01A12980
07-25-2002
LaShawn M. Knowles, Complainant, v. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.
LaShawn M. Knowles v. Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation
Administration)
01A12980
July 25, 2002
.
LaShawn M. Knowles,
Complainant,
v.
Norman Y. Mineta,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation
(Federal Aviation Administration),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A12980
Agency No. DOT 2-99-2073
Hearing No. 100-A0-7817x
DECISION
This appeal involves a dispute between LaShawn M. Knowles (�complainant�)
and the Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration)
(�the agency�). At all relevant times, complainant worked as a Contract
Specialist in the agency's Office of Acquisitions in Washington, DC.
On or around April 1, 1999, she filed a formal complaint alleging that
the agency had discriminated against her on the bases of her race (African
American) and sex (female) by subjecting her to disparate treatment and/or
a hostile work environment from the period of December 1998 through
January 21, 1999. Complainant claimed that she endured a pattern of
discriminatory harassment and/or disparate treatment exemplified by
(among other things) (1) a selecting panel's failure to choose her for
a TSSC Contracting Officer position; (2) her supervisor's refusal to
correct her time and attendance records so that she would be paid for
overtime and compensatory time worked; and (3) the agency's unwillingness
to promote her temporarily (and compensate her accordingly) while she
was detailed as an acting team leader. Complainant was thus alleging
that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(�Title VII�), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The agency issued an investigative report on these allegations on or
around April 28, 2000. After receiving this report, complainant requested
a hearing before an administrative judge (�the AJ�) from the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (�EEOC� or �the Commission�).
However, after reviewing the relevant record, the AJ issued a decision
on this matter without first holding a hearing. This AJ ruling, dated
February 20, 2001, found that the agency had not discriminated against
complainant as she claimed. The agency subsequently adopted this summary
judgment decision in full in a final agency order (�FAO�).
Complainant then filed a timely notice challenging this FAO, which we
accepted and docketed as this appeal. We accepted complainant's appeal,
and are now issuing this decision, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
We are charged with reviewing the AJ's decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of the agency (and the FAO implementing it) de novo (or �anew�).
See EEO Management Directive for C.F.R. 29 Part 1614 (rev. Nov. 9, 1999)
(�EEO MD-110�), at 9-16. This essentially means that we look at the
case with fresh eyes. We are free to accept or reject at will the AJ's
(and agency's) legal and factual conclusions � including conclusions
on the ultimate fact of whether intentional race-based or sex-based
discrimination occurred.
That said, the task before us is really to determine whether the
AJ's decision to rule in favor of the agency without first holding a
hearing was proper. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a
decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is
patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given
the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,
there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). An issue of fact is �genuine�
if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in
favor of the non-moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986); see also Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105
(1st Cir. 1988). A fact is �material� if it has the potential to affect
the outcome of the case. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's (and an EEOC administrative judge's) function is not to weigh
the evidence, but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues
for trial (i.e., a hearing). 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the
non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all
justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting
evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an
administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment
only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed
for summary disposition.
After analyzing all the evidence in this record and considering the merits
of this complaint, we believe the AJ did err in issuing a summary judgment
in this case. There are several outstanding genuine issues of material
fact which the AJ either did not address or dismissed. In addition,
the AJ weighed the credibility of the various parties, credited the
non-moving party's (i.e., the agency's) version of facts, and failed to
view the evidence in the light most favorable to complainant.
For example, complainant was alleging (at least in part) that the agency
failed to select her for the TSSC Contracting Officer position because
she is an African American woman. In her investigative affidavit,
complainant claims that the selecting official for the position (who
ultimately chose an African American male for the job instead of
complainant) told her that complainant:
had just had a baby and maybe will have more in the future and he [the
selecting official] did not think that TSSC would be a good position
for me because it required too much travel. He stated that wom[e]n
should be home taking care [of] their children. He stated that one of
the reasons why he was divorced is that his ex-wife did not clean his
home and take care of his child in a proper manner . . . .
[This selecting official also] stated that in his experience, men,
especially black men, had difficulty being supervised and taking direction
from a black wom[a]n supervisor. Therefore, since the TSSC team was an
all male Program Team which two members were black men and two were white
men, he felt that this was not a good position for me a black woman.
[He] stated that he felt that the all-male team would not show respect
to me as a supervisor . . . .
Complainant's Affidavit (Apr. 7, 2000), at 2.
The AJ made no mention of this purported direct evidence of discrimination
in issuing a summary judgment finding of no discrimination on this
issue. However, the AJ credited (despite complainant's assertions to
the contrary) the agency's self-serving reasons for failing to select
complainant for the TSSC role (i.e., that she was not qualified for the
job), for refusing to correct complainant's time and attendance records
(i.e., that she was asking to be paid for overtime and compensatory
time that had not been pre-approved), and for omitting to promote her
temporarily while she served as an acting team leader (i.e., that there
was a freeze on temporary promotions in effect at the time). The AJ
even adopted as fact an agency official's statement that �any �hostile
environment' for [complainant], if it existed, was brought on by herself.�
AJ's Decision (Feb. 20, 2001), at 4. Yet whether complainant created her
own hostile environment, whether she was not qualified for the TSSC role,
whether she failed to secure permission for overtime and compensatory
time worked, and whether there was a freeze on temporary promotions at
the time complainant was detailed as an acting team leader � these are
all questions that can only properly be answered by an AJ who holds a
hearing and then weighs the credibility of the various parties on the
relevant underlying issues.
We have noted often in the past that a hearing is intended to be an
extension of the investigative process itself, and is designed to
�ensure that the parties have a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain and supplement the record and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.� EEO MD-110, at 7-1. �Truncation of this process, while
material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is
still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full and
fair investigation of [his] claims.� Erickson v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A1149 (Oct. 31, 2001); Valdez v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A11835 (Oct. 26, 2001);
and Trimble v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A01124
(Aug. 22, 2001). That is exactly what happened here. For this reason,
summary judgment in favor of the agency was premature and improper.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the AJ's decision and FAO are vacated and this case is
remanded to the appropriate hearings unit for a hearing on complainant's
complaint, consistent with the ORDER below.
ORDER
The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the appropriate EEOC field
office the request for a hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of
the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit
a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen
(15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency
shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the
address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted
to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the AJ (or whichever administrative
judge is appointed to conduct the hearing) shall hold a hearing on the
claim(s) originally accepted by the agency for investigation. The AJ
shall then issue a decision in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109, and
the agency shall issue a final action on this AJ decision in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar
days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall
be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C.
20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and
the agency must send a copy of all submissions to complainant. If the
agency does not comply with the Commission's order, complainant may
petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. See 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(a). Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to
enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following
an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,
1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, complainant has the
right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance
with the paragraph below entitled �Right to File A Civil Action.� See
29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or
a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline
stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c). If complainant files a civil action,
the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition
for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be
filed with the Office of Federal Operations within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; EEO MD-110, at 9-18. All requests and arguments
must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.
In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be
deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the
expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of the
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of complainant's complaint. However, if complainant wishes
to file a civil action, complainant has the right to file such action
in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90)
calendar days from the date that complainant receives this decision.
In the alternative, complainant may file a civil action after one
hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date complainant filed
complainant's complaint with the agency, or filed complainant's appeal
with the Commission. If complainant files a civil action, complainant
must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the
official agency head or department head, identifying that person by
his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of complainant's case in court. �Agency� or �department�
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility
or department in which complainant works. Filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of the complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If complainant decides to file a civil action, and if complainant does
not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, complainant may
request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent complainant and
that the Court permit complainant to file the action without payment
of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial
of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a
request for an attorney does not extend complainant's time in which
to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above entitled
�Right to File A Civil Action.�
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
July 25, 2002
__________________
Date