01986267
03-29-2000
Linda M. Chapman, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Linda M. Chapman v. United States Postal Service
01986267
March 29, 2000
Linda M. Chapman, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01986267
v. ) Agency No. 1H351103096
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Linda M. Chapman (complainant) timely filed an appeal on August 11, 1998,
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission) from
a final agency decision (FAD), received by complainant on July 13, 1998,
concerning a claim of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e
et seq.<1> The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the agency correctly determined that complainant was not
discriminated against on the basis of sex (female) when she was charged
Absent Without Leave (AWOL).
BACKGROUND
Complainant was employed by the agency as a Distribution Window Clerk,
PS-05. She filed a formal complaint on August 20, 1996, claiming
discrimination on the basis of sex (female) when, from March 27, 1997
through March 29, 1997, she was charged AWOL. The agency's FAD found
no discrimination, reasoning that complainant had not established a
prima facie case of discrimination because she had not identified a
similarly situated male employee who was treated more favorably.<2>
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency
has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility
to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which
the first step normally consists of determining the existence of
a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the
agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to
the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In response to complainant's claim that she was charged AWOL, the agency
has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
According to the sworn statement of management official S-1, Supervisor,
Customer Services, complainant was charged AWOL pending medical
documentation because of her past attendance record. Complainant was,
however, paid for the hours after an agency nurse called complainant's
doctor's office to confirm that she had, in fact, been ill, and she was
charged with sick leave rather than AWOL.
Since the agency articulated such a reason, the burden returns to the
complainant to demonstrate that the agency's articulated reason was a
pretext for discrimination. We find that the complainant has failed
to show pretext. Complainant argued that a female coworker, C-1,
had repeated unexcused absences, but was not charged AWOL. The record
shows, however, that C-1 was charged AWOL for these absences, and we
note that she is in the same protected group as complainant. The record
also shows that a male coworker of complainant, C-2, was also charged
AWOL for unexcused absences. The record contains no other evidence
of pretext. Therefore, the agency's determination that complainant
failed to establish that she was discriminated against, with respect to
this claim, was supported by the record.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the agency is hereby AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 29, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
________________________
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2 We find that the agency erred in concluding that complainant had not
established a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex merely
because she did not identify a similarly situated male coworker who
was treated in a more favorable manner. To establish a prima facie case,
complainant need only present evidence which, if unrebutted, would support
an inference that the agency's action resulted from discrimination based
on sex. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
It is not necessary for her to show that a comparative individual,
from outside of her protected group, was treated differently. O'Connor
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996); Enforcement
Guidance on O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caters Corp., EEOC Notice
No. 915.002, n.4 (September 18, 1996); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996). Since the agency's finding of no
discrimination with respect to the basis of sex was not based solely on
complainant's inability to establish a prima facie case, we find that
the agency's error was harmless.