LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 27, 2020

14319736 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/319,736 06/30/2014 James Male 0484-US-01 5626
83579 7590 02/27/2020
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
Attn: Patent Docketing
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield, CO 80021
EXAMINER
HOULIHAN, STEPHEN J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2451
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent.docketing@level3.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES MALE, CECIL SUNDER, PAUL J. YELTON, and
JENNIFER L. MOSES
Appeal 2018-003830
Application 14/319,736
Technology Center 2400

Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.

RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 10, 11, and 15–18. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).2
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “[A]pplicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Level 3
Communications, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
2 We conducted an oral hearing on January 27, 2020. A transcript of the oral
hearing (“Tr.”) has been entered into the record.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to systems and methods for investigating,
tracking, preventing, and providing accountability for telecommunication
network outages, particularly human error outages. See Spec., Abstr. Claim
10, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
10. One or more non-transitory tangible computer-readable
storage media storing computer-executable instructions for
performing a computer process on a computing system, the
computer process comprising:
receiving a plurality of tickets, each of the tickets
including an assigned team for investigating a network outage,
the assigned team selected from a plurality of teams;
storing the tickets in one or more databases;
tracking a status of each of the tickets, the status
designated based on a responsibility of the assigned team for
causing the network outage;
generating consolidated analytics based on the tracked
statuses of the tickets; and
outputting the consolidated analytics,
wherein the status is designated validated upon the
assigned team confirming responsibility for causing the
network outage,
wherein the consolidated analytics includes:
a correlation of the tracked statuses that are
designated new with at least one of the teams; and
a correlation of the tracked statuses that are
designated validated with at least one of: one or more
root causes, and one or more preventative measures.
REJECTIONS
Claims 10, 11, and 15–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 3.
Claims 10, 11, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Caicedo (US 2015/0046578 A1, Feb. 12, 2015), Swenson
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(US 5,490,097, Feb. 6, 1996), and Black (US 2008/0155327 A1, June 26,
2008). Id. at 5.
Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Caicedo, Swanson, Black, and Adams (US 2006/0233310 A1, Oct. 19,
2006). Id. at 9.
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Caicedo, Swanson, Black, and Jabbarnezhad (US 5,930,333, July 27,
1999). Id. at 10.
Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Caicedo, Swanson, Black, Adams, and Daffin (US 5,893,906, Apr. 13,
1999). Id. at 11.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See id.

Rejections under § 101
I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described
in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed
to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972)).
Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical
processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an
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abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
After the docketing of this Appeal, the USPTO published revised
guidance on the application of § 101 (“Guidance”). See, e.g., USPTO, 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Revised Guidance”); USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Update”), 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019)
(notice).
Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice,
or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

II. New Arguments in the Oral Hearing Related to Office Guidance
During the hearing, Appellant raised new arguments based on the
Guidance and the Office’s “Berkheimer Memorandum” (Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (April 19,
2018)). E.g., Tr. 11:18–12:3. Appellant contended that (1) Appellant could
raise these arguments at the hearing because the Guidance and Berkheimer
Memorandum issued after Appellant filed its Reply Brief, or in the
alternative, that (2) we should remand the case to the Examiner for further
fact-finding. Id. at 9:20–10:1 (“[A]t a minimum, we can offer how this fits
into th[ose] standards as well. . . . [T]his case, at minimum, should be
remanded back to the Examiner for additional fact-finding consistent with
that new Guidance and consistent with Berkheimer and other standards that
have been set forth during that time.”). Before analyzing the merits of the
Examiner’s § 101 rejection, we address these two preliminary issues.
First, we agree that Appellant permissibly raised new arguments under
the Guidance and Berkheimer Memorandum at the hearing. “[A]rguments
not presented in the briefs and made for the first time at the oral hearing are
not normally entitled to consideration.” MPEP § 1205.02 (citing In re
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Chiddix, 209 USPQ 78 (Comm’r Pat. 1980)).3 Nonetheless, during the oral
hearing, “[u]pon a showing of good cause, appellant . . . may rely on a new
argument based upon a recent relevant decision of either the Board or a
Federal Court.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.47(e)(2) (2017). Although the Guidance and
Berkheimer Memorandum were issued by the Office, not the Board, we
nevertheless determine that Appellant has shown good cause for raising
these new arguments in this case, as both issued after Appellant filed its
Reply Brief. See id. § 41.1(b) (“The provisions of Part 41 shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding
before the Board.”); see also Update, 17 (“As with any rejection, every
applicant whose claims have been twice rejected, may appeal from the
decision of the examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and an
applicant may rely upon the 2019 PEG [Guidance] in support of his or her
argument that a rejection under § 101 is in error.” (emphasis added)).
However, we reject Appellant’s proposal that we must remand this
case to the Examiner for further fact-finding. See Tr. 12:5–11. The Office’s
authority to remand a case from the Board to the Examiner arises from at

3 The MPEP further states, “[t]his sentence is not intended to preclude the
filing of a supplemental brief or document if new authority should become
available or relevant after the brief or reply brief was filed. An example of
such circumstances would be where a pertinent decision of a court or other
tribunal was not published until after the brief or reply brief was filed.”
MPEP § 1205.02. Although Appellant did not file a supplemental brief, we
do not read MPEP § 1205.02 as requiring Appellant to file a supplemental
brief in order to present a new argument at the hearing. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.47(e)(2). On the other hand, Appellant’s decision not to avail itself of
an available mechanism to present new arguments—filing a supplemental
brief—cuts against Appellant’s argument that the Office should expend
additional resources analyzing these issues on remand.
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least the following rules. First, 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1) provides, “[t]he
Board may also remand an application to the examiner.” Second, 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.35(c) provides, “[p]rior to the entry of a decision on the appeal by the
Board (see §41.50), the Director may sua sponte order the proceeding
remanded to the examiner.” These rules specify that the Board and the
Director “may” remand the case to the Examiner, which indicates that the
Board and the Director retain discretion to remand.
Appellant points us to no authority requiring us to remand in this
instance, i.e., “for additional fact-finding consistent with that new Guidance
and consistent with Berkheimer and other standards that have been set forth
during that time.” See Tr. 9:25–10:1. Nor are we aware of any; for
example, neither rule quoted above applies any such restriction. In fact, the
MPEP describes an analogous situation and states, “[f]or example, the
Director may remand a case for consideration of a new ground of rejection
. . . where there has been a change in the law.” MPEP § 1211 (emphasis
added). But in this example, the Director (or the Board) “may remand” and
is not required to remand. As Appellant presents no compelling reason for
us to remand in this case, we decline to do so.4

4 We note that several Board decisions have applied the Guidance and/or
Berkheimer Memorandum in appeals docketed prior to the Guidance or
Berkheimer Memorandum. See, e.g., Ex parte Hannun, Appeal No. 2018-
003323 (PTAB Apr. 1, 2019) (informative); Ex parte Smith, Appeal No.
2017-000064 (PTAB Feb. 1, 2019) (informative); Ex parte Olson, Appeal
No. 2017-006489 (PTAB Mar. 25, 2019) (informative); Ex parte Kimizuka,
Appeal No. 2018-001081 (PTAB May 15, 2019) (informative); Ex parte
Savescu, Appeal No. 2018-003174 (PTAB Apr. 1, 2019) (informative); Ex
parte Fautz, Appeal No. 2019-000106 (PTAB May 15, 2019) (informative).

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III. Step 2A, Prong One (Judicial Exception)
The Examiner determines that claim 105 is directed to the abstract
idea of “using categories to organize, store and transmit information.” Final
Act. 4. We agree with the Examiner that claim 10 recites an abstract idea,
namely, a mental process.
We determine that claim 10 recites a mental process because claim 10
broadly recites receiving tickets, tracking their status, and generating and
outputting analytics. Specifically, claim 10 recites (1) “receiving a plurality
of tickets, each of the tickets including an assigned team for investigating a
network outage, the assigned team selected from a plurality of teams,” (2)
“tracking a status of each of the tickets, the status designated based on a
responsibility of the assigned team for causing the network outage,” (3)
“generating consolidated analytics based on the tracked statuses of the
tickets,” (4) “outputting the consolidated analytics,” (5) “wherein the status
is designated validated upon the assigned team confirming responsibility for
causing the network outage,” and (6) “wherein the consolidated analytics
includes: a correlation of the tracked statuses that are designated new with at
least one of the teams; and a correlation of the tracked statuses that are
designated validated with at least one of: one or more root causes, and one or
more preventative measures.”
As drafted, these limitations, under their broadest reasonable
interpretation, recite a mental process that can be performed in the human

5 Appellant argues claims 10, 11, and 15–18 as a group. See Appeal Br. 8–
16. We select independent claim 10 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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mind or using a pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a
claim whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human
using a pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental process). In
this case, these limitations encompass acts people can perform using their
minds or pen and paper because a user can (1) visually review tickets
received (see Spec. ¶ 4, “[a] notification of the ticket is provided to the
responsible team.”), (2) track the status of the tickets by visually observing
their status (see id. ¶ 62, “analytics user interface 1600 may be used . . . to
track any changes”), (3) generate consolidated analytics by mentally
performing the correlations of tracked statuses (such as “correlat[ing] . . . the
tracked statuses with . . . one or more of the teams [and] one or more root
causes,” id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added)), (4) output the consolidated analytics by
writing them down on paper, and (5) think about designating the status as
validated upon the assigned team confirming responsibility.
Although the claim nominally requires these steps to be performed by
a computer process,6 a computer implementation of a mental process is
insufficient to take the invention out of the realm of abstract ideas. See
Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via
pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an
abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’” is
insufficient to confer eligibility.).

6 As recited in the preamble. We take no position as to whether the claim
preamble is limiting.
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During the hearing, we asked Appellant to address whether the claims
recite “mental processes.” Tr. 15:2–13. In response, Appellant contended as
follows:
For [a] mental process, this doesn’t seem like something
that actually can be performed in the human [mind]. You see a
distributive network here where you’re tracking statuses of all
these pieces, receiving validation, storing them in databases.
To me, this doesn’t seem like something that can be practically
performed in the human mind. Particularly, with the
transmission element outputting these pieces and putting
together these different consolidated analytics.
. . . .
But I think one of the concepts under mental processes,
even with the pen and paper concept, is it has to be something
that would be practically performed, as I best understand that
category, within the human mind or with pen and paper.
And in this case, I just don’t think that’s a practical
possibility for the average human to be able to store all that
information, consolidate it, have the analytics in ones’ mind,
and then be able to put that out in pen and paper.
Tr. 12:21–13:2, 14:23–15:6 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Appellant’s first argument,
that the claim cannot be performed in the human mind because there is a
“distributive network here,” is unsupported by the claim. See id. Claim 10
merely recites, in the preamble, “performing a computer process on a
computing system,” not a distributive network. Appellant also emphasizes
“the transmission element outputting these pieces and putting together these
different consolidated analytics” and that the “average human [would not] be
able to store all that information, consolidate it, have the analytics in ones’
mind, and then be able to put that out in pen and paper.” Id. Claim 10 does
not recite a “transmission element.” And the Specification explains that “the
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consolidated analytics includes a correlation of the tracked statuses with
various attributes, including . . . one or more of the teams [and] one or more
root causes.” Spec. ¶ 43 (emphasis added); see Tr. 15:10–12 (identifying
paragraphs 42 and 43 of the Specification as supporting Appellant’s
interpretation of “consolidated analytics”). We consider that the human
mind can generate consolidated analytics by correlating the claimed “tracked
statuses that are designated validated with at least . . . one or more root
causes” and output this correlation on paper. Similarly, a human can
generate consolidated analytics by correlating the claimed “tracked statuses
that are designated new with at least one of the teams” and output this
correlation on paper.
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we determine that claim
10 recites a mental process, and thus, an abstract idea. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

IV. Step 2A, Prong 2 (Integration into a Practical Application)
Under the Guidance, we now must determine if additional elements in
the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application
(see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).7
We discern no additional element (or combination of elements)
recited in Appellant’s representative claim 1 that integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.

7 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong 2 may
be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Guidance). For purposes
of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them
under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27–32.
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at 54–55 (“Prong 2”). For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements
(e.g., “storing the tickets in one or more databases”) do not: (1) improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any
particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Instead, these limitations
merely serve to narrow the recited abstract idea using a generic computing
device, which cannot impart patent-eligibility. See Spec. ¶ 67 (“The
computer system 2000 may be a general computing system[.] . . . The
computer system 2000 may be a conventional computer.”); Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that
a general-purpose processor that merely executes the judicial exception is
not a particular machine).
Appellant’s arguments focus on limitations that we determine are part
of the judicial exception as discussed above; thus, these limitations are not
“additional elements” that can impart patent eligibility to the claim. See,
e.g., Appeal Br. 10–16; see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24
(“USPTO guidance uses the term ‘additional elements’ to refer to claim
features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the
identified judicial exception.”).
Even assuming these limitations could be considered additional
elements, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. For
example, Appellant contends the claims are analogous to the claims in
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McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016), in that they are directed to “solving a technical problem related to
investigating, tracking, preventing, and providing accountability for
telecommunication network outages, particularly human error outages.”
Appeal Br. 11 (internal quotation omitted).
In McRO, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim, when
considered as a whole, was directed to a “technological improvement over
the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques” through the “use[ of]
limited rules . . . specifically designed to achieve an improved technological
result in conventional industry practice.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Specifically, the
Federal Circuit found that the claimed rules allow computers to produce
accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated
characters that previously could only be produced by human animators, and
the rules were limiting because they define morph weight sets as a function
of phoneme sub-sequences. Id. at 1313.
We find no evidence of record here to support the argument that the
present situation is like the one in McRO, where computers were unable to
make certain subjective determinations, i.e., regarding morph weight and
phoneme timings, which could only be made prior to the claimed invention
by human animators. Although investigating, tracking, preventing, and
providing accountability for telecommunication network outages may
improve a mental concept, it does not achieve an improved technological
result.
Appellant also contends that the claims represent “a specific, discrete
implementation” as in BASCOM. Appeal Br. 14 (citing BASCOM Glob.
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Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Specifically, Appellant contends the claims recite “a particular set of ordered
actions to improve the network outage tracking functionality of the
described system.” Id. But at most, claim 10 recites a particular ordered set
of mental actions. No matter how many mental actions or how ordered they
are, mental actions cannot confer eligibility.
Appellant also relies on Amdocs, stating that “[e]ven a cursory
comparison between claim 1 in Amdocs and the present claim 10” indicates
the patent-eligibility of claim 10. Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Amdocs (Israel)
Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). This
argument is conclusory and, hence, unpersuasive. Similarly, Appellant
makes a conclusory argument that the present claims are analogous to those
in DDR Holdings, which is also unpersuasive. See id. at 16 (citing DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Accordingly, we determine that claim 10 does not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application and, therefore, is directed to
the recited abstract idea (e.g., mathematical concepts).

V. Step 2B (Inventive Concept)
Because we find that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
next consider whether the claims include additional limitations, such that the
claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.
The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the additional elements are
well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Final Act. 4.
Specifically, the Examiner finds, “[t]he database and server are recited at a
high level of generality and are recited as performing generic computer
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functions routinely used in computer applications. Generic computer
components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well
understood, routine and conventional activities.” Id.
As we explained above, the additional limitations, individually and as
an ordered combination, merely narrow the recited abstract ideas using
generic computer components. See Spec. ¶ 67. Accordingly, we find that
there are no additional limitations that cause the claims to amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea.
During the hearing, we asked Appellant to address the Berkheimer
Memorandum, and specifically, the Examiner’s finding that the claimed
processor and computer readable storage media recite computer functions
that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Tr. 15:20–16:7. In
particular, we pointed Appellant to paragraph 67 of the Specification and
asked Appellant if this paragraph’s description of a “general computing
system capable of executing the program to do the processes recited” is
“sufficient evidence to support the Examiner’s finding.” Id. Appellant
conceded: “I think as to [a] basic finding as to whether a processor and
memory can be the same processor and memory that could be used in a
generic computer, yes.” Id. at 16:8–10.
Then Appellant asserted the claims discuss “very specific computer
hardware components that are recited even in the preamble of the claims.”
Id. at 16:14–16. Claim 10’s preamble, however, merely recites “[o]ne or
more non-transitory tangible computer-readable storage media storing
computer-executable instructions for performing a computer process on a
computing system.” Setting aside whether the preamble is limiting (which
we do not decide), the only hardware recited in the preamble are storage
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media and a processor, hardly “very specific computer hardware
components.” See id. Rather, these components recite precisely the sort of
“general computing system” described in the Specification, which Appellant
agrees provides evidence for the Examiner’s “well-understood, routine, and
conventional” finding. See id. at 16:8–10 (“I think as to [a] basic finding as
to whether a processor and memory can be the same processor and memory
that could be used in a generic computer, yes.”); Berkheimer
Memorandum, 3 (“A citation to an express statement in the specification or
to a statement made by an applicant during prosecution [can] demonstrate[]
the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional
element(s)” (emphasis added)).
Thus, we determine no element or combination of elements recited in
claim 10 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly
more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application.
Because Appellant’s independent claim 10 is directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract concept, does not include additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and does not
recite significantly more than the abstract idea to which the claim is directed,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 10, 11, and 15–18, which
Appellant argues as a group, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter in light of Alice, its progeny, and the Guidance. See
supra n.2.

Rejections under § 103
Appellant contends that the combination of Caicedo, Swenson, and
Black fail to teach or suggest “wherein the status is designated validated
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18
upon the assigned team confirming responsibility for causing the network
outage,” as recited in claim 10. Appeal Br. 16–20; Reply Br. 3–5.
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds that Black’s “network
administrator confirms and identifies the root cause responsible for the
network outage.” Final Act. 8 (citing Black, Fig. 7, ¶¶ 21, 50–53).
Appellant contends that Black is directed to monitoring network
health, where the functional health of a network device is checked. Appeal
Br. 18 (citing Black ¶ 49). According to Appellant, if Black’s functional
health check is unsatisfactory, “an inference is drawn that the root cause is
associated with the suboptimal network health of the network device.” Id.
(citing Black ¶ 50). Appellant, therefore, contends,
Black does not teach that a team (or even a network manage-
ment entity) confirms responsibility for causing the suboptimal
network health of a network device. As such, there is similarly
no teaching that the status of a ticket tracking the suboptimal
network health is designated as validated upon such confirma-
tion by the team. Instead, Black merely teaches a network
management entity must rely on an inference that is neither
substantiated nor validated by the network management entity.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
The Examiner’s Answer does not appear to directly respond to
Appellant’s arguments. See Ans. 4. Instead, the Examiner finds:
The assigned network administrator(s) confirms and identifies
the root cause responsible for the network outage such as
whether an outage is caused by the network service being
offline (i.e. “down”) or whether the outage is due to network
attachment device such as a server attached to the network
being responsible for the outage).
Id. (citing Black, Fig. 7, ¶¶ 7, 21, 50–53).
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19
We disagree with the Examiner because nothing in the passages of
Black cited by the Examiner teaches or suggests that a “status is designated
validated upon the assigned team confirming responsibility for causing the
network outage.” Black teaches that “an inference is drawn wherein the root
cause associated with the other than optimal real-time network health
condition is identified as related to (e.g., rooted in) the network devices
having the other than satisfactory functional health check results.” Black
¶ 50. That is, Black merely discloses drawing an inference that a root cause
is related to a particular network device. We, therefore, agree with
Appellant that “Black merely teaches a network management entity must
rely on an inference that is neither substantiated nor validated by the
network management entity.” Appeal Br. 19.
We note the Examiner has not relied on any of the other cited
references to teach this element. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 and its corresponding dependent claims.
We do not reach Appellant’s further allegations of error because we find the
issue discussed above to be dispositive of the obviousness rejection of all the
pending claims.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
10, 11, 15–18 101 Eligibility 10, 11,
15–18

10, 11, 18 103 Caicedo, Swenson,
Black
10, 11, 18
15 103 Caicedo, Swanson,
Black, Adams
15
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20
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
17 103 Caicedo, Swanson,
Black, Jabbarnezhad
17
16 103 Caicedo, Swanson,
Black, Adams, Daffin
16
Overall
Outcome
10, 11,
15–18

Since at least one rejection encompassing all claims on appeal is
affirmed, the decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED