Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 24, 1980

248 N.L.R.B. 1366 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston and General
Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local
Union No. 968, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and helpers of America. Case 23-
CA-7748
April 24, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS, PENELLO, AND TRUESDALE
Upon a charge filed on November 30, 1979, by
General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local Union No. 968, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, War-
ehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called
the Union, and duly served on Lighthouse for the
Blind of Houston, herein called Respondent, the
Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Re-
lations Board, by the Acting Regional Director for
Region 23, issued a complaint on December 4,
1979, against Respondent, alleging that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Copies of the charge and complaint were duly
served on the parties to this proceeding.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the
complaint alleges in substance that on October 19,
1979, following a Board election in Case 23-RC-
4709 the Union was duly certified as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of Respon-
dent's employees in the unit found appropriate;'
and that, commencing on or about November 21,
1979, and at all times thereafter, Respondent has
refused, and continues to date to refuse, to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative, although the Union has re-
quested and is requesting it to do so. The com-
plaint also alleges that since on or about November
21, 1979, and all times thereafter, Respondent has
refused, and continues to refuse, to furnish, at the
Union's request, names, dates of hire, job classifica-
tions, overtime policy, vacation policy, insurance
coverage, holidays, and work rules applied to all
unit employees, as well as all existing benefits of all
unit employees. On December 12, 1979, Respon-
dent filed its answer to the complaint admitting in
Official iotice is taken ;4f the record in the representalion proceed-
ing, Case 23 RC-470, as the term "record" is defined in Secs 102.68
and 102 69(g) (f Ihe Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended
See 1.I1 Electrnoytemns, Inc. l6h NL.RB 938 (1967), enfd 388 F.2d 683
(4th Cir 19¢8); Golden A4g Beverage Car, 167 NLRB 151 (1967), enfd. 415
F d 2o (51h Cir 1969); ntr rpe ('. v Penello, 269 F.Supp. 573
(D.C.Va 1967); Filhitt Corp., 164 NLRB 378 (1967), enfd 397 F2d 91
(71h Cir 1968); Sec 9(d) of the NI.RA, as amended
248 NLRB No. 178
part, and denying in part, the allegations in the
complaint.
On January 10, 1980, counsel for the General
Counsel filed directly with the Board a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Subsequently, on January 17,
1980, the Board issued an order transferring the
proceeding to the Board and a Notice To Show
Cause why the General Counsel's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment should not be granted. Respondent
thereafter filed a response to the Notice To Show
Cause.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
In its answer to the complaint and its response to
the Notice To Show Cause, Respondent contends
that the Board does not have jurisdiction over Re-
spondent's workers or its business because its shel-
tered workshop employees are not employees
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act and
that it is engaged in charitable activities which do
not affect commerce within the definition of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The General Counsel
argues that these material issues have been previ-
ously decided, that there are no litigable issues of
fact, and thus that the Board should grant its
Motion for Summary Judgment on these issues. We
agree with the General Counsel.
Our review of the record herein, including the
record in Case 23-RC-4709, discloses that a repre-
sentation hearing in which Respondent participated
was held on November 1, 1978. Thereafter, on No-
vember 29, 1978, the Regional Director for Region
23 issued a Decision and Direction of Election in
which he asserted jurisdiction over the Respon-
dent, asserted jurisdiction with respect to the per-
sons employed in Respondent's workshop, and
found a unit of all production and maintenance em-
ployees in the Industrial Division workshop to be
appropriate. Thereafter, Respondent filed a timely
request for review of the Regional Director's deci-
sion, alleging that in reaching his determination the
Regional Director departed from Board precedent,
and that in any event the Board had improperly as-
serted jurisdiction over institutions such as Respon-
dent. On January 4, 1979, the Board granted the
request for review but did not stay the election. On
September 18, 1979, the Board issued its Decision
on Review 2 in which it affirmed the Regional Di-
rector's decision. 3 On September 24, 1979, the im-
pounded ballots of the election conducted on Janu-
ary 5, 1979, were counted, and revealed that 47
244 NI.RB No 155 (1979)
' The Board suhsequently issued a "Correction" changing two inad-
vertentl errors
---
LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND OF HOUSTON 1367
votes were cast for and 17 against the Union, with
3 challenged ballots. On or about October 19, 1979,
the Regional Director for Region 23 issued a Sup-
plemental Decision and Certification of Representa-
tive in which he overruled the Respondent's objec-
tions to the election and certified the Union as rep-
resentative of the employees in the appropriate
unit.
It is well settled that in the absence of newly dis-
covered or previously unavailable evidence or spe-
cial circumstances a respondent in a proceeding al-
leging a violation of Section 8(a)(5) is not entitled
to relitigate issues which were or could have been
litigated in a prior representation proceeding.4
All issues raised by Respondent in this proceed-
ing concerning the jurisdiction of the Board over
this Respondent and its employees, were or could
have been litigated in the prior representation pro-
ceeding, and Respondent does not offer to adduce
at a hearing any newly discovered or previously
unavailable evidence, nor does it allege that any
special circumstances exist herein which would re-
quire the Board to reexamine the decision made in
the representation proceeding. We therefore find
that Respondent has not raised any issue regarding
the jurisdiction of the Board which is properly liti-
gable in this unfair labor practice proceeding. 5 Ac-
cordingly, we find that Respondent has at all times
material herein refused to recognize and bargain
with the Union, upon request, and that its refusal
to do so is violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
In its answer to the complaint, Respondent
denied, "for lack of information," paragraph 5 of
the complaint, which alleged that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act. In his Decision and Direction of
Election, the Regional Director for Region 23
found that the Union was a labor organization
under the Act. Respondent did not request review
of the Regional Director's determination on this
issue. Further, the Board, in its Decision on
Review, affirmed the Regional Director's Decision
and Direction of Election. Inasmuch as Respondent
is not entitled to relitigate matters which were or
could have been litigated in the representation
case, 6 we find the allegation in paragraph 5 of the
complaint to be true.
In its answer to the complaint, and response to
the Notice To Show Cause, Respondent admits
that it has refused, upon request, to furnish to the
Union wage and employment information pertain-
4See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941);
Rules and Regulations of the Board, Secs. 102.67(f) and 102.69(c).
6 See also N.LR.B. v. Yeshiva University, 103 LRRM 2526, 2530, fn.
11, 87 LC¶ 11,819 (1980).
6 See fn. 4, supra.
ing to bargaining unit employees. 7 Respondent
denies that the information requested by the Union
is relevant, material, or required to be produced.
However, it is well established that such informa-
tion is presumptively relevant for purposes of col-
lective bargaining, and must be provided upon re-
quest to the employees' bargaining representative.8
Further, it is well settled that a union is not re-
quired to demonstrate the exact relevance of such
information unless the employer has submitted evi-
dence sufficient to rebut the presumption of rel-
evance.9 Respondent has not attempted to rebut
the relevance of the information requested by the
Union. Rather, it claims only that it has "insuffi-
cient information" to admit or deny the relevancy
and necessity of the information. Moreover, in its
letter to the Union, Respondent stated only that it
declined to recognize or bargain with the Union so
that it could "appeal the decision of the Board."
For the reasons stated above regarding the relitiga-
tion of issues previously decided in a representation
proceeding, this latter assertion is not a meritorious
defense.
Accordingly, we find that no material issues of
fact exist with regard to Respondent's refusal to
furnish the wage and employment information
sought by the Union through its letter of Novem-
ber 8, 1979, and that its refusal to do so violated
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Finally, Respondent asserts that the General
Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment should
be denied and the complaint dismissed because the
complaint failed to contain a notice of hearing,
which Respondent contends must be included
under the Board's Rules and Regulations. We dis-
agree. It is undisputed here that Respondent was
served with a copy of the complaint, and thus had
notice of the charges of alleged unfair labor prac-
tices against it and an opportunity to prepare its
7 It is uncontroverted that by letter dated November 8, 1979, the
Union requested Respondent to furnish it with the following information
with respect to the unit of production and maintenance employees in the
Industrial Division workshop: names of employees in the bargaining unit
and dates of hire; classifications of employees in the unit (by name); over-
time policy (time and one-half after - hours, weekly, double time, how
distributed, etc.); rates of pay of the employees in the bargaining unit (by
name); vacation policy; insurance coverage (amount of employer's and
employee's contribution, coverage of employee and dependents; also
copy of policy and/or booklet describing benefits); a list of paid holidays
per year and hours paid for such holidays; any established and/or posted
work rules or rules of conduct governing bargaining unit employees; and
any other benefits that employees receive, such as bonuses, pension plans,
profit sharing, etc., including any descriptive information relating to any
of the benefits. The Union again requested such information from Re-
spondent by letter dated November 20. 1979. Respondent, by letter dated
November 21, 1979, and at all times thereafter, declined to furnish the
requested information.
8 Verona Dyestuff Division Mobay Chemical Corporation. 233 NLRB
109, 110 (1977), and cases cited therein at fn. 5.
9 Curriss-Wright Corporation, Wright A4eronautrical Division v. N.L.R. B.,
347 F 2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965), enfg. 145 NLRB 152 (1963).
1368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
answer and defense. Thus, lack of formal notice of
hearing at this time, without more, does not preju-
dice Respondent, since the General Counsel has
not sought a hearing, but instead has filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, of which Respondent had
full and fair notice.'0 In this regard, we note that
Respondent's reply to the Union's request for bar-
gaining and information clearly evidenced Respon-
dent's intent merely to challenge the Board's certi-
fication in this case on statutory grounds. These are
matters normally resolved by summary judgment,
not hearing, especially when, as here, there are no
material issues of fact for which a hearing is re-
quired. Also, Section 102.15 of the Board's Rules
and Regulations, as amended, upon which Re-
spondent relies, was clearly designed to require a
regional director of the Board to issue a complaint
upon determination that an unfair labor practice
charge had merit. The lack of formal notice of
hearing at the initial issuance of complaint, while
not preferable, does not, without more, constitute a
denial of due process or subversion of the rulemak-
ing process.12 Inasmuch as the lack of notice of
hearing in the formal complaint is nonprejudicial in
the instant case and, for the reasons set forth
above, we grant the General Counsel's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
On the basis of the entire record, the Board
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all material times
herein, a nonprofit Texas corporation with its prin-
cipal office and place of business in Houston,
"' Sec. 102.24, for example, recognizes that the General Counsel may
file such motions. It states, in pertinent part, "All motions for summary
judgment made prior to hearing shall he filed in writing with the Hoard
pursuant to the provisions of section 102 5 ' (mphasis supplied.)
' The following Rules, among others, apply to the issuance (of coim-
plaints by regional directors:
Sec. 102.15 When and by whom issued, contents, service. After a
charge has been filed, if it appears to the regional director that
formal proceedings in respect thereto should be instituted, he shall
issue and cause to be served on all the other parties a formal com-
plaint in the name of the Board stating the unfair labor practices and
containing a notice of hearing before an admniistratise law judge at
a place therein fixed and at a time not less than 10 days after the
service of the complaint. The complaint shall contain (I) a clear and
concise statement of the facts upon which assertion of jurisdiction by
the Board is predicated, and (2) a clear and concise description of
the acts which are claimed to constitute unfair labor practices, in-
cluding, where known, the approximate dates and places of such acts
and the names of respondent's agents or other representatives by
whom committed.
Sec. 102.16 learing; change of date or place--Upon his own
motion or upon proper cause shownl by any other party, the regional
director issuing the complaint may extend the date of such hearing
i2 See l'an Heusen Company, 221 NLRB 732 (1975), fn. I of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's Decision, which the Board adopted
Texas, where it maintains and operates various
manufacturing facilities, utilizing therein sight-im-
paired employees.
During the past 12 months, a representative
period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of
its business as described above, sold goods and sup-
plies valued in excess of $50,000 directly from its
Houston, Texas, facility to points located outside
the State of Texas. Respondent also received gross
revenues in excess of $4 million from sales of such
products as "Skilcraft" felt-tip pens, disinfectant,
and detergent, mostly to the United States Govern-
ment. 3
We find, on the basis of the foregoing, that Re-
spondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local Union No. 968, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, War-
ehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Representation Proceeding
1. The unit
The following employees of Respondent consti-
tute a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining
purposes within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:
All production and maintenance employees
employed by the Respondent in the Industrial
Division workshop of its Houston, Texas, fa-
cility, excluding all other employees, employ-
ees in workshop B, office clerical employees,
i3 The complaint alleges only that Respondent received gross revenues
in excess of $4 million. The Board found in the underlying representation
case that Respondent stipulated that it sold goods and supplies in excess
of $50,000 directly from its Houston facility to customers located outside
the State of Texas. Thus, it is clear. and Respondent does not contest,
that Respondent meets the Board's discretionary jurisdictional amount
standards. The Board's Decision in the underlying representation case in-
advertently stated that Respondent satisfied the Board's "retail" standard,
although it cited the Board's nonretail standard. See 244 NLRB No. 155,
fn. II. 'Ihe Board hereby corrects this clerical error and the word
"retail" is corrected to read "nonretail." Respondent of course is not pre-
judiced by this correction, since it stipulated that it met the Board's non-
retail standard, and does not place into issue this question. Respondent
clearly meets the Board's retail standard as alleged in the complaint and
admitted by Respondent in its answer to the complaint. Respondent
denies only that it is subject to the Board's statutory jurisdiction for other
reasons. Cf Cincinnati .4slhtion fir the Blind, 244 NLRB No. 154
(1979); 235 NLRB 1448 (197T)
LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND OF HOUSTON 1369
professional employees, technical employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. The certification
On January 5, 1979, a majority of the employees
of Respondent in said unit, in a secret-ballot elec-
tion conducted under the supervision of the Re-
gional Director for Region 23 designated the
Union as their representative for the purpose of
collective bargaining with Respondent. The Union
was certified as the collective-bargaining represen-
tative of the employees in said unit on October 19,
1979, and the Union continues to be such exclusive
representative within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act.
B. The Unfair Labor Practices
Commencing on or about November 8, 1979, and
at all times thereafter, the Union has requested Re-
spondent to bargain collectively with it as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of all
the employees in the above-described unit. Com-
mencing on or about November 21, 1979, and con-
tinuing at all times thereafter to date, Respondent
has: (1) refused to recognize the Union as the ex-
clusive representative for collective bargaining of
all employees in said unit; (2) refused to bargain
with the Union over wages, hours, working condi-
tions, and conditions of employment; and (3) re-
fused the Union's request for the names, dates of
hire, job classifications, rates of pay, overtime
policy, insurance coverage, paid holidays, estab-
lished and/or posted work rules, and any other
benefits enjoyed by employees in the unit.
Accordingly, we find that Respondent has, since
November 21, 1979, and at all times thereafter, re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the ap-
propriate unit, and that, by such refusal, Respon-
dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with its oper-
ations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traf-
fic, and commerce among the several States and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we
shall order that it cease and desist therefrom, and,
upon request, bargain collectively with the Union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in
the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement. We shall also order that Respondent,
upon request, shall furnish to the Union the infor-
mation with respect to unit employees which it re-
quested by letter dated November 8, 1979.
In order to insure that the employees in the ap-
propriate unit will be accorded the services of their
selected bargaining agent for the period provided
by law, we shall construe the initial period of certi-
fication as beginning on the date Respondent com-
mences to bargain in good faith with the Union as
the recognized bargaining representative in the ap-
propriate unit. See Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc.,
136 NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Company d/b/a
Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328
F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817;
Burnett Construction Company, 149 NLRB 1419,
1421 (1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965).
The Board, upon the basis of the foregoing facts
and the entire record, makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local Union No. 968, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, War-
ehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees
employed by Respondent in the Industrial Division
workshop of its Houston, Texas, facility, excluding
all other employees, employees in workshop B,
office clerical employees, professional employees,
technical employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since October 19, 1979, the above-named
labor organization has been and now is the certified
and exclusive representative of all employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about November 21, 1979,
and at all times thereafter, to bargain collectively
1370 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with the above-named labor organization as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of all the employ-
ees of Respondent in the appropriate unit, Respon-
dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
6. By refusing on or about November 21, 1979,
and at all material times thereafter, to furnish rel-
evant wage and employment information concern-
ing said unit employees, Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
7. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respon-
dent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced,
and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing,
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby had en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, Texas, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment with General Drivers,
Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 968,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of its employees in the following appropriate
unit:
All production and maintenance employees
employed by the Respondent in the Industrial
Division workshop of its Houston, Texas, fa-
cility, excluding all other employees, employ-
ees in workshop B, clerical employees, profes-
sional employees, technical employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization by refusing to fur-
nish said labor organization with relevant wage and
employment information concerning unit employ-
ees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named
labor organization as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
(b) Upon request, bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization by furnishing it
with the following relevant wage and employment
information concerning unit employees: names of
employees in the bargaining unit and dates of hire;
classifications of employees in the unit (by name);
overtime policy (time and one-half after-hours,
weekly, double time, how distributed, etc.); rates of
pay of the employees in the bargaining unit (by
name); vacation policy; insurance coverage
(amount of employer's and employee's contribu-
tion, coverage of employee and dependents; also
copy of policy and/or booklet describing benefits);
a list of the paid holidays per year and hours paid
for such holidays; any established and/or posted
work rules or rules of conduct governing bargain-
ing unit employees; any other benefits that employ-
ees receive, such as bonuses, pension plans, and
profit sharing, including any descriptive informa-
tion relating to any of the benefits.
(c) Post at its Houston, Texas, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."' 4 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps have been taken to comply here-
with.
MEMBER PENELLO, dissenting:
For the reasons fully explicated in my dissenting
opinion in the underlying representation proceed-
ing at 244 NLRB No. 155 (1979), I would not
assert jurisdiction over the Respondent and would
14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
order of the National Labor Relations Board."
LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND OF HOUSTON 1371
therefore deny the General Counsel's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment
with General Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers Local Union No. 968, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the bargaining unit described
below.
WE WILI. NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with the above-named labor organization by
refusing to furnish it with the relevant wage
and employment information it has requested
with respect to the employees in the appropri-
ate unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union, as the exclusive represen-
tative of all employees in the bargaining unit
described below, with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees
employed by the Employer in the Industrial
Division workshop of its Houston, Texas, fa-
cility, excluding all other employees, em-
ployees in workshop B, office clerical em-
ployees, professional employees, technical
employees, guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with the above-named labor organization by
furnishing it with the following relevant infor-
mation it has requested concerning the unit
employees: names of employees in the bargain-
ing unit and dates of hire; classifications of em-
ployees in the unit (by name); overtime policy
(time and one-half after -- hours, weekly,
double time, how distributed, etc.); rates of
pay of the employees in the bargaining unit
(by name); vacation policy; insurance coverage
(amount of employer's and employee's contri-
bution, coverage of employee and dependents;
also copy of policy and/or booklet describing
benefits); a list of the paid holidays per year
and hours paid for such holidays; any estab-
lished and/or posted work rules or rules of
conduct governing bargaining unit employees;
any other benefits that employees receive,
such as bonuses, pension plans, profit sharing,
etc., including any descriptive information re-
lating to any of the benefits.
LIGHTHOUSE FOR THE BLIND OF
HOUSTON