Local 945, Teamsters

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 16, 1977

232 N.L.R.B. 1 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

LOCAL 945, TEAMSTERS
Local 945, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri-
ca and Newark Disposal Service, Inc.1 Case 22-
CC-681
September 16, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On December 15, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Marvin Roth issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Local 945,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Kearny,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in said recommended
Order.
i The name of the Charging Party was amended at the hearing.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARVIN ROTH, Administrative Law Judge: This case was
heard at Newark, New Jersey, on September 9, 1976. The
charge was filed on July 21, 1976, by Newark Disposal
Service, Inc. (herein Newark Disposal). The complaint,
which issued on August 9, 1976, alleges that Local 945,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (herein the Union
or Respondent) violated Section 8(b)(4Xi) and (ii) (B) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which
section proscribes secondary boycotts. The Union's answer
denies the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
The principal issues are: (I) whether the Union picketed
the Kearny, New Jersey, plant of Swift Processed Meats
Company (herein Swift), and threatened to resume such
picketing, for an object of forcing Swift and other persons
232 NLRB No. I
to cease doing business with Newark Disposal, and with
each other, and thereby violated Section 8(bX4)B); and (2)
if so, whether a remedial order is warranted which would
restrain the Union from engaging in any secondary boycott
conduct for an object of forcing Swift or any other person
to cease doing business with Newark Disposal or any other
rubbish removal contractor within the State of New Jersey
not represented by the Union. All parties were afforded full
opportunity to participate, to present relevant evidence, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and
to file briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having
considered the briefs submitted by General Counsel and
the Union, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED
Swift, a Delaware corporation, maintains one of its
plants and places of business at Kearny, New Jersey
(herein Kearny plant), where it is engaged in the processing
and wholesale distribution of packaged meats. In the
operation of its business, Swift annually receives at its
Kearny plant goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 which are transported to that plant directly from
States of the United States other than New Jersey, and
annually distributes from its Kearny plant products valued
in excess of $50,000 which are shipped from that plant
directly to points outside of New Jersey. Newark Disposal,
a New Jersey corporation, maintains its office and place of
business in Kearny, New Jersey, and is engaged in the
business of providing rubbish removal services for industri-
al and commercial customers in northern New Jersey. In
the operation of its business, Newark Disposal annually
receives in excess of $50,000 for services performed for
firms which are directly engaged in interstate commerce.
Newark Disposal's personnel consists of Peter Dellisanti
and his cousin, who are coowners and president and vice
president, respectively, of the corporation, and who
perform all of the work of Newark Disposal. It is
unnecessary to determine, for the purposes of this case,
whether Newark Disposal is an employer within the
meaning of the Act. I find that Swift is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act, that Newark Disposal is a person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it would effectuate the policies of the Act to assert
jurisdiction herein.
I1. THE RESPONDENT AND ITS AGENTS
The Union is admittedly a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act. The Union has a charter from the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters which grants it
jurisdiction to organize and represent private sanitation
employees in the State of New Jersey, and, in fact, it carries
out those functions throughout the State, except in the
Camden area. Joseph Campisano is president of the Union,
and Flan Chestnut is its business representative. Both are,
I
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as the Union admits, agents within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act, and have been and are now agents of the
Union acting on its behalf.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In February 1976,1 Swift and Newark Disposal entered
into an arrangement whereby Newark Disposal undertook
to perform solid waste removal services for Swift at the
Kearny plant on a regular basis. Newark Disposal
furnished and placed its waste containers at four locations
on the plant premises. On an average of three times a week
(normally Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings)
Dellisanti or his cousin would come to the plant with their
truck and haul away a container or containers to a disposal
site. Each trip normally necessitated Newark Disposal's
presence on the plant premises for about one-half hour.
The number of trips (seldom less than thrice weekly, but
sometimes including a fourth trip, usually on Saturday)
depended upon Swift's needs. Newark Disposal was paid
on a per-load basis in accordance with a purchase order
executed by the parties. Dellisanti normally made his
arrangements with Frank Doe, Swift's chief engineer at the
Kearny plant, who awarded the contract to Newark
Disposal. In Doe's absence, Dellisanti would deal with
Maintenance Supervisor Walter Scanlon, Doe's immediate
subordinate. Prior to February, the waste removal services
were performed by Piscaty Disposal Service, which is a
party to or covered by a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union. Newark Disposal does not have a contract
with the Union or any other labor organization.
Swift's production and maintenance employees at Kear-
ny are represented by Local P-653, Meat, Food and Allied
Workers and its parent organization, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workers of North America, AFL-
CIO (herein collectively Meat Workers), and its drivers are
represented by Teamsters Local 478. The Union, in its
answer, admitted that at no time material has it had any
labor dispute with Swift.2 Nevertheless, about 10:30 a.m.
on Tuesday, July 13, Local 945 set up a picket line
consisting of three pickets, initially accompanied by
Chestnut, at the vehicular entrance to the Swift plant.3 The
pickets wore signs which bore the following text:
Information to the General Public-Swift Processed
Meats Co. does not have a contract with Teamsters
Local 945. Please do not stop patronizing this establish-
ment. Go in and tell this company you prefer [sic] he
does business with a union house. We will appreciate
your help in helping us obtain union working condi-
tions for these employees. Local 945 has elevated
conditions of employment for working people through-
I All dates herein are in 1976 unless otherwise indicated.
2 There was some testimony that in January Meat Workers had
suggested to Swift that it might use employees who would otherwise be laid
off to perform the trash removal services which Swift normally awarded to
an outside contractor. However, Union Business Representative Chestnut
admitted that he was unaware of such discussions, and there is no evidence
that the Union's picketing related in any way to any real or apparent dispute
between Swift and any of the labor organizations which represent its
employees.
3 The Swift plant contains four buildings which are located on a fenced
tract of some 12 to 15 acres. There is a vehicular gate (which was picketed)
out the state. Through your patronage you can help.
We thank you in advance.
The text on the signs, which bore no caption, was in such
small print that Dellisanti was unable to read it at a
distance of 15 feet. Meat Workers Local President Mitchell
Holloway testified that he attempted to read the sign but
"couldn't make heads or tails" of it. The text of the signs
falsely indicated that the Union had a labor dispute with
Swift. No other employer was named, indeed, the signs did
not even suggest that the Union's grievance had anything
to do with a rubbish removal contractor. A picket told
Holloway that they were picketing because Swift should be
under contract with the Union. However, Chestnut
admitted that the Union picketed Swift because there was a
"non-union garbage contractor working at Swift." On the
day of the picketing, Newark Disposal was not scheduled
to work at the Kearny plant, nor did it perform any trash
removal that day. Newark Disposal's waste containers
were not visible from the gate.
At the time of the picketing, Meat Workers representa-
tives were meeting with Swift Labor Manager Clark
Breisch to discuss certain department closings. An employ-
ee came in and informed them that there were pickets at
the main gate. Their immediate reaction was that the
picketing was probably directed at another firm nearby.
However, Meat Workers' Chief Steward Stafford went out
and returned to report that they were picketing "us."
Stafford obtained from the pickets a union business card
with the Union's telephone number and Campisano's name
printed on the front, but with Chestnut's name written on
the back. Meat Workers Local President Holloway tele-
phoned the Union and spoke to Chestnut, who told him
that the reason for the picketing was that Swift was doing
business with a nonunion sanitation company. Holloway
reported this to Breisch, who instructed Holloway to tell
Chestnut that if that was the problem, they needed a week
to change contractors. At the time, Chief Engineer Doe
was on vacation, and was scheduled to return on July 20.
Chestnut told Holloway that on the basis of this represen-
tation, he would remove the pickets, and in fact, Chestnut
ordered the picket line removed. That same day, Mainte-
nance Supervisor Scanlon talked with Dellisanti and
verified that he was nonunion.
Chestnut admitted in his testimony, with some equivoca-
tion, that he assumed that Swift would get rid of the
nonunion contractor and get a union contractor. On July
19, after first checking with Holloway, Chestnut tele-
phoned Breisch and questioned him as to the "status of the
situation up there," asking whether it would be necessary
to return the pickets.4 Breisch answered that the situation
had been remedied, that there was no need to return the
and a narrow pedestrian gate. The vehicular gate is normally used by
wholesaler customers picking up products, suppliers, salesmen, Swift's own
trucks, and passenger cars of employees. Swift does not conduct any retail
business at the Kearny plant, and the plant is not open to the general public.
4 I credit the testimony of Breisch concerning this conversation. Chestnut
was somewhat equivocal, testifying that he did not recall saying anything
about pickets. In view of Chestnut's own admission that he regarded
replacement of the nonunion contractor as the quid pro quo for removal of
the picket line, it is more likely than not that he would have raised the
specter of resumed picketing. Moreover, Chestnut's patently false and self-
serving assertions in his testimony, that his opinions in the matter were his
2
LOCAL 945, TEAMSTERS
pickets, and that he would obtain the exact details of
handling the matter. The next day, upon Doe's return to
work, Scanlon briefed him on the situation and Breisch
told him of Chestnut's call, explaining that if the situation
were not corrected the pickets would be back. Doe then
terminated the arrangement with Newark Disposal, and
replaced that firm with Piscaty Disposal Service. Breisch
then left a message with Chestnut's secretary, which
Chestnut received, that Swift was using Piscaty, a member
of the Union. In sum, as Doe informed Dellisanti, Swift
ceased utilizing the services of Newark Disposal because of
the threat of a resumption of picketing.
I find, as Chestnut in substance admitted, that the Union
picketed Swift, and threatened to renew such picketing, for
an object of forcing Swift to cease doing business with
Newark Disposal, and thereby violated Section 8(bX4)(B)
of the Act. It is hornbook law that such conduct constitutes
an unlawful secondary boycott. As indicated, the picketing
was conducted at an entrance which was used exclusively
by Swift, its commercial customers, deliverymen, suppliers
and other firms doing business with Swift, and their
employees, and the Union deliberately sought to create the
false impression that its dispute was with Swift. In light of
these facts, I specifically find that by its picketing the
Union threatened, coerced, and restrained Swift, its
customers, deliverymen, suppliers, and other firms utilizing
the picketing gate, and induced and encouraged individu-
als employed by them to engage in work stoppages, for an
object of forcing Swift and other persons to cease doing
business with Newark Disposal, and with each other. It is
immaterial whether the picketing actually had the immedi-
ate effect of causing work stoppages or a disruption of
business between Swift and other neutral persons using the
gate. 5 N.L.R.B. v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, AFL
[Gotham Broadcasting Corp. (Station WINS)], 226 F.2d
900, 904-905 (C.A. 2, 1955). In fact, the picketing stopped
after about 35 minutes only because the Union was
satisfied that it had achieved its ultimate objective.
IV. THE REMEDY
General Counsel does not contend that the evidence as
developed with respect to the Swift - Newark Disposal
matter, standing alone, demonstrates a proclivity to violate
Section 8(bX4XB) as would warrant a broad order
prohibiting the Union from engaging in any secondary
boycott conduct. However, General Counsel does contend
that in view of the history of secondary boycott litigation
involving the Union, a broad remedial order is warranted.s
In support of this contention, General Counsel presented
in evidence two Decisions and Orders of the Board, each of
which was entered pursuant to a settlement stipulation
providing for the entry of a consent order by the Board and
a consent judgment by any appropriate United States
Court of Appeals. The first Decision and Order 'was
entered on April 27 in two consolidated cases (herein
own and did not represent union policy, marked him a less than credible
witness. Chestnut admitted that he had authority to set up picket lines and
his actions made clear that he also had authority to decide when they should
be withdraw.
5 The only evidence of a possible work stoppage consisted of hearsay
testimony concerning an unidentified truckdriver.
collectively the Inmont Case), pursuant to a stipulation
executed by all parties on February 27. The second
Decision and Order (herein the Kravitz case) was entered
on July 29, pursuant to an all-party stipulation executed on
June 14, 1976. As of the present hearing General Counsel
anticipated that the Board would obtain court decrees in
each case. Neither stipulation contained a nonadmission
clause, nor did they contain any other provision governing
their use in any other litigation, beyond conceding the
usual jurisdictional facts and consenting to the entry of the
order specified in the stipulation. The format of each Order
is substantially the same. In Inmont, the Board ordered the
Union in sum: to cease and desist from threatening,
coercing, or restraining Gino's of New Jersey or any other
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, or inducing or encouraging individuals em-
ployed by them to engage in work stoppages, for an object
of compelling Gino's or any other person to cease doing
business with Sano Carting Company, Inc., or with each
other; and further enjoined the Union from similarly
engaging in secondary boycott conduct against Inmont
Corporation, other persons, and their employees, for an
object of forcing Inmont to cease doing business with
Custom Disposal Service Corporation t/a D&V Disposal
Service Corporation, or with each other. In Kravitz, the
Board ordered the Union to cease and desist from engaging
in secondary boycott conduct against M.A. Kravitz Co.,
Inc., Lawrence Associates, other persons and their employ-
ees, for an object of forcing Lawrence, Kravitz, or any other
person to cease doing business with Harry W. Fawkes
Trash Collection, Delaware Valley Scrap Co., or with each
other. The jurisdictional facts indicate that Inmont, Gino's,
Lawrence, and Kravitz are each engaged in business in
New Jersey (owning or operating, respectively, a chemical
plant, fast food chain, and shopping mall), that the cases
arose in New Jersey, and that Sano, D&V, Fawkes, and
Delaware Valley are each engaged in New Jersey in the
business of providing rubbish removal service for commer-
cial users.
General Counsel, while acknowledging that there is no
Board authority precisely in point, requests that I take
notice of the foregoing Decisions and Orders, and find
therefrom, together with the evidence in this case, that the
Union has demonstrated a proclivity to engage in secon-
dary boycott conduct against persons doing business with
nonunion rubbish removal contractors within its territorial
jurisdiction, and, therefore, that a broad order is warrant-
ed. The Union also concedes that there is no decisional
authority in point. The Board has held that it will not rely
upon a consent order or decree which contains a nonad-
mission clause, as a basis for finding a proclivity on the
part of a respondent to violate the Act. See Raymond Buick,
Inc., 173 NLRB 1292 (1968), enfd. 445 F.2d 644 (C.A. 2,
1971), involving a minority union which obtained recogni-
tion in violation of Section 8(bX I XA) of the Act. Converse-
ly, the Board has found a proclivity to violate the
s For ease in reference, when discussing orders in secondary boycott
cases, the term "narrow order" when used herein, means an order limited
both as to named secondary persons and the named primary person. A
"medium order" is one which is not limited to named secondaries, but is
limited to the named primary. A "broad order" is one which is not limited
either to named secondaries or to a named primary.
3
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
secondary boycott provisions of the Act, based on two
consent orders entered pursuant to stipulations which
expressly permitted the Board to make use of each of the
orders to the same extent as an adjudicated decision.
Sequoia District Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO (Nick
Lattanzio d/b/a Lattanzio Enterprises), 206 NLRB 67, 69
(1973), enfd. 499 F.2d 129 (C.A. 9, 1974). In Brotherhood of
Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70, IBT (C&T
Trucking Co.), 191 NLRB 11 (1971), which was distin-
guished by the Administrative Law Judge in Sequoia, the
Board declined to enter a broad secondary boycott order
based, inter alia, on 13 previous settlement agreements
entered into by Local 70. The Board stated that it "has
frequently held that settlement agreements, and consent
decrees arising therefrom, have no probative value in
establishing that violations of the Act have occurred and,
hence, they may not be relied upon to establish a
'proclivity' to violate the Act." The Board cited as
authority a prior case involving Local 70 as Respondent
Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No.
70, IBT (Sam-Jo, Inc., d/b/a Smiser Freight Service), 174
NLRB 98 (1969), in which the settlements were made a
part of the record, and further referred to three reported
Board decisions which had been cited as authority for the
Smiser decision (174 NLRB at fn. 1). However, neither
C&T Trucking nor Smiser indicated whether the settle-
ments were formal or informal, or whether they contained
nonadmission clauses. As for the three cited decisions, two
involved settlement agreements which contained nonad-
mission clauses and the third involved an informal
settlement agreement. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers
and Taxicab Drivers, Local Union No. 327, IBT (Greer
Stop Nut Co., a division of Kaynar Mfg. Co., Inc.), 160
NLRB 1919, 1920 (1966); citing Local No. 92, International
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, AFL-CIO (R. W. Hughes Construction Co., Inc.),
138 NLRB 428, 429 (1962); and United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Endicott
Church Furniture, Inc.), 125 NLRB 853, 854 (1959).
The proposition posed by General Counsel is one which
only the Board can resolve. My own view, for what it is
worth, is that absent a nonadmission clause, a consent
order and enforcement decree is the equivalent of, and
tantamount to an adjudication that the Respondent has
engaged in the conduct prohibited therein. "It is true, as a
general principle, that an adjudication by consent or
agreement has the same res judicata effect as judgment
entered after answer and trial." Menendez v. Saks and
Company, 485 F.2d 1355, 1363 (C.A. 2, 1973), reversed on
other grounds sub nom, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). The Union argues
that such an approach would discourage settlements. The
more compelling consideration is that it will discourage
violations of the Act. I find that the four cases of violations
of Section 8(b)(4XB), including the present case, all
occurring over a relatively short time span, demonstrate a
proclivity on the part of the Union to engage in secondary
boycott conduct directed against persons doing business
with rubbish removal contractors whom it deems objec-
tionable.
There is another consideration which warrants a broad
order in this case. Assuming, arguendo, that the consent
orders do not constitute adjudications of unlawful conduct,
the fact nevertheless remains that two recent Board orders
prohibiting secondary boycott conduct have not deterred
the Union from engaging in similar conduct not expressly
prohibited by the precise wording of those orders. The
violation here was clear and flagrant. Significantly, the
evidence here indicates that at no time did Chestnut ever
refer to Newark Disposal or Dellisanti by name. Rather,
Chestnut referred only to the fact that there was a
nonunion sanitation company. Indeed, Chestnut testified
that Union President Campisano told him to picket Swift
because there was a nonunion garbage contractor working
there. It may be fairly inferred from the Union's course of
conduct, including its disregard of the principle, albeit not
the literal proscription of two Board orders, that it will
continue to engage in secondary boycott conduct against
persons dealing with nonunion rubbish removal contrac-
tors unless it is prohibited by order from doing so. It is not
necessary, in order to find a proclivity to violate Section
8(bX4XB), that there be more than one proven case of such
conduct. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, Local 690 (R.L (Bob) Moore Construction
Company, Inc.), 190 NLRB 609, fn. I (1971). Indeed, this is
the teaching of International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 501, et al, [Samuel Langer] v. N.LRkB., 341
U.S. 694, 706 (1951). In that case, the evidence indicated
that the secondary conduct was directed against two firms.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Board was
warranted in issuing a medium order. The court declared in
off-quoted language that "When the purpose to restrain
trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not
necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left
open and that only the worn one be closed." Although
Electrical Workers involved a medium order and the
present case involves a proposed broad order, the principle
remains the same and is still applicable. Where, as here,
there is a justifiable apprehension that the Respondent may
engage in unlawful conduct similar to that involved in the
instant case, i.e., "presuasively ... related to the proven
unlawful conduct," the order need not be limited to
prohibiting the precise conduct involved in that case.
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO and Local
No. 4372, etc. [Ohio Consolidated Telephone Co.] v.
N.LR.B., 362 U.S. 479 (1960), quoting N.LR.B. v. Express
Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941). Compare
N.LR.B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 120 F.2d
532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941). Therefore I am including in the
recommended order the broad proscription requested by
General Counsel. I shall also include in the order and
notice an express reference to picketing and threat of
picketing, as such phrases would presumably be more
comprehensible to the average trash collector employee
than the prolix verbiage of Section 8(bX4XB). I am further
recommending that the Union be ordered to post appropri-
ate notices and to furnish and give appropriate notices to
Swift and Newark Disposal. However, I am not recom-
mending, as requested by General Counsel, that the Union
be ordered to give notice that it has no objection to Swift
doing business with Newark Disposal. The Union has a
4
LOCAL 945, TEAMSTERS
right to maintain its position in this regard, so long as it
does not attempt to enforce that position in a manner
prohibited by Section 8(b)(4XB).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
i. Swift is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and Newark
Disposal is a person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By its picketing and threat to resume picketing of
Swift, the Union has engaged and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bX)(4B) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend-
ed:
ORDER 7
The Respondent, Local 945, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Picketing or threatening to picket Swift Processed
Meats Company or any other person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, for an object of
forcing or requiring Swift Processed Meats Company, or
any other person to cease dealing in the products of or
cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service, Inc.,
or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of
New Jersey not represented by Respondent, or with each
other.
(b) In any other manner or by any other means, engaging
in or inducing or encouraging any individual employed by
Swift Processed Meats Company or by any other person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities, or to perform any services; or threatening,
coercing, or restraining Swift Processed Meats Company or
any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof
is to force or require Swift Processed Meats Company, or
any other person, to cease dealing in the products of or
cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service, Inc.,
or any other rubbish removal contractor within the State of
New Jersey not represented by Respondent, or with each
other.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is found
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business office in West Paterson, New
Jersey, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 22, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Furnish to the Regional Director for Region 22,
signed copies of said notice for posting, if Newark Disposal
Service, Inc. and Swift Processed Meats Company are
willing, in their respective facilities, in the places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region
22, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
shall be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for
such posting.
(c) Notify Swift Processed Meats Company and Newark
Disposal Service in writing within 20 days from the date of
this Order that it will not, by threats to picket or by
picketing or by any other unlawful manner or means,
attempt to force or require Swift Processed Meats Compa-
ny, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, to cease doing business with
Newark Disposal Service.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
8 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT picket or threaten to picket Swift
Processed Meats Company or any other person
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, for an object of forcing or requiring Swift
Processed Meats Company, or any other person, to
cease dealing in the products of or cease doing business
with Newark Disposal Service, Inc., or any other
rubbish removal contractor within the State of New
Jersey not represented by us, or with each other.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner or by any other
means engage in, or induce or encourage any individual
employed by Swift Processed Meats Company or by
any other person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a
refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities,
or to perform any services, or threaten, coerce, or
restrain Swift Processed Meats Company, or any other
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce where, in either case, an object thereof is to
force or require Swift Processed Meats Company or
any other person, to cease dealing in the products of or
to cease doing business with Newark Disposal Service,
Inc. or any other rubbish removal contractor within the
State of New Jersey not represented by us, or with each
other.
LocAL UNION No. 945,
A/W INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA
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