Lisa M. Horace, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 17, 2011
0120110007 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 2011)

0120110007

03-17-2011

Lisa M. Horace, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Lisa M. Horace,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120110007

Hearing No. 420-2009-00036X

Agency No. 200L05202008102342

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's

appeal from the Agency's August 23, 2010 final order concerning her equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as

a Dental Assistant at the Agency's Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System

facility in Biloxi, Mississippi. The record reflects that Complainant

was hired, subject to a one-year probationary period beginning, February

19, 2008. The record further reflects that of the individuals who applied

for the position of Dental Assistant that was awarded to Complainant,

one was Asian, two were White and two were Black.

On April 24, 2008, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that

the Agency subjected her to hostile workplace discrimination on the

bases of race (African-American) and reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when:

1) On February 25, 2008, she was consistently threatened by one of the

dentists she worked for that if she didn't have all computer information

correct by the time the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare

Organizations (JCAHO) arrived, she would be without a job.

2) On March 4, 2008, one of the dentists she worked for stated to her that

had he known she lived in Mobile, Alabama, he wouldn't have hired her.

He later yelled at her stating that he did not need the instruments she

put out for him, yet used them.

3) On March 14, 2008, she was docked for taking a one hour lunch break

although other staff members regularly take one hour for lunch.

4) On March 20, 2008, one of the dentists she worked for stated to her

that she should not be there, did not have the skills to work in the

Dental Clinic, and felt she lied on her resume.

5) On March 21 and 27, 2008, a staff dentist refused to work with

her.

6) Complainant also alleged that, because she filed a complaint of hostile

workplace harassment regarding the above, her employment was terminated

on June 20, 2008.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested

a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f).

On July 29, 2010, the AJ issued a summary decision finding no

discrimination. In reaching this decision, the AJ determined that

even if Complainant could establish a prima facie case, the Agency

had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions,

including Complainant's termination.

According to the AJ, the assertion by Complainant that on February 25,

2008, she was consistently threatened by one of the dentists, by being

told that if she didn't have all computer information correct by the

time the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations

(JCAHO) arrived, she would be without a job, is not supported by the

available evidence. The evidence shows that the dentist involved did

tell Complainant that he would, in substance, be quizzing her on a regular

basis to help her answer questions so that she would not be flustered when

JCAHO came. Similarly, the AJ found that the assertion by Complainant

that on March 4, 2008, one of the dentists she worked for stated to her

that had he known she lived in Mobile, Alabama, he wouldn't have hired

her, is not supported by the evidence. Complainant lived in Mobile, at

the time she applied for the instant job. The dentist who allegedly made

the comments attributed to him by Complainant was on her selection panel.

Regarding the assertion that a dentist yelled at Complainant, on March 4,

2008, stating that he did not need the instruments she put out for him,

yet used them, was also found not supported by the available evidence.

The dentist involved acknowledged raising his voice, in his reaction to

what Complainant had done, because he was irritated with her. The AJ

also found that the assertion by Complainant that on March 14, 2008,

she was docked for taking a one hour lunch break although other staff

members regularly take one hour for lunch, is not supported by the

evidence. Complainant admitted that she was not docked. According to

the AJ regarding the assertion that, on March 20, 2008, one of the

dentists Complainant worked for stated to her that she should not

be there, did not have the skills to work in the Dental Clinic, and

felt she lied on her resume has no connection to Complainant's race.

The dentist involved acknowledged that he told Complainant that she did

not have the skills to work there at the Clinic. The dentist stated that

Complainant lacked basic knowledge of standard dental instruments, and

was ineffective in assisting him during patient surgery. With respect

to Complainant's claim that a staff dentist refused to work with her,

the AJ found that the dentist involved stated that he did elect to not

work with Complainant because he found her to be disrespectful.

Finally, the AJ found that Complainant was ultimately terminated during

her probationary period because she was not qualified for the Dental

Assistant position and she was "poisoning" the work atmosphere with

her poor attitude. Further, the AJ found no evidence of any other

probationary employee being treated more favorably under the same or

similar circumstances.

In conclusion, the AJ found that the events of which Complainant

complains, either individually or collectively fail to rise to the level

of unlawful harassment prohibited by Title VII. Most importantly, there

is no evidence that any of the actions or decisions of agency management

were motivated by unlawful reasons. Complainant failed to establish that

any of management's reasons for its actions were pretextual or unworthy

of belief. Complainant failed to establish discrimination under either

the theory of disparate treatment or unlawful harassment.

On appeal, Complainant asserts, inter alia, that the AJ improperly

entered summary judgment in this matter. She further asserts that the

AJ did not adequately address her claims of harassment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(a), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior

EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive.

Wibstad v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699

(Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39

(D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working

environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the

alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an

employee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court has

stated that: "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an

objectively hostile work environment - an environment that a reasonable

person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview."

Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).

To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, complainant

must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class;

(2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal

or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment

complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the

harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of

Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should

be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the

victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance at 6.

An employer is subject to vicarious liability for harassment when it is

"created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority

over the employee." Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524

U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998). When the harassment does not

result in a tangible employment action being taken against the employee,

the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability. The agency

can meet this defense, which is subject to proof by a preponderance

of the evidence, by demonstrating: (a) that it exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (b)

that appellant unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive

or corrective opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm

otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2270;

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. at 2293; Enforcement Guidance:

Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). This defense is not available when the

harassment results in a tangible employment action (e.g., a discharge,

demotion, or undesirable reassignment) being taken against the employee.

Here, Complainant asserted that based on her statutorily protected

classes, management continuously subjected her to a hostile work

environment. However, we find that Complainant has not shown that she

was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct involving her protected classes, or the harassment complained of

was based on her statutorily protected classes. Further, Complainant

has not shown that the purported harassment had the purpose or effect

of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. While Complainant

has cited various incidents where agency management took actions that

were either adverse or disruptive to her, we find that Complainant fails

to show that these incidents were as a result of unlawful discrimination.

To the extent complainant is alleging disparate treatment with respect

to her termination, she has not shown that the agency's reasons for

terminating her were a pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order,

because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a

hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does

not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time

period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration

as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely

filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted

with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider

requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very

limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL

(Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 17, 2011

__________________

Date

2

0120110007

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

6

0120110007