Level 3 Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 3, 2020

2020000249 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/604,084 01/23/2015 Cecil Sunder 0476-US-U1 1049
83579 7590 11/03/2020
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
Attn: Patent Docketing
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield, CO 80021
EXAMINER
IQBAL, MUSTAFA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent.docketing@centurylink.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte CECIL SUNDER, OPHIR RAHMANI, and
JAMES MALE
____________

Appeal 2020-000249
Application 14/604,084
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JAMES P. CALVE, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and LEE L. STEPINA,
Administrative Patent Judges.

CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the final
rejection of claims 1–16. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Level 3 Communications, LLC, as the
Applicant and real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-000249
Application 14/604,084
2
THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention is task management computer software.
Spec. ¶¶ 2–3. Claim 14, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject
matter on appeal.
14. One or more tangible non-transitory computer-
readable storage media storing computer-executable
instructions for performing a computer process on a
computing system, the computer process comprising:
obtaining a plurality of orders using disparate
quoting systems;
receiving, from the disparate quoting systems,
milestone information corresponding to the plurality of
orders using at least one processor, the milestone
information including a plurality of tasks for each of the
plurality of orders and a start date, an end date, and a
status for each of the plurality of tasks;
correlating and normalizing the milestone
information from the disparate quoting systems into a
table of milestones for the plurality of orders using the
at least one processor, the table of milestones
identifying the start date, the end date, and the status for
each of the plurality of tasks; and
generating aggregated milestones from the table of
milestones using the at least one processor, the
aggregated milestones including aggregated orders and
milestone management information, the aggregated
orders detailing an amount of completed orders from the
plurality of orders and an amount of pending orders
from the plurality of orders, the milestone management
information detailing the plurality of tasks for each of
the orders.

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THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the
rejections:
NAME REFERENCE DATE
Dougherty US 2002/0169650 A1 Nov. 14, 2002
Olsen US 2009/0037241 A1 Feb. 5, 2009
Aboujaoude US 7,689,477 B1 Mar. 30, 2010
Mabari US 2012/0095798 A1 Apr. 19, 2012
Bishop US 2013/0231971 A1 Sept. 5, 2013
Taylor US 2016/0048794 A1 Feb. 18, 2016
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1–16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to a judicial exception to patentable subject matter.
2. Claims 1–6, 8–9, and 14–16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Mabari, Dougherty, and Olsen.
3. Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Mabari, Dougherty, and Taylor.
4. Claims 10 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Mabari, Dougherty, and Bishop.
5. Claims 12 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Mabari, Dougherty, and Aboujaoude.
OPINION
Patent Eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant argues claims 1–16 as a group. Appeal Br. 8–18. Claim 14
is representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the courts recognize certain judicial exceptions to Section 101,
namely: (1) laws of nature, (2) natural phenomena, and (3) abstract ideas.
Mayo Collaborative Svc. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–71
(2012).
The Supreme Court has set forth “a framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). According to the Supreme Court’s framework,
we must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those concepts. Id. If so, we must secondly “consider the elements of each
claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id.
Courts treat collecting information as well as analyzing information
by steps people go through in their minds as essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category. Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In situations where an
abstract idea is implemented on a computer, the first step in the Alice/Mayo
analysis asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in
computer capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an “abstract
idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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The Supreme Court characterizes the second step of the analysis as “a
search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 72–73). Where the claim is directed to an abstract idea that is
implemented on a computer, merely stating the abstract idea while adding
the words “apply it” is not enough to establish such an inventive concept.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223.
[I]f that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could
claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting
a computer system configured to implement the relevant
concept.
Id. at 224.
In conducting step one of the Alice framework, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human interactions such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (the “Guidelines”). In other words, under prong 1 of an
abstract idea analysis, we look to whether the claim recites an abstract idea.
Then, if it does, under prong 2, we look at the claim, as a whole, and
determine whether the claim is “directed to” the abstract idea or, instead, is
“directed to” a “practical application” of the abstract idea.
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Step 1, Prong 1
The Guidelines identify three key concepts as abstract ideas:
(a) mathematical concepts including “mathematical relationships, formulas,
equations, or calculations”;  (b) methods of organizing human activity, such
as “fundamental economic principles or practices,” “commercial or legal
interactions,” and “managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between”; and (c) mental processes including “observation,
evaluation, judgment, [and] opinion.”
With respect to the first step, the Examiner determines that the claims
are directed to an abstract idea. Final Action 7. According to the Examiner,
the steps are directed to an abstract idea in the form of: (1) mental
processes; and (2) a method of organizing human behavior. Ans. 4.
Appellant argues that the claims do not recite a judicial exception. Appeal
Br. 10. In particular, Appellant denies that the claims recite mental
processes, which Appellant alleges must be performed “in the human mind,”
whereas Appellant’s claims require computer implementation. Reply Br. 3.
There is little question here that claim 14 recites an abstract idea.
Appellant’s Specification explains that the invention relates to management
of tasks. Spec. ¶ 2. This concept, which is captured in the recitations of
claim 14, is considered to be a method of “managing personal behavior”
under the Guidelines. Appellant’s claim 14 also recites an abstract idea in
the form of a mental process. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems,
Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that courts treat
collecting information as well as analyzing information by steps people go
through in their minds as essentially mental processes within the abstract-
idea category).
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A method of organizing human activity is recognized by the courts as
an abstract idea. See In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litig., 823
F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (classifying and storing digital images is an
abstract idea as a method of organizing human activity); see also Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (tracking financial transactions to determine whether they exceed
a pre-set spending limit is an abstract idea as a method of organizing human
activity); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (screening messages is an abstract idea as a method of
organizing human activity); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (filtering internet
content is an abstract idea as a method of organizing human behavior).
“Information as such is an intangible,” hence abstract. Electric Power
Group., 830 F.3d at 1353–54. Consequently, claims focused on “collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis” are directed to an abstract idea. Id. The claims here relate to
managing and processing customer orders by collecting data, processing the
data, and displaying the results. Claims App. As such, the method recites
an abstract idea under the principles espoused in Electric Power Group.
Step 1, Prong 2
Under Prong 2 of Step 1 of the 2019 Guidelines, we do not assume
that such claims are directed to patent ineligible subject matter because “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) quoting Alice. Instead,
“the claims are considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their
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character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. 2019
Guidelines. If the claims are “directed to” an abstract idea, then the inquiry
proceeds to the second step of the Alice framework. Id.
Consequently, we consider whether the claimed task management
system includes additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application. A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a
practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception. Guidelines.
Here, Appellant argues that the claims integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application. Appeal Br. 11. According to Appellant: “The
claims are drawn toward specific improvements to the operation of a
computer such that new and beneficial features are possible, and/or to
specific improvements in systems that provide an improved computing
system for correlating and summarizing information from multiple disparate
systems.” Id. at 11–12. In response, the Examiner states that the claims are
not trying to solve a technical problem, but rather a business related one.
Ans. 4. In reply, Appellant points to passages in the Specification that
purportedly show “technical and user-interface” improvements. Reply Br. 4
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 24, 29].
Although automating tasks that humans are capable of performing
may be patent eligible if properly claimed (See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313),
we are not persuaded that Appellant has achieved something that may be
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properly characterized as a “practical application” under the Guidelines.
Here, Appellant’s invention is concerned with “milestone” information.
Spec. ¶ 5. The Specification describes a “milestone” as information
regarding tasks that must be performed to fill a customer order. Id.
Milestone information includes a start date, an end date, and a status for each
of a plurality of tasks. Id. Claim 14 recites the use of generic computer
equipment with memory that stores instructions to perform four functional
steps: (1) obtaining . . . orders, (2) receiving . . . information, (3) correlating
the information in a table format, and (4) generating aggregated information
from the table of information. Claims App. Thus, the invention collects,
processes, and presents information to keep track of progress on tasks. In
simple terms, it automates various aspects of performing a “to do” list. Such
is properly characterized as managing personal behavior. It is also properly
characterized as essentially a mental process. Appellant’s argument that it is
not a mental process, because it is performed by a computer is not
persuasive. Mankind has been organizing its behavior through the use of “to
do” lists for centuries prior to the advent of the computer (e.g., the Egyptians
building the pyramids). One can take a mental process or “pen and paper”
method and automate it by using a computer, but it, nevertheless remains a
mental process, abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One
Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental
processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was
precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson[, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)].”).
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The prospect that Appellant’s method uses a computerized “tool” does
not render the claims less abstract. An abstract idea does not become non-
abstract by limiting the invention to a particular technological environment.
Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (Merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular
existing technological environment does not render the claims any less
abstract); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (the fact a computer exists in the
physical realm is beside the point). Here, the focus of the instant claims is
not on improving a computer, but rather on a process for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
Appellant demonstrates a fundamentally incorrect understanding of
what it means for an idea to be integrated into a “practical” application. The
notion that implementation of Appellant’s method may result in more
efficient customer order processing and management does not render the
claim any less abstract. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that
performance by computer of operations that previously were performed
manually, albeit less efficiently, does not convert an abstract idea into
eligible subject matter).
To illustrate what is required for an invention to be “integrated” into a
“practical application,” we reversed an Examiner’s Section 101 rejection in
the case of Ex Parte Hladio, 2019 WL 2285538 (PTAB April 29, 2019). In
that case, the inventor used sensor and computer technology to improve a
surgical procedure that entailed navigation and alignment of a surgical tool
and a patient’s bone. Id. We noted that both the bone and the surgical tool
were physical real world tangible items. Id. We further noted that the
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invention was directed to improving the performance and outcome of the
surgical procedure as a result of improved bone-tool alignment. Id. We
reversed the Examiner in that case because, although the claims recited an
abstract idea, the idea was integrated into an application that was “practical.”
Id. In contrast, Appellant using a computer to organize task management
information falls short of the standard of “practical application” required by
our guidelines.
Step 2
Turning to step 2 of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we look more precisely
at what the claim elements add in terms of whether they identify an
“inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible matter to which the
claim is directed to. SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167
(Fed. Cir. 2018). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include
‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–78). Those “additional features” must be
more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 79.
Under step two of the Alice/Mayo framework, the Examiner
determines that Appellant’s order processing and management system,
considered both individually and in combination, does not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Action 7–11. Specifically,
the Examiner finds that the recited limitations:
[D]escribe the general concept of collecting data from orders,
analyzing the tasks or milestones associated with that order and
displaying certain task and milestone information regarding the
orders . . . . The claims do not include additional elements that
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are sufficient to amount to the significantly more than the
judicial exception claims.
Final Act. 8. The Examiner notes that claim 14 recites computer memory
that stores computer executable instructions for a performing a computer
process on a computer system but, nevertheless, finds that such elements
amount to no more than instructions to implement the idea on a computer
using computer functions that well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known in the industry. Id. at 8–9. The Examiner finds
that:
These additional elements amount to no more than mere
instructions to implement the idea on a computer and recitation
of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.
Id. at 9–10.
Appellant argues that the rejection falls short of examination
standards set forth in the “Berkheimer Memo.” 2 Appeal Br. 15–17.
Appellant further argues that the rejection fails to correctly recite the
“additional elements” of the claim that the Examiner relies on under Step 2
of the Alice analysis. Appeal Br. 16. According to Appellant, “[t]he Office
Action . . . identifies the ‘additional elements’ as solely as the recited
hardware elements, the preambles, and the outputting step.” Id.
With respect to the “additional elements” argument, the Examiner
points out, correctly, that the so-called “additional element” is the generic
computer equipment recited in the preamble of claim 14. Final Act. 8.

2 The “Berkheimer Memo” refers to a Memorandum from the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, entitled Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to
Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
(Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (Apr. 19, 2018).
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Appellant would have us include the recitations directed to the abstract idea
itself among the “additional elements.” The phrase “additional elements”
means what it says. They are elements of the claim that are in “addition to”
the recital of an abstract idea. Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, n. 24.
However, what Appellant points to now is just the abstract idea itself.
Appeal Br. 16. We may assume that the techniques claimed are
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,” but that is not enough for
eligibility. SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013)). Appellant’s
steps of obtaining, receiving, correlating, normalizing, and generating
merely tell a computer to “apply” the abstract idea of step 1. However, it
does not matter how innovative Appellant’s abstract idea is. Id. A claim for
a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant’s reliance on the Berkheimer Memo is of no avail.
Appellant’s Specification explains that its “user device” may be a personal
computer or a smartphone. Spec. ¶ 18. Appellant’s network 104 includes a
server that hosts a website. Id. ¶ 19. In the Appeal Brief, Appellant touts
the advantages of its “improved user-interface experience” (Appeal Br. 12),
however, claim 14 does not recite a user-interface at all, much less some
feature of a user-interface that purports to be an improvement over the prior
art. Claims App. Similarly, independent claim 1 mere recites “outputting
. . . in a tiered view for display on a user device.” Id. Appellant offers no
explanation as to how its user device and/or user interface transcends well-
understood, routine, conventional technology. The computer equipment and
its associated interconnections with a network and servers is described at a
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high level of generality that presumes familiarity on the part of the reader.
Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
There is no indication in the Specification that Appellant has achieved
an advancement or improvement in computer technology. See generally
Spec. Appellant merely uses a computer processor to implement the task
management software recited in the obtaining, receiving, correlating and
generating steps of claim 14. Claims App. claim 14. There is no indication
in the Specification that Appellant has achieved an advancement or
improvement in computer processing technology. See generally Spec.
There is similarly no indication in the Specification that Appellant has
achieved an advancement or improvement in display technology. Id.
Appellant is required to submit a specification that describes the
invention in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). For
purposes of the Alice/Mayo analysis, a specification demonstrates the well-
understood, routine, conventional nature of step 2 “additional elements”
when it describes them in a manner that indicates they are sufficiently well-
known that they need not be described with particularity to satisfy 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a).3 That is the case here. Given the dearth of teaching disclosure in
Appellant’s Disclosure regarding the structure of its computer equipment,
the Examiner’s findings of fact under Step 2 of the Alice analysis are fully in
accord with the Berkheimer Memo.
Essentially, all Appellant has done here is use generic computer
technology to assist people keep track of their “to do” list. This is
quintessentially “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis.” Electric Power Group., 830 F.3d

3 Berkheimer Memorandum.
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at 1353. Appellant’s method recites an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In short,
claim 14 is directed to an abstract idea that is implemented on a computer in
a manner that merely states the abstract idea while adding the words “apply
it.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223. This is not sufficient for patent eligibility.
Id.
We have considered Appellant’ remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, for the above reasons, the recited elements
of claim 14, considered individually and as an ordered combination, do not
constitute an “inventive concept” that transforms independent claim 1 into
patent-eligible subject matter. On this record, we affirm the Examiner’s
Section 101 rejection of all pending claims.
Unpatentability of Claims 1–16
over Combinations Based on Mabari and Dougherty
In view of our Decision to affirm the Examiner’s Section 101 ground
of rejection of all pending claims, we do not reach the Examiner’s prior art
grounds of rejection. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1) (The affirmance of the
rejection of a claim on any of the grounds specified constitutes a general
affirmance of the decision of the examiner on that claim, except as to any
ground specifically reversed).
Among other things, we elect not to undertake the Examiner’s art
rejection because we have serious reservations regarding the indefiniteness
of independent claims 1 and 14. “If no reasonably definite meaning can be
ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become
obvious–the claim becomes indefinite.” In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385
(CCPA 1970).
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Claims 1 and 14 contemplate obtaining “orders.” Claims App. It is
unclear what constitutes an “order.” An “order” suggests a transaction
between two parties, but it is unclear who the parties to the transaction are.
The claims contemplate “obtaining” an order. Id. In view of the fact that it
is unclear what constitutes an order and who the parties to an order are, it is
unclear what it means to “obtain” an order. The claims contemplate a
“quoting system.” Id. However, it is unclear what a quoting system is and
how it relates to obtaining an order. It is equally unclear just who it is that
avails themselves of the quoting system to create, place, or generate an
order. The quoting systems are “disparate.” Id. It is unclear what is
required to render a first quoting system disparate from a second quoting
system. The claim contemplates “receiving” information “from . . . the
quoting systems.” Id. However, it is unclear what the relationship is
between “obtaining” an order using a quoting system and “receiving”
information from the quoting system. For example, is the information that is
“received” already present in the order when it is “obtained?”
The Board enters a new ground of rejection at its discretion, and no
inference should be drawn from a failure to exercise that discretion. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b); see also MPEP § 1213.02. Here, in view of the fact that
we affirm the Examiner’s Section 101 ground of rejection of all pending
claims, we exercise our discretion to not enter a new ground of rejection on
the basis of indefiniteness under the particular facts and circumstances of
this case. Nevertheless, we provide the foregoing comments to assist
Appellant and the Examiner following completion of this appeal.

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CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
§ References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1-16 101 Unpatentable Subject Matter 1-16
1-6, 8,9,
14-16
103 Mabari, Dougherty, Olsen4
7 103 Mabari, Dougherty, Taylor5
10, 11 103 Mabari, Dougherty, Bishop6
12, 13 103 Mabari, Dougherty,
Aboujaoude7

Overall
Outcome
1-16
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

4 This ground of rejection is not reached. 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.