Local 7, Bricklayers and Associated Craft Workers (Castle Stone and Tile)

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Aug 11, 2016

29-CB-158878 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 11, 2016)

JD(NY)-29-16
Brooklyn, NY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
LOCAL 7, BRICKLAYERS and
ALLIED CRAFT WORKERS
and Case 29–CB–158878
TOM BALADI
John Mickley, Esq.,
for the General Counsel
Edward Groarke and Alicia Showell, Esqs.
(Colleran O’Hara & Mills, LLP), of
Woodbury, New York,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
MINDY E. LANDOW, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Brooklyn, New
York, on January 28, 2016. The underlying charge was filed on August 27, 20151 and the
complaint was issued on November 20, alleging that Local 7, Bricklayers and Allied Craft
Workers (Local 7 or Respondent),2 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by: (1) on
August 14, notifying Castle Stone and Tile, Inc. (Castle or the Employer) that it could not employ
Tom Baladi (Baladi or the Charging Party) because he was not a member in good standing
because of unpaid dues which were incurred while Baladi worked for a different employer and
(2) by attempting to cause and causing the Employer to discharge Baladi. It is further alleged
that the Union engaged in the above-described conduct without previously advising Baladi of
the precise amount he owed in union dues, the period for which such dues were owed, the
method by which the amount owed was computed and without providing Baladi a reasonable
opportunity to pay the amount owed. On December 17, Respondent filed an answer to the
complaint, denying the material allegations contained therein and raising certain affirmative
defenses, which will be discussed as applicable, below.
After considering the record in this matter, including a stipulation of facts and
corresponding exhibits entered into by the parties, the record testimony, my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses and the inherent probability of their testimony, and after duly
considering the briefs submitted by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following

1 All dates are in 2015 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Reflecting the correct name of Respondent as amended at hearing.
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Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
At all material times, the Employer has been a domestic New York corporation. The
parties stipulated that the Company maintains an office and place of business located at 134
Cedar Road, East Northport, New York, where it is engaged in the business of the installation of
tile and marble. Annually in the course and conduct of its business operations, the Employer
has provided services in excess of $50,000 to entities within the State of New York who are
directly engaged in interstate commerce. It has been stipulated and I find that the Employer is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
Background
Respondent represents employees within the construction industry and operates a
nonexclusive hiring hall whereby employees are referred to work performing brick laying, tile
and terrazzo work in the greater New York City and New Jersey area, as well as some upstate
locations. The industry collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Greater
New York and New Jersey Tile Contractors Association, which currently is effective from June
3, 2013 to June 2, 2017, contains a union-security clause, stipulated by the parties to be valid,
which requires employees as a condition of employment to become and remain members of
Local 7. Approximately 20 percent of employees working in the industry at any given time
receive referrals through the Union’s hiring hall, at other times they solicit work on their own.
Baladi became a member of Respondent on November 30, 2007, and remained so until
April 2013,3 when his membership was discontinued for a failure to pay dues for a 3-month
period. Employees’ dues obligations are set forth in various ways. Initially, they are set forth in
the “Rules and Regulations Required and Expected of a New Member,” conveyed to
employees. This document was provided to Baladi upon his membership and signed by him.4
Union President Thomas Lane testified that members’ dues obligations are also discussed at
semiannual so-called “mega meetings” held with employees and reminder letters are sent
should the member become delinquent in remitting payment. Lane further testified that in the
event an employee fails to remit dues to the local union, it is nonetheless required to submit
such funds to the international, of which it is a member.
Beginning in January 2013, Baladi was unable to work for a period of 5 months due to
his incarceration. He failed to pay his union dues during this period of time, and the Union
terminated his membership in April. During this period Baladi, who lived in a home owned by a
family member, but had his own apartment, was sent two communications from Respondent,
apparently unaware of his circumstances, regarding his dues arrears. The first notice, sent on
March 1, 2013, was sent to the address maintained in the Union’s files and stated that the
Union’s records indicated that Baladi was delinquent in the payment of dues and notifying him

3 The record indicates that there was a hiatus in Baladi’smembership in Local 7 during a period when
he resided in Florida and was a member of a sister local.
4 These rules and regulations provide, in pertinent part, that “members will be dropped by [Local 7] if
they fall three months behind” in their dues obligations.
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that the relevant provisions the Union’s constitution and bylaws provided that membership shall
be suspended for a dues arrears of 3 months. The letter continued:
Your payment must be received by the end of the month or you will be automatically
dropped. Once you have been dropped, in order to be reinstated as a member, you will
be required to pay an additional fee.
The total amount due is $66.00
Baladi failed to respond to this notice and was sent another letter, dated April 1, 2013,
notifying him that he had been dropped from membership and stating that to be reinstated as a
member in good standing he must satisfy his dues delinquency by April 15, 2013. The letter
further stated that after that time Baladi would be required to complete a reinstatement form and
pay, in addition to dues owed, a $150 reinstatement fee.
Baladi asserts that, due to his incarceration, he did not receive either of the two letters
referred to above and, in any event, was without funds to satisfy his dues obligations during this
period of time or thereafter. There is no evidence that the letters were returned to the Union as
undeliverable. Moreover, Baladi confirmed that he was aware of his obligation to pay dues to
the Union and the consequences of failing to do so.
On or about July 3, 2013, Baladi contacted Larry Walmsley, an employee of Local 7 who
is responsible for managing the payment of dues. At that time, as Baladi testified, he informed
the Union that he had been incarcerated. Baladi was advised that Local 7 could not assist him in
obtaining work within the jurisdiction of Local 7 until he satisfied his financial obligations to Local
7 through the payment of dues and a reinstatement fee.
Baladi testified that the Union failed to advise him as to how he could reinstate his
membership and, moreover, that he had made “painstaking efforts to try to get reinstated, but
they [the Union] denied my money.” In particular, Baladi testified that he contacted Union
President Lane, but received no response. Based upon the record as a whole, I do not credit
such testimony. There is no other evidence that the Union refused at any time to accept the
arrearages owed by Baladi and this theory of a violation is not alleged in the complaint. When
counsel for the General Counsel was specifically asked whether the Government was
contending that the Union had discriminatorily rejected Baladi’s efforts to render dues and
initiation fees, he answered in the negative.
After his release from prison, Baladi picked up various jobs, including several within the
asserted jurisdiction of Local 7, which had extant collective-bargaining agreements, containing
union-security clauses, when he could obtain such employment. Generally such employment
was of short duration.5
During one of these jobs, for American Tile, located in the Bronx, New York, Baladi was
approached by a Local 7 Field Representative William Reilly, along with another Union
representative. They told Baladi that he should not be working on the job, as he had been
dropped for non-payment of dues. Baladi told the Union representatives that he had been
incarcerated, and would get in touch with Union President Thomas Lane and straighten out the

5 In particular, Baladi worked for Troy Enterprises New York, Inc. (Oct. 2013); L&L Stone Tile, Inc.
(April 2014); American Tile (summer 2014) and Pride Enterprise of NY Inc., (Dec. 2014). Baladi failed to
remit dues to Local 7 during any of these periods of time.
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dues that were owed and pay what he owed to the Union. Reilly testified that they left Baladi
working at the site, but several hours later they contacted the Employer to state that Baladi had
been dropped from the Union and should not continue on the job.
Union President Lane testified that after Reilly’s visit to the jobsite, he received a text
message from Reilly stating that that Baladi complained that he was not being paid properly,
asking what the Union could do about it. Lane testified that the Union was being put in a difficult
position if Baladi continued to operate as a nonmember, a so-called “free rider,” but stated that
he would call the Employer, which Lane did. The Employer responded with some comments
about Baladi which are set forth in the record, but do not bear repetition here as they have no
relevance to the Union’s conduct with regard to the instant dispute.
Baladi’s Employment with Cathedral and Subsequent Events
In the summer of 2015, Baladi started working on a tile project for an employer referred
to as Cathedral Stone (Cathedral), an entity which does not have a collective-bargaining
relationship with the Union. The project in question was located at 19th Street and Park Avenue,
in Manhattan (the 19th Street project). Baladi was referred by a friend who was a fellow worker,
referred to as “Ed.” Baladi was hired by Cathedral owner Ed Teran (as distinguished from “Ed”),
and was paid $32 per hour, but did not receive any benefits. Baladi worked at this location for
one or 2 days.
Shortly after the job commenced, a union representative came to the worksite and told
Teran that the work employees were performing was within the jurisdiction of the Union.
Teran then arranged to subcontract that work to Castle which was willing to sign a
collective-bargaining agreement with the Union and employ union members. Teran testified that
Cathedral contacted the Union’s secretary-treasurer Christopher Guy and advised him that he
had several employees that would like to sign for the Union.
Teran then went to the union office and met with Guy to register Cathedral employees as
members of the Union so that they could work with Castle. He provided Guy with a list of
employees who were working for Cathedral as of that time. Baladi’s name was on the list. As
Teran testified at the hearing, Guy stated, “no—no to Tom. Tom was not able to work at the
time.” Teran further testified that Guy told him that “there’s some issues with Tom; that he can’t
sign up right now or work.” As Teran testified, Guy did not state anything further about why
Baladi could not sign up.6 Teran testified that he discussed the situation with Baladi and
transferred him to another nonunion worksite where he worked for approximately 2 weeks, until
the job ended.
The stipulation of facts entered into the parties provides as follows as regards the
exchange between Teran and Guy:
At that meeting, Teran told Guy that Cathedral was willing to turn the aforementioned job
over to the Employer and that the Employer would be willing to sign a collective

6 In light of the parties’ stipulation as to what occurred at this meeting, as set forth below, I give
limited weight to Teran’s account of what Guy may have told him. In this regard, I observed that Teran
demonstrated the demeanor of a reluctant witness who did not present himself as someone who was
thoughtfully trying to reconstruct events. I further note that counsel for the General Counsel, in stating his
theory of the case, has primarily relied upon the stipulation.
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bargaining agreement with Respondent. Guy asked Teran if he would be signing the
collective bargaining agreement on behalf of the Employer. Teran said “no” as he has no
affiliation with Castle Stone.
Teran recommended for employment several employees to Guy. The Charging Party
was one of those employees recommended.
Guy informed Teran that the Charging Party was not a member in good standing.
Teran then asked Guy if the non-member employees who were working on the
aforementioned job could become members of Respondent. Guy said yes.
There was no conversation concerning Tom Baladi between Local 7 and the Employer
until mid-November 2015.
Mr. Baladi never worked for the Employer.
Castle’s owner, Sharon Amari, testified that she hired those employees referred
to her from the union hall but did not know who picked them. As she stated, Castle called the
union hiring hall and they sent men, and she paid them as they worked. Amari further testified
that she never spoke to Baladi and did not know who he was until she received an inquiry from
the Union on November 16. At that time Amari exchanged emails with the Union and confirmed
that Baladi had never worked for Castle.
It is undisputed that aside from the two written communications referred to above, sent in
early 2013, the Union never provided additional written notice to Baladi of his obligation to pay
the dues and initiation fees owed to the Union prior to his employment with Cathdral and the
only other communications to such effect were those discussed above.
The Union’s Further Communications with Baladi
After the filing of the charge in the instant matter, anticipating an apparent merit
determination by the Region, Baladi and Lane had the following exchange via text message
which commenced on October 27 and continued to October 28. Their exchange is as follows:
Baladi: I win [the test message contains a “smiley face” icon as well]7
Lane: What are you looking to do?
Baladi: Get back with my old IU # and seeking damages for lost pay.8
Lane: You can come back as a member but you have to pay initiation and five months
dues.
Baladi: No deal I’ll see you in court.
On cross-examination Baladi confirmed the foregoing exchange and added, “[w]ith
everything that happened to me and me being kicked off of jobs and costing me thousands of

7 Baladi testified that this was a reaction to being informed by the Board that “what [the Union] did
was illegal and they had to let me back into the Union. I had been fighting to get back into the Union for a
while; so at that point I was feeling very victorious.”
8 The “IU” number Baladi was referring to was his number with the international union. Lane testified
that, despite the difficulty in doing so, consultations with the attorney for the international union resulted in
an agreement that Baladi could seek reinstatement of his IU number once he agreed to begin paying his
dues.
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dollars, I didn’t think that was a good deal; so I replied, “No deal, I will see you in court.”
On November 19, Lane sent a letter to the Charging Party providing in pertinent part as
follows:
PLEASE BE ADVISED: That BAC Local 7 has no objection to you performing covered
employment for Castle Stone & Tile Co., Inc. (“Castle Stone”). A copy of a letter I sent to
Castle Stone is attached for your records.
PLEASE BE FURTHER ADVISED that to become a member in good standing of BAD,
Local 7 it is your obligation to remain current in the payment of your union dues. This is a
follow up letter to our conversation on October 28, 2015 via text that explained what was
necessary to become a member in good standing. Although you expressed that you will
“see me in court” I want you to fully understand what your obligations are in order to be
reinstated in Local 7. If you choose to reinstate as a member while the NLRB is deciding
their determination or after that date you must take the following steps.
In order to be reinstated as a member of BAC, Local 7 the Constitution and By-Laws
requires that you pay a reinitiating fee of $750 plus the arrears that were paid by the
local of $66.00 for the period of 1/01/2013 through 4/01/2013. You would also have to
pay $44.00 in future dues while your membership is being processed. We would allow
you to pay the initiation fee in full or over a 3 month period with equal payments of
$250.00
If you do not pay your reinstatement fee and dues arrearage within 15 days of this notice
than you should be aware that BAC, Local 7 is empowered through its union seniority
clause with signatory employees to seek your termination.
The Union also sent a letter to Amari (with a copy to Baladi, as referenced above) stating
that the Union had no objection to Castle employing him to perform work covered under the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.
Baladi has since satisfied his financial obligations to the Union and is currently employed
at jobs within its asserted jurisdiction.
III. Analysis and Conclusions
General Legal Standards
A union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act it causes or attempts to cause an
employer to discharge an employee for the employee’s failure to pay dues without first providing
the employee with proper notice. Unions have a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with employees
whom they seek to terminate for failure to pay dues. The Board has extended this rationale to
those situations where a union had informed an employer that an employee is no longer a
member in good standing and thus ineligible for hire. See Industrial Contractors Skanska, Inc.,
362 NLRB No. 169, slip op at 1–2 (2015) (and cases cited therein).
The Board has explained that, at a minimum, the fiduciary duty owed to employees
requires that a union
Give the employee “reasonable notice of the delinquency, including a statement of the
precise amount and months for which dues [are] owed, as well as an explanation of the
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method used in computing such amount.” In addition, the union must specify when such
payments are to be made and make it clear to the employee that discharge will result
from failure to pay. This fiduciary responsibility to advise an employee regarding his
dues obligation requires “positive action,” without regard to any concurrent obligation on
the employer to provide notice.
Western Publishing Co., 263 NLRB 1110, 1111–1112 (1982)(internal citations omitted).
As the Board in Industrial Contractors Skanska supra, slip op. at 2 went on to elaborate,
a union’s fiduciary duty requires that an employee be provided with a reasonable opportunity to
make payment after receipt of the notification of delinquency and such a duty is not satisfied by
the fact that the employee may have acquired independent knowledge of the existence of and
the obligations thereunder. Thus, the Board considers this rule to be a prophylactic one which
operates largely independently of the subjective knowledge of the employee.
Notwithstanding the above, it is also the case that the above protections were never
“intended to be so rigidly applied as to permit a recalcitrant employee to profit from his own
dereliction in complying with his obligations.” Thus the Board has found that there is a
reasonable basis to excuse a union’s failure to fully comply with the notice requirements if the
union proves that the employee made a “conscious decision” to willfully and deliberately. . .
evade his union-security obligations. Ralphs Grocery, 209 NLRB 117, 124–125 (1974). See also
IBI Security, 292 NLRB 648, 648–649 (1989) where the employee “resisted joining the [u]nion
and procrastinated until the [u]nion had no alternative but to seek his dismissal,” despite the
union notifying the employee of his obligations to join the union and pay the fees, the amount of
the fees and the consequence of his failure to do so. The Board has also found, however that
“negligence or inattention on the part of the employee will not relieve the union of its fiduciary
obligation.” Grassetto USA Construction, 313 NLRB 674, 677 (1994); Industrial Contractors
Skanska, supra.
Contentions of the Parties
In its post hearing brief, the General Counsel advances several arguments as to why
Respondent’s conduct was unlawful. As an initial matter, General Counsel maintains that
Respondent unlawfully caused Baladi to be removed from the 19th Street project because he
failed to pay his dues in 2013, when he was employed elsewhere and failed to pay dues under a
prior union-security agreement between the Union and another employer. In support of the
foregoing contentions, the General Counsel relies upon Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 NLRB 553
fn. 6 (1955).9
The General Counsel further contends that Respondent’s conduct not only caused
Baladi’s removal from the 19th Street project but further caused Castle not to hire him because
of that same failure; i.e., the failure to pay dues in 2013 under a union-security clause between
the Union and a different employer, In this regard, the General Counsel acknowledges that the
complaint in this matter alleges that Castle discharged Baladi; rather than its failure to hire him.
General Counsel asserts however, that “Baladi was discharged from the 19th Street project and
Respondent was on notice of the allegations.” As General Counsel maintains, “whether the
[c]omplaint incorrectly uses the word ‘discharge’ is immaterial because Respondent clearly

9 In that case, the employees in question had resigned from the union prior to the time the union
sought to enforce the union-security provisions of its collective-bargaining agreement with the employer. It
was found that the provisions in question were not ironclad, and allowed nonmembers to work.
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understood the allegations.” Thus, the General Counsel relies upon its assertion that the issue
of Baladi’s employment, in particular, Castle’s failure to hire him, is closely connected to the
subject matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated herein. United Healthcare Services,
363 NLRB No. 134, slip op. at 2 (2016); see also Dilling Mechanical Contractors, 348 NLRB 98,
99 (2006), “[u]nder well-established precedent, the Board may find a violation not alleged in the
complaint if the issue is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has been
fully and fairly litigated” (citations and footnote omitted).10
The General Counsel further maintains that the undisputed facts lead to three
conclusions which support the finding of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act: (1) during the
conversation about whom Castle would hire, Guy told Teran that Baladi was not a member in
good standing of the Union; (2) Guy told Teran that the Union had no problem with other
individuals joining the Union and being hired by Castle and (3) as a result of this conversation,
Baladi was not hired by Castle.
Based upon the foregoing, the General Counsel argues that Respondent did not adhere
to the Board’s longstanding notice requirements prior to causing Baladi’s removal from the 19th
Street project. Philadelphia Sheraton Corp., 136 NLRB 888 (1962). The General Counsel
further contends that Respondent’s proffered defense: that is not liable because Baladi
deliberately avoided paying dues, is without merit.
The Respondent contends that it met its fiduciary obligation under Philadelphia Sheraton
to deal fairly with Baladi. The Union further argues that, inasmuch as Baladi was never
employed by Castle, it cannot be charged with interfering with his employment with that
Employer. It is further contended that any notice deficiencies should be excused because
Baladi’s conduct rises to the level of a willful and deliberate attempt to avoid his dues
obligations. Finally, the Union argues that due to the nonexclusive nature of its hiring hall, it had
no legal obligation to assist Baladi in his search for employment.
Discussion
Due Process Considerations
Before addressing the Union’s liability for causing Castle not to hire Baladi and the issue
of whether it met the requirements of Philadelphia Sheraton, there are certain preliminary
considerations which should be addressed. In particular, I find that there are substantial
omissions in the pleadings and concomitant factual development which in my view would be
necessary to a successful prosecution of this case under the theories put forth by the General
Counsel. Here, Cathedral was not alleged an employer; Baladi’s transfer to another work
location (variously characterized by the General Counsel as his “discharge” or “removal” from
the 19th Street project) by Cathedral was not specifically alleged as an unfair labor practice
attributable to the Union and, most importantly, Teran, who, according to the record evidence, is
the only individual to have had contact with the Union regarding Baladi’s membership status,
was not alleged as an agent of Castle. I find that the General Counsel’s failure to allege and

10 In his opening statement, counsel for the General Counsel stated as follows: “by the conversation I
just described [between Guy and Teran], the Respondent caused Mr. Baladi not to be hired by Castle and
to be discharged from the job that he was working at the time because of past-owed dues . . .” I note that
the complaint alleges, in part, that the Union violated the Act by notifying Castle that it could not employ
Baladi because of unpaid dues that were incurred while he worked for a different employer. In my view,
this complaint allegation is sufficient to place the issue of Castle’s failure to hire Baladi in contention.
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otherwise fully and fairly litigate these matters is a denial of due process owed to the
Respondent.
Recently, in Graymont PA, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 37, slip op. at 5–6 (2016) (fns. omitted),
the Board had occasion to discuss this issue as follows:
The issue here is one of procedural due process, the fundamental elements of which are
“notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Earthgrains Co., 351 NLRB 733, 735 (2007).
Sufficient notice is that which “afford[s] [the] respondent an opportunity to prepare a
defense by investigating the basis of the complaint and fashioning an explanation of
events that refutes the charge of unlawful behavior.” Pergament United Sales, Inc. v.
NLRB, 920 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1990), enfg. 296 NLRB 333 (1989). As stated in
Sunshine Piping, Inc., 351 NLRB 1371, 1378 (2007), “[t]he precise procedural
protections of due process vary, depending on the circumstances, because due process
is a flexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.”
Section 102.15(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations provides that the complaint shall
contain “a clear and concise description of the acts which are claimed to constitute unfair
labor practices, including, where known, the approximate dates and places of such acts
and the names of respondent's agents or other representatives by whom committed.”
The complaint, however, is not the exclusive source of notice of the material issues to be
addressed in a Board proceeding. Depending on the circumstances, notice may also be
provided by the General Counsel's representations at the hearing, or it might be evident
from the respondent's conduct in the proceeding. “It is well settled that the Board may
find and remedy a violation even in the absence of a specified allegation in the complaint
if the issue is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has been fully
litigated.” Pergament, 296 NLRB at 334. The determination whether a matter has been
fully litigated “rests in part on ‘whether the respondent would have altered the conduct of
its case at the hearing, had the specific allegation been made.”’ Piggly Wiggly Midwest,
LLC, 357 NLRB 2344, 2345 (2012) (quoting Pergament, supra at 335).
Here, I find that had the pleadings set forth the above-noted contentions, Respondent
might well have altered the presentation of its defense to the allegations and supplemented the
record with additional testimony or other evidence. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that these
matters have been fully litigated.
The Evidence Fails to Support the Allegations of the Complaint
As an evidentiary matter, I disagree with the General Counsel’s apparent contention that
a request by the Union that Baladi not be hired by Castle may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances set forth in the record in this matter. This is particularly the case in light of a
failure of proof of Teran’s agency status, at least insofar as it presumes communications or
knowledge regarding the hiring decisions of Castle. Teran denied that he handled labor relations
for Castle, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Moreover, there is no evidence of any joint
or single-employer relationship between Cathedral and Castle.
General Counsel relies upon those cases where the Board has found that direct
evidence of an express demand by a union that an employee be discharged is not necessary
where the evidence supports a reasonable inference of a union request, Avon Roofing & Sheet
Metal Co., 312 NLRB 499, 499 (1993)(and cases cited therein), and where the Board has also
found that a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by informing an employer that
an employee is no longer a member in good standing and therefore ineligible for hire. Industrial
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Contractors Skanska, supra, slip op. at 1.
However, the evidence is not sufficient to show that this is what occurred in this
instance. It has been stipulated that a union agent told Teran that Baladi was not a member in
good standing. There is no evidence to show that Teran did anything with that information, other
than transfer Baladi to another nonunion worksite after a determination was made that
Cathedral would no longer continue to operate at the 19th Street project, a decision which
affected all employees. It is also the case that the evidence fails to show that Teran is affiliated
(other than in an arms-length business relationship) with Castle11 or that he, acting on behalf of
that Company, communicated to Castle that Baladi was ineligible for hire due to his failure to
maintain his membership in the Union or for any other reason. The evidence likewise fails to
show that any representative of the Union made such a representation to Amari or any other
principal of Castle. The parties’ stipulation specifically states that there was no communication
between Local 7 and the Employer concerning Baladi until mid-November. Moreover, Amari
testified that she had no idea who Baladi was until she was contacted by the Union in mid-
November, well after employees were hired to work at the 19th Street project.
Additionally, there is insufficient credible evidence that at the time the project was
subcontracted to Castle, Baladi would have been prevented by the Union from resuming his
membership in Local 7, should he have chosen to do so. As noted above, I have specifically
discredited Baladi’s testimony insofar as it suggests to the contrary.
The Exception to Philadelphia Sheraton Would Apply Here
Here, the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, as supplemented by that
evidence found by me to be reliable, confirms that the Union has a routine manner in which
employees are generally informed of their dues obligations and Baladi received such
information. The record further establishes that during the period of his incarceration, Baladi
was sent two written communications from the Union relating to his dues delinquency. Although
Baladi denies receiving these letters, I do not credit his testimony in this regard. As an initial
matter the letters were sent to him at his listed address, which was in a residence owned by a
family member. Baladi offered no testimony to explain or otherwise address why such mail
would not be forwarded or otherwise provided to him. In addition, I find that Baladi’s actions in
contacting Walmsley, the individual responsible for managing dues payments, shortly after his
incarceration ended, raises a strong inference that he was aware of his dues delinquency, and
Baladi did not deny that that was the case. At that time, as Baladi acknowledged, he was
advised that he could not obtain work within the jurisdiction of Local 7 until he satisfied his
outstanding financial obligations to the union, which he apparently chose not to attempt to do. In
this regard, as noted above, I discredit Baladi’s testimony to the effect that the Union refused to
allow him to pay dues in order to be reinstated.
Baladi was further advised of his financial obligations to the Union on subsequent
occasions, as described above: in particular, in the summer of 2014, when he worked for
American Tile.
I also find that there is no doubt that at the time of his employment with Cathedral, Baladi
was aware of his financial obligations to the Union. However, as discussed above, Board law

11 The parties’ stipulation provides, in relevant part, “Guy asked Teran if he would be willing to sign a
collective-bargaining agreement on behalf of the Employer. Teran said, “No” as he has no affiliation with
Castle Stone.
JD(NY)-29-16
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does not deem that sufficient. The question which has been raised by Counsel for the General
Counsel is whether the Union had the obligation, under Philadelphia Sheraton and its progeny,
to provide a specific notice to Baladi about his financial obligations, the period for which they
were owed, the method in which they were calculated, and a date by which such payments
were to be made prior to making its request, inferred or otherwise, that Baladi not be referred for
employment to Castle. As discussed above, I have found insufficient evidence to establish that
the Union had any such communications with the Employer named in the complaint; thus, I find
such contentions to be without merit.
Moreover, even if I were to conclude that the Union had made such a request or that
knowledge on behalf of Castle could somehow be inferred, I would find that the exception to
Philadelphia Sheraton would apply in this instance. I find that Baladi made a conscious decision
to willfully and deliberately evade his dues obligations, of which he was fully aware, even while
working in jobs where he knew the Union had collective-bargaining agreements with his
employers containing union-security provisions. His conduct in this regard shows neither
negligence nor inadvertence. This is evinced by his text message exchange with Union
President Lane, which has been set forth above. Although this exchange postdates the relevant
events here, it demonstrates Baladi’s continuing intention to get his membership reinstated
without remitting dues or initiation fees, uniformly required as a condition of continued
membership. See, e.g., Food & Commercial Workers Local 368A (Professional Services), 317
NLRB 352, 354–355 (1995), where the Board dismissed the compliant because the delinquent
employee, like Baladi in the instant case, ha actual knowledge of the amount of dues owed, the
date by which it had to be paid, the consequences of nonpayment and the means of reinstating
membership. See also No. 60 Teamsters (Ralphs Grocery), 209 NLRB 117, 124-125 (1974);
Big Rivers Electric Corp., 260 NLRB 329 (1982); IBI Security, 292 NLRB 648 (1989). Here,
there is no evidence that prior to December 2015, Baladi made any attempt to cure his
arrearages, or that the Union refused to accept any such offer. Accordingly, I find that the
exception to Philadelphia Sheraton applies in this instance.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended12
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C., August 11, 2016
Mindy E. Landow
Administrative Law Judge

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.