LAM RESEARCH CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2020

14720595 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/720,595 05/22/2015 Tuan Nguyen LAMRP202/3690-1US 5957
83422 7590 09/03/2020
WEAVER AUSTIN VILLENEUVE & SAMPSON - LAMR/NOVL
P.O. BOX 70250
OAKLAND, CA 94612-0250
EXAMINER
HORNING, JOEL G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1712
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@wavsip.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TUAN NGUYEN, EASHWAR RANGANATHAN,
SHANKAR SWAMINATHAN, ADRIEN LAVOIE,
CHLOE BALDASSERONI, RAMESH CHANDRASEKHARAN,
FRANK L. PASQUALE, and JENNIFER L. PETRAGLIA
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
Technology Center 1700
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, DONNA M. PRAISS, and BRIAN D. RANGE,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1 and 3–15. Claims 2 and 16–42 are
canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Lam
Research Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a fill on demand ampoule method that will
refill an ampoule with precursor concurrent with the performance of other
deposition processes using a secondary fill stop condition that involves
determining when the cumulative time of filling exceeds a threshold.
Abstract; Spec. ¶ 5. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method for filling an ampoule of a substrate processing
apparatus, the method comprising:

(a) determining that an ampoule fill start condition for
filling the ampoule with a liquid precursor is met;

(b) filling the ampoule with precursor, wherein filling the
ampoule with the precursor is performed concurrent with at least
one other substrate processing operation;

(c) determining that a sensor level in the ampoule indicates
that the ampoule is not full, wherein a primary fill stop condition
is met when the sensor level in the ampoule indicates that the
ampoule is full;

(d) maintaining a cumulative time of filling the ampoule,
wherein the cumulative time of filling the ampoule is all of the
time that precursor is flowing to the ampoule since the
cumulative time of filling the ampoule was last reset, wherein the
cumulative time of filling the ampoule is reset when the sensor
level in the ampoule indicates that the ampoule is full;

(e) determining that a secondary fill stop condition is met,
wherein the secondary fill stop condition comprises determining
that the cumulative time of filling exceeds a threshold; and

(f) in response to determining that the secondary fill stop
condition is met and in response to determining that the sensor
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
3
level in the ampoule indicates that the ampoule is not full,
ceasing the filling of the ampoule with the precursor.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Kuckens et al. US 3,669,312 June 13, 1972
Ludwig US 2005/0173016 A1 Aug. 11, 2005
Paranjpe et al. US 2012/0216712 A1 Aug. 30, 2012
Yudovsky et al. US 2015/0299858 A1 Oct. 22, 2015
REJECTIONS
Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite
for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
Claims 1 and 4–15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Yudovsky in view of Paranjpe in view of Kuckens.
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Yudovsky, Paranjpe, and Kuckens further in view of Ludwig.
OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
The Examiner finds that the claim term “soft shutdown” in claim 5 is
a relative term which renders the claim indefinite because the term “soft
shutdown” is not defined by the claim, the Specification does not provide a
standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the
art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Final
Act. 3.
Appellant contends that the phrase “soft shutdown” is not an
indefinite term because the Specification concretely describes this phrase in
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
4
two full paragraphs with the heading “Soft shutdown.” Appeal Br. 7; see
Spec. ¶¶ 84, 86, 87.
The Examiner further finds that claim 5 is unclear “how hard a
shutdown needs to be in order to not be a ‘soft shutdown’ (and that is even if
it was known in which metric softness was measured for this purpose). The
metes and bounds of the claim are unclear and claim 5 is indefinite.” Ans. 3.
The test for definiteness is whether “those skilled in the art would
understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the
specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d
1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Language in a claim is unclear if, when given
its broadest reasonable interpretation, it “is ambiguous, vague, incoherent,
opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed
invention,” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014), or if it is
“is amenable to two or more plausible claim constructions,” Ex parte
Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1211 (BPAI 2008) (precedential).
We agree with Appellant that the claim term “soft shutdown” is not
indefinite. From the multiple examples set forth in the Specification, skilled
artisans would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of
the Specification. The Specification makes clear that a “soft shutdown” is
less than a “hard shutdown” which results in an immediate and sudden
shutdown. Spec. ¶ 86.

35 U.S.C. § 103
Claims 1 and 4–15
Appellant argues claim 1 provides an ampoule and/or associated
apparatus capable of making the determinations of claim 1. Such
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
5
ampoule/apparatus would have to include (i) functionality for maintaining a
cumulative time of filling, (ii) functionality for determining that the
cumulative time of filling exceeds a threshold, and (iii) a sensor level in the
ampoule capable of indicating that the ampoule is not full. Appeal Br. 7–8.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the prior art does not teach or
suggest “us[ing] both determinations of clauses (c) and (e) of claim 1 for
some purpose, as recited in clause (f). Clearly, the art does not suggest such
operation, and particularly does not suggest using the recited combination of
determinations for the purpose of ‘ceasing the filling of the ampoule.’”
Appeal Br. 8; see generally Reply Br. 3–6.
The Examiner maintains that the Kuckens reference teaches counting
with a timer and dispensing fluid until the duration reaches a threshold (a
total cumulative filling time, where the timer restarts for the next filling
operation) which ends the flow of fluid, in order to produce very controlled
amounts of fluid to be dispensed. Final Act. 6. Additionally, the Examiner
relies upon extrinsic evidence to define the terms “fill level” and “overfill
level” as used by Paranjpe, specifically API 2350 “Overfill Protection for
Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities” 49 CFR 195.428(c). Ans. 4–5.
Appellant contends that the Examiner had ample opportunity to present the
new evidence earlier and that the Examiner failed to establish this new
evidence is combinable with the Paranjpe reference. Reply Br. 6.
We agree with Appellant and find that the Examiner did not rely upon
terms “fill level” and “overfill level” as being well-known in petroleum
storage facilities in the grounds of the rejection. See In re Hoch, 428 F.2d
1341, 1342 n.3 (CCPA 1970) (“Where a reference is relied on to support a
rejection, whether or not in a ‘minor capacity,’ there would appear to be no
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
6
excuse for not positively including the reference in the statement of the
rejection.”). As a result, we do not consider the Examiner’s extrinsic
evidence concerning petroleum storage facilities in combination with the
cited prior art references concerning multiple level determinations in
refilling an ampoule.
The Examiner’s rejection is based upon an end-use dispensing
metered volumes of fluid (milk) and the corresponding use of a timer during
dispensing. Ans. 7–8. The Examiner’s reliance on Kuckens’ “dispensing”
to reject the claimed “refilling” an ampoule using a timer in combination
with fill sensors is not supported by sufficient reasoning. We agree with
Appellant that the limited timing circuitry of the Kuckens reference does not
teach or suggest the use of a cumulative time as required by claim 1.
Although the Kuckens reference teaches time as a variable in control of fluid
flow and capacity, the Examiner has not provided sufficient reasoning for
using a cumulative time of fluid flow in the refilling process of an ampoule
as claimed.
Appellant further argues that “the Examiner takes too many logical
leaps from the cited references.” Reply Br. 6. We agree with Appellant that
the Examiner has not adequately explained how the references describe or
support the Examiner’s conclusions. Id.
At best, the Paranjpe reference discloses the use of two values in
determining refill of precursor delivery system, where the:
precursor delivery system may also have provisions for
connecting an external bulk-refill system 650 that periodically
fills the ampoule from an external tank 652 having a solution
654. To enable automated operation, the ampoule may have one
or more level sensors 656 that allow the user to set the low, high
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
7
and overfill (alarm) levels. This is in addition to, or instead of,
the pressure gage 617 that may also serve a similar function.
Paranjpe ¶ 89 (emphasis added). The Examiner does not adequately explain
why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have replaced Paranjpe’s
pressure gage with Kuckens’ timer circuitry where the timer in the
combination with Paranjpe would use cumulative time as a failsafe alarm for
refilling the uses cumulative time as a failsafe alarm for refilling an ampoule
of independent claim 1.
As a result, Appellant’s arguments identify error in the Examiner’s
factual findings and conclusion of obviousness based upon the proffered
combination of prior art teachings. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
rejection of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 4–15 as set forth by
the Examiner in the rejection.
Claim 3
With respect to dependent claim 3, Appellant argues that “modifying
Kuckens with Ludwig improperly changes the principle of operation of
Kuckens.” Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant contends that the Examiner has not provided any rationale
regarding “tailing” and the proffered rationale that
it would have been obvious to . . . interrupt the step of dispensing
the source material into the ampoule in the process of Yudovsky
in view of Paranjpe in view of Kuckens in order to be able to
measure the tail and thus more accurately dispense the amount
of liquid required into the ampoule [is unsupported].
Appeal Br. 13–14 citing Final Act. 9–10.
The Examiner relies upon the Ludwig reference to teach and suggest a
refilling in two distinct refill steps rather than a single step, but the Examiner
has not identified how the Ludwig reference teaches or suggests the claimed
Appeal 2019-005738
Application 14/720,595
8
“wherein the cumulative time of filling is temporarily stopped one or more
times when ampoule refill temporarily ceases and deposition commences,
but the cumulative time of filling resumes when filling starts again.”
(Emphases added). Nor does the Examiner identify how the Ludwig
reference remedies the noted deficiency in the base combination. As a
result, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent
claim 3.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection is reversed and the
Examiner’s obviousness rejections are reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§ Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
5 112(b) Indefiniteness 5
1, 4–15 103 Yudovsky, Paranjpe, Kuckens, 1, 4–15
3 103
Yudovsky,
Paranjpe, Kuckens,
Ludwig
3
Overall
Outcome 1, 3–15

REVERSED