Lawrence Sherman

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 3, 2020

13595664 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/595,664 08/27/2012 Lawrence SHERMAN 2207385.00121US1 2406
23483 7590 04/03/2020
WILMERHALE/BOSTON
60 STATE STREET
BOSTON, MA 02109
EXAMINER
SAINT-VIL, EDDY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
scott.barrett@wilmerhale.com
whipusptopairs@wilmerhale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LAWRENCE SHERMAN
Appeal 2018-0010651
Application 13/595,664
Technology Center 3700
Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, BRANDON J. WARNER, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The citations herein refer to the Specification filed August 27, 2012
(“Spec.”), Final Office Action dated November 18, 2016 (“Final Act.”),
Appeal Brief filed April 21, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”), Examiner’s Answer dated
September 7, 2017 (“Ans.”), Reply Brief filed November 7, 2017 (“Reply
Br.”), and Oral Hearing Transcript dated October 3, 2019 (“Tr.”).
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–12, 14, 15, 18–22, 24, and 25. An
oral hearing was held on September 19, 2019.
We have jurisdiction under § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 10, and 15 are independent. Independent claim 1,
reproduced below with numbering added in brackets, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter.
1. A computer-implemented crowdsourced method for
personalized electronic education of a plurality of students by
receiving explanations from a crowd over one or more networks,
the method comprising:
[1] defining, by one or more processors, a plurality of
learning profiles, wherein each of the learning profiles is defined
based on characteristics of at least one of the plurality of students,
and wherein each of the learning profiles is stored in an
electronic storage;
[2] performing, by the one or more processors, a
computerized assessment of each of the plurality of students to
determine a knowledge deficit of each of the plurality of students
associated with at least one of a plurality of concepts;
[3] pairing, by the one or more processors, at least one of
the plurality of learning profiles with each of the plurality of
students;
[4] requesting, over the one or more networks by the one
or more processors, explanations directed towards a first learning
profile of the plurality of learning profiles and a first concept of

2 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the inventor and applicant, Lawrence Sherman, as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

3
the plurality of concepts, by crowdsourcing the explanations
from a plurality of individuals;
[5] receiving, at the one or more processors, a plurality of
computerized explanation submissions from the plurality of
individuals via the one or more networks, each of the explanation
submissions including information entered by an individual
specifying that the explanation submission relates to the first
concept and is directed towards the first learning profile;
[6] associating, by the one or more processors, each of the
received computerized explanation submissions with at least the
first learning profile;
[7] providing, over the one or more networks by the one
or more processors, a first of the received computerized
explanation submissions for presentation to a first group of
students, and a second of the received computerize explanation
submissions for presentation to a second group of students, after
[8] determining that each student in the first and second groups
of students is paired with the first learning profile;
[9] evaluating, by the one or more processors, an
understanding of the first concept by each of the first and second
groups of students after the first and second computerized
explanation submissions have been presented;
[10] rating, by the one or more processors, each of the at
least two computerized explanation submissions based on the
evaluation;
[11] selecting, by the one or more processors, the first
computerized explanation submission as the best explanation for
the first concept and the first learning profile based on the ratings
of the first and second computerized explanation submissions;
[12] providing, over the one or more networks by the one
or more processors, the selected computerized explanation
submission to a student to teach the student the first concept;
[13] providing, over the one or more networks by the one
or more processors, a third computerized explanation submission
for presentation to a third group of students after
[14] determining that each student in the third group of students
is paired with the first learning profile, wherein the third
computerized explanation submission relates to the first concept
and is directed towards the first learning profile;
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

4
[15] rating, by the one or more processors, the third
computerized explanation submission based on an evaluation of
an understanding of the first concept by the third group of
students after the third computerized explanation submission has
been presented; and
[16] replacing the selected computerized explanation
submission with the third computerized explanation submission
as the best explanation for the first concept and the first learning
profile after [17] comparing the rating of the third computerized
explanation submission with a rating associated with the selected
computerized explanation submission.
Appeal Br., Claims App.

REJECTION3
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1, 4–12, 14, 15,
18–22, 24, 25 101 eligibility

ANALYSIS
Principles of Law
35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit
exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.” E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)

3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1, 4–12, 14, 15,
18–22, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Ans. 2.
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

5
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
To “distinguish[] patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts,” the Supreme Court, in Alice, reaffirmed the
two-step analysis previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step of the analysis considers whether a claim is directed to a
patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at
77). According to Supreme Court precedent, concepts determined to be
abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of
organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (id. at
219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical formulas
(Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes
(Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)).
The Supreme Court has also made clear “[a] claim drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it
uses a mathematical formula.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
In that same case, the Supreme Court cautioned that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. at 191(citing Benson and Flook).
If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, we turn to the second step
of the Alice framework. The second step considers whether the claim recites
an inventive concept—an element or combination of elements sufficient to
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

6
ensure the claim amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea and
transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 78, 79). “A claim that
recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea].’” Id. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
USPTO Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (“2019 Revised Guidance”), 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal
agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also
October 2019 Update supra at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas, i.e., (a) mathematical concepts, (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice,
and (c) mental processes, (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and

4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019
Update”), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_
2019_update.pdf.
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

7
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. The evaluation under
Step 2A, Prong Two is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55
(Section III(A)(2)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
“Step 2B,” to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.

Independent Claim 1
In rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as patent
ineligible, the Examiner analyzes the claim using the Alice two-step
framework. Final Act. 3–6; Ans. 3–6. Pursuant to the first step, the
Examiner determines the claim is directed to a computer-implemented
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

8
crowdsourced method for personalized electronic education of a plurality of
students by receiving explanations from a crowd over one or more networks,
which is similar to other concepts that the courts have identified as abstract
ideas and, therefore, is an abstract idea. Ans. 3–5. Under the second step,
the Examiner determines the claim does not amount to significantly more
than the abstract idea because the additional elements, namely one or more
processors and one or more networks, are recited at a high level of
generality. Id. at 5. According to the Examiner, the claim, considered in
view of the Specification, requires only off-the-shelf, conventional computer
components to perform the recited functions. Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 19–26).
The Examiner further determines there is no indication that the combination
of claim elements improves the function of a computer or any other
technology. Id. at 6.
As an initial matter, Appellant’s argument that “the ordered
combination recited in claim 1 confines the claim to a particular useful
application for providing online personalized education” (Appeal Br. 19) is
not persuasive of error. Although particularity, i.e., preemption, may be the
concern behind the judicial exceptions to statutory subject matter,
preemption is not the test for eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made
clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions
to patentability. For this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and
resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Step 2A, Prong One: Recitation of a Judicial Exception, e.g., an
Abstract Idea
Under Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
consider whether independent claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

9
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. For abstract ideas, we contemplate whether a
claim limitation or combination of limitations falls within the enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance. Id.
Independent claim 1 includes several limitations reciting concepts that
can be performed in the human mind, i.e., limitations [1]–[3], [6], [8]–[11],
and [14]–[17]. As recited in limitation [1], “defining . . . a plurality of
learning profiles, wherein each of the learning profiles is defined based on
characteristics of at least one of the plurality of students” is an evaluation of
learning profiles relative to characteristics of at least one of the plurality of
students. Similarly, “performing . . . a[n] . . . assessment of each of the
plurality of students to determine a knowledge deficit of each of the plurality
of students associated with at least one of a plurality of concepts” as recited
in limitation [2], is an evaluation to ascertain a knowledge deficiency. These
types of evaluations can be performed in the human mind.
“[P]airing . . . at least one of the plurality of learning profiles with
each of the plurality of students,” as recited in limitation [3], is a judgment
to pair a particular learning profile with a particular student. The recitation
of “associating . . . each of the received . . . explanation submissions with at
least the first learning profile” in limitation [6] is a judgment to associate
each of the received explanation submissions with the first learning profile.
These judgments can be done mentally.
Limitation [8] recites “determining that each student in the first and
second groups of students is paired with the first learning profile,” and
limitation [14] similarly recites “determining that each student in the third
group of students is paired with first learning profile.” Each of these
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

10
determinations is observing a pairing, and such an observation can be
performed in the mind.
Limitation [9] recites “evaluating . . . an understanding of the first
concept by each of the first and second groups of students after the first and
second . . . explanation submissions have been presented,” and the recited
evaluation can be performed mentally. Limitation [17] recites “comparing
the rating of the third . . . explanation submission with a rating associated
with the selected . . . explanation submission,” and the comparison is also an
evaluation that can be performed mentally.
Limitations [10] and [15] recite “rating . . . each of the at least
two . . . explanation submissions based on the evaluation” and “rating . . . the
third . . . explanation submission based on an evaluation of an understanding
of the first concept by the third group of students after the
third . . . explanation submission has been presented,” respectively. Rating
an electronic submission based on an evaluated understanding is an
evaluation of the electronic submission relative to the evaluated
understanding, and such an evaluation of the electronic submission can be
done in the human mind.
Limitation [11] recites “selecting . . . the first . . . explanation
submission as the best explanation for the first concept and the first learning
profile based on the ratings of the first and second . . . explanation
submissions,” and limitation [16] recites “replacing the
selected . . . explanation submission with the third . . . explanation
submission as the best explanation for the first concept and the first learning
profile.” Selecting the best explanation is a mental judgment.
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

11
Concepts that can be performed in the human mind, including
observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, are mental processes, which
is one of the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas in the 2019 Revised
Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52. In view of these limitations reciting
mental processes, independent claim 1 recites abstract ideas.
Furthermore, limitation [4] of independent claim 1 recites
“requesting . . . explanations directed towards a first learning profile of the
plurality of learning profiles and a first concept of the plurality of concepts,
by crowdsourcing the explanations from a plurality of individuals.” Appeal
Br., Claims App. Crowdsourcing explanations directed to a first learning
profile and a first concept is leveraging or managing a social activity to
obtain a certain type of information. According to the 2019 Revised
Guidance, managing interactions between people, including social activities,
falls within the enumerated grouping of abstract ideas for certain methods of
organizing human activity. 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52. Thus, this limitation of
independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Appellant argues the Examiner fails to articulate the abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 2–5. Appellant’s argument does not persuade
us of error because independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea for the
reasons above.
In view of the foregoing, limitations [1]–[4], [6], [8]–[11], and
[14]–[17] recite abstract ideas. Thus, independent claim 1 recites a judicial
exception.
Step 2A, Prong Two: Integration into a Practical Application
Having determined that independent claim 1 recites a judicial
exception, we next consider whether the claim recites any additional
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

12
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. More specifically, we
evaluate any additional elements, individually or in combination, to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application,
using one or more of the considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit and set forth in MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h). Id.
Apart from the limitations reciting abstract ideas, which we identify
above in accordance with the analysis under Step 2A, Prong One,
independent claim 1 includes limitations reciting receiving and providing
data, i.e., limitations [5], [7], [12], and [13]. Receiving and sending data,
however, are extra-solution activities that are incidental to the crowdsourced
method for personalized electronic education of independent claim 1.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31; MPEP § 2106.05(g)(3).
Extra-solution activity is insufficient for integration into a practical
application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Limitations [1]–[17] also recite computing components, namely “one
or more processors,” “one or more networks,” and “electronic storage.”
The limitations further recite a “computerized” assessment and
“computerized” explanation submissions. Under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, if an additional element, alone or in combination, implements a
judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a
particular machine, then the additional element may integrate the judicial
exception in a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. However, a general
purpose computer that applies a judicial exception via conventional
computer functions does not qualify as a particular machine. MPEP
§ 2106.05(b)(I). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the computing
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

13
components are recited at a high level of generality, without any meaningful
detail about their structure or configuration. Ans. 5; Spec. ¶¶ 19–26. To the
extent that Appellant asserts the computing components enable a more
robust approach for personalized education (Tr. 5:1–7), computing
components that perform tasks more quickly or accurately nonetheless fail to
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 701 (2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more
quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”).
Accordingly, the recited computing components do not reflect a particular
machine.
As also set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance, if an additional
element, alone or in combination, reflects an improvement in the functioning
of a computer or an improvement to another technology or technical field,
then the additional element may integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant
argues the claimed invention is directed to an improvement in computer
capabilities. Appeal Br. 15–19; Reply Br. 5–6. Specifically, Appellant
asserts that
claim 1 recites a particular ordered combination of computerized
steps that, together, serve to improve a computer’s ability to
crowdsource data (e.g., computerized explanation submissions)
in order to gather explanations directed at a particular concept
and a particular student’s characteristics (as defined in a stored
learning profile for a student), and then to filter the data to
identify one explanation to present in teaching the concept to a
student.
Appeal Br. 17 (citing Spec. ¶ 18). Appellant similarly contends the
claimed invention changes the way the computer performs by
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

14
combining crowdsourcing, the use of learning profiles, and a specific
iterative process to refine explanations of a concept to specific
learning profiles. Tr. 8:19–23.
Although the claimed invention may provide an improvement, the
improvement is to personalized education. The claimed invention improves
personalized education by leveraging crowdsourcing to generate explanation
submissions for a particular concept and using an iterative process to
personalize the submissions to specific learning profiles. As set forth in the
Specification, “the crowdsourcing of explanation submissions and the
automatic curation of received explanation submissions can provide
electronic education materials that can be personalized by a learning profile
of an individual student or group of students.” Spec. ¶ 18. The claimed
invention changes the way the computer operates only to the extent it
implements the improved personalized education scheme. In other words,
the recited computing components are simply tools to implement an
improved personalized education scheme that takes advantage of
crowdsourcing and iterative filtering. Thus, the recited computing
components, alone and in combination, do not reflect not an improvement in
the functioning of a computer or an improvement to another technology or
technical field.
For these reasons, independent claim 1 does not include any
additional elements, considered individually and in combination, that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Consequently,
independent claim 1, as a whole, is directed to a judicial exception.
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

15
Step 2B: Well-understood, routine, and conventional
As independent claim 1 recites a judicial exception and does not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, we consider
whether the claim includes any additional elements, alone or in combination,
that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appellant argues “[t]he ordered
combination recited in claim 1 was not well-understood, routine, or
conventional.” Appeal Br. 19. According to Appellant, the prior art of
record does not teach or suggest the combination of steps recited in the
claim. Id.; Reply Br. 8.
This step of the analysis, however, considers only additional elements,
as limitations reciting a judicial exception cannot supply an inventive
concept. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73 (requiring “a process that focuses
upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination
of elements, sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the natural law itself” (emphasis added)); BSG Tech. LLC v.
BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”); Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (“[A]nd
Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal
Circuit] which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged
‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.).” The additional elements recited in
independent claim 1, considered alone and in combination, simply append
Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

16
well-understood, routine, conventional activities known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality.
As set forth above, limitations [5], [7], [12], and [13] recite receiving
and providing data, and are additional elements apart from a judicial
exception. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that off-the-shelf,
conventional computer components can perform the functions of receiving
and providing data recited in these limitations. Ans. 5; see also In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming.”).
Independent claim 1 also recites various computing components,
which are also additional elements. As we previously discuss, these
computing components are recited and described at a high level of
generality. Spec. ¶¶ 19–26. Furthermore, the recited computing
components do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the
computer. Cf. id. ¶ 18 (describing an improvement to personalized
education). Thus, independent claim 1 does not include any additional
elements, alone or in combination, that represent something other than
well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field.
In view of the foregoing, independent claim 1 is directed to a judicial
exception without significantly more to transform the nature of the claim
into a patent-eligible application. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of
independent claim 1.

Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

17
Claims 4–12, 14, 15, 18–22, 24, and 25
For independent claims 10 and 15, Appellant relies on its arguments
for independent claim 1. Appeal Br. 20; Reply Br. 9. Appellant does not
present arguments for dependent claims 4–9, 11, 12, 14, 18–22, 24, and 25
apart from its arguments for the independent claims. Appeal Br. 20; Reply
Br. 20. Accordingly, for the same reasons as independent claim 1, Appellant
does not apprise us of error, and we similarly sustain the rejection of
claims 4–12, 14, 15, 18–22, 24, and 25.

CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 for the reasons above. We sustain the rejection of
claims 4–9, 11, 12, 14, 18–22, 24, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the
same reasons as independent claim 1.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–12, 14,
15, 18–22,
24, 25
101 eligibility
1, 4–12,
14, 15,
18–22, 24,
25

Overall
Outcome:
1, 4–12,
14, 15,
18–22, 24,
25

Appeal 2018-001065
Application 13/595,664

18
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED