Linda Briggs-Beloff, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 28, 2002
01995699 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 28, 2002)

01995699

02-28-2002

Linda Briggs-Beloff, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.


Linda Briggs-Beloff v. United States Postal Service

01995699

February 28, 2002

.

Linda Briggs-Beloff,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01995699

Agency No. 4-F-945-0256-97

Hearing No. 370-98-X2506

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. Complainant alleges she was discriminated against on the

bases of race (Caucasian), color (white), sex (female) and age (DOB:

October 7, 1942) when:

(1) from 1995 through August 6, 1997, she was denied promotions

by District Managers who manipulated and influenced the Executive

Administrative System (EAS) promotion selection process; and

on August 6, 1997, she was denied a detail to an EAS-17 position and

reassigned to a Supervisor, Customer Services position in Delivery.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

The record reveals that complainant that during the relevant time,

complainant was employed as an EAS-16, Supervisor, Customer Services at

the agency's Walnut Creek - Dollar Ranch Station facility in California.

The record reflects that complainant applied for two vacancies: an

EAS-17 position at the Walnut Creek post office posted in October 1996,

and an EAS-18 position at the Dollar Ranch Station posted in April 1997.

In addition, complainant applied for three details: an EAS-18 position at

the Dollar Ranch Station in 1996, an EAS-18 position at the Walnut Creek

Station in 1996, and an EAS-17 position at the Dollar Ranch Station in

August 1997. The record also reflects that complainant was not selected

for any of these positions.

On July 28, 1997, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently,

filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on October 16, 1997,

alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced

above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received

a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a

decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to show that her rrace, color,

sex, and/or age were factors in the selection decisions made by the

agency. The AJ found that complainant did not show by a preponderance

of the evidence that her qualifications were such as to render the

selection decisions discriminatory. The AJ also concluded that in

regard to complainant's reassignment to a delivery supervisor position

and failure to be detailed to the EAS-17 position in August 1997, that the

agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Specifically, the AJ found that complainant was reassigned because the

agency needed a delivery supervisor and management felt that she needed

to update her delivery skills. The AJ further found that complainant

did not present any evidence beyond her mere assertions that the district

managers manipulated the selection process in an effort to discriminate

against her.

The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal,

complainant contends, inter alia, that the AJ erred by misinterpreting

Postal policy, creating a recommended decision that is diametrically

opposed to the terms, conditions and privileges of complainant's

employment, and arbitrarily finding no discrimination. In response,

the agency requests that we affirm its final decision.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

Although the initial inquiry of discrimination in a discrimination case

usually focuses on whether the complainant has established a prima facie

case, following this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency

has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

See Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May

31, 1990). In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant

has established a prima facie case to whether she has demonstrated by

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ correctly

concluded that complainant failed to show that the agency engaged

in unlawful employment discrimination based on her race, color, sex

and/or age. The Commission also notes that, even assuming, arguendo,

complainant did establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the agency

articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. In

reaching this conclusion, we note that the record evidence indicates

that complainant did not request a higher level detail verbally or

through the agency's 991 database. In addition, the record also shows

that complainant was reassigned to the delivery supervisor position

because she needed to improve her delivery skills. We further find that

complainant has presented no evidence that other employees similarly

situated were treated more favorably. In point of fact, complainant

has been detailed to higher level positions on five occasions.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the AJ's decision

properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant failed to

present evidence that any of the agency's articulated reasons were

motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's race, color, sex

and/or age. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore,

after a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions

on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not

specifically addressed in this decision, the agency's final decision

is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 28, 2002

__________________

Date