Lee, Eugene M.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 20, 2020

2019004854 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/599,517 08/30/2012 Eugene M. Lee 113708.121_CON4 1019
23400 7590 07/20/2020
POSZ LAW GROUP, PLC
12040 SOUTH LAKES DRIVE
SUITE 101
RESTON, VA 20191
EXAMINER
YESILDAG, LAURA G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/20/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
dposz@poszlaw.com
mailbox@poszlaw.com
tvarndell@poszlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte EUGENE M. LEE
____________

Appeal 2019-004854
Application 13/599,517
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
CAROLYN D. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This application returns to us after we affirmed the Examiner’s
decision to reject then-pending claims 21–38 in part. Ex parte Lee, Appeal
2016-003036 (PTAB Apr. 3, 2017) (“Bd. Dec.”). Prosecution reopened
after that decision, and Appellant1 now appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a)
from the Examiner’s subsequent decision to reject claims 21–40. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Eugene M.
Lee. Appeal Br. 5.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention is an intellectual property (IP) information
analysis, searching, and access system that, among other things, administers
licenses. To this end, the claimed invention (1) tracks royalty payments paid
by licensees according to license agreements as actual royalty rates, and (2)
notifies of potential breaches when the rates are below those for most
favored nations. See generally Abstract; Spec. 45–47; Figs. 1, 11. Claims
21 and 25 are illustrative:

21. A method for administering licenses, comprising:
providing a data store which is configured to store a
plurality of license agreements associated with a licensing
package;
tracking, in the computer processor device, payments of
royalties paid by licensees according to respective schedules in
the license agreements associated with the licensing package, as
actual royalty rates;
monitoring, by the computer processor device, the actual
royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the
licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored
nation rates in the plurality of license agreements in the
licensing package; and
providing, by the computer processor device, an end-user
visualization tool which, responsive to clicking on a particular
clause in a license agreement of the plurality of license
agreements, displays relative usage of the clause in the plurality
of license agreements, wherein the clause is a most favored
nation rate clause.

25. A method for administering licenses, comprising:
providing a data store which is configured to store a
plurality of license agreements;
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obtaining, by the computer processor device, from public
records, sales data indicating geographic or territorial area sales,
as actual activity, by the licensee, in producing products in
connection with one of the license agreements;
tracking, by the computer processor device, compliance
of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the
license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic
and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements; and
providing, by the computer processor device, notification of
compliance of the actual activity with the license agreement.

RELATED APPEALS
On page 5 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant cites ten related appeals, all
of which have been decided as follows:

Application Number Appeal Number Appeal Status
10/229,273 2009-010022 Decision mailed Apr. 22, 2011
10/229,273 2014-009230 Decision mailed Aug. 5, 2016
13/599,415 2014-003734 Decision mailed Mar. 2, 2017
13/618,979 2014-008495 Decision mailed Mar. 15, 2017
13/619,486 2014-008498 Decision mailed Mar. 15, 2017
13/599,639 2014-009733 Decision mailed Mar. 21, 2017
13/599,206 2014-009364 Decision mailed Mar. 20, 2017
13/803,691 2015-001993 Decision mailed Mar. 29, 2017
13/599,517 2016-003036 Decision mailed Apr. 3, 2017
13/619,151 2018-006242 Decision mailed July 2, 2019

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THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 4–9.2
The Examiner rejected claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as indefinite. Final Act. 9–10.
The Examiner rejected claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 10–19.
The Examiner rejected claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Rivette (WO 00/11575 A1; published Mar.
2, 2000). Final Act. 20–23.
The Examiner rejected claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Rivette and Grundfest (US 2002/0165726
Al; published Nov. 7, 2002). Final Act. 24–35.

THE INELIGIBILITY REJECTION
The Examiner determines that the claimed invention is directed to an
abstract idea, namely (1) processing and managing legal transactions with
respect to royalties paid by licensees, and (2) monitoring legal compliance of
contractual and legal obligations between licensors and licensees, which
involve certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes.
See Final Act. 10–19; Ans. 11–29. According to the Examiner, the recited

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed July 2,
2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed January 8, 2019 (“Appeal
Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 2, 2019 (“Ans.”); and (4) the
Reply Brief filed June 3, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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additional elements, including the recited computer components, do not add
significantly more to the abstract idea, but merely recite generic computer
elements that implement the abstract idea. See Final Act. 15–19; Ans. 14–
21.
Appellant argues that the claims are eligible because, among other
things, they are directed to specific tools for checking (1) package-wide
interaction of actually-paid royalties versus most favored nation clauses, and
(2) interaction between public-record-actual activity and geographic and
territorial limits of one license agreement. Appeal Br. 20–33; Reply Br. 9–
20. According to Appellant, not only do the claims fail to recite certain
methods of organizing human activity, the claims recite additional elements
that integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application, including
(1) an end-user visualization tool that enables clicking on a particular clause
in one agreement resulting in displaying that clause in other agreements in
independent claims 21, 27, and 33, and (2) obtaining sales data from public
records that indicates a licensee’s geographic or territorial sales, and tracking
the licensee’s compliance of that sales activity with geographic or territorial
limits under an associated license agreement in independent claims 25, 31,
and 37. Reply Br. 10–14. Appellant adds that the recited additional
elements are not well-understood, routine, and conventional and, therefore,
add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. Appeal Br. 29–30, 32–
34; Reply Br. 15, 20.

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ISSUE
Under § 101, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–40 as
directed to ineligible subject matter? This issue turns on whether the claims
are directed to an abstract idea and, if so, whether the recited elements—
considered individually and as an ordered combination—transform the
nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 187 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 67 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). That
said, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
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concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See
USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under that guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:

3 See also October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df.
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

ANALYSIS
Claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38–40: Alice/Mayo Step One
Representative independent claim 21 recites a method for
administering licenses with the following steps:

providing a data store which is configured to store a plurality of
license agreements associated with a licensing package;

tracking, in the4 computer processor device, payments of royalties
paid by licensees according to respective schedules in the license agreements
associated with the licensing package, as actual royalty rates;

monitoring, by the computer processor device, the actual royalty rates
in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for
uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the plurality of
license agreements in the licensing package; and

providing, by the computer processor device, an end-user
visualization tool which, responsive to clicking on a particular clause in a
license agreement of the plurality of license agreements, displays relative

4 Although no antecedent basis exists for the first instance of “the computer
processor device,” we nonetheless assume that “the computer processor
device” was intended to be “a computer processor device.”
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usage of the clause in the plurality of license agreements, wherein the clause
is a most favored nation rate clause.

As shown in Appellant’s Figure 1, the disclosed invention includes an
IP licensing application 108 that assists users in organizing, tracking,
storing, searching, and leveraging license agreements. Spec. 23. As
explained on the Specification’s page 46, the cost analyzer assigns costs and
other payment schedules affiliated with licensing packages, thus enabling
licensors and licensees to track royalty and other costs associated with
licenses. The Specification further explains that licenses are tracked for “a
host of reasons” including, for example, uniformity, consistency, and
negotiation strategy success. Spec. 46.
Notably, for some users, losing track of royalty rates can be
disastrous. Id. For example, a licensor may have signed licensees up to a
“most favored nation” royalty guarantee. Id. By failing to monitor the
royalty amount in such a circumstance, licensors can be held in breach if
they were to lower the license royalty rate below the most favored nation
rate, and not offer that rate to the first customer. Id.
Appellant’s IP licensing application also includes a royalty tracker
1112 that automatically tracks licensees’ royalty payments. Id. This
tracking capability results from data supplied by “compliance tracker” 1110
that can track royalty payments according to a preloaded schedule. Id. 47.
The IP licensing application also includes “sales tracker” 1116 that tracks
product sales data based on user-defined variables, including geographic and
territorial limits linked to public records showing sales data. Id.
Turning to claim 21’s eligibility, we first note that the claim recites a
method and, therefore, falls within the process category of § 101. But
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despite falling within this statutory category, we must still determine
whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To this end, we must determine whether the
claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) fails to integrate the exception
into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. If both
elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the
first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
The Examiner determines that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea,
namely (1) processing and managing legal transactions with respect to
royalties paid by licensees, and (2) monitoring legal compliance of
contractual and legal obligations between licensors and licensees, which are
said to involve certain methods of organizing human activity and mental
processes. See Final Act. 10–19; Ans. 11–29. To determine whether a claim
recites an abstract idea, we (1) identify the claim’s specific limitations that
recite an abstract idea, and (2) determine whether the identified limitations
fall within certain subject matter groupings, namely, (a) mathematical
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concepts5; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity6; or (c) mental
processes.7
Here, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license
agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer processor
device,8 and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is
responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, all of claim
21’s recited limitations fit squarely within at least one of the above
categories of the USPTO’s guidelines. When read as a whole, the recited
limitations are directed to (1) tracking paid royalties pursuant to license
agreements, and (2) ensuring the agreements’ royalty rates are consistent
with those of most favored nations.
That is, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store
license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer
processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose
display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause,
claim 21’s tracking, monitoring, and displaying limitations fit squarely in the

5 Mathematical concepts include mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
6 Certain methods of organizing human activity include fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating
risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships
or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and
following rules or instructions). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
7 Mental processes are concepts performed in the human mind including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
8 We italicize recited limitations for emphasis.
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mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity
categories of the USPTO’s guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary mental processes
including observation, evaluation, and judgment); see also id. (listing
exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including legal
obligations, business relations, and following rules or instructions).
To the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 21’s limitations that
are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on pages 10 and 11
of the Reply Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we disagree. As noted
above and detailed below, apart from (1) providing a data store configured
to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the
computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool
whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement
clause, every limitation of claim 21 recites an abstract idea. That is, items
(1)–(3) enumerated above are the only additional elements beyond the
abstract idea: all other limitations in claim 21 are part of the abstract idea as
detailed below.
First, (1) “tracking . . . payments of royalties paid by licensees
according to respective schedules in the license agreements associated with
the licensing package as actual royalty rates,” and (2) “monitoring . . . the
actual royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing
package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the
plurality of license agreements in the licensing package” can be done
entirely mentally by merely (1) writing down royalty payments on a piece of
paper after they are received from licensees pursuant to license agreements;
and (2) cognitively comparing that information to most favored nation rates
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in those agreements. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that a person could construct a map
of credit card numbers by merely writing down a list of credit card
transactions made from a particular IP address).
Second, “display[ing] relative usage of [a most favored nation rate]
clause in the license agreements” could also be done entirely mentally and
with pen and paper by merely (1) cognitively selecting a clause in a license
agreement; (2) mentally comparing that clause to clauses in other license
agreements; (3) cognitively determining whether the agreements’ clauses
match a most favored nation rate clause; and (4) displaying that match by
writing it down on a piece of paper. Such steps merely involve observation
and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a
recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine the
validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by
merely using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by
merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all
originated from the same IP address).
The tracking, monitoring, and displaying steps also organize human
activity, at least with respect to complying with legal obligations, business
relations, and following rules or instructions. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52 (listing exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including legal
obligations, business relations, and following rules or instructions). Accord
Ans. 11–12. Cf. Shortridge v. Foundation Construction Payroll Service,
LLC, 655 F. App’x 848, 849–544 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (holding
ineligible claim reciting method of public works construction payroll
processing for a contractor including, among other things, producing reports
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indicating whether the contractor complies with applicable jurisdiction-
specific rules).
In short, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store
license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer
processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose
display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause,
the recited tracking, monitoring, and displaying steps fit within the mental
processes and certain methods of organizing human activity categories of the
USPTO’s Guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea.
Notably, the three elements enumerated above are the only recited
elements beyond the abstract idea, but these additional elements, considered
individually and in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application when reading claim 21 as a whole.
First, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves a
computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise
changes the way those devices function, at least in the sense contemplated
by the Federal Circuit in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a
specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent
Appellant contends that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to
improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the
way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such a contention.
To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is
rooted in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution
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(see Appeal Br. 23–30; Reply Br. 10–15), we disagree. Even assuming,
without deciding, that the claimed invention can (1) track paid royalties
pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensure the agreements’ royalty rates
are consistent with those of most favored nations faster or more efficiently
than doing so manually, any speed or efficiency increase comes from the
capabilities of the generic computer components—not the recited process
itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co.,
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012,
1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process
of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and
accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-
purpose computer do not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.”). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of Appellant’s
claimed invention is not on improving computer processors as tools, but on
certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components
as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095.
Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br.
26–27. There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules
that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
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Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using
particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three-
dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 1316.
But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely uses generic computer components to (1) track paid
royalties pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensure the agreements’
royalty rates are consistent with those of most favored nations. This generic
computer implementation is not only directed to mental processes and
certain methods of organizing human activity, but also does not improve a
display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See SAP Am. v. InvestPic,
LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing McRO).
Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance on Core Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (2018). See
Appeal Br. 25. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a computing
device that could display an application summary window that was not only
reachable directly from the main menu, but could also display a limited list
of selectable functions while the application was in an un-launched state.
Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. Upon selecting a function, the device
would then launch the application and initiate the selected function. Id. at
1360. In reaching its eligibility conclusion, the court noted that the claimed
invention was directed to an improved user interface for computing devices
that used a particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of
information to the user, unlike conventional user interface methods that
displayed a generic index on a computer. Id. at 1362–63.
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That is not the case here. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the
contrary (Appeal Br. 25), the fact that a user can click on a particular clause
to display its relative usage in license agreements in the claimed invention
differs substantially from the particular manner of summarizing and
presenting a limited set of information to the user, including a limited list of
selectable functions while an application is in an un-launched state in Core
Wireless. See Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. To the extent Appellant
contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in
computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 25), there is no persuasive evidence on
this record to substantiate such a contention.
Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 25–26) is
likewise unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a
technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing
problems with other Internet filtering systems by making a known filtering
solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider
(ISP)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized filtering at the ISP.
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Notably, this customizable filtering solution
improved the computer system’s performance and, therefore, was patent-
eligible. See id. But unlike the filtering system improvements in BASCOM
that added significantly more to the abstract idea in that case, the claimed
invention here uses generic computing components to implement an abstract
idea as noted previously.
Appellant’s reliance on Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879
F.3d 1299 (2018) (Appeal Br. 28) is also unavailing. There, the court held
eligible claims directed to a behavior-based virus scanning system. In
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reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the claimed invention
employed a new kind of file that enabled a computer security system to do
that which could not be done previously, including accumulating and using
newly-available, behavior-based information about potential threats. Finjan,
879 F.3d at 1305.
That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that
the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer
capabilities (see Appeal Br. 28), there is no persuasive evidence on this
record to substantiate such a contention.
Appellant’s reliance on Trading Technologies International v. CQG,
Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (Appeal Br. 28) is
also unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a method for
displaying and facilitating trading of market information relating to a traded
commodity, including dynamically displaying an indicator in each of a
GUI's bid and ask display regions, the regions positioned along a common
static price axis. Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1002–06. The claimed
invention in that case also displayed an order entry region with locations for
receiving trade order commands, and, responsive to selecting a particular
location, (1) commodity-related trade order parameters were set, and (2) a
trade order was sent to an electronic exchange. Id. at 1003. Notably, the
court held that claimed invention did not simply display information on a
graphical user interface, but rather required a specific, structured graphical
user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the
interface’s structure that addressed and resolved a specifically-identified
problem in the art and, therefore, was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at
1004.
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That is not the case here. Although the claimed invention displays a
particular clause’s relative usage in license agreements responsive to
clicking that clause in a license agreement, to the extent Appellant contends
that the claimed invention is directed to a specific, structured graphical user
interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the
interface’s structure that addresses and resolves a specifically-identified
problem in the art as in Trading Technologies (see Appeal Br. 28), there is
no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention.
Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance (Appeal Br. 27–28) on
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (discussing eligibility of a claim reciting a data processing system
for designing, creating, and importing data into a viewable form, where the
system included, among other things, (1) a form file that modeled the
physical representation of an original paper form and established the
calculations and rule conditions required to fill in the viewable form; (2) a
form file creation program that imported a background image from an
original form; and (3) a form viewer program).
That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that
the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer
capabilities (see Appeal Br. 27–28), there is no persuasive evidence on this
record to substantiate such a contention.
Appellant’s reliance on the non-precedential Board decision, Ex parte
Scheer, Appeal 2017-011742 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2019) on pages 12 and 13 of
the Reply Brief is likewise unavailing. Not only do the facts in that case
differ from those at issue here, as a non-precedential decision, it is not
binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure
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2 (Rev. 10) § I(B),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN
AL.pdf.
Furthermore, the recited “providing a data store configured to store
license agreements associated with a licensing package” also does not
integrate the exception into a practical application. First, given its high level
of generality, the recited “data store” can be realized by simply providing a
file cabinet that stores paper copies of license agreements. Second, even if
the recited data store was limited to storing digital data in electronic form—
which it is not—the limitation is insignificant pre-solution activity that
merely gathers data and, therefore, does not integrate the exception into a
practical application for that additional reason. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963
(characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity);
see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–
72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that even if some physical steps are required to
obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard,
clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer
patentability); accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(g)).
On this record, then, the claimed invention does not recite additional
elements that (1) improve a computer itself; (2) improve another technology
or technical field; (3) implement the abstract idea in conjunction with a
particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; (4) transform
or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; or (5) apply or use
the abstract idea in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the
abstract idea’s use to a particular technological environment, such that the
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claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(a)–
(c), (e)). In short, the claim’s additional elements do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 21 as a whole.
In conclusion, although the recited functions may be beneficial by (1)
tracking paid royalties pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensuring the
agreements’ royalty rates are consistent with those of most favored nations,
a claim for a useful or beneficial abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that claim 21 is directed to an
abstract idea.

Claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38–40: Alice/Mayo Step Two
Turning to Alice/Mayo step two, claim 21’s additional recited
elements, namely (1) providing a data store configured to store license
agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) computer processor
device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is
responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause—considered
individually and as an ordered combination—do not provide an inventive
concept that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea when
reading claim 21 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56. As noted above, the claimed invention merely uses
generic computing components to implement the recited abstract idea.
To the extent Appellant contends that the recited limitations, including
those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly
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more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under
Alice/Mayo step two (see Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15), these limitations
are not additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed
to the abstract idea as noted previously. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1290
(explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the
claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional”)
(emphasis added); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing that
additional recited elements should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two to
determine whether they (1) add specific limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append
well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to
the industry (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
As noted above, to the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 21’s
limitations that are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on
pages 10, 11, and 15 of the Reply Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we
disagree. As noted above, apart from (1) providing a data store configured
to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the
computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool
whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement
clause, every limitation of claim 21 recites an abstract idea. That is, items
(1)–(3) enumerated above are the only additional elements beyond the
abstract idea whose generic computing functionality is well-understood,
routine, and conventional. See Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25
(noting that components such an “interface,” “network,” and “database” are
generic computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept
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requirement); accord Spec. 66–71 (describing generic computer components
used to implement the invention); Final Act. 15–17; Ans. 20–21
(determining that the recited generic computer components are additional
elements that do not add significantly more to the abstract idea).
Appellant’s contention that the Examiner allegedly did not comply
with the evidentiary requirements under the April 2018 USPTO
memorandum mandating these requirements for ineligibility rejections after
Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Appeal Br.
29–30; Reply Br. 15) is unavailing. To be sure, the Examiner must show—
with supporting facts—that certain claim elements are well-understood,
routine, and conventional where such a finding is made. See Berkheimer,
881 F.3d at 1369 (noting that whether something is well-understood, routine,
and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention is a factual
determination). In light of this factual determination, the USPTO issued a
memorandum requiring that Examiners support a finding that an additional
element of a claim is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Robert W.
Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.), USPTO, Apr. 19, 2018 (“Berkheimer Memo.”), at 2–3 (noting that the
Berkheimer decision clarifies the inquiry whether an additional element (or
combination of additional elements) represents well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity).
As noted previously, the recited (1) data store; (2) computer
processor device, and (3) end-user visualization tool whose display is
responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, are the
additional recited elements whose generic computing functionality is well-
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understood, routine, and conventional. Therefore, to the extent that
Appellant contends that the Examiner failed to provide evidence that all
recited elements—including those indicated on pages 10, and 11, and 15 of
the Reply Brief that Appellant incorrectly characterizes as “additional
elements”—are well-understood, routine, and conventional (see Appeal Br.
29–30; Reply Br. 15), such an argument is not commensurate with the more
limited scope of the Examiner’s findings in this regard. Rather, the
Examiner’s finding is that the elements other than the abstract idea, namely
the additional computer-based elements, provide generic computing
functionality that is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Final
Act. 15–16; Ans. 20–21 (noting that the recited additional elements are well-
known generic computing components and, therefore, do not add
significantly more than the abstract idea).
As noted previously, there is ample evidence of this generic
computing functionality in not only the cited case law, but also Appellant’s
own Specification. See, e.g., FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1096 (noting that
using generic computing components like a microprocessor or user interface
do not transform an otherwise abstract idea into eligible subject matter);
Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1343–49 (holding ineligible claims reciting
providing an intelligent user interface to an online application comprising
(1) furnishing plural hyperlinked icons on a displayed web page, and
(2) displaying a dynamically generated online application form set
responsive to activating an icon as directed to the abstract idea of retaining
information in navigating online forms); Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at
1324–25 (noting that a database is a generic computer component that does
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not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); Spec. 66–71 (describing
generic computer components used to implement the invention).
We reach a similar conclusion regarding the recited insignificant
extra-solution activity, namely “providing a data store which is configured to
store a plurality of license agreements associated with a licensing package.”
That such a data store is provided does not mean that this data gathering
function is performed in an unconventional way to add significantly more
than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step
two. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Given this limitation’s high level of
generality, the recited extra-solution activity does not add significantly more
than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step
two. To the extent Appellant contends otherwise (see Appeal Br. 29–30;
Reply Br. 15), we disagree.
In conclusion, the additional recited elements—considered
individually and as an ordered combination—do not add significantly more
than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step
two when reading claim 21 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 21 and claims 22–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38 not argued separately with
particularity.

Claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 – Alice/Mayo Step One
Independent claim 25 is reproduced below:

25. A method for administering licenses, comprising:

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providing a data store which is configured to store a
plurality of license agreements;

obtaining, by the computer processor device, from public
records, sales data indicating geographic or territorial area sales,
as actual activity, by the licensee, in producing products in
connection with one of the license agreements;

tracking, by the computer processor device, compliance
of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the
license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic
and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements; and

providing, by the computer processor device, notification
of compliance of the actual activity with the license agreement.

As shown in Appellant’s Figure 11, the disclosed invention’s
licensing module 108 not only includes a license compliance tracker 1110
that can track royalty payments according to a preloaded schedule, but also a
“sales tracker” 1116 that tracks products sales data based on user-defined
variables including geographic and territorial limits linked to public records
showing sales data. Spec. 47.
Turning to claim 25’s eligibility, we first note that the claim recites a
method and, therefore, falls within the process category of § 101. But
despite falling within this statutory category, we must still determine
whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To this end, we must determine whether the
claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) fails to integrate the exception
into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. If both
elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the
first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
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The Examiner determines that claim 25 is directed to an abstract idea,
namely monitoring legal compliance of contractual and legal obligations
between licensors and licensees, which are said to involve certain methods
of organizing human activity and mental processes. See Final Act. 10–14;
Ans. 22–26.
Here, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license
agreements; and (2) the computer processor device, all of claim 25’s recited
limitations fit squarely within at least one of the above categories of the
USPTO’s guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary mental processes including
observation, evaluation, and judgment); see also id. (listing exemplary
methods of organizing human activity, including legal obligations, business
relations, and following rules or instructions). When read as a whole, the
recited limitations are directed to monitoring a licensee’s compliance with a
license’s geographical and territorial restrictions based on publicly-available
sales information.
To the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 25’s limitations that
are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on page 16 of the
Appeal Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we disagree. As noted above
and detailed below, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store
license agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the
computer processor device, every limitation of claim 25 recites an abstract
idea. That is, items (1) and (2) enumerated above are the only additional
elements beyond the abstract idea: all other limitations in claim 25 are part
of the abstract idea as detailed below.
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First, (1) “obtaining . . . from public records, sales data indicating
geographic or territorial area sales, as actual activity, by the licensee, in
producing products in connection with one of the license agreements” can be
done entirely mentally by merely reading paper records of sales information
and cognitively determining the particular geographic or territorial area
associated with those sales. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that
a person could construct a map of credit card numbers by merely writing
down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address).
Second, “tracking . . . compliance of the actual activity by the licensee
pursuant to one of the license agreements with the activity permitted under
geographic and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements” can
be done entirely mentally by merely cognitively determining whether the
licensee’s activity comports with the license’s geographic and territorial
restrictions—a process that merely involves observation and logical
reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that
utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine the validity of a credit
card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by merely using
logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing
that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from
the same IP address).
Third, “providing . . . notification of compliance of the actual activity
with the license agreement” organizes human activity by merely
communicating the licensee’s compliance to another person, such as a
colleague or client, either orally or in writing. Cf. In re Salwan, 681 F.
App’x 938, 939–41 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding ineligible claims
reciting, among other things, receiving medical records information and
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transmitting reports where the claimed invention’s objective was to enable
electronic communication of tasks that were otherwise done manually using
paper, phone, and facsimile machine); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
896 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that a nontechnical human
activity of passing a note to a person who is in a meeting or conversation as
illustrating the invention’s focus, namely providing information to a person
without interfering with the person’s primary activity); LendingTree, LLC v.
Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 993–94, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(holding ineligible claims reciting, among other things, (1) receiving
selection criteria from lending institutions and credit data from a computer
user, and (2) forwarding the credit data to selected lending institutions as
directed to an abstract idea). Therefore, apart from the computer processor
device, the recited notification limitation fits squarely within the certain
methods of organizing human activity categories of the USPTO’s guidelines
and, therefore, recites an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
(listing exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including personal
interactions and following rules or instructions).
Notably, (1) providing a data store configured to store license
agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the computer
processor device discussed above are the only recited elements beyond the
abstract idea, but these additional elements, considered individually and in
combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application
when reading claim 25 as a whole.
First, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves a
computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise
changes the way those devices function, at least in the sense contemplated
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by the Federal Circuit in Enfish. The claimed self-referential table in Enfish
was a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent
Appellant contends that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to
improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the
way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such a contention.
To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is
rooted in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution
(see Appeal Br. 31–34; Reply Br. 15–21), we disagree. Even assuming,
without deciding, that the claimed invention can monitor a licensee’s
compliance with a license’s geographical and territorial restrictions based on
publicly-available sales information faster or more efficiently than doing so
manually, any speed or efficiency increase comes from the capabilities of
the generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See
FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095) (citing Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I, 711 F. App’x at 1017
(“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files
and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases
stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-purpose computer do
not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”).
Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of Appellant’s claimed invention
is not on improving computer processors as tools, but on certain
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independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components as
tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095.
Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in
McRO. There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules
that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using
particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three-
dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 1316.
But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely uses generic computer components to monitor a
licensee’s compliance with a license’s geographical and territorial
restrictions based on public sales information. This generic computer
implementation is not only directed to mental processes and certain methods
of organizing human activity, but also does not improve a display
mechanism as was the case in McRO. See SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167
(distinguishing McRO).
Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance on Core Wireless. See
Appeal Br. 25, 33. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a computing
device that could display an application summary window that was not only
reachable directly from the main menu, but could also display a limited list
of selectable functions while the application was in an un-launched state.
Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. Upon selecting a function, the device
would then launch the application and initiate the selected function. Id. at
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1360. In reaching its eligibility conclusion, the court noted that the claimed
invention was directed to an improved user interface for computing devices
that used a particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of
information to the user, unlike conventional user interface methods that
displayed a generic index on a computer. Id. at 1362–63.
That is not the case here. To the extent Appellant contends that the
claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities
(see Appeal Br. 25, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such a contention.
Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(Appeal Br. 25–26, 33) is likewise unavailing. There, the court held eligible
claims directed to a technology-based solution to filter Internet content that
overcame existing problems with other Internet filtering systems by making
a known filtering solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet
Service Provider (ISP)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized
filtering at the ISP. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Notably, this customizable
filtering solution improved the computer system’s performance and,
therefore, was patent-eligible. See id. But unlike the filtering system
improvements in BASCOM that added significantly more to the abstract idea
in that case, the claimed invention here uses generic computing components
to implement an abstract idea as noted previously.
Appellant’s reliance on Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879
F.3d 1299 (2018) (Appeal Br. 28, 33) is also unavailing. There, the court
held eligible claims directed to a behavior-based virus scanning system. In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the claimed invention
employed a new kind of file that enabled a computer security system to do
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that which could not be done previously, including accumulating and using
newly-available, behavior-based information about potential threats. Finjan,
879 F.3d at 1305.
That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that
the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer
capabilities (see Appeal Br. 28, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on this
record to substantiate such a contention.
Appellant’s reliance on Trading Technologies International v. CQG,
Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (Appeal Br. 28, 33)
is also unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a method for
displaying and facilitating trading of market information relating to a traded
commodity, including dynamically displaying an indicator in each of a
GUI's bid and ask display regions, the regions positioned along a common
static price axis. Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1002–06. The claimed
invention in that case also displayed an order entry region with locations for
receiving trade order commands, and, responsive to selecting a particular
location, (1) commodity-related trade order parameters were set, and (2) a
trade order was sent to an electronic exchange. Id. at 1003. Notably, the
court held that claimed invention did not simply display information on a
graphical user interface, but rather required a specific, structured graphical
user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the
interface’s structure that addressed and resolved a specifically-identified
problem in the art and, therefore, was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at
1004.
That is not the case here. Although the claimed invention displays a
particular clause’s relative usage in license agreements responsive to
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clicking that clause in a license agreement, to the extent Appellant contends
that the claimed invention is directed to a specific, structured graphical user
interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the
interface’s structure that addresses and resolves a specifically-identified
problem in the art as in Trading Technologies (see Appeal Br. 28, 33), there
is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention.
Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance (Appeal Br. 27–28, 33)
on Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (discussing eligibility of a claim reciting a data processing system
for designing, creating, and importing data into a viewable form, where the
system included, among other things, (1) a form file that modeled the
physical representation of an original paper form and established the
calculations and rule conditions required to fill in the viewable form; (2) a
form file creation program that imported a background image from an
original form; and (3) a form viewer program).
That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that
the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer
capabilities (see Appeal Br. 27–28, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on
this record to substantiate such a contention.
To the extent that Appellant relies on the non-precedential Board
decision, Ex parte Scheer, Appeal 2017-011742 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2019), such
a reliance is unavailing, for not only do the facts in that case differ from
those at issue here, as a non-precedential decision, it is not binding on this
panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10)
§ I(B),
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https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN
AL.pdf.
Furthermore, the recited “providing a data store configured to store
license agreements” also does not integrate the exception into a practical
application. First, given its high level of generality, the recited “data store”
can be realized by simply providing a file cabinet that stores paper copies of
license agreements. Second, even if the recited data store was limited to
storing digital data in electronic form—which it is not—the limitation is
insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore,
does not integrate the exception into a practical application for that
additional reason. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering
steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that
even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a
database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-
gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); accord Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
On this record, then, the claimed invention does not recite additional
elements that (1) improve a computer itself; (2) improve another technology
or technical field; (3) implement the abstract idea in conjunction with a
particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; (4) transform
or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; or (5) apply or use
the abstract idea in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the
abstract idea’s use to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(a)–
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(c), (e)). In short, the claim’s additional elements do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 21 as a whole.
In conclusion, although the recited functions may be beneficial by
monitoring a licensee’s compliance with a license’s geographical and
territorial restrictions based on public sales information, a claim for a useful
or beneficial abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that claim 25 is directed to an
abstract idea.

Claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40: Alice/Mayo Step Two
Turning to Alice/Mayo step two, claim 25’s additional recited
elements, namely the recited (1) providing a data store configured to store
license agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the
computer processor device—considered individually and as an ordered
combination—do not provide an inventive concept that amounts to
significantly more than the abstract idea when reading claim 25 as a whole.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. As noted
above, the claimed invention merely uses generic computing components to
implement the recited abstract idea.
To the extent Appellant contends that the recited limitations, including
those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly
more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under
Alice/Mayo step two (see Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15), these limitations
are not additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed
to the abstract idea as noted previously. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1290
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(explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the
claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to
which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional”)
(emphasis added); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing that
additional recited elements should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two to
determine whether they (1) add specific limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append
well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to
the industry (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
As noted above, to the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 25’s
limitations that are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on
page 32 of the Appeal Brief and page 16 of the Reply Brief as not part of the
abstract idea, we disagree. As noted above, apart from (1) providing a data
store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing
package; and (2) the computer processor device, every limitation of claim 25
recites an abstract idea. That is, items (1) and (2) enumerated above are the
only additional elements beyond the abstract idea whose generic computing
functionality is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Mortgage
Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (noting that components such an “interface,”
“network,” and “database” are generic computer components that do not
satisfy the inventive concept requirement); accord Spec. 66–71 (describing
generic computer components used to implement the invention); Final Act.
15–17 (determining that the recited generic computer components are
additional elements that do not add significantly more to the abstract idea).
We reach a similar conclusion regarding the recited insignificant
extra-solution activity, namely “providing a data store configured to store
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license agreements associated with a licensing package.” That license
agreements are stored does not mean that this data gathering function is
performed in an unconventional way to add significantly more than the
abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Given this limitation’s high level of
generality, the recited extra-solution activity does not add significantly more
than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step
two. To the extent Appellant contends otherwise (see Appeal Br. 32–34;
Reply Br. 20), we disagree.
In conclusion, the additional recited elements—considered
individually and as an ordered combination—do not add significantly more
than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step
two when reading claim 21 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 25 and claims 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 not argued separately with
particularity.

THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REJECTION
Regarding independent claim 21, the Examiner finds that Appellant’s
original disclosure does not convey to ordinarily skilled artisans possession
of monitoring actual royalty rates for uniformity with respect to most
favored nation rates as claimed. Final Act. 5–8; Ans. 3–7.
Appellant argues that not only does the Specification convey
possession of the claimed invention, the level of skill of ordinarily skill in
computers is high and the art is predictable, and, therefore, ordinarily skilled
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artisans would know how to implement the claimed invention, particularly
given its predictable algorithm. Appeal Br. 11–14; Reply Br. 3–5.
Appellant argues other recited limitations summarized below.

ISSUE
Has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–40 under § 112, first
paragraph by finding that Appellant’s original disclosure fails to convey
with reasonable clarity that Appellant possessed:
(1) monitoring, by the computer processor device, the actual royalty
rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for
uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the plurality of
license agreements in the licensing package as recited in claim 21?
(2) the tracking and notification steps in claim 25?

ANALYSIS
Claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38, and 39
We begin by noting that claim 21 differs from the version of that
claim that was before us in the earlier appeal. Although the claim’s first two
clauses, namely the providing and tracking steps, are identical in both
versions, claim 21 formerly recited, in pertinent part, comparing the actual
royalty rates to most favored nation rates in the license agreements—a
limitation that we held was not supported by the original disclosure to show
possession of that feature. See Bd. Dec. 5–8.
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Now, claim 21 recites, in pertinent part, monitoring the actual royalty
rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for
uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates.9
In the Appeal Brief’s Summary of Claimed Subject Matter section,
Appellant cites the Specification’s page 46, lines 9 to 21 and cost analyzer
1106 in Figure 11 for supporting the recited monitoring step. On this record,
we find that Appellant’s original disclosure reasonably conveys possession
of the recited monitoring step. We reach this finding noting the disclosed
functionality of cost analyzer 1106 as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 5, 13–
14; Reply Br. 4)—a function that is part of IP licensing application 108 in
Figure 11. As explained on page 46 of the Specification, the cost analyzer
assigns costs and other payment schedules affiliated with licensing
packages, thus enabling licensors and licensees to track royalty and other
costs associated with licenses. The Specification further explains that
licenses are tracked for “a host of reasons” including, for example,
uniformity, consistency, and negotiation strategy success. Spec. 46.
Notably, for some users, losing track of royalty rates can be
disastrous. Id. For example, a licensor may have signed licensees up to a
“most favored nation” royalty guarantee. Id. By failing to monitor the
royalty amount in such a circumstance, a licensor can be held in breach if
they were to lower the license royalty rate below the most favored nation
rate, and not offer that rate to the first customer. Id. Appellant’s IP
licensing application also includes a royalty tracker 1112 that automatically
tracks licensees’ royalty payments. Id.

9 Claim 21’s last clause also differs from its former version, but that change
is not pertinent to the written description rejection.
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This description warns of a potential consequence of lowering a
license royalty rate below the most favored nation rate, namely a possible
breach, and, when considered in context, reasonably supports monitoring of
these rates for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as
claimed.
Given this disclosure, considered in light of the functionality that
tracks licenses for uniformity and consistency on the Specification’s page 46,
Appellant’s original disclosure reasonably conveys possession of monitoring
actual royalty rates in plural licensing agreements associated with a given
package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in those
agreements as claimed.
We reach this conclusion noting that patent applications are written
for those ordinarily skilled in the art who come to the application with
knowledge of what has come before. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth
Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Therefore, it
is unnecessary to spell out every detail of the invention; only enough must
be included in the disclosure to ensure the claims are clear, and convince a
person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention,
and to enable such a person to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation. See id.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
claim 21; (2) independent claims 27, and 33; and (3) dependent claims 22–
24, 28–30, 32, 34–36, 38, and 39 for similar reasons.

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Claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40
We sustain the Examiner’s written description rejection of claim 25
reciting, in pertinent part, (1) tracking, by the computer processor device,
compliance of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the
license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic and
territorial limits in the one of the license agreements; and (2) providing, by
the computer processor device, notification of compliance of the actual
activity with the license agreement. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 8–9.
In the Appeal Brief’s Summary of Claimed Subject Matter section,
Appellant cites the Specification’s page 47, lines 11 to 16 and license
compliance tracker 1110 for supporting both limitations. Appeal Br. 7.
Later in the Brief, however, Appellant also refers to the royalty payment
functionality of application 1112, accounting application 1114, and sales
tracker 1116 for supporting the recited tracking step. Appeal Br. 15.
On page 47, Appellant’s Specification describes license compliance
tracker 1110 that can include an application 1112 for tracking royalty
payments according to a preloaded schedule. Payment information received
from accounting application 1114 may update an electronic calendar
indicating that a royalty payment is received on time, and a license manager
can be notified that a payment is late. Spec. 47. The royalty tracker notifies
the license manager and licensee of upcoming due dates. Id. Also, sales
tracker 1116 tracks product sales data based on user-defined variables that
include geographic and territorial limits that are linked to public records
showing sales data. Id.
But even if this disclosure shows possession of the recited compliance
tracking step, Appellant still does not squarely address—let alone
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persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s finding that the original disclosure does
not show possession of the recited compliance notification limitation. See
Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 8. That the disclosed invention can notify others about
late payments and upcoming due dates does not convey with reasonable
clarity that compliance of an activity pursuant to the particular geographic
and territorial limits in a license agreement is tracked to show possession of
that feature, let alone that notification of such compliance is provided as
claimed. That Appellant quotes only claim 25’s tracking step in the
associated arguments in the Briefs, but omits the notification step (see
Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 5) is telling in this regard.
We reach this conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that such a
compliance notification would have been obvious from the original
disclosure, for that alone is insufficient to show possession of that feature.
Although the written description requirement under § 112 does not demand
any particular form of disclosure or require a verbatim recitation, a
description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the
requirement. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Accord Ans. 9 (noting this point).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 25, and claims 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 not argued separately with
particularity.

THE INDEFINITENESS REJECTION
We do not sustain the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection of claim 21.
According to the Examiner, not only would ordinarily skilled artisans fail to
understand the metes and bounds of the recited “relative usage,” the recited
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monitoring for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates is
unclear. Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 10.
We disagree. First, the claim recites, in pertinent part, that responsive
to clicking on a particular clause in a license agreement, that clause’s
relative usage in plural license agreements is displayed. According to the
Specification’s page 48, a client can click a mouse on a particular clause,
and its relative usage is displayed company-wide or product-wide. Also, the
user can hyperlink directly to that clause in a related license agreement to
see how it has been used. Spec. 48.
The clear import of this discussion is that a selected clause’s “relative
usage” pertains to how the clause is used in each agreement with respect to
the clause’s meaning and context in those agreements. This interpretation
reasonably comports with the plain meaning of the term “usage,” which is
defined, in pertinent part, as “the way in which words and phrases are
actually used (as in a particular form or sense) in a language community.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/usage (last visited July 8, 2020). Although the
Examiner determines that a clause’s “relative usage” can have multiple
alternative meanings (Ans. 10), we disagree given its context in the claim
when read in light of the Specification and the plain meaning of the term.
Despite the Examiner’s determination that it is unclear “how relative
is relative usage” (Ans. 10), the claim need not so specify. That the term
“relative usage” is broad in scope does not mean that it is indefinite. See In
re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970) (“Breadth is not
indefiniteness.”); MPEP § 2173.04 (citing Gardner).
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We reach the same conclusion regarding monitoring the actual royalty
rates for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed. On
page 46, the Specification explains that licenses are tracked for “a host of
reasons” including, for example, uniformity, consistency, and negotiation
strategy success. Although the term “uniformity” is not further defined in
this context, the term “uniform” is defined, in pertinent part, as “having
always the same form, manner, or degree: not varying or variable.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/uniform (last visited July 8, 2020). Thus,
“uniformity” in this context is the state of having the same form, manner, or
degree, or not varying or variable. Given this plain meaning, monitoring
actual royalty rates’ uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as
claimed monitors the actual royalty rates to determine that they do not vary
from the most favored nation rates.
Despite the Examiner’s determination that it is unclear “how uniform
is monitoring rates for uniformity” (Ans. 10), the claim need not so specify.
That the term “uniformity” is broad in scope does not mean that it is
indefinite. See Gardner, 427 F.2d at 788 (“Breadth is not indefiniteness.”);
MPEP § 2173.04 (citing Gardner).
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
independent claim 21; (2) independent claims 27 and 33 that recite
commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 22–24, 28–30, 32, 34–
36, and 38 for similar reasons.

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION
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Regarding independent claim 25, the Examiner finds that Rivette
administers licenses by, among other things, obtaining sales data indicating a
licensee’s geographic or territorial area sales from public records, including
a licensing database whose data are accessible from a query statement
module. Final Act. 20–22; Ans. 29–31.
Appellant argues that Rivette’s invoices and royalty statements are not
data obtained from public records, but rather are non-public, self-reported
data that may lack a licensee’s unreported sales from public records. Appeal
Br. 35–38; Reply Br. 22–23.

ISSUE
Under § 102, has the Examiner erred by finding that Rivette discloses
obtaining, by a computer processor device, from public records, sales data
indicating geographic or territorial area sales, as actual activity, by the
licensee, in producing products in connection with one of plural license
agreements as recited in claim 25?

ANALYSIS
We begin by construing the key disputed limitation of claim 25 that
recites, in pertinent part, “public records.” The Specification does not define
the term “public records,” unlike at least one other term whose concrete
definition leaves no doubt as to its meaning. See Spec. 2 (defining the term
“application” explicitly).
The Specification does, however, explain that the IP licensing
application includes “sales tracker” 1116 that tracks product sales data based
on user-defined variables, including geographic and territorial limits linked
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to public records showing sales data. Spec. 47. Although this passage does
not further detail these public records, the Specification elsewhere describes
exemplary public data, including public IP databases, press releases, trade
magazines, financial databases, and news coverage. See Spec. 36, 59.
Although this description informs our understanding of the recited
“public records,” the term is not so limited, nor will we import that
description into the claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We, therefore, construe the term “public record”
with its plain meaning, namely “[a] record that a governmental unit is
required by law to keep, such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse.”
Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009). That dictionary adds
that “[p]ublic records are generally open to view by the public.” Id.
Although Appellant proffers a definition of “public” from a general-
purpose dictionary in interpreting the term “public records” in connection
with the ineligibility rejection (Appeal Br. 31), we decline to adopt this
interpretation, for the term “public record” is defined explicitly, and has a
particular legal meaning that is commonly understood as noted above. See
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Absent an express
definition in their specification, the fact that appellants can point to
definitions or usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the
PTO’s definition unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that
support its interpretation.”).
Given our interpretation, we cannot say—nor has the Examiner
shown—that sales data, including the number of units sold, from a royalty
statement in Rivette’s licensing database as shown in Figure 89 is
necessarily from a public record as the term is commonly understood. See
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Rivette 105. Although this sales data indicates a licensee’s geographic and
territorial sales, namely those in the United States and Canada as shown by
the “US” and “CDN” currency designations in Figure 89, this information is
nonetheless provided by the licensee. See Rivette 102 (noting that royalty
statements are provided by licensees).
To the extent that the Examiner finds that this licensee-provided
information is somehow necessarily obtained from public records under the
term’s plain meaning, namely those records that (1) governmental units are
required by law to keep, and (2) are generally open to public view, there is
no evidence on this record to substantiate such a finding. That this licensee-
provided data is accessible to (1) the licensor; (2) the licensor’s authorized
representatives and administrators; and (3) the computer system that
processes that data as described on Rivette’s pages 101 to 108 does not mean
that this data is necessarily obtained from public records as claimed. To the
extent that the Examiner finds otherwise (see Ans. 29–31), we disagree.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
independent claim 25; (2) independent claims 31 and 37 that recite
commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 26, 39, and 40 for
similar reasons. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the
Examiner’s rejection of these claims, we need not address Appellant’s other
associated arguments.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION
The Examiner finds that Rivette discloses every recited element of
independent claim 21 including monitoring actual royalty rates in a licensing
package’s license agreements for uniformity with respect to most favored
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nation rates in agreements in that package. Final Act. 25–26; Ans. 32–34.
The Examiner also takes Official Notice that contract clauses have most
favored nation rates. Final Act. 29. In addition, the Examiner cites
Grundfest for teaching monitoring actual royalty rates with respect to most
favored nation rates for uniformity. Final Act. 30. Based on these collective
teachings, the Examiner concludes that the claim would have been obvious.
Final Act. 30–31.
Appellant argues, among other things, that the prior art does not teach
or suggest monitoring actual royalty rates with respect to most favored
nation rates for uniformity, where the actual royalty rates are royalties that
licensees actually paid. Appeal Br. 40–50; Reply Br. 25–26.

ISSUE
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 21 by finding
that Rivette and Grundfest collectively would have taught or suggested
monitoring actual royalty rates in license agreements associated with a
licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in
the license agreements in the package, where the actual royalty rates are
royalties that licensees paid according to respective schedules in the
agreements (“the monitoring limitation”)?

ANALYSIS
As noted above, the key disputed limitation in claim 21 requires
monitoring actual royalty rates in license agreements for uniformity with
respect to most favored nation rates, where the actual royalty rates are
royalties that licensees paid according to the agreements’ respective
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schedules. Our emphasis underscores the past tense associated with this
payment, namely that it occurred previously. Accord Appeal Br. 49 (noting
this point).
On this record, we agree with Appellant that Rivette and Grundfest
collectively do not teach or suggest the monitoring limitation. To be sure,
Rivette’s system (1) compares royalty payments with expected revenue on
page 142, and (2) involves license agreements with a “Favored Nation” field
on page 73 and Figure 72. Moreover, Grundfest’s paragraph 101 teaches
notifying a transaction party if a master transaction agreement (MTA) or
corresponding subordinate contract contains clauses related to most favored
nation status.
But we cannot say—nor has the Examiner shown—that the
Rivette/Grundfest system monitors the licensees’ past royalty payments for
uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in plural agreements in a
licensing package as claimed. As noted previously, “uniformity” in this
context is the state of having the same form, manner, or degree, or not
varying or variable. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/uniform (last visited July 8,
2020). Given this plain meaning, monitoring actual royalty rates’ uniformity
with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed monitors the actual
royalty rates to determine that they do not vary from the most favored nation
rates.
That most favored nation rate clauses are known contract provisions
as the Examiner indicates (Final Act. 28–29; Ans. 33) does not mean that
monitoring licensee’s past royalty payments for uniformity with respect to
most favored nation rates would have been obvious. As noted above, in
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light of the plain meaning of “uniformity,” the recited monitoring effectively
determines that the past royalty payments do not vary from the most favored
nation rates. There is insufficient evidence on this record to support the
Examiner’s conclusion that this particular monitoring scheme would have
been obvious.
Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1)
independent claim 21; (2) independent claims 21, 27, and 33 that recite
commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 22–24, 28–30, 32, 34–
36, and 38 for similar reasons.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
21–40 101 Ineligibility 21–40
21–40 112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
25, 26, 31,
37, 39, 40
21–24,
27–30,
32–36,
38, 39
21–24,
27–30,
32–36,
38
112,
second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 21–24,
27–30,
32–36, 38
25, 26,
31, 37,
39, 40
102(b) Rivette 25, 26,
31, 37,
39, 40
21–24,
27–30,
32–36,
38
103 Rivette,
Grundfest
21–24,
27–30,
32–36, 38
Overall
Outcome
21–40
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED