0120061783
05-01-2007
Leron Williams, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Leron Williams,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01200617831
Hearing No. 310A50043X
Agency No. 4G760006704
DECISION
On January 19, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's
December 15, 2005, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �
2000e et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether complainant was discriminated against on the basis of his race
(African American), when on December 10, 2003, he was issued a notice
of removal effective January 3, 2004.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked
as a City Letter Carrier at the agency's Euless Post Office facility
in Euless, Texas. On November 18, 2003, he approached his supervisor
(supervisor-1)(Hispanic) to dispute the time that the supervisor had
allowed him to cover his route that day. The conversation became loud
and attracted the attention of a union steward (Caucasian) and another
supervisor (supervisor-2)(Ocean Pacific Islander). The union steward
told supervisor-2 that the matter was under control. When supervisor-2
returned, he heard supervisor-1 ask complainant why he had "bumped
him." Witnesses indicated that complainant reacted aggressively and got
into a boxing stance with his fist pointed toward supervisor-1's face
and indicated that if he bumped him he would know. Complainant continued
yelling at supervisor-1; therefore, supevisor-2 stepped in between them.
Complainant was ultimately sent to the office. After a discussion
with supervisor-2, complainant returned to the floor. He then sought
out supervisor-1 and continued yelling at him and called him "stupid."
Complainant then went to make his deliveries. Later, he was given a
notice of suspension six hours later and; subsequently, he was issued
a notice of removal. Complainant filed the EEO complaint regarding the
matter on March 25, 2004.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on November 18, 2005
and issued a decision on December 12, 2005. The agency issued a final
order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that
he was subjected to discrimination as alleged. Specifically, the AJ
indicated that it was complainant's burden to either identify employees
outside of his protected category who engaged in similar conduct or to
identify other evidence that created an inference of discrimination.
As comparative evidence, complainant indicated that a fellow employee
(White) was often loud with management and coworkers. Complainant
maintained that this employee had never been issued a notice of removal.
The AJ found that this coworker was not similarly situated as there was
no evidence that supervisor-2 was involved and more importantly, there
was no evidence that the employee's behavior, unlike complainant's,
went beyond words and had become physically threatening.
Complainant also argued that minorities were more harshly disciplined.
The AJ found that the agency had persuasively argued that these
instances were not described to the point where a prima facie case could
be established. The AJ did find, however, that complainant had raised
an inference of race discrimination regarding supevisor-2's use of the
words "brothers" and "jive." Notwithstanding, the AJ found that even
if complainant established a prima facie case of race discrimination,
the agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions, namely that complainant was issued the notice of
removal because he had engaged in aggressive behavior and had bumped
and intimated supervisor-1. The AJ found that complainant failed to
show that the agency's reason was pretext for discrimination. The AJ
also noted that it was significant that complainant had been an amateur
boxer and that his behavior during the confrontation was consistent with
bobbing and weaving.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, complainant contends that management made inconsistent
statements about the event regarding whether supervisor-1 felt physically
threatened. Complainant also contends that there was prolific evidence
presented at the hearing regarding the disparate treatment of minorities
in the office. He maintains that black employees are disciplined more
harshly than white employees. Complainant believes the AJ erred when
he did not fully consider testimony regarding these facts.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's
credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the
tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other
objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so
lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.
See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant
must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He
must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances
that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be
dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated
legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request
No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation
is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on
appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that
complainant failed to show that the agency's legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for issuing him a notice of removal was pretext for discrimination.
The record clearly shows that complainant bumped and physically threatened
a supervisor. Further, regarding complainant's contentions on appeal, we
find that there is no evidence in the record which supports his argument
that the AJ did not fully consider all of the testimony. The record
indicates that the agency has a zero tolerance policy for violence and
complainant was disciplined because he bumped and physically threatened
a supervisor. Complainant did not present any evidence of coworkers, not
of his race, who had behaved in the same manner, but were not similarly
disciplined. Thus, the Commission does not find that discriminatory
animus was involved in this case. Accordingly, we find that there was
substantial evidence to support a finding of no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
____5/1/07_______________
Date
1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the
above-referenced appeal number.
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0120061783
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036
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0120061783