Local Union No. 369, IBEW

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 13, 1975

216 N.L.R.B. 141 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

LOCAL UNION NO. 369, IBEW 141
Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and Kelley Electric
Co., Inc. and C. T. Love & Associates , Inc. Cases
9-CC-755-1 and 9-CC-755-2
January 13, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On May 31, 1974 , Administrative Law Judge
Eugene F. Frey issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding . Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief , and the Charging Parties filed
an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings , findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Union No.
369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, Louisville , Kentucky, its officers,
agents, and representatives , shall take the action set
forth in the said recommended Order.
1 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge 's broad remedial order, we
place no reliance on the previous informal settlement agreement executed
by these parties , which is discussed in the Remedy section of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
encouraged employees of Love and EGB to engage in
strikes or refusals to work for their respective employers
and thereby coerced and restrained both employers, with
an object of forcing or requiring Love or EGB or other
persons to cease doing business with Kelley Electric Co.,
Inc. (herein called Kelley), another subcontractor on said
project with whom Respondent has a labor dispute and/or
forcing Kelley to make a collective-bargaining contract
with Respondent, in violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)
(B) of the Act.'
At close of the trial all parties waived oral argument, but
filed written briefs which have been carefully considered
by me in the preparation of this Decision.
Upon the entire record in the case, observation of
witnesses on the stand, and consideration of arguments of
counsel, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF LOVE, EGB, AND KELLEY, AND
STATUS OF RESPONDENT
Kelley is an Indiana corporation with its principal offices
in New Albany , Indiana, where it operates as an electrical
contractor in the building and construction industry. In
course of this business Kelley annually performs services
valued over $50,000 for customers located outside Indiana.
Love is a Kentucky corporation with its principal office
in Louisville, Kentucky, where it is in business as a general
contractor in the building and construction industry. In
this business Love annually performs services valued over
$50,000 for customers outside Kentucky.
EGB is a Kentucky corporation with its principal offices
located in Louisville , Kentucky , where it operates as a
mechanical contractor in the building and construction
industry.
Respondent admits, and I find, that Kelley, Love, and
EGB are employers engaged in commerce and in opera-
tions affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
At all times material herein Respondent is and has been
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE F. FREY , Administrative Law Judge : This case
was tried before me on due notice on February 14, 1974, at
Louisville , Kentucky , with all parties represented by
counsel , after pretrial proceedings in compliance with the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 29 U.S .C. Sec.
151, et seq. (herein called the Act). The issue in the case is
whether Respondent Union , by picketing certain entrances
of a project of C. T . Love & Associates, Inc. (herein called
Love) on which EGB of Louisville , Inc. (herein called
EGB) was doing work as a subcontractor, induced and
1 The issue arises on a complaint issued January 11, 1974, by General
Counsel of the Board through the Board's Acting Regional Director for
Region 9, after Board investigation of charges filed December 17, 1973, by
216 NLRB No. 25
Operations at the Love Project
Since November 1973, Love has been the general
contractor for construction of the Southwestern Regional
Government Center (herein called the Center) on Dixie
Highway, in Louisville, Kentucky, under contract with the
fiscal court of Jefferson County Kentucky, an instrumen-
tality of the government of Jefferson County. In October
1973, Love made a contract with Kelley to do the electrical
work at the Center, and Kelley actually began work there
November 7, 1973, with a crew of two electricians, Joseph
A. Kelley, son of Stanley G. Kelley, president of Kelley,
and one other employee. The electrical work continued
Kelley and Love, and answer of Respondent admitting jurisdiction but
denying the commission of any unfair labor practices.
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
until at least January 7, 1974. In the same period EGB has
been subcontractor for plumbing, heating and air-condi-
tioning work at the Center.
During all times material herein, Respondent has had no
labor dispute with Love or EGB, but has had a labor
dispute of longstanding with Kelley.
The Layout of the Center Project2
At the start of the Love work, the ground on which the
Center was to be built consisted of a roughly rectangular
tract of land fronting on Dixie Highway to the west,
bounded at the rear and east by a railroad right-of-way
with tracks, by an open ditch on the left or north side, and
on the right or south side by a shallow drainage ditch and
an approximate 16-foot strip of land containing an
easement or right-of-way for entry of utility lines to
another rectangular county tract containing county build-
ings and facilities which adjoined the Center tract on its
right. The front portion of the second tract along Dixie
Highway is either owned or leased to a private gasoline
service station operation; the rear portion, which abuts the
railroad right-of-way, is occupied by three white county
service or maintenance buildings, with an adjacent
stockpile of road materials, a parking area along the
railroad and a gasohne pump facility to their left.
When Kelley started work on the Center tract in
November, vehicular access to that site was through two
precut breaks in the curb on Dixie Highway. One (marked
on G.C. Exh. 2 with a circle and "Gate No. 1") is at the
lower left corner of the Center tract, and the other (marked
with a circle and "Gate No. 2") is at the lower right corner
of the tract, abutting a permanent county building at that
point.3 Access to the second, or southern, county tract,
from Dixie Highway is afforded by a similar precut break
in the curb at the extreme right-hand lower corner of G.C.
Exh. 2 (marked with a circle) connecting with a long,
unpaved, dirt lane or cleared space running almost the
depth of that tract along its right edge, with a left turn in
the lane opposite one of the white maintenance buildings
through a sliding wire gateway, which gives access to the
parking area behind the three buildings and to the gas
pumps to their left. Vehicles reaching the gas pumps can
gain access to the Center tract by driving through several
breaks in a rough post fence line near the right rear comer
of the Center tract and also at various points along the
shallow ditch and utility right of way closer to Dixie
Highway (all access points are marked by arrows on G.C.
Exh. 2 pointing into the Center tract).
When Kelley started work at the Center on November 7,
Love and EGB had separate office trailers parked just
inside the Center tract to the right of the gate no. 1 curb
break behind a large official sign announcing the purpose
of the Center and facing the Center itself. Shortly after
Kelley began work, it placed a smaller office trailer at a
point at right angles to the Love trailer. However, there
2 The description of the project is based on testimony of witnesses of
General Counsel , and a large aerial photograph of the whole site, with
directions and the relationships of buildings and other pertinent features
described in relation to each other as though the writer were positioned
across the highway from, and well above , a permanent white county
building on the highway and at the right front comer of the Center project
was no sign on that trailer, or at or near the gate no. I
entrance to denote the presence of Kelley at the site. Up to
December 5, Kelley employees entered the site and
reached the Kelley office through gate no. 1.
The Union set up pickets at gates I and 2 on December
3, 1973. They carried signs stating on one side "The
electrical work on this project is not being installed under a
collective bargaining agreement with Local Union No. 369,
and the electricians on this project are not receiving fringe
benefits provided by IBEW Local Union 369's agree-
ment"; the reverse side stated "We are not requesting
employees of neutral employers to refuse to work on this
project. We are picketing the KELLEY ELECTRIC CO. only."
On December 4, Love put up a printed sign at the
sidewalk at the edge of gate 1, reading in block letters:
"Kelley Electric Company, Inc., its employees and suppli-
ers are prohibited from using this entrance." On December
5, Love put up similar sign at gate 2, and also a larger
printed sign on the wire fence adjacent to a sliding gate
giving access to the county maintenance buildings at the
back of the lane on the second tract giving access to those
buildings as noted above (that gate is marked as "Gate No.
3" on G.C. Exh. 2). The sign read:
This entrance is reserved exclusively for Kelley Electric
Co., Inc., its employees and suppliers. All other persons
are prohibited from using this entrance. Kelley Electric
Co. Inc., its employees and suppliers, are prohibited
from using any other entrance to these premises.
C. T. LovE AND
ASSOCIATES
The above signs with the lettering noted have remained
at the respective gates until the date of trial.
Since the sign was posted at gate 3, employees of Kelley
have used that entrance personally and with a truck to
enter and leave the Center tract, going up and down the
dirt lane and through the sliding gate, around behind the
county maintenance buildings, and past the gas pumps
through the partial fence and ditch to enter and leave the
building site. Orders to that effect were also given to all
suppliers of Kelley, and at least one supplier delivering
concrete by truck used the same gate and mode of entrance
during December 1973.
On December 7, Love sent a telegram to Respondent
advising it of the separate gate established December 4 for
Kelley, and demanding that Respondent restrict its
picketing to that gate, warning that Respondent's failure to
do so would subject it.to liability for any damages suffered
by the secondary boycott of Respondent and that Love
would file charges with the Board. Respondent received it
December 10.
After the signs were posted, pickets of Respondent
continued to parade at gates 1 and 2 daily and also at gate
3, until December 21, 1973. At times the pickets were
site itself . The left edge of the photo is roughly north , the right edge roughly
south, the top is east and the bottom west . Some facts are also found from
smaller ground photographs showing details of the project and surrounding
physical features
3 The curb breaks were put in at the entry and exit points of a circular
driveway to be built across the front of the Center
LOCAL UNION NO. 369 , IBEW 143
joined by Assistant Business Agent Robert Baker of
Respondent.
Contentions of the Parties, and Final Conclusions
of Fact and Law Thereon
While the record shows that Respondent 'picketed
reserve gate 3 as soon as it was established for Kelley
employees and suppliers,4 a prima facie case of picketing to
enmesh neutral employers is established by the continued
picketing of gates I and 2 which Kelley. employees and
suppliers were publicly and specifically prohibited from
using. All parties recognize that Respondent complied with
three of the standards for primary picketing on common
situs situations set forth in Sailor's Union of the Pacific
(Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547 (19); i.e.:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the
situs of the dispute is located on the secondary
employer's premises;
(b) At the time of the picketing the primary employer is
engaged in its normal business at the situs;
(d) The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is
with the primary employer.
Their disagreement occurs over compliance with standard
(c) requiring that "The picketing is limited to places
reasonably close to the location of the situs." General
Counsel argues that continued picketing of gates 1 and 2
after December 5, when the reserve gate 3 was set up,
violates the Act. While mere picketing of those gates was
peaceful, without apparent active coercion or threats, as
Respondent points out, that characteristic would not
prevent a finding that it violated Section 8(b)(4) if all the
circumstances of the picketing show that it was designed to
enmesh neutral employers and their employees in the labor
dispute with Kelley.5 Aside from this principle, however,
the record shows that the picketing actually had some
effect on suppliers of Love, for uncontradicted testimony
of Charles G. Sham, the Love project superintendent,
shows that on December 10 an employee of its subcontrac-
tor, EGB, left his job and refuse to cross the picket line,
and on December 18 a supplier of concrete for Kelley
advised Shain that its drivers would not cross the picket
line to deliver for Kelley, but would do so only if the
material was ordered by Love, so that Shain had to use that
subterfuge to get Kelley's material delivered.
Respondent presents three main arguments in defense of
picketing gates I and 2:
(1) It claims that gate 3 was not in fact a "reserve" gate
for the exclusive use of Kelley and its suppliers, because
the record shows that during the picketing it was
continually used by employees and vehicles of Jefferson
County, the landowner, to gain access to the county
maintenance buildings located on the second county tract.
While this is true to some extent, the argument is beside the
Stanley G. Kelley, president of Kelley, testified to this effect, as noted
by Respondent , contrary to the contention of General Counsel.
Salem Building Trades Council (Cascade Employers Association, Inc.),
163 NLRB 33, 36 (1967)
6 In reaching this conclusion , I have assumed that county employees
point, for the main issue here is whether the picketing of
gates I and 2, reserved for neutral employers, after gate 3
was established, was unlawful. However, even if that were
material, use of that gate by county employees to any
extent would not destroy the "reserve" nature of that gate
norjustify continued picketing of gates I and 2. There is no
proof that the neutral employers or their employees ever
used gate 3, and it is clear that none of the county
employees using or working at the county maintenance
buildings were engaged in any way in the construction of
the Center on the adjoining tract, hence the county and its
employees, insofar as they worked on the second tract on
county business, were not a "neutral" employer or
"neutral" employees within the purview of Section 8(b)(4)
of the Acts Moreover, even if neutral employers and their
employees had used gate 3 during the picketing, that would
not have excused any violations of the "reserve" gate status
of gates I and 2 of the neutral employers. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. Local No. 639 (American
Modular Corporation), 203 NLRB 1112 (1973).
(2) Respondent argues that during the picketing the
alleged "neutral" status of gates I and 2 was violated
several times by subcontractors of Kelley and their
employees, relying on uncontradicted proof which shows
that: On December 18, a driver of a supplier delivering
electrical conduit for Kelley pulled into gate 1 notwith-
standing the prohibitive sign located there, in an attempt to
unload material just inside that gate at a point where
Kelley was then laying such conduit for underground
power lines in a ditch running from a power pole adjacent
to gate 1 to the rear of the foundation of the Center. When
his truck mired in the mud inside gate 1, the driver sought
help from Shain who told him he was using the wrong gate,
and should go through gate 3. It is not clear from the
record whether the conduit was already unloaded at the
point the truck bogged down, before the driver talked to
Shain, or whether it backed out and reentered the site
through gate 3. An official or salesman of this supplier had
previously been ordered to make the delivery through the
gate marked for Kelley's use , and the invoice in the hands
of the driver clearly gave this delivery instruction. A
ditching contractor, Earl J. Hartlage, who had been
digging ditches for Love and other subcontractors on the
site , was hired by Kelley to dig the conduit ditch aforesaid
and actually did the work on December 18 and 19, using
equipment already on the site. In this period, Hartlage and
his employees continued to use gates I and 2 as formerly,
never having been told by Kelley or Love to use gate 3
when working for Kelley. On December 18, a truck of
another supplier delivered a bucket for Hartlage's backhoe,
using gate 1 to enter the site. If the picketing had started on
December 18, there would be some merit to Respondent's
claim that on and after that date gate I at least was used by
regularly used gate 3 during the picketing , but the record shows that most of
them used the 16 -foot easement strip along the south edge of the
construction site to reach the county maintenance buildings This fact
further weakens Respondent 's argument.
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the primary contractor and its suppliers, so as to justify
continued picketing there.? However, such uses of gate I
on and after December 18 do not afford any defense or
justification for Respondent's picketing of that reserve gate
before December 18 .8 Hence, I can only conclude that the
picketing in that period failed to comply with the third
requirement for common-situs picketing established by the
Board under the principles of Moore Dry Dock, supra, and
that the picketing of "reserve" gates 1 and 2 in that period
could only have been for the purpose of enmeshing Love,
EGB, and other neutral employers in Respondent's dispute
with Kelley in order to induce them to cease doing business
with Kelley, in violation of Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii)(B) of
the Act. Analysis of the alleged violations of gate 1 on
December 18 and after leads to the same conclusion about
the picketing through December 21. The delivery of
conduit through gate I on December 18 was clearly in
violation of specific instructions previously given by Kelley
to his supplier. Love tried to remedy the violation of that
gate as soon as Shain learned about it. In those circum-
stances I conclude that Kelley and Love had done all that
was reasonably necessary to establish and maintain the
"reserve" status of gate I, and that this isolated instance of
violation of that status on December 18 did not cause it to
lose its protected status and give Respondent the right to
picket it on and after that date .9 Although the use of gate 1
by employees and a supplier of Hartlage while he was
doing work for Kelley on 2 days presents a stronger
instance of violation of that gate, where neither Love nor
Kelley gave him instructions to use only gate 3, I still
consider it an isolated occurrence which does not establish
a pattern of destruction of the "reserve" gate status of gate
1 so as to justify Respondent's picketing of that gate; and a
fortiori it could not on any theory justify picketing of gate
2, as to which there is a total absence of credible proof that
Kelley, its employees or suppliers, ever used it.10
(3) Respondent also argues that throughout the picketing
Kelley and its employees used other unmarked means of
access to the construction site , when, after entering the
second county tract through gate 3, they crossed a
boundary ditch and fence at four different points along the
easement strip to get into the construction site . The record
shows that, after gates 1 and 2 were marked as "reserve"
gates for neutral employers, Kelley employees always
entered the second tract through gate 3, crossed the rear of
that tract, and then up the easement (which was part of the
construction site), and crossed the adjoining ditch at any
one of four different places (marked with arrows) to get to
the Center site proper, but at no point did they make the
crossing closer than 180 feet from Dixie Highway. When
leaving the project, they would follow the same route in
reverse. In using this route, they were at no point closer
than 180 feet to Dixie Highway. They never used either
gates I or 2. Although there was no construction work on
the second tract itself, gate 3 and the route taken across
7 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 441 (Jones and
Jones, Inc), 158 NLRB 549, 522 (1966)
8 Nashville Building & Construction Trades Council, et als (H.E. Collins
Contracting Company, Inc), 172 NLRB 1138, 1139, 1140 (1%8).
s United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. Local No 639 (American
Modulars Corporation), supra, Teamsters Local 294 (Northeastern Industrial
Park, Inc), 196 NLRB 332, 339 (1972); Allied Industrial Workers of America,
that tract to get to the project site was all part of the county
property, and none of it was public highway, hence I find
that the whole route through and beyond gate 3 was in
effect a private way on county property, well removed
from gates 1 and 2, and granted to Kelley for use during
the picketing. The easement strip by usage was still on
county property and not a public highway. Hence, Kelley's
use of it after entering gate 3 was not in any way a
violation or circumvention of the "reserve" status given to
gates 1 and 2. I find no merit in this argument of
Respondent.
Having considered all the pertinent facts and circum-
stances in light of the arguments of counsel, I must
conclude that on and after December 5, 1973, the
entrances to the Center project area were so marked in an
unconfusing manner as to provide reasonable notice and
assurances to Respondent that, by Respondent's picketing
of gate 3 reserved for the use of Kelley, which was the situs
of its dispute with Kelley, the message of its picket signs
would be sufficiently carried to the employees and
suppliers of the primary employer. Hence, Respondent's
continued picketing of gates I and 2, which were properly
and effectively "reserved" for use of and used substantially
only by neutral employers and their employees and
suppliers, compels the conclusion that the picketing of
those gates was designed to enmesh neutral employers and
employees in the primary dispute, and that it therefore had
the object of forcing and requiring Love and EGB and
other neutral employers to cease doing business with
Kelley, and thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
Act. Since the picketing also had the effect of encouraging
and inducing individuals employed by suppliers or employ-
ees of Love and EGB to refuse to work on the project or
deliver materials thereto for their respective employers,
with the same proscribed objective, Respondent thereby
violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act.11
III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section II,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of
Love, EGB, and Kelley described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce in violation of Section
8(b)(4Xi) and (iiXB) of the Act, I recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Local 681 (Smith Engineering Works), 174 NLRB 389, 393, 394 (1969).
10 Nashville Building & Construction Trades Council, et als (H E. Collins
Contracting Company, Inc.), 172 NLRB 1138,1140 (1%8).
ii I have considered carefully other facts, arguments, and authorities
adduced by Respondent, but find them insufficient to overcome the above
findings and conclusions.
LOCAL UNION NO. 369 , IBEW 145
General Counsel and Respondent argue for a broad
remedial order on the basis of certain aspects of the long-
continued labor dispute between Kelley and Respondent.
The record shows that for some years before 1972 Kelley
had collective-bargaining contracts with Respondent, but
not since 1972. In January 1973, the continued feud was
marked by the filing by Kelley of charges with the Board
alleging Respondent had violated Section 8(b)(4) of the
Act in a manner similar to this case, at another construc-
tion site in Louisville, Kentucky. The dispute was settled
without issuance of a complaint through an informal
settlement agreement approved in February 1973, by the
Regional Director for Region 9. I also take judicial notice
of the fact that Respondent in mid-1973 was found guilty
by the Board of a similar violation of the Act in
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union No. 369 (Clark Trucking and Rigging Company), 206
NLRB 15 (1973), which involved threats of secondary
boycott activity at a construction site in Cincinnati, Ohio.
In a somewhat similar situation the Board held that a
broad order is appropnate whenever a proclivity to violate
the Act is established, either by prior Board decisions
against the labor organization which is then before it based
on similar unlawful conduct in the past, or by the facts in a
particular case.12 Such order is also justified even though
different neutral employers were involved in the prior
instances of unlawful conduct.13 I shall therefore recom-
mend a broad order prohibiting similar unlawful seconda-
ry action against other employers and their employees.
or to perform any services, for their respective employers,
and from threatening, coercing, or restraining the above-
named employers or any other person as aforesaid where,
in either case, an object thereof is to force or require C. T.
Love & Associates or any other person to cease doing
business with Kelley Electric Co., Inc.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
hereby found necessary to effectuate the policies and
purposes of the Act:
(a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls in
Louisville, Kentucky, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 15 Copies of said notice, on forms to be
provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after
being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail copies of said notice to the Regional
Director for Region 9 for posting by C. T. Love &
Associates, Inc., if it be willing, in all locations where
notices to its employees and employees of its suppliers or
subcontractors on its construction sites are customarily
posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in wnting,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Love, EGB, and Kelley are employers engaged in
commerce or in industries affecting commerce, and
Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
2. By inducing and encouraging employees of EGB and
of suppliers of Kelley to refuse to perform services or
transport matenals for their respective employers and
threatening, coercing, and restraining Love, with an object
of forcing or requiring Love to cease doing business with
Kelley, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Sections 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) and 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and'
conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER 14
Respondent Local Union No. 369 , International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers , AFL-CIO, its officers,
agents , and representatives shall:
1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging any
individuals employed by C. T. Love & Associates, Inc.,
EGB of Louisville , Inc., or any other person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process , transport , or otherwise handle
or work on any goods , articles , matenals , or commodities,
12 International Union of Operation Engineers, Local No 139 (T J Butters
Construction), 198 NLRB # 11951 (1972), where the Board issued a broad
order based on a single Board finding of similar unlawful conduct in the
past
13 General Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local Union 563 (Fox Valley
Construction Materials Suppliers Association, Inc), 179 NLRB 650, 654
(1969), International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et a! v
NLRB , 341 U S 694, 705, 706 (1951)
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
15 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board ," shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
We hereby notify our members and all employees that:
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any individuals
employed by C. T. Love & Associates, Inc., EGB of
Louisville, Inc., or any other person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities, or to perform any services,
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for their respective employers, and WE WILL NOT Associates , Inc., or any other person, to cease doing
threaten , coerce, or restrain the above-named employ- business with Kelley Electric Co., Inc.
ers or any other person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce where , in either case, an
object thereof is to force or require C. T. Love & LOCAL UNION No. 369,
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS,
AFL-CIO