Linda T. Dozier

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 17, 2020

2018008886 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/369,739 02/09/2012 Linda T. Dozier 28849/09292 6823
27530 7590 07/17/2020
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
IP Department
One Wells Fargo Center
301 South College Street, 23rd Floor
Charlotte, NC 28202
EXAMINER
ZAIDI, SYED A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2432
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip@nelsonmullins.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LINDA T. DOZIER
Appeal 2018-008886
Application 13/369,739
Technology Center 2400
Before DENISE M. POTHIER, JOHN A. EVANS, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1,2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Cricket
Media, Inc. Appeal Br. 4.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Final Action (“Final Act.”) mailed
February 3, 2017, the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed March 2, 2018, the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed July 19, 2018, and the Reply Brief
(“Reply Br.”) filed September 19, 2018.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “[a] system and method for managing
access policies where the result of an intersection performed on policy sets
associated with each of two nodes based on the nodes’ attributes determines
whether the two nodes may interact.” Spec., Abst. For example, a user
(e.g., node 3) may be attempting to communicate with other users (e.g.,
nodes 7, 9, 10). Id. ¶¶ 10, 42. The process identifies the action to take place
(e.g., communication) (steps 200, 202), retrieves and compares the nodes’
policies (step 204), determines if an intersection (e.g., commonality)
between node policies exists (step 206), and performs the appropriate action
(e.g., permits email transmission) (step 208). Id. ¶¶ 10, 42–46, Fig. 2.
Independent claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A method for managing an action from one node to another
node on a computer network, the method comprising utilizing
processing circuitry to perform the steps of:
defining a rule for the action based on at least one value
derived from one or more attributes of the nodes;
defining at least one policy based on the rule to facilitate
implementation of the rule;
associating the one node with a first policy set wherein
the first policy set is configured to include a plurality of policy
identifiers;
associating the another node with a second policy set
wherein the second policy is configured to include a plurality of
policy identifiers;
assigning the at least one policy to the first policy set by
including a policy identifier of the at least one policy in the first
policy set based on the at least one derived value of the one or
more attributes of the one node;
assigning the at least one policy to the second policy set
by including a policy identifier of the at least one policy in the
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second policy set based on the at least one derived value of the
one or more attributes of the another node;
comparing the first policy set with the second policy set
to find an intersection of one or more of the plurality of policy
identifiers between the first and second policy sets; and
managing the action between the one node and the
another node based on the intersection.
Appeal Br. 17–18, Claims App. (emphasis added).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellant could have
made, but did not make in the Brief are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On the record before us, we are unpersuaded the
Examiner has erred. Except as noted, we adopt as our own the findings and
reasons set forth in the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the
Examiner’s Answer.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Schneider US 6,105,027 Aug. 15, 2000
Fields US 6,605,120 B1 Aug. 12, 2003
Devaraj3 US 2006/0206440 A1 Sept. 14, 2006
Bertino US 2008/0320549 A1 Dec. 25, 2008
Anne Anderson, A Comparison of Two Privacy Policy Languages: EPAL
and XACML (Sun microsystems) (Sept. 2005) 1–46 (“Anderson”).

3 The first named inventor of this reference is Anderson. We however refer
to this reference as “Devaraj” for consistency with the Final Office Action
and briefing and so as not to be confused with the reference authored by
Anne Anderson.
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OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER SCHNEIDER,
ANDERSON, AND DEVARAJ

Claims 1–6, 9–13, 15–17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)4 as being unpatentable over Schneider, Anderson, and Devaraj.
Final Act. 12–34. Appellant argues the claims collectively. Appeal Br.
8–16. We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner found that Schneider teaches many
of the claim’s limitations, including defining a rule based on a value derived
from a node attribute, defining a policy based on the rule, and associating
nodes with policy sets. Final Act. 12–14 (citing Schneider 11:65–12:32,
12:15–41, 13:10–56, 14:10–15:10, cols. 31–32, Figs. 16A–B, 25). The
Examiner found Anderson in combination with Schneider teaches or
suggests the policy sets “include a plurality of policy identifiers” limitations,
including assigning the policies to policy sets by including the recited policy
identifiers, comparing the policy sets to find an intersection of policy
identifiers between policy sets, and managing an action between nodes based
on the intersection. Id. at 14–17 (citing Anderson 17–18, 41, 41; Schneider
11:55–12:47, 14:10–15:10, cols. 31–32, Figs. 16A–B, 25). However, the
Examiner stated “Schneider in combination with Anderson does not
explicitly disclose ‘intersection of one or more of the plurality of policy
identifiers,’” turning additionally to Devaraj in combination with Schneider

4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Changes to § 103 apply to
applications filed on or after March 16, 2013. Because this application has
an effective filing date before March 16, 2013, we refer to the pre-AIA
version of § 103.
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and Anderson to teach this feature. Id. at 17–18 (citing Devaraj ¶¶ 11, 19,
40, 57, 79–94, 122–125, Figs. 7 (steps 700-1060), 11) (emphasis added).
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is confusing and should be
reversed for failing to comply with the “standard” set forth in the Manual
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 706.02(j). See Appeal Br. 11–12.
Appellant also argues the Examiner has not shown “a single reference that
teaches” finding an intersection as recited and managing an action between
nodes based on the intersection as recited. Id. at 13–16. More specifically,
Appellant asserts the Examiner relies on Devaraj to teach the “intersection of
policy identifiers in a policy set” but Devaraj fails to manage an action based
on that intersection. Id. at 13–14; Reply Br. 2–3 (citing Devaraj ¶ 122).
Appellant also contends Schneider does not teach comparing policies to find
an intersection but rather determines whether a policy denies access. Appeal
Br. 14–15 (citing Schneider 12:32–47, 20:5–10).

ISSUES
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by finding
that Schneider, Anderson, and Devaraj teach or suggest:
“comparing the first policy set with the second policy set to find an
intersection of one or more of the plurality of policy identifiers between the
first and second policy sets” and
“managing the action between the one node and the another node
based on the intersection”?
ANALYSIS
Based on the record before us, we find no error in the Examiner’s
rejection.
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Allegedly Confusing Rejection
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is confusing and does “not
clearly set forth the Examiner's arguments as to unpatentability.” Appeal Br.
12. Appellant provides two examples where the rejection indicates
Schneider teaches a claim limitation (e.g., “associating the one node with a
first policy set wherein the first policy set is configured to include a plurality
of policy identifiers” (“limitation (d”) and “comparing the first policy set
with the second policy set to find an intersection of one or more of the
plurality of policy identifiers between the first and second policy sets”
(“limitation (h”)) but later states Anderson or the combination of Schneider
and Anderson teaches the same limitation. Id. at 10, 12. Appellant then
contends the rejection should be reversed. Id. at 12.
We are not persuaded.
Cited MPEP § 706.02(j) sets forth guidance to the Examiner
concerning the contents of a rejection based on 35 U.S.C. § 103. See MPEP
§ 706.02(j). Any assertion that the Examiner failed to comply with the
guidance set forth in the MPEP is a petitionable matter, which is not within
the jurisdiction of the Board. See MPEP §§ 1002 and 1201, 9th ed. (Oct.
and Nov. 2015 respectively); see also In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403
(CCPA 1971).
To the extent Appellant contends the Examiner has not met the notice
requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 132 (see Appeal Br. 12),
the PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in
“notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its]
rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the
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propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” 35
U.S.C. § 132.

In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Jung also indicates “all
that is required of the office to meet its prima facie burden of production is
to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references
relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the
notice requirement of § 132.” Id. at 1363.
The Examiner has identified the statutory basis for the rejection of
claim 1 (i.e., § 103(a)) and the references relied upon (e.g., Schneider,
Anderson, and Devaraj) in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner.
See Final Act. 12–14. As to the disputed limitation d) (Appeal Br. 12), the
rejection first indicated Schneider teaches “associating the one node with a
first policy set[,] wherein the first policy set is configured to includes
plurality of polic[y] identifiers.” Final Act. 14 (citing Schneider 12:15–41,
cols. 31–32, Figs. 16A–B). Immediately following from this statement, the
Examiner states that “Schneider does not explicitly disclose ‘include a
plurality of policies identifiers.’” Id. (emphasis added); see Ans. 6.
As such, the rejection turns to Anderson in combination with
Schneider to teach what may not be explicitly taught in Schneider. Final
Act. 14–15 (citing Anderson 17–18, 41). The Examiner further provides a
reason to combine these references. See id.; see Ans. 6–7. Although we
agree that a rejection that states certain claim language is taught by a
reference and then later states the language is not taught by the same
reference can be somewhat confusing, this rejection, when viewed in its
entirety, sufficiently articulates and informs Appellant that the Examiner
further cited to Anderson and proposed to combine it teachings with
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Schneider to teach what Schneider may not teach related to the recited
“policy identifiers”5 in claim 1.
Similarly, for disputed limitation h), the rejection first identifies and
maps teachings from Schneider and Anderson to the recited “comparing the
first policy set with the second policy set to find an intersection of one or
more of the plurality of policy identifiers between the first and second policy
sets” recited in claim 1. Final Act. 16 (citing Schneider 12:32–47, 14:10–
15:10, Fig. 25; Anderson 17–18). However, the rejection almost
immediately indicates “Schneider in combination with Anderson does not
explicitly disclose ‘intersection of one or more of the plurality of policy
identifiers,’” turning to Devaraj in combination with Schneider and
Anderson to teach what is missing from the Schneider and Anderson. Id. at
17 (citing Devaraj ¶¶ 11, 19, 40, 57, 79–94, Fig. 7). The rejection also
provides a reason to combine the references (id. at 17–18), such that it is
sufficiently articulate and informative of the basis for the rejection.
For the foregoing reasons, the rejection satisfies the notice
requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 132, and Appellant has been given a full
and fair opportunity to respond to the rejection.
“[C]omparing the first policy set with the second policy set to find an
intersection of one or more of the plurality of policy identifiers between the
first and second policy sets”

5 Notably, Schneider shows in Figure 16A that each policy (e.g., Policies
Access, PoliciesAdminister, PolicesPolicyMaker) has “PolicyID” within
policy tables 1605. Schneider 31:1–4, 32:5–8, Fig. 16A. In this regard,
Anderson may be cumulative.
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Appellant also asserts the Examiner has not shown “a single reference
that teaches” finding an intersection as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 13.
Appellant contends Schneider does not teach looking for an intersection and
thus does not teach comparing policies to find an intersection. Instead,
Appellant argues Schneider determines whether a policy denies access. Id.
at 14–15 (citing Schneider 12:32–47, 20:5–10). We are not persuaded.
As previously discussed, the rejection relies upon Schneider,
Anderson, and Devaraj to teach “comparing the first policy set with the
second policy set to find an intersection of one or more of the plurality of
policy identifiers between the first and second policy sets” (“the recited
‘comparing’ step”) recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 16–17 (citing
Schneider 12:32–47, 14:10–15:10, Fig. 25; Anderson 17–18; Devaraj ¶¶ 11,
19, 40, 57, 79–94, Fig. 7). We thus examine the collective teachings and
what they suggest to an ordinarily skilled artisan, not what a single reference
alone teaches.
Quoting from the Specification, the Examiner indicates (Ans. 5) “[a]n
intersection exists if there is any commonality between the two policy sets.”
Spec. ¶ 45. A broad and reasonable interpretation of “an intersection of one
or more of the plurality of policy identifiers between the first and second
policy sets” therefore includes one or more policy identifiers that the policy
sets have in common. See Ans. 5. The recited “comparing” step thus
includes comparing the first and second policy sets to find one or more
policy identifiers that these policy sets have in common.
Turning to Schneider, the Examiner relies on a passage in column 12
to teach in part, the recited “comparing” step. Final Act. 16–17 (citing
Schneider 12:32–47, 14:10–15:10). The Examiner states Schneider
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“implicitly teaches that a comparison or match is performed between the
pluralities of policies to determine whether a user’s requested access should
be allowed or denied.” Id. at 17 (citing Schneider 11:55–12:47). The
Examiner explains in the Examiner’s Answer that the active filter 203
“suggest[s an] ‘intersection’ because user (node) and the resource (i.e.,
another node) share multiple policies[,] wherein the access filter applies
these policies to determine access permission for user’s access to the
resource.” Ans. 11.
Schneider administrators (e.g., 2509, 2519, 2521) are provided the
right to make access policy (e.g., 2515) that permits certain users (e.g.,
members of Engineers 2511) to access certain information (e.g., Engineering
Data 2513 as shown by dashed arrow 2512) that can be accessed by certain
users (e.g., Engineers user group 2511). Schneider 14:23–38, 14:55–60, Fig.
25. Schneider further teaches Engineers (e.g., 2511) may be subdivided into
Software Engineers, Hardware Engineers, and Sales Engineers user groups.
Id. at 11:67–12:3, 15:1–2. Schneider also teaches access policies can be
created to give Engineers, including Software, Hardware, and Sales user
groups, access to any engineering data. Id. at 12:15–19; see id. at 14:35–38.
Schneider explains “[a]ccess rights are inherited within hierarchies of user
groups. As such, a user who belongs to the Hardware Engineers user group
also automatically belongs to the Engineers user group for access checking
purposes.” Id. at 12:7–10. The above passages implicitly teach that a policy
is compared with a user and a user group (e.g., Hardware Engineers user
group, Software Engineers user group, and Sales Engineers user group) to
determine whether a user has access to certain resources or information. See
id. at 11:55–12:32. But, these passages do not teach or suggest comparing
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one policy to another policy or more specifically “the first policy set with the
second policy set” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 17, Claims App.
Cited column 12, lines 33–47, in Schneider (Final Act. 16–17) do not
fair better. Schneider teaches there may be different access polices for
various user groups to which a user belongs. Schneider 12:35–38. When
faced with multiple access policies related to a user, access filter 203 applies
the policies in a restrictive way. Id. at 12:38–47. In particular, Schneider
discusses the following two techniques: “[i]f multiple policies allow or deny
a user group's access to an information set, policies that deny access prevail”
and “[i]f a particular user is a member of multiple user groups, and multiple
policies allow or deny access to the information set, policies that deny access
prevail.” Id. at 12:42–47. Above, Schneider teaches examining each of
multiple policies to a user group or a user, which may be member of
multiple user groups, to determine whether any of the policies deny a user
group access to an information set. See id. But, as Appellant indicates (see
Appeal Br. 15), Schneider does not teach comparing the multiple policies
with each other “to find an intersection,” let alone “an intersection of one or
more of the plurality of policy identifiers” as claim recites. We therefore
disagree with the Examiner that Schneider “suggest[s an] ‘intersection’ [as
recited] because user (node) and the resource (i.e., another node) share
multiple policies[,] wherein the access filter applies these policies to
determine access permission for user’s access to the resource.” Ans. 11.
However, the rejection also relied on Devaraj and its teachings and
proposed to modify the Schneider/Anderson combination to arrive at what
claim 1 recites—“comparing the first policy set with the second policy set to
find an intersection . . . .” See Final Act. 17–18 (citing Devaraj ¶¶ 11, 19,
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40, 57, 79–94, Fig, 7 (steps 700-1060)); see also Ans. 12–13. Devaraj
specifically teaches analyzing policies by computing an intersection of
policies and provides an example of policy intersections for two web
services entities who wish to communicate. Devaraj ¶¶ 79, 81. For
example, Devaraj discusses taking the cross product (e.g., an intersection) of
a policy set from a first entity and a policy set from a second entity to
determine if at least one policy set remains (e.g., considered “consistent” or
has commonality). Id. ¶ 81; see id. ¶¶ 83–91 (showing an exemplary cross
product). As such, Devaraj reasonably teaches or suggests comparing policy
sets of different entities (e.g., nodes) “to find an intersection of one or more
policy identifiers” as claim 1 recites.
Appellant has not challenged Devaraj’s teaching related to comparing
policy sets to find an intersection of a policy identifier as claim 1 recites.
See Appeal Br. 13–16. Indeed, Appellant states “what Devaraj does is to
identify intersections between policies.” Id. at 14. Likewise, in the Reply
Brief, Appellant discusses paragraph 122 in Devaraj without addressing the
above-discussed and cited paragraphs in Devaraj. See Reply Br. 3.
Nor has Appellant asserted that Devaraj’s teaching cannot be applied
to Schneider as proposed to modify Schneider’s technique (Final Act. 17–
18), resulting in the claimed “comparing” step in claim 1. See Appeal Br.
13–16. At best, Appellant argues “a single reference” does not “teach[] the
claimed limitations that require comparing policy sets to find an intersection
of one or more of the plurality identifiers between the policy sets.” Id. at 13
(emphasis omitted). But, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
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references. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see Ans. 13.
For the above reasons, we determine the combination of Schneider,
Anderson, and Devaraj teaches and suggests the recited “comparing” step.
“[M]anaging the action between the one node and the another node based
on the intersection”
For the above limitation (“the recited ‘managing the action’ step),
Appellant argues Devaraj fails to teach this limitation. Appeal Br. 14.
Specifically, Appellant contends “[t]here is simply nothing in Devaraj that
manages action based on that intersection . . . .” Id.; see also Reply Br. 3.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant also asserts “the Examiner believes that
Devaraj discloses the limitation of managing the action (which the Examiner
equates to ‘controlling access request’) between the one node and the
another node based on the intersection of the policy identifiers.” Reply Br. 2
(emphasis omitted). These arguments are unavailing.
As noted above, the rejection relies on Schneider and Devaraj to teach
the recited “managing the action” step. See Final Act. 16 (discussing
Schneider teaching “managing the action between the” nodes to allow or
deny a user’s access to resources (e.g., an action6)) (citing Schneider 12:32–
47, 14:10–15:10, Fig. 25), 17 (citing Devaraj ¶¶ 11, 19, 40, 57, 79–94, Fig.
7). In the Answer in response “to Appellant’s assertion,” the Examiner
further states “[p]rimary reference Schneider summarily teaches ‘managing
an action from one node to another node on a computer network’” and
further discusses Schneider teaches “controlling interactions between groups

6 The Examiner explains an “action” includes communication functions and
access functions. Ans. 3 (quoting Spec. ¶ 10).
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. . . based on policies that define access control (i.e., actions) to
resources/data based on a user's role (i.e., attribute).” Ans. 10 (citing
Schneider 11:65–12:32, 14:10–15:10, Abstract, Fig. 25).
We therefore disagree with Appellant that the rejection solely relies
on Devaraj to disclose “the limitation of managing the action.” Reply Br. 2.
Granted, the Examiner discusses in the Answer that Devaraj teaches
controlling an access request and maps this to “managing action.” Ans. 9.
But, the actual rejection relies on Schneider to teach “managing an action”
based on policies and maps Schneider’s controlling access to information
and resources to one such recited “action.” See Final Act. 16–17 (discussing
allowing or denying a user’s access to resources) (citing Schneider 11:55–
12:47). Furthermore, the rejection cites to Devaraj for the limited purpose of
teaching the claimed “intersection of” policy identifiers. See id. at 17. Thus,
when applying Devaraj’s modification to Schneider as the rejection
proposed (see id. at 17–18), the resulting method would have predictably
resulted in the recited “managing an action” step, which is “based on the
intersection” as claim 1 recites.
Appellant has not challenged Schneider’s teaching related to the
recited “managing an action” step. See Appeal Br. 13–16. Nor has
Appellant asserted that Devaraj’s teaching cannot be applied to Schneider as
proposed (Final Act. 17–18) to modify Schneider’s technique, resulting in
the recited “managing an action” step in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 13–16. At
best, Appellant argues “a single reference” does not “teach[] the claimed
limitations that require . . . manag[ing] an action between nodes based on
that intersection.” Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted). But, as noted, the rejection
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relies on the collective teachings of Schneider, Anderson, and Devaraj. See
Ans. 13.
For the above reasons, we determine the combination of Schneider,
Anderson, and Devaraj teaches and suggests the recited “managing an
action” step.
Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection
of independent claim 1 and claims 2–6, 9–13, 15–17, 19, and 20, which are
not argued separately.

THE REMAINING OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
Claims 7, 8, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schneider, Anderson, Devaraj, and Bertino (Final Act.
34–36); claim 18 is are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Schneider, Anderson, Devaraj, and Fields (id. at 36–37).
Appellant does not separately argue these rejections. See generally Appeal
Br. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we summarily sustain
these rejections. See MPEP § 1205.02.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 9–13,
15–17, 19,
20
103 Schneider,
Anderson,
Devaraj
1–6, 9–13,
15–17, 19,
20

7, 8, 14 103 Schneider,
Anderson,
Devaraj, Bertino
7, 8, 14
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18 103 Schneider,
Anderson,
Devaraj, Fields
18
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED