ) forcing and requiring
Biltmore to recognize Respondent Carpenters and Respondent Teamsters as the
collective-bargaining representatives of its employees , although Respondents Car-
penters and Teamsters have not been certified as such representatives in accordance
with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, the Respondents have engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B ) of the Act.
4. By demanding recognition of Teamsters and Carpenters by Biltmore and
Modern Frame as bargaining representatives of their employees, respectively, when
neither represented a majority of the said employees in an appropriate unit , and the
execution of union -shop contracts with the said unions, and by Teamsters' and
Carpenters' picketing of Biltmore and Modern Frame to enforce the said demands,
the Respondents have attempted to cause Biltmore and Modern Frame to dis-
criminate against their employees within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The conduct described in paragraph 4, above, did not restrain and coerce
employees within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
7. Organizing Committee is not a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
8. By Teamsters ' picketing of Biltmore , the Respondents have not engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B ) of the Act.
(Recommendations omitted from publication.
Locals 406 , 406A, 406B and 406C , International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers , AFL-CIO and Jahncke Service, Inc.
Seafarers' International Union of North America, Atlantic and
Gulf District , AFL-CIO and Jahncke Service , Inc. Cases Nos.
15-CC-52 and 15-CC-53. June 30, 1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 6, 1957, Trial Examiner David London issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also
found that the Respondent Seafarers' had not violated the Act in cer-
tain other respects and recommended that to that extent the complaint
against it be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondents, the General
Counsel, and the Charging Party herein filed exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report and supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
120 NLRB No. 215.
1742 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS BOARD
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with.the exceptions, modifications, and-
additions noted below.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent Operating
Engineers and the Respondent Seafarers violated Section 8 (b) (4),
(A) and (B) of the Act. In so doing,, however, we find that the•
Respondents, by picketing the trucks of Jahncke, with whom they had
a labor dispute, at the various construction sites, induced and encour-
aged employees of secondary employers to engage in a strike or a
concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use or handle-
Jahncke's products, with the object of forcing the secondary employers
to cease doing business with Jahncke and with the further object of
forcing Jahncke to recognize and bargain with the Respondent Oper-
ating Engineers as the representative of its crane operators, and with
the Respondent Seafarers as the representative of its marine em-
ployees, although the Respondents were not representatives certified
by the Board under Section 9 of the Act.' The Trial Examiner-
declined to find that one of the objects of the Respondents' activities:
was to force Jahncke to recognize or bargain with the Seafarers.
As set forth in the Intermediate Report and disclosed in the record,,
the Respondents called a strike against Jahncke to secure better terms
and conditions of employment for the crane operators, whom the.
Operating Engineers sought to represent, and the marine employees,
whom the Seafarers sought to represent. In furtherance of the strike,,
the Respondents picketed all but two of Jahncke's installations 2 Not
being successful in their efforts at Jahncke's installations, the Re-
spondents extended their picketing activities to various construction
sites when Jahncke's trucks were making deliveries of ready-mixed
concrete. They did so despite the fact that the truckdrivers, who
were not directly involved in the dispute, entered and left Jahncke's,
plants from 8 to 16 times during the course of a day's work to report
and load their trucks.3 The pickets carried signs at the construction
sites stating, among other things, that Jahncke's employees were on
strike for better wages and conditions. In their brief to the Board,
the Respondents admit that they engaged in picketing at the construe--
1 Contrary to the view of the Trial Examiner and the parties, the Board has held that-
the Moore Dry Dock doctrine ( 92 NLRB 547 ) is inapplicable to a situation where, as
here , the primary employer has a permanent place of business at which the union could
adequately publicize its labor dispute Brewery and Beverage Drivers, etc ( Washington
Coca - Cola Bottling Works , Inc ), 107 NLRB 299, 302-303, enfd. 220 F. 2d 380 (C. A.,
D C ) ; Local 6 5 7, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , etc. (Southwestern Motor
Transport, Inc.), 115 NLRB 981, 983-984; United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, etc.
(Barry Controls, Inc.), 116 NLRB 1470, 1471.
2 Contrary to the suggestion in the Intermediate Report, the record shows that the
Respondents did not picket Jahncke's lumberyard or Chalmette plant.
3 Simmons , the Respondent Operating Engineers ' business agent, estimated that the
drivers spend about 25 percent of their working time at Jahncke 's plants.
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B -AND 406C 1743
tion sites in order to bring to the attention of the contractors and their
employees working there the facts of the Operating Engineers' dispute
with Jahncke.
As a result of these picketing activities, employees of contractors at
a number of the construction sites refused to handle Jahncke's con-
crete or to work while the picket lines were maintained. In addition;
contractors on several of the jobs canceled their contracts with Jahncke
for the delivery of concrete. Significantly, there is evidence that
Simmons, a business agent of the Respondent Operating Engineers,
advised Whitty, a contractor, that he could avoid picketing at his
project if he obtained concrete from someone other than Jahncke. In
the case of another contractor, Farnsworth & Company, there is also
undisputed evidence that Simmons requested its cooperation by dis-
continuing its purchases of concrete from Jahncke and that, upon
Farnsworth's refusal to do so, its projects were picketed when
Jahncke's trucks delivered concrete, thus causing work stoppages and
eventually leading to a cancellation of Jahncke's contract.
It is clear that an object of the Respondents' picketing at the con-
struction sites was to force and require employers, who were wholly
unconcerned in the Respondents' dispute' with Jahncke, to cease doing
business with Jahncke. This object is revealed, not only in the fact
that Respondents extended their picketing activities from Jahncke's
permanent places of business where they could; and did, publicize
their dispute, but also, as indicated above, in undisputed evidence
and, indeed, in Respondents' admissions, that they thereby sought to
enlist the support of these neutral employers in aid of their dispute
with Jahncke. That a further object of the Respondents' activities
was to secure recognition and bargaining rights from Jahncke is
persuasively established by the record 4 Thus, the Respondents ad-
mittedly called the strike and picketed for the purpose of securing
higher wages and better working conditions for the employees they
purported to represent.5 Also, at a membership meeting of the Team-
sters Union, which represented other employees of Jahncke, the
Respondents made clear their objective by informing the assemblage
that a successful conclusion of the strike would lead to recognition
and collective bargaining. In addition, before the strike, the
Respondent Seafarers filed with the Board a representation petition
for certification, which it later withdrew.
& The Trial Examiner is in error in' stating that the Respondents in their joint answer
admitted the allegations of the separate complaints that the Respondents engaged in a
campaign for recognition and collective bargaining On the contrary, the Respondents
specifically denied the allegations However, as indicated above, the ,record amply sup-
ports a finding that the Respondents sought such recognition and collective bargaining.
In Petric's, an Operating Division of Red Robin Stores, Inc, 108 NLRB 1318, the
Board found that such conduct constituted 'a demand for recognition and collective
bargaining.
1744 DECISIONS OF., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Contrary to the Trial Examiner's finding, we find-that an objective
of the Respondent Seafarers' activities was to secure recognition and
bargaining rights as the representative of Jahncke's marine em-
ployees, as the Respondent Operating Engineers' objective was to
secure recognition and bargaining rights as the representative of the
crane operators . Although the signs carried by the pickets at the
construction sites bore the name only of the Operating Engineers,
it was stipulated for the record'that 6 pickets, 4 of whom were Sea-
farers' organizers , were furnished and paid by the Seafarers. More-
over, the signs carried at Jahncke premises and the literature dis-
tributed to employees bore the Seafarers' name. In these circum-
stances , it is unreasonable to assume that the Seafarers engaged in
secondary picketing solely in furtherance of the Operating Engineers'
demands and not their own.
The Respondents contend, however, that they did not seek to
achieve their objectives through the inducement of secondary em-
ployees to engage in a work stoppage or a refusal to handle Jahncke's
products, which Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) proscribes. They
argue that, by picketing at the construction sites, they merely at-
tempted to publicize their dispute with Jahncke. We find no merit
in this contention. As we have recently had the occasion to reiterate,
a picket line necessarily invites employees to make common cause with
the strikers and to refuse to work behind it or to handle the struck
employer's product.' In fact, at a number of the construction sites,
this was precisely the result of the Respondents' picketing. More-
over, the Respondents themselves admit that they resorted to picket-
ing at the construction sites as a means of appealing to employees of
neutral employers for their assistance 7 As a further indication that
the picketing was designed to reach employees other than Jahncke's
is the fact that, at several construction sites, picketing was conducted
at distances varying from 30 to 600 feet from Jahncke trucks.
Accordingly, we find that, by picketing the construction sites in
question, the Respondents, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and
(B), induced and encouraged secondary employees to engage in a
work stoppage or a refusal to handle Jahncke's products for objec-
tives proscribed in those provisions of the Act.' Contrary to the
Respondents' contention, such picketing under settled law is more
6Dallas General Drivers etc . (Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas, Inc.), 118
NLRB 1251; see also Laundry, Linen Supply & Dry Cleaning Drivers Local No. 928, etc.
( Southern Service Company, Ltd.), 118 NLRB 1435.
7 Although the Respondents state that they expected that such assistance would con-
sist of peacefully persuading Jahncke's drivers to support the Respondents ' efforts to
obtain better wages and working conditions from Jahncke, there is no evidence that the
contractors' employees were so informed.
8N. L R. B v General Drivers etc (Otis Massey Co.), 225 F 2d 205 (C. A 5), relied
on by the Respondents, is factually distinguishable from the present case in that in the
cited case, unlike here, the construction employees of the primary employer , whom the
union attempted to reach at a construction site, "almost never came" to the employer's
permanent place of business.
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B AND 406C =1745
than an exercise of free speech and is undeniably conduct the Act
is designed to reach."
In defense of the secondary picketing, the Respondents also invoke
a so-called "hot cargo" clause in a master contract between the New
Orleans Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, and the
Building and Construction Trades Council of New Orleans and Vicin-
ity to which the Respondent Operating Engineers is a party. This
clause provides that "the Contractors recognize that it is not unlawful
or a violation of this agreement for a member of a union to refuse to
work with nonunion employees, to refuse to cross a picket line, .. .
or to refuse to handle any product which is manufactured, processed,
or delivered by an establishment where a strike is in progress within
the jurisdiction of the New Orleans Building Trades Council." For
the reasons' set forth in the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the
Sand Door and companion cases," we find this defense to be without
merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Respondents violated
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Act by picketing the trucks of
Jahncke at the construction sites of the secondary employers with the
object of forcing or requiring the secondary employers to cease doing
business with Jahncke and of forcing and requiring Jahncke to recog-
nize or bargain with the Respondent Operating Engineers and the
Respondent Seafarers as the collective-bargaining representative of
Jahncke's crane operators and marine employees, respectively, al-
though the Respondents were not representatives certified by. the
Board under Section 9 of the Act.11
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Locals 406, 406A,
406B, and 406C, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-
CIO, and the Respondent Seafarers' International, Union of North
America, Atlantic and Gulf District, AFL-CIO, their officers, repre-
sentatives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging
the employees of any employer other than Jahncke Service, Inc., to
engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employ-
0Inte,national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v N. L. R. B. ( Samuel Langer), 341
U. S. 694; N. L. R . B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Counsel, at al. (Gould
& Pieisncr), 341 U. S. 675.
10 Local 1976 , Local Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL, et at.
( Sand Door & Plywood Co .) v. N. L. R. B 357 U. S 93.
11 In view of our additional finding that an object of Respondent Seafarers' secondary
picketing was to secure recognition and bargaining rights as the representative of
Jahneko's marme employees, we shall provide in our order that the Seafarers cease and
desist from such activity. '
483142-59=vol. 120=111 • -
1746 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to perform
any services where an object thereof is to force or require any employer
or other person to cease using or handling the products of Jahncke
Service, Inc., or to cease doing business with that Company, or to force
or require Jahncke Service, Inc., to recognize or bargain with the
Respondent Operating Engineers and the Respondent Seafarers as
the representatives of any of Jahncke's employees unless the Respond=
ents have been certified as the representatives of such employees under
the provisions of Section 9 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at their respective offices and meeting halls in New
Orleans, Louisiana, copies of the notice attached hereto marked
"Appendix." 12 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by
an authorized representative of each Respondent herein, be posted by
said Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by them for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ents to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(b) Mail to the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region signed
copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix" for posting
at the projects of the contractors or subcontractors listed in the Inter-
mediate Report in places where notices to their employees are cus-
tomarily posted, if such contractors and subcontractors are willing
to do so.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region in writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER FANNING took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
17 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Ap-
peals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B, AND 406C,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, AND
SEAFARERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, ATLANTIC
AND GULF DISTRICT, AFL-CIO, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B AND 406C 1747
WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage the employees
of any.employer, other than Jahncke Service, Inc., to engage in,
a; strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to,
perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or re-
quire any employer or other person to cease using or handling
the products of Jahncke Service, Inc., or to cease doing business
with that company, or to force or require Jahncke Service, Inc.,
to recognize or bargain with Locals 406, 406A, 406B, and 406C,
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, and
Seafarers' International Union of North America, Atlantic and
Gulf District, AFL-CIO, as the collective bargaining represent-
atives of any of Jahncke's employees unless we are certified as,
such representatives under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act.
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B, AND 406C,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
SEAFARERS ' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
NORTH AMERICA, ATLANTIC AND GULF
DISTRICT, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges filed by Jahncke Service , Inc., herein called
Jahncke, against Respondent Locals 406, 406A, 406B and 406C , International Union
of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, herein called Operating Engineers , and Re-
spondent Seafarers ' International Union of North America, Atlantic and Gulf
District , AFL-CIO, herein called Seafarers , the Regional Director of the Board for
the Fifteenth Region issued two separate complaints charging each of said Re-
spondents with identical violations of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B ), and Section
2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the
Act.
In each complaint it is alleged that the respective Respondents or Respondent as
designated therein , together with the Respondent or Respondents in the other'casd,
were engaged in a campaign to organize Jahncke 's employees and to have Jahncke
recognize the Operating Engineers and the Seafarers as collective -bargaining repre-
sentatives of its crane operators and marine employees respectively , and to enter
into collective -bargaining agreements with them fixing the wages , hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment of Jahncke 's said employees . Each complaint
further alleges that the Respondents or Respondent so designated in each proceeding,
since on or about August 20, 1956 , followed Jahncke 's trucks engaged in making
1748 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
deliveries of its ready-mixed concrete to construction sites on which were engaged
employees of nine contractors or subcontractors, and there engaged in picketing
and otherwise inducing or encouraging employees of said contractors or subcon-
tractors to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to work in the course of their
employment, all for the purpose of forcing br requiring the said contractors or
subcontractors to cease using Jahncke's products, or doing business with it, and to
force or require Jahncke to recognize or bargain with all the Respondents.
On November 2, 1956, the Regional Director for the Board ordered that the two
cases be consolidated. On or about December 28, 1956, the Respondents in both
cases filed their joint answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practice.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at New Orleans, Louisiana, on January 8
and 10, 1957, before the Trial Examiner duly designated to conduct said hearing.
All parties were represented by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing
on the issues.' Briefs in behalf of all the parties were submitted and have been
,duly considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. COMMERCE; THE BUSINESS OF THE. COMPANIES
Jahncke Service, Inc., is a Louisiana corporation with its main office located in
New Orleans, Louisiana. It is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution
of ready-mixed concrete, concrete pipe, and concrete products; the dredging of
rivers and lakes in and about New Orleans for shells used in construction, marine
operations in connection therewith, and the stock piling, sale, and distribution of
such shells; the sale and distribution of lumber and other general building materials;
shipbuilding and ship maintenance; the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
gravel; and the maintaining in connection with these operations of seven plant
locations in and about the city of New Orleans. During the calendar year 1956
Jahncke had sales aggregating $15,000,000, of which approximately $1,500,000
were for sales which were made outside the State of Louisiana and consisted of the
sale of building materials and the performance of dredging operations. On the
entire record I find that Jahncke is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Locals 406, 406A, 406B, and 406C, International Union of Operating Engineers,
AFL-CIO, and Seafarers' International Union of North America; Atlantic and Gulf
District, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Though the alleged violations with which we are concerned revolve about the
ready-mixed concrete operations of Jahncke, what has been found in 1, above,
estdblishes that Jahncke is also widely engaged in other fields. To service all of
these operations, its organization is divided into three divisions: -(a) the building
materials division which encompasses the sale of ready-mixed concrete and other
building materials; (b) the marine division which produces and delivers sand, giavel,
and shells; and (c) the dredging division which operates dredges in nearby Lake
Pontchartrain and elsewhere for the production of sand, gravel, and shells.
Jahncke's main offices are located at 814 Howard Avenue, New Orleans. It has
a ready-mixed concrete installation, a building material warehouse, and mainte-
nance garage at 1011 Claiborne Avenue. An additional installation, known as Slip
4, is located on Burma Road where the company maintains a ready-mixed concrete
plant and a yard to handle shells, sand, and gravel. Other ready-mixed concrete plants
are maintained at Harahan, Algiers, and Chelmette. All of the foregoing locations
are in the city of New Orleans or its immediate vicinity.
Jahncke engages the services of approximately 700 employees, of whom about
240 are classified as truckdrivers, warehousemen, lift truck operators, car washers,
and truck service employees. These approximately 240 employees are represented
for purposes of collective bargaining by a labor organization not involved in these
'A number of affidavits and a deposition originally filed in the Section 10 (1) proceed-
ing dealing with the events involved herein were received in evidence in the instant pro-
ceeding pursuant to a stipulation of all the parties that they be given the same effect as
if the affiant or deponent therein had appeared personally and given oral testimony. The
parties further stipulated that "none of [this] .material [would] be controverted."
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B AND 406C • 1749
proceedings-Local 270 of the Teamsters Union-with whom Jahncke has a col-
lective-bargaining agreement. Jahncke has no such agreement in behalf of the
remainder of its employees.
The complaints allege, and the joint answer of the Respondents admits, that at all
times material herein, the Operating Engineers and the Seafarers have both been
engaged in a campaign to organize employees of Jahncke and to have Jahncke
recognize them as collective-bargaining representatives of its crane operator and
marine employees respectively, and to enter into a collective- bargaining agreement
with them fixing the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
of its said employees.
The foregoing pleadings also respectively charge, and admit, that at all times
material herein, neither of said labor organizations has been certified under the
provisions of Section 9 of the Act as the collective-bargaining representative of any
of Jahncke's employees and that since on or about August 20, 1956, the Operating
Engineers and the Seafarers have engaged in a primary strike against Jahncke and
have engaged in picketing at business locations of Jahncke in and about New
Orleans, Louisiana.
In furtherance of that strike, "pickets were placed at all of the Jahncke installations
on August 20th, 1956," 2 which picketing, in behalf of both the Operating Engineers
and the Seafarers, continued intermittently until on or about September 10, 1956,
when it was enjoined by the "Civil District Court." No complaint is made, how-
ever, of this activity at Jahncke's premises. In the early days of that picketing, all
of the Jahncke drivers-and other employees represented by the Teamsters refused
to cross the picket line at the'Jahncke premises, and because only a relatively small
number returned before the-strike ended, Jahncke, intermittently, employed approxi-
mately 180 new men during the strike. Here, however we are concerned only with
picketing carried on at various construction sites in or about New Orleans where
contractors who had no dispute with the picketing union were engaged in con-
struction work, but where Jahncke's trucks were making deliveries of ready-mixed
concrete.
Because practically all of the relevant facts are undenied, indeed they are admitted,
I find it unnecessary to detail the evidence concerning the events at the various
construction sites which brought these proceedings before the Board. Accordingly,
and after carefully considering the entire record, I deem it sufficient, in order to
pose the legal problems involved, to make the following broad, inclusive findings.
Each driver of Jahncke's ready-mixed concrete truck reports for work in the
morning at one of its premises, checks the truck he is to operate, and then drives
to the ready-mixed concrete installation for loading. After loading, he drives to
the construction site, unloads the concrete, and returns to one of the plants for
another load. Whatever maintenance work the truck requires is performed by the
driver on Jahncke's premises. In the course of the day, each driver returns to one of
Jahncke's ready-mix plants for a new load from 4 to 8 times, depending on the
distance from the plant to the point of delivery. Normally, it only takes about 3
minutes to actually load, and not much longer to unload, the concrete, but the driver
and his truck may be delayed longer at one or both ends of his journey due to the
presence of other trucks, or the failure of the contractor to be ready for the delivery
of the concrete.
On various dates between August 30 and September 10, 1956, Jahncke trucks were
engaged in delivering, or attempting to deliver, ready-mixed concrete at certain con-
struction sites in or around New Orleans where the contractors or subcontractors,
whose names appear next below, were engaged in construction work and prepared
to receive Jahncke's ready-mixed concrete pursuant to agreement with that company:
Project Contractor or Subcontractor
Carrollton Interchange Bridge__________ R. P. Farnsworth & Company, Inc.
New Orleans Cold Storage____________ R. P. Farnsworth & Co., Inc.
Westwego Shopping Center_________ _ G. J. Glover Co., Inc.
International Business Machines Build-
ing -------------------------- _____ -Gervais F. Saviot Co., Inc.
Richland Terrace Housing Development_ Pat Caffey Construction Co., Inc.
Longino-Collins Sausage Factory_______ Tri-State Construction Company.
Paradise Manor Housing Development___ E. H. S. Construction Company.
George Washington Carver School______ J. A. Jones Construction Co. and
Stephen K. Whitty.
Lauradale Terrace Housing____________ Kelly Generes Construction Company,
Inc.
2 Lawrence Simmons, business agent of the Operating Engineers , so testified.
1750 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
During the same period, but only while the Jahncke trucks were actually on the
construction sites aforementioned, or waiting in close proximity to drive thereon,
a picket left his automobile parked nearby and posted himself on the public street
at the entrance of the construction site. It was stipulated that on all such occasions
the sign carried by the picket contained the following legend:
See our pamphlet.
PICKET
Jahncke's Service, Inc. employees, on,strike for
Better wages and conditions.
Operating Engineers, Local 406, AFL-CIO.
See our pamphlet
The picket maintained his.post at all of the sites as long as a Jahncke truck remained
there. Promptly upon the departure of the truck or trucks, the picket was with-
drawn in accordance with instructions from the Operating Engineers. At 2 or 3,
of the construction sites, the picket handed a pamphlet to 1 or 2 employees, or to
company officials or supervisors.. In practically all of such instances, however, the
pamphlet was given only after a request therefor was made. It read as follows:
This picket sign is directed at the employees of Jahncke's Service, Inc., on this
job site. We are picketing' Jahncke's Service, Inc., for better wages, hours,
and working conditions. This picket is not aimed at any other employers on
this job site since there is no labor dispute between-these contractors and this
Union.
Operating Engineers, Local 406.
At several of the construction projects, "employees on the construction sites either
refused to handle Jahncke material, or refused to work while the picket line was
maintained." At other sites, "employees on the job, including members of the
Operating Engineers Local Union, continued to handle Jahncke material and con-
tinued to work throughout the time that the picket line was present on the job site
near the truck." 3 On several of the jobs, the contractors, though under agreement
with Jahncke to buy all of their ready-mixed concrete from that company, turned
to other suppliers to fill their needs for that commodity. "After the roving picketing
started," Jahncke's ready-mixed concrete operations were curtailed approximately
50-60 percent.
On August 24, before any roving picketing began, Simmons, business agent for
the Operating Engineers, called Louis K. Good, vice president of R. P. Farnsworth
& Co., Inc., and told him that he, Simmons, was aware that Farnsworth was "using
concrete from Jahncke on a number of jobs." He told Good that because the
Operating Engineers were engaged in "a controversy and had pickets at the Jahncke
yards," and because he and Farnsworth "had been working in close harmony, he
hoped [Farnsworth] would cooperate and see [its] way clear to get [its] concrete
elsewhere." Good told him he could not give him an immediate answer but would
call him back. Not receiving that call, Simmons called Good on August 28 or 29,
and informed him "he was getting ready to go to a Building Trades Council meeting,"
and asked whether Farnsworth was going to discontinue receiving concrete from
Jahncke. Good answered affirmatively. Picketing of the nature heretofore de-
scribed occurred upon the appearance of a Jahncke truck during the morning of
August 30 at the Carrollton and New Orleans Cold Storage projects under construc-
tion by Farnsworth.
On September 7, while subcontractor Stephen K. Whitty, was engaged on the
Carver School job, a number of his employees, including members of the Operating
Engineers, walked off the job while the Jahncke truck, then on or near the premises,
was being picketed. When Whitty called Simmons and complained that he was
being unjustly harmed because he had no dispute with his employees, Simmons told
him that if he "got concrete from someone other than Jahncke, [he] would have no
difficulty at all."
Although, as heretofore found, all the picket signs at the construction sites involved
herein carried only the name of the Operating Engineers, it was stipulated at the
hearing that four of the men who carried picket signs at those sites were organizers
for the Seafarers. It was also stipulated that these 4 men, together with 2 others,
engaged in that picketing at the request of Lindsay Williams, the port agent for the
3 The findings within the two preceding quotations are extracts from the affidavit of
Thomas E Gould received in evidence under the circumstances described in footnote 1,
supra. The quoted testimony of Gould correctly summarizes the testimony to the same
effect given by other witnesses.
LOCALS 406 , 406A, 406B AND 406C 1751
Seafarers, and were paid for such services by the Seafarers. However, the instruc-
tions as to how and where the picketing was to be conducted were given only by the
Operating Engineers.
The parties further stipulated that a master agreement between the New Orleans
Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, and The Building & Construc-
tion Trades Council of New Orleans and Vicinity "was applicable during -the times
pertinent hereto on all of the construction jobs about which testimony was intro-
duced." The agreement containd a so-called "hot-cargo" clause reading in pertinent
part as follows:
The Contractors recognize that it is not unlawful or a violation of this
agreement for a member of a Union to refuse to work with non-union em-
ployees, to refuse to cross a picket line, . or to refuse to handle any product
which is manufactured, processed or delivered by an establishment where a
strike is in progress within the jurisdiction of the New Orleans Building Trades
Council.
Contention of the Parties and Concluding Findings
It is the position of the General Counsel that, "as a matter of law, the mere fact
that the Respondents engaged in picketing away from Jahncke's premises" is suf-
ficient to find them guilty of the violations with which they are charged herein.
Jahncke, in its brief, takes a similar position and as authority therefore points to
Board decisions which, it argues, hold that "ambulatory picketing alone [is] per se
violative of the Act." Respondents take issue with the foregoing theory and deny
that the mere existence of an opportunity to publicize the labor dispute at Jahncke's
premises is sufficient to make ambulatory picketing unlawful. They contend that
no violation can be found "unless it is clearly shown . . . that the actual object of
the union . was to unlawfully. induce secondary employees to cease work,
[and that] this may only be shown by direct and convincing evidence that the union
actually engaged in threats and inducements and encouragement to neutral em-
ployees to cease work for neutral employers." They also argue that by reason of
the "hot-cargo" clause aforementioned "that the employees on the job sites have the
contractual right to refuse to handle struck goods and to themselves boycott Jahncke
material, and that the employer has in effect consented in advance to such a boycott
under the terms of this agreement."
The Picketing at the Construction Sites
Though the General Counsel has posed the issue simply, the underlying problem
on this phase of the case is one that has given both the Board and the courts great
concern for it involves the delicate and difficult task of attempting to strike a balance
between "the dual Congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organiza-
tions to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes,"
a right guaranteed by Sections 7 and 13 of the Act,4 "and of shielding unoffending
employers and others from pressures and controversies not their own," a practice
proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Acts N. L. R. B. v. Denver
Building and Construction Trades Council, et al., 341 U. S. 675, 692. Thus, if this
case had been presented to me early in the administration of the Act, and had it
become incumbent upon me to initially strike that balance, my task would, indeed,
have been a most difficult one.
* Section 7 : "Employees shall have the right to self-organization , to . .. assist labor
organizations , . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
11tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .
Section 13 : "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right "
5 Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) . "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents-to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is :
(A) forcing or requiring . any employer or other person to cease using, selling, han-
dling , transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or re-
quiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the rep-
resentative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of Section 9."
1752 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
However, since the Act became law in 1947, the Board, by a series of decisions,
has progressively established guide posts which must dictate decision herein. The
exhaustive and able review of those decisions found in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, etc. (Associated General Contractors Association of Omaha, Nebraska,
Inc.), 116 NLRB 461, 472-475, makes it unnecessary for me to chart in detail the
route taken by the Board in that progression. Suffice it to say that, in accordance
with that and other decisions hereafter noted, picketing at the premises of a sec-
ondary employer is primary if it meets all the following conditions: (a) the picket-
ing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the
secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer
is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places
reasonably close to the location of the situs; (d) the picketing discloses clearly that
the dispute is with the primary employer; and (e) the primary employer has no
permanent establishment in the vicinity that may effectively be picketed.6
On the entire record I find that the picketing at the construction sites in the
manner heretofore found complied with the first four conditions prescribed by the
Board. I further find that the fifth condition has not been met. Instead, it is
affirmatively found that Jahncke has, and maintains, a number of premises in New
Orleans which may, and in fact were, effectively picketed in behalf of both Respond-
ents. Indeed, the trucks picketed at the various premises of neutral employers
entered and left Jahncke's picketed premises a total of 8 to 16 times a day.
There remains for consideration the legal effect to be given to the lack of proof
that all five conditions aforementioned have been met. The four criteria spelled
out by the Board in Moore Dry Dock, as it applies to common-site picketing in
situations of the kind contemplated by that case, have generally received judicial
approval by the courts of appeals which have dealt with the problem? The Board's
decision in the Washington Coca-Cola case, imposing the fifth condition, was en-
forced by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Brewery and Beverage
Drivers and Workers Local Union No. 67, etc. (Washington Coca-Cola Bottling
Works, Inc.) v. N. L. R. B., 220 F. 2d 380). That Board decision, and others
hereafter referred to, sustain the contention of the General Counsel that failure
to satisfy all five conditions aforementioned, under the circumstances here presented,
establishes, per se, that the picketing at the construction sites was not directed
exclusively to the employees of the primary employer, Jahncke, and was therefore
violative of the Act.
With special reference to the fifth condition, the Board's "conclusion rests on the
sound premise that a union which can direct its inducements to the primary em-
ployer's employees at the primary employer's premises does not seek to accomplish
any more with respect to the same employees by directing the same inducements
to those same employees at the premises of some other employer. Consequently,
the only reasonable inference in such a situation is that inducements which are
ostensibly directed at the primary employer's employees are in fact directed at the
employees of the • secondary employers. In concluding, therefore, that picketing
under such circumstances violates . . . the Act, the Board is effectuating the
congressional objective of shielding unoffending employers from pressures and
controversies not their 'own, while at the same time leaving the union free to exert
its pressures on the primary employer in a manner which will, at the most, have
only an incidental effect on the secondary employers." Local 657 International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc.), 115
NLRB 981.
Though the Board's per se doctrine has been criticized or rejected by a number
of courts,8 and with due respect to those tribunals, I am constrained in the perform-
8 The first four conditions were first promulgated by the Board in Moore Dry Dock
Company, 92 NLRB 547; the fifth in Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 107 NLRB
299
4 See N L R. B v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, etc, 191 F 2d 65, 68 (C. A. 2) ; Piezonki v.
N. L. It. B , 219 F. 2d 879, 883 (C. A. 4) ; N. L R B. v. Chari'feurs, Teamsters, etc.
(Hoosier Petroleum Co ), 212 F. 2d 216, 219 (C. A. 7) , N. L. It. B. v Local Union No. 55,
etc. (Professional and Business Men's Life Insurance Co.), 218 F. 2d 231 (C A. 10) ;
N. L. It B v Associated Musicians of Greater New York, etc (Gotham Broadcasting
Corporation), 226 F 2d 900 (C. A 2)
8 N. L. R. B v General Drivers etc., Local 968 (Otis-Massey Co ), 225 F. 2d 205 (C A.
5) ; Sales Drivers, etc., Local Union 859 v N L R B. (Campbell Coal Company), 229
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B AND 406C 1753
ance of my duty as an arm of the Board , in the absence of a controlling precedent
by the Supreme Court, to adhere to the, interpretation of the Act last announced
by the Board.
Notwithstanding the decisions cited in footnote 8, supra, which are critical of
that doctrine, and with the same respect which I maintain for the opinions of those
courts, the Board has, since the date of -those decisions, consistently continued to
apply the so-called Washington Coca-Cola test to picketing situations such as con-
fronts me here. Thus, in the first df a series of cases, the Southwestern Motor
Transport case, supra, the Board, on April 6, 1956, again invoked the per se
doctrine under discussion, and expressly declined the -conclusion of the Court of
Appeals in the Campbell Coal case, footnote 8, supra, which had rejected that
doctrine. Though additional evidence of the Union's objective was also noted in
the Associated General Contractor Employers Association of Omaha case, supra,
in Sales Drivers, etc., Local Union 859 (Campbell Coal Company), 116 NLRB
1020, in United Steelworkers, etc., Local 5246 (Barry Controls Inc.), 116 NLRB
1470, and in General Drivers, etc., Local Union 984 (The Caradine Company,
Inc.), 116 NLRB 1559, the Board, in all four cases, again expressed its approval
of the doctrine that picketing of a mixed situs, where the primary employer had a
fixed place of business in the area of dispute, is per se violative of the Act.
In accordance with the Board decisions last discussed, I find that by picketing at
the construction sites while Jahncke "had a permanent place of business at which the
[Operating Engineers] could, and actually did, publicize its labor dispute, plainly
reveals that the picketing was intended , at least in part , to induce and encourage
the employees of secondary employers to engage in a concerted refusal in the course
of their employment to handle [Jahncke's] products or to quit work with an object
of forcing the secondary employers to cease doing business with [Jahncke]." (The
Caradine Company, Inc., supra.) By that conduct, the Operating Engineers violated
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act .9
It is undisputed that the Operating Engineers carried on their picketing activities
at the construction sites for the purpose of forcing or requiring Jahncke to recognize
that union as the representative of its crane operators though it has never been certi-
fied as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of
the Act. Having found that by such picketing the Operating Engineers induced and
encouraged the employees of neutral employers to engage in a strike or concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to handle Jahncke 's mixed concrete, it is
further found that an objective of said picketing was to force or require Jahncke to
recognize the Operating Engineers as the representative of its crane operators, and
that thereby that labor organization violated Section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the Act.io
The "Hot-Cargo" Clause
The defense urged by Respondents that the "hot-cargo" clause in the contract of
the New Orleans General Contractors absolves them from liability herein is without
F. 2d 514 (C A, D C ) , Douds v. Teamsters Local 976, 139 F. Supp. 702 (D. C, So.
N I ) , LeBus V Truck Drivers, 141 F. Supp. 676 (D C., E La.). But see N. L. R. B. V.
Truck Drivers, etc, Local Union No. 728 (National Trucking Co), 228 F 2d 791 (C A. 5).
o However, it should be noted that, apart from the application of the Washington Coca-
Cola doctrine, "there is substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole to sup-
port the finding . that an object of the picketing was to bring about a strike or con-
certed refusal to work on the part of employees [of neutral employers at the construction
sites] The union makes the claim that the only purpose of the picketing was to publicize
its dispute with [Jahncke]. But the evidence shows that at least one of its objectives was
to apply pressure to the secondary employers for the purpose of causing-them, in turn,
to threaten [Jahncke] with loss of business unless it came to terms with the union.
The urgings to [Good and Whitty not to buy concrete from Jahncke] clearly indicate
the purpose of the picketing at the [construction sites]. . . Requests and threats ad-
dressed by respondents to employers, even though not illegal in themselves (Henry V.
Rabouin d/b/a Conivay'i Express v N L R B., 195 F. 2d 906, 911-912 (C A. 2)), may
be considered in determining the motives for picketing N. L. R. B v. Denver Building
and Construction Trades Council , 193 F. 2d 421, 423-424 (C A. 10)." N L. R B. v.
Associated Musicians , Local 802 , 226 F 2d 900 (C A. 2)
10 No probative evidence was received to establish that the objective of the picketing
at the construction sites was to require Jahncke to recognize the Seafarers as the repre-
sentative of its marine employees. It will, therefore, be iecommended that the allega-
tions of the complaint charging that the picketing was conducted to achieve that objec-
tive he dismissed -
1754 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
merit or substance . Whatever absolution that clause might have given Respondents
earlier in the administration of the Act by reason of the Board 's decisions in the
Conway's Express and Pittsburgh Plate Glass cases (87 NLRB 972 and 105 NLRB
740, respectively ), and upon which cases Respondents now rely , the conclusions
announced in those decisions may not now be invoked . They were expressly re-
nounced and overruled in Local 1976, United Carpenters & Joiners etc. (Sand Door
& Plywood Co.), 113-NLRB 1210, 1217, which decision was enforced by the Court
of Appeals a few days ago. N. L. R. B. v. Local 1976, United Carpenters & Joiners
etc., 241 F. 2d 147 (C. A. 9).
The Board , in the Sand Door & Plywood case, held that , notwithstanding the
presence of a "hot-cargo" clause in a contract to which the neutral employer is a
party, and to which he may give effect if he so desires, a labor organization may not"approach employees of the [ neutral ] employer and induce and encourage them
to refuse to handle the goods of another employer with immunity from the sanctions
of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). In [the Board's ] opinion , such conduct constitutes
inducement and encouragement of employees to engage in a concerted refusal to
handle goods for an object proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) no less than it
does in the absence of such agreement. Such conduct is contrary to the express
language of the statute, and therefore cannot be validated by the existence of a
contract containing a `hot-cargo' clause."
Respondents seek to distinguish and avoid the impact of Sand Door & Plywood
because, in another portion of that decision , the Board describes the proscription
imposed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) as being directed against "any direct appeal to
employees by a union to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to handle a
product . " [Emphasis supplied]. Continuing their argument, Respondents con-
tend that in the instant proceeding there was no direct appeal by the Operating
Engineers to employees not to handle Jahncke's concrete-that all that Respondents
did here was to publicize the dispute with that employer.
The distinction attempted to be drawn by Respondents does not bear scrutiny.
First, the tenor of the entire decision militates against so narrow a construction. At
several points in the decision the. Board speaks of the interdiction found in Section
8 (b) (4) (A) as being broadly directed against inducement and encouragement of
employees and not merely as being limited to a "direct appeal." Second, as the
Board pointed out in the McAllister Transfer, Inc., case, 110 NLRB 1769, 1777,
the forerunner of Sand Door & Plywood, the purpose of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and
(B) was to outlaw all secondary boycotts. Our economic history has shown that
such boycotts are, in practically all cases, made effective by the imposition of a
picket line. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that Congress intended to limit the
prohibition against secondary boycotts to those comparatively rare instances where
only what Respondents describe as "direct appeals" are made to employees of neutral
employers , and to allow picketing to have full sway in achieving an outlawed
objective.
Lastly, it is too late in the day to now assert , as" Respondents contend , that by
picketing at the construction sites all that they did was merely to publicize the
dispute with Jahncke-that there was no "direct appeal" to engage in a secondary
boycott . "Plainly, the object of all' picketing at all times is to influence third per-
sons to withhold their business or services from the struck employer. In this re-
spect there is no difference between lawful primary picketing and unlawful sec-
ondary picketing proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A)." International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, etc. (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 NLRB 502. And, in
one of the earliest cases to come before the Supreme Court following enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court held that "To exempt peaceful picketing from the
condemnation of § 8 (b ) (4) (A) as a means of bringing about a secondary boy-
cott is contrary to the language and purpose of that section . The words `induce or
encourage ' are broad enough to include in them every form of influence and per-
suasion . There is no legislative history to justify an interpretation that Congress
by those terms has limited its proscription of secondary boycotting to cases where
the means of inducement or encouragement amount to a `threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit .' Such an interpretation would give more significance to the
means used than to the end sought . . . To exempt peaceful picketing from the
reach of § 8 (b) (4) would be to open the door to the customary means of enlisting
the support of employees to bring economic pressure to bear on their employer.
The Board quickly recognized that to do so would be destructive of the purpose of
§ 8 (b) (4) (A ). It said 'To find that peaceful picketing was not thereby proscribed
LOCALS 406, 406A, 406B AND 406C 1755
would be to impute to Congress an incongruous intent to permit, through indi-
rection, the accomplishment of an objective which it forbade to be accomplished
directly."' International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, et al. (Samuel Langer)
v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694, 701-703.
The Liability of the Seafarers
Respondents contend that "there is absolutely no evidence in this record to sustain
the charges and the complaint against the [Seafarers because] all of the picketing
with which we are concerned was conducted solely by the Operating Engineers."
While it is true that the picket signs bore the name only of the Operating Engi-
neers, a realistic appraisal of the action of both unions in relation to their overall
objective establishes the liability of the Seafarers herein.
It will be recalled that both organizations picketed Jahncke's premises to enforce
their demands for recognition. While no complaint is made of that activity, it
demonstrates that both unions engaged in a joint course of action in support of
interests common to both groups. Most significant, however, is the fact that at
least five paid representatives of the Seafarers actually participated in the illegal
picketing. On the entire record I find that by that participation the Seafarers, like
the Operating Engineers, violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the employer set forth in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in activities violative of Section
8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Act, it will be recommended that they cease and
desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the.
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Jahncke Service , Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. Locals 406, 406A, 406B , and 406C, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL-CIO, and Seafarers ' International Union of North America, Atlantic
and Gulf District , AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meanitig of Section
2 (5) of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging employees of the employers listed 11 to engage
in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, process,
handle , or work on products of Jahncke , and/or to perform services for their
respective employers , with the object of (a) forcing and requiring such employers
to cease doing business with Jahncke , and (b ) forcing and requiring Jahncke to
recognize or bargain with the Respondent Operating Engineers as the collective-
bargaining representative of its employees, although that Respondent has not been
certified as such representative in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of
the Act, both Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B ) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
5. Respondent Seafarers have not engaged in any unfair labor practice with the
object of forcing or requiring Jahncke to recognize or bargain with the Seafarers
as the collective bargaining agent of its employees.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
11 R P Farnsworth & Co, Inc.: G J. Glover Co, Inc. ; Gervais F Saviot Co, Inc ;
Pat Caffey Construction Co Inc. ; Tri-State Construction Co. Inc ; E. H. S Construction
Co ; J. A Jones Co ; Stephen K. Whitty ; and Kelly Generes Construction Co. Inc