Level 3 Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 4, 2020

14456823 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/456,823 08/11/2014 Cecil Sunder 0466-US-U1 5224
83579 7590 08/04/2020
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
Attn: Patent Docketing
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield, CO 80021
EXAMINER
BYRD, UCHE SOWANDE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent.docketing@centurylink.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CECIL SUNDER, OPHIR RAHMANI, TARA RISSER, and
DERICK K. ZINES
Appeal 2019-005667
Application 14/456,823
Technology Center 3600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 5–16, 21, and 22. Claims 2–4, 17–
20, 23, and 24 are cancelled. A telephonic oral hearing took place on July 7,
2020, and a copy of the transcript will be placed in the file in due course.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Level 3
Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
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We affirm.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to systems and methods for quality order
tracking. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for increasing order quality comprising:
receiving an order for a product using at least one
computing device;
extracting information corresponding to critical order
attributes from the order using the at least one computing device,
the critical order attributes including technical data for
provisioning the product;
evaluating the information automatically using the at least
one computing device according to a set of critical-to-quality
rules relating at least to the technical data for provisioning the
product;
determining that the information is insufficient to meet the
set of critical-to-quality rules;
sending an electronic message to a separate computing
device, the electronic message including an electronic link to
permit correction of the information;
receiving a response to the electronic message;
extracting corrected information from the response using
the at least one computing device;
prior to releasing the order to provision the product,
validating the corrected information automatically using the at
least one computing device according to the set of critical-to-
quality rules; and
releasing, by the at least one computing device, the order
to provision the product only when the corrected information
satisfies the critical-to-quality rules.
Appeal Br. 23 (Claims Appendix).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Race US 8,548,842 B1 Oct. 1, 2013
Enright US 2006/0106473 A1 May 18, 2006
Heinze US 2007/0226211 A1 Sept. 27, 2007
Gibson US 2010/0113072 A1 May 6, 2010
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 5–16, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–6.
Claims 1, 5, 6, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Enright, Race, and Gibson. Final Act. 7–21.
Claims 7–16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Enright, Race, Gibson, and Heinze. Final Act. 21–28.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Standard for Patent Eligibility
In issues involving subject matter eligibility, our inquiry focuses on
whether the claims satisfy the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The Court
instructs us to “first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept,” id. at 218, and, in this case, the inquiry centers on
whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If the initial threshold is
met, we then move to the second step, in which we “consider the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
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patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). The Court
describes the second step as a search for “an ‘“inventive concept”’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The USPTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 consistent with Alice and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October 2019
Guidance Update”).
Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (referred to Step 2A, prong 1 in
the Guidance); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(referred to Step 2A, prong 2 in the Guidance).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then move to Step 2B of the Guidance. There, we look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions2
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more under the Guidance. Final Act. 3–6; Ans. 4–6.
Under Step 2A, prong 1, the Examiner determines claim 1 recites a judicial
exception. Ans. 4–5. The Examiner determines that the claims “are directed
towards . . . increasing order quality” (Final Act. 3), which the Examiner
characterizes as “methods related to commercial interactions relating
behaviors and business relations, as well as, managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people” (Ans. 5) under the Guidance.
Under Step 2A, prong 2, the Examiner determines the claims “are
comprised of generic computer elements to perform an existing business
process” (Ans. 5–6) and that the additional limitations “recite mere
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer and uses the
computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea without reciting any
improvements to a technology, technological process or computer-related
technology.” Ans. 6.

2 The Final Office Action was mailed prior to the Guidance. The Final
Office Action applied the case-law-based approach from previous eligibility
guidance in rejecting the claims under § 101. The Appeal Brief, Examiner’s
Answer and Reply Brief were filed subsequent to the issuance of the
Guidance. The Examiner’s Answer updated the rejection to incorporate the
procedure set forth in the Guidance, and we refer primarily to the arguments
as updated by those findings and conclusions in the Answer.
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Under Step 2B, the Examiner determines the additional claim
elements are well-understood, routine and conventional. Ans. 5 (citing
MPEP § 2106.05(d)). The Examiner finds “the claims . . . amount to
nothing more than requiring a generic computer system.” Ans. 5 (citing
Spec. ¶ 52).
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant presents several arguments for eligibility. Appellant first
argues “Appellant[] do[es] not concede that claim 1 is directed to organizing
human activity or any other judicial exception.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant
argues that “claim 1 is directed to ‘a specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities,’” and asserts the claim compares favorably to
Example 42 of the 2019 Guidance. Appeal Br. 12–13. Appellant further
asserts that the functions recited in claim 1 integrate any recited judicial
exception into a practical application because the claims “are directed to a
specific improvement in efficient managing and programming computer
systems to process and correct technical order information.” Reply Br. 3.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1
The Judicial Exception
Applying the Guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred
in determining that the claims recite a judicial exception to patent eligible
subject matter.3 The Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted
groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing
human activity such as fundamental economic practices and commercial

3 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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interactions (including . . . advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations), and (3) mental processes. We focus our
analysis on the second grouping—certain methods of organizing human
activity.4
We conclude the limitations of claim 1 recite a process of increasing
order quality by checking the accuracy of order information prior to
fulfilling the order, which is a commercial practice falling within the
category of certain methods of organizing human activity under the
Guidance. For example, claim 1 recites (1) “receiving . . . an order for a
product,” and (2) “extracting information from the order,” (3) “evaluating
the information,” (4) “determining that the information is insufficient,”
(5) “sending [a] . . . message . . . to permit correction of the information,”
(6) “receiving a response to the . . . message,” (7) “extracting corrected
information from the response,” (8) “prior to releasing the order . . .
validating the corrected information,” and (9) “releasing . . . the order to
provision the product.” Appeal Br. 23 (Claims Appendix). These
limitations all recite steps that would take place in connection with ordering
a product from a supplier.
For example, limitations (1)-(3) which generally recite receiving and
evaluating order information, are typical of any ordering process.

4 Appellant’s arguments against the § 101 rejection are made to the claims
generally. We treat claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(2018) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are
argued as a group or subgroup by Appellant, the Board may select a single
claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the
ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the
selected claim alone.”).
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Limitations (4)–(9), which recite identifying insufficient ordering
information, obtaining and verifying corrected information from the
customer, and fulfilling the customer order also are operations typical of
product ordering processes. We conclude the claimed process of increasing
order quality, as set forth in claim 1, recites a judicial exception of a
commercial interaction, which is a certain method of organizing human
activity under the Guidance . . . , and therefore recites a commercial
interaction of sales activity (a certain method of organizing human activity)
under the Guidance.5
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our
analysis under the Guidance turns now to determining whether claim 1
recites any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Under the Guidance, limitations that are indicative of “integration into
a practical application” include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);

5 Several of these limitations can also reasonably be characterized as a
mental processes because they could be performed by a person in their mind
with the aid of pen and paper. See October 2019 Guidance Update at 9 (“A
claim that encompasses a human performing the step(s) mentally with the
aid of a pen and paper recites a mental process”) (emphasis omitted).
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3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to
a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely include instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool
to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong 2”).
As shown above, most of the claim limitations in claim 1 recite
abstract ideas. Additional to those abstract limitations, claim 1 recites that
various steps are performed “using at least one computing device.” Appeal
Br. 23 (Claims Appendix). The mere recitation of a non-specific and
generic computer is insufficient to integrate the recited judicial exception
into a practical application. See MPEP 2106.05(f) (explaining that it is not
indicative of integration into a practical application where the claims
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“merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or
merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea”).
Claim 1 additionally recites (a) the extracted order information
includes “corresponding to critical order attributes . . . the critical order
attributes including technical data for provisioning the product,” (b) that the
information is evaluated “automatically . . . according to a set of critical-to-
quality rules relating to at least the technical data,” (c) determining that the
information is insufficient “to meet the set of critical-to-quality rules,” (d)
“sending an electronic message to a separate computing device, the
electronic message including an electronic link to permit correction of the
information,” (e) “receiving a response to the electronic message,” (f)
corrected information is validated “automatically . . . according to the set of
critical-to-quality rules,” and (g) that the order is released “only when the
corrected information satisfies the critical-to-quality rules.”
These limitations do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application because we do not discern in these limitations any improvements
to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical
field. MPEP § 2106.05(a). Limitation (a), which characterizes the specific
information extracted from the order, merely confines the judicial exception
to a specific environment and field of use. That is, the limitation specifies
the type of order information that is extracted, but it does so in the context of
implementing the abstract process of improving order quality. Generally
linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment or field of use, however, is not indicative of integration into a
practical application. MPEP § 2106.05(h). Limitations (b) and (c), which
recite that an evaluation and determination of insufficiency of the extracted
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data is performed “automatically” and according to “a set of critical-to-
quality rules,” similarly confine the judicial exception a particular
environment or field of use. Although the evaluation is performed
“automatically,” and according to “a set of critical-to-quality rules” there is
no significant disclosure regarding how the evaluation occurs or how those
rules are defined. See Spec. ¶ 37 (“An operation 210 automatically validates
the information in the order relating to the critical attributes using the
critical-to-quality rules. In one implementation, the critical-to-quality rules
include one or more pass/fall rules.”); see also Spec., Fig. 2. These
limitations also can be reasonably characterized as extra-solution activity,
insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. MPEP
§ 2106.05(f) (identifying “[s]electing a particular data source or type of
data” as an example of extra-solution activity) (emphasis omitted).
Limitations (d) and (e), which recite sending a notification message that the
order information is insufficient and then receiving a response, do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because they also
are extra-solution activity. Specifically, they recite data gathering operations
which are used to carry out the order improvement process. MPEP
§ 2106.05(g) (“An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering
data for use in a claimed process.”). Limitation (f), which recites that the
corrected information is validated “automatically,” and according to the
“critical-to-quality rules,” is also both a field of use (MPEP § 2106.05(h))
and extra-solution activity (MPEP § 2106.05(g)) for the same reasons as
limitations (b) and (c) above. Limitation (g), which recites that the order is
released “only when the corrected information satisfies the critical-to-quality
rules,” is also a field of use limitation because it merely confines the
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fulfillment of the customer order (the judicial exception) to a specific
scenario—when the corrected information is satisfactory.
As we noted above, Appellant argues that “claim 1 is directed to ‘a
specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities,’” and asserts the
claim compares favorably to Example 42 of the 2019 Guidance. Appeal Br.
12–13. We disagree. Example 426 describes a scenario in which a claim
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application because “the
additional elements recite a specific improvement . . . by allowing remote
users to share information in real time in a standardized format regardless of
the format in which the information was input.” Thus, the integration of the
judicial exception was based on a technical improvement to how information
could be standardized when input in a non-standardized way. Claim 1
provides no similar improvement to how data is stored, converted, or output.
Rather, the process recited in claim 1 merely invokes a computer as a tool
for carrying out the process of increasing order quality by checking ordering
information for errors.
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that the
functions recited in claim 1 integrate any recited judicial exception into a
practical application because the claims “are directed to a specific
improvement in efficient managing and programming computer systems to
process and correct technical order information.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant
does not explain how the claimed process improves how the computer

6 We note the Guidance states that “[t]he examples below are hypothetical
and only intended to be illustrative of the claim analysis under the 2019
PEG.”
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operates, as opposed to improving the business process of ensuring accurate
order information.
In sum, whether viewed individually or as an ordered combination,
the additional elements recited in claim 1 focus on improving the accuracy
of order information to ensure delivery of an accurately configured product.
Thus, purported improvement identified by Appellant is not to efficient
managing and programming computer systems, but instead to order
improvement, and, therefore, is not an improvement to technology. The
recited process, at best, affects an improvement to the abstract idea itself. It
is well-established, however, that improvements in the abstract idea are
insufficient to confer eligibility on an otherwise ineligible claim. SAP Am.
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We conclude
claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception under step 2A, prong 2, of the
Guidance.
The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Having determined the claim is directed to a judicial exception, we
proceed to evaluating whether claim 1 adds a specific limitation beyond the
judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 56.
Our review of the Examiner’s rejection under Step 2B is guided by the
Berkheimer Memorandum, which sets forth what fact finding requirements
are applicable to rejections under § 101. Consistent with the Berkheimer
Memorandum, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not add
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specific limitations beyond what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Our analysis focuses largely on the same limitations addressed in
Step 2A, prong 2, above. The Examiner finds that the additional limitations
are generic computer components and the remaining limitations are recited a
high level of generality. Final Act. 4–5 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)(ii)). We
agree.
We first note that Appellant does not contest the Examiner’s findings
and analysis under Step 2B. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 14 (concluding section
101 arguments at Step 2A, prong 2), Reply Br. 3 (same). Moreover,
consistent with the Berkheimer Memorandum, the Examiner cited MPEP
§ 2106.05(d) as evidence of the well-understood, routine, and conventional
nature of the additional limitations.
Because the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception, and because Appellant does not identify any error in the
Examiner’s determination under step 2B of the Guidance, we sustain the
rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as well as of the
remaining claims.
REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings
of Enright, Race, and Gibson.7 Relevant here, the Examiner finds that
Enright teaches a method of improving order quality including extracting
and evaluating order information to determine that the order information is

7 Appellant argues the rejections under § 103 as a group, with claim 1 being
representative. Our decision with respect to claim 1, therefore, is dispositive
as to the remaining claims.
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insufficient to meet a set of critical-to-quality rules, and correcting the order
information. Final Act. 7–8. The Examiner further finds that Race generally
teaches validating order information, and releasing a product only when the
information has been automatically validated according to the critical-to-
quality rules. Final Act. 8–13. The Examiner finds that Enright and Race do
not teach sending an electronic message with a link to permit correction of
order information, but that Gibson teaches receiving and responding to text
messages in order to permit updating an order. Final Act. 13–15.
Appellant presents several arguments against the rejection, which we
address in turn. First, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding
Enright teaches “extracting information corresponding to critical order
attributes from the order using the at least one computing device, the critical
order attributes including technical data for provisioning the product.”
Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 4–5. Second, Appellant argues the Examiner
erred in finding the Race and Enright collectively teach “releasing, by the at
least one computing device, the order to provision the product only when the
corrected information satisfies the critical-to-quality rules.” Appeal Br. 16–
17, Reply Br. 7–8. Third, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding
Gibson and Enright teach “sending an electronic message to a separate
computing device, the electronic message including an electronic link to
permit correction of the information.” Id.
Appellant’s first argument is not persuasive because, as the Examiner
explains,
Enright describes extracting information, which contains
information that consist of attribute data, which is processed for
vendors that is used in ordering; Enright at 0360 discloses
processing information base on its attributes. The definition of
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provisioning is the action of providing or supplying something
for use, which is what Enright is disclosing that attribute data is
being processed for uses by the vendors which coincides with the
Applicant's spec[ification] at 0023, "critical order attributes
necessary to complete the order may be missing or inadequate."
Regarding, "technical data for provisioning the product",
Enright at 0315 teaches the XML data is used for order
processing. XML Data is technical data which is used in the MES
Backbone system for creating products for order. (Enright at
0009, 0121, and 0210). Therefore, Enright teaches technical data
for provisioning the product.
Ans. 7. Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the broad scope of
the argued limitation.
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s second argument that the
prior art fails to teach “releasing, by the at least one computing device, the
order to provision the product only when the corrected information satisfies
the critical-to-quality rules.” Appellant asserts that Race cannot teach this
limitation because it does not deal with “corrected information.” However,
the Examiner relies on Enright, and not Race as providing the recited
“corrected information.” Thus, Appellant argues the references separately,
when the rejection is based on their combined teachings.
Appellant’s third argument is not persuasive for similar reasons.
Appellant argues that Gibson is deficient because it does not teach any
corrected information. However, as the Examiner explains:
Enright at 0105, 0209 teaches corrected information for
ordering and Enright at 0006, 0163, 0201 quality and quality
control. Then, Gibson at 0108, 0147–0150, 0159 describes
receiving and responding to text messages of several devices for
permitting the updating of an order. Gibson, also teaches
extracting data in response to the user's interaction with the link
in the message so that the order update can be executed.
Therefore Enright in view of Gibson teaches this limitation and
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it would have been obvious to combine the ordering of Enright
with the communication of quality control and corrected
information of Gibson.
Ans. 10.
Because we do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive of
Examiner error, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections.
More specifically,
We affirm the rejection of claims 1, 5–16, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
We affirm the rejection of claims 1, 5, 6, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Enright, Race, and Gibson.
We affirm the rejection of claims 7–16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Enright, Race, Gibson, and Heinze.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5–16, 21,
22
101 Eligibility 1, 5–16, 21,
22

1, 5, 6, 21,
22
103 Enright, Race,
Gibson
1, 5, 6, 21,
22

7–16 103 Enright, Race,
Gibson, Heinze
7–16
Overall
Outcome
1, 5–16, 21,
22

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED