Linda Hammond, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 4, 2003
01A23774 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 4, 2003)

01A23774

03-04-2003

Linda Hammond, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Linda Hammond v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A23774

March 4, 2003

.

Linda Hammond,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23774

Agency No. 99-1064

Hearing No. 170-A1-8503X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated this appeal from the agency's final

order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint

of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. At all times

relevant to the agency action at issue, complainant was employed at

the agency's Coatesville Medical Center in Coatesville, Pennsylvania.

Complainant alleges in her complaint that she was subjected to unlawful

discrimination, in the form of disparate treatment and harassment and on

the basis of an unspecified perceived disability, when, on February 14,

1999, she was reassigned to the position of Health Aide in the agency's

�Silver Spoon Program� (SSP).<1> Complainant also alleged that the

agency's practice of reassigning employees with injuries or impairments

to the SSP had a disparate impact upon African-American employees,

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

At the conclusion of the agency's investigation into her complaint,

complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing,

the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination. As for the disability

discrimination portion of her complaint, the AJ found that complainant

had failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment because

there was no evidence that the agency regarded her as an individual with

a disability, as claimed.<2> The AJ further found that even if she had

found that complainant had established that she had been regarded as an

individual with a disability, there was no indication that she had been

treated differently than others outside her protected class. The AJ

also found that, even assuming complainant had established a prima facie

case, the agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its action. The AJ noted that an agency human resources official

had testified that the SSP was established for the purpose of providing

patients at the facility with timely feeding of their meals, as well as

to reduce workers' compensation costs for the agency. The AJ also noted

that agency officials testified that complainant had been placed in the

SSP out of concerns for her safety, based upon the number of injuries

she had sustained in the course of her employment with the agency.

The AJ also found that complainant had failed to prove the reasons

articulated by the agency were mere pretexts for unlawful discrimination.

The AJ also found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of disability-based harassment, as the reassignment at issue

did not rise to the level of conduct sufficiently severe to support a

harassment claim. As for her disparate impact claim, the AJ found that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case, because she failed

to present sufficient statistical evidence to support her claim that the

agency practice in question caused the exclusion at issue. For these

reasons, the AJ found that complainant failed to establish her claims.

The agency implemented the AJ's decision in full, and complainant

subsequently filed the instant appeal.

We note that, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing

factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd.,

340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding

whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's

conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether

or not a hearing was held.

In a claim such as complainant's allegation of disparate treatment based

upon disability, where, as here, there is an absence of direct evidence of

such discrimination, the allocation of burdens and order of presentation

of proof is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); Presley v. United States Postal Serv.,

EEOC Request No. 05980656 (Sept. 20, 2001) (applying McDonnell Douglas

analysis to disability claims). First, complainant must establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

Kimble v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01983020 (Aug. 22,

2001). Next, the agency must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency is successful in meeting its

burden, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the legitimate reason proffered by the agency was a pretext for

discrimination. Id. at 256. However, the ultimate burden of persuading

the trier of fact that the agency intentionally discriminated against

complainant remains at all times with complainant. Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Applying this analysis

to the instant matter, we find that the AJ's finding is supported by

substantial evidence in the record. The record evidence, as identified

by the AJ in her decision, supports the finding that, even assuming she

established a prima facie case of disability-based disparate treatment,

the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions which complainant failed to prove were mere pretext for unlawful

discrimination.

We also find that the AJ's finding regarding complainant's

disability-based harassment claim was supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Harassment is actionable only if the harassment to which

the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of his or her employment. Cobb v. Department

of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (Mar. 13, 1997); see also

Flowers v. Southern Reg'l Med. Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235-36 (2001).

In determining whether a working environment is hostile, factors to

consider include the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct,

its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,

or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc., No. 915.002, at 3, 6 (Mar. 8, 1994). We agree with

the AJ that the evidentiary record fails to show that the conduct at

issue�a single reassignment to another position within the agency, with

no evidence indicating an accompanying loss of pay or other benefits�was

itself sufficiently severe or pervasive to support her harassment claim.

We further find that the AJ's ultimate finding regarding complainant's

disparate impact claim is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, the Commission finds

that the AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in

the record and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant

facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.

We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, it is the

decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. �Agency� or �department� means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

(�Right to File A Civil Action�).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 4, 2003

Date

1 In her complaint, complainant also included sex as a discriminatory

basis for the alleged unlawful activity, as well as the additional

allegation that her duty hours were unlawfully changed because of her

race, color, sex, and disability. Complainant subsequently withdrew

her allegations pertaining to the basis of sex and the additional claim

relating to her duty hours.

2 Complainant did not claim to have an impairment which substantially

limited any major life activities, or to have a record of having such

an impairment. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g) (providing that �[d]isability

means, with respect to an individual�(1) a physical or mental impairment

which substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of

the individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded

as having such an impairment�).