Lafayette Steel Erectors, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 26, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 1220 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lafayette Steel Erectors, Inc. and Joseph E. Spain
and Harold P. Puderer. Cases 15-CA-7822 and
15-CA-7835
March 26, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS FANNING AND HUNTER
On November 10, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge J. Pargen Robertson issued the attached De-
cision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions and sup-
porting briefs, and Respondent filed a brief in re-
sponse to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Lafayette Steel Erectors, Inc., Scott, Louisiana, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(b) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and re-
ports, and all other records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order."
' Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
violated Sec. 8(aXI) of the Act by discharging Joseph Spain, we rely on
his conclusion that Respondent's motive for discharging Spain was
Spain's protests over unsafe working conditions. We therefore find it un-
necessary to pass on his interpretation of Plastilite Corporation, 153 NLRB
180 (1965), and Tamara Foods. Inc., 258 NLRB 1307 (1981).
260 NLRB No. 160
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees be-
cause of their protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended.
WE WILL offer Joseph Spain immediate and
full reinstatement to his former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges.
WE WILL make Joseph Spain whole for any
loss of earnings he may have suffered as a
result of our discrimination against him, with
interest.
LAFAYETTE STEEL ERECTORS, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
J. PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard on August 25, 1981, in New Or-
leans, Louisiana. The charges were filed on August 18
and 27, 1980, respectively. The complaint, which issued
on November 26, 1980, alleges that Respondent terminat-
ed employees Joseph Spain and Harold Puderer on June
1, 1980, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Upon the entire record, my observation of the wit-
nesses and after due consideration of briefs filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent, I hereby make the fol-
lowing:
Findings'
The General Counsel argues that employees Spain and
Puderer were terminated because they complained about
unsafe conditions on Respondent's Gramercy, Louisiana,
job on June 1, 1980.
Respondent admitted the commerce allegation in the complaint. On
the basis of the allegations and admissions, I find that Respondent is, and
has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
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LAFAYETTE STEEL ERECTORS
Employees Spain and Puderer were referred to Re-
spondent's Gramercy job about mid-May 1980, by the
Carpenter's Union, Local 1846. Harold Puderer testified
that the job involved the construction of a coke bin out
of wood. The bin was to be used for storing coke, which
was to be used as fuel in heating aluminum. Spain de-
scribed the bin as, "pyramid-shaped," 100 to 130 feet
high.
Spain was originally employed as a foreman. Howev-
er, a week to 10 days after reporting, Respondent
changed his job from foreman to carpenter. Thereafter
Spain worked as a carpenter. Puderer worked as a car-
penter from his original referral in mid-May.
In late May, according to Puderer and Spain, they
found some safety-related OSHA documents on the job.
At Spain's suggestion those documents were distributed
to other employees. Both Spain and Puderer passed out
the documents. Spain also nailed an OSHA poster near
the ladder that employees used in reaching the dome of
the bin.
Shortly after the OSHA documents were distributed, a
representative of Respondent, ultimately identified as
David Puballs,2 addressed the employees. According to
Spain's unrebutted testimony, at the conclusion of the
meeting Puballs asked Spain if he had anything to say.
Spain told Puballs that the job was "All right with me as
long as it was safe." 3
On June 1, 1980, while working high on the dome of
the bin, Spain noticed that some of the carpenters work-
ing alongside him did not have safety belts. Spain asked
the men, "Where is your safety belts." Some of the men
replied that they did not have safety belts and, "If they
went down, they were fired." Spain asked the foreman,
Kenneth Perkins, to get the union steward, James Story.
Sometime after asking for the steward, Spain took off his
shirt and asked the men around him including Harold
Puderer and Clayton Whitfield, to take off their shirts.
Spain testified that he took off his shirt in order to get a
fast response. He said he was protesting for safety. Spain
stated that a man without his shirt can be spotted from
the ground more easily than someone without a safety
belt.' Both Spain and Puderer testified that Whitfield
took off his shirt. Spain recalled Puderer taking off his
shirt. Puderer's recollections as to his actions in that
regard appeared hazy. He testified, "I think I remember
I Both Spain and Puderer originally identified the speaker as Mr. Dela-
houssaye. However, both ultimately identified Puballs as the man they
thought to be Delahoussaye. Respondent has a Mr. Delahoussaye but De-
lahoussaye testified that he did not come to the Gramercy job until June
6, 1980.
'Puderer understood the Puballs' meeting resulted from unrest among
employees which flowed from his and Spain's distribution of the safety
documents. This does not square with Spain's recollection of Puballs'
meeting. Spain understood that Puballs' address was "on organizing the
job and . . . where it was at and how long it was going to run." I was
more impressed with Spain's demeanor than that of Puderer. Puderer
demonstrated some difficulty in recalling the facts as originally related in
his investigatory affidavit to the Region. On occasion Puderer testified
regarding facts which would have been significant, but which were not
contained in his investigatory affidavit. Therefore, to the extent Spain
and Puderer's testimony conflicts and to the extent that conflicting testi-
mony does not involve matter directly involving Puderer such as his per-
sonal involvement in the alleged concerted activities on June I, I shall
credit Spain.
'Supervisory personnel were frequently on the ground, not up high.
taking off my shirt sometime during the day, but I didn't
want to get sunburned."
Spain testified that Foreman Perkins5 and the steward
came up and he and the others were told to put on their
shirts or they would be fired. Spain said, "I will put my
shirt back on as soon as you get safety belts for those
guys on the job." The foreman agreed that he would get
safety belts for the men. Spain stated that he then put his
shirt on.
However, later that day Spain noticed "another man
along side me holding on to the beam with no safety
belt." At that point Spain again took off his shirt. Spain
and Puderer testified that Puderer had cut his shirt up so
that he was wearing only a part shirt. Clayton Whitfield
took his shirt off. Shortly thereafter, Spain was dis-
charged."6 During that same day Puderer, along with
some 12 carpenters, were laid off in a reduction in
force. 7
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Joseph Spain
The record demonstrates conclusively that on June 1,
1980, Joseph Spain engaged in a protest over what he
and at least two other employees perceived as unsafe
working conditions. The evidence is not in dispute that
Spain observed some employees working high up on the
coke bin without safety belts. Spain protested to super-
vision. Subsequently, Spain in further protest removed
his shirt and asked two other employees to remove their
shirts. Employees Puderer and Whitfield joined in the
protest. Puderer either removed or cut up his shirt and
Whitfield removed his shirt along with Spain on at least
two occasions. Spain was subsequently discharged. His
discharge followed direction from Foreman Perkins that
he would be discharged unless he put on his shirt.
Spain's June I termination slip reflects that he was dis-
charged for "insubordination."
B. Harold Puderer
The factual issues regarding Puderer present a more
difficult problem. Puderer's testimony corroborates
Spain's testimony reflecting that Spain initiated the June
I protest and that Spain was the spokesman with Fore-
man Perkins. Although Puderer and other employees
were laid off on June 1, Spain was the only employee
that was discharged. Whereas Spain's termination slip re-
flects that he was terminated because of insubordination,
Puderer's, like the slips of other laid-off employees
s Respondent admitted in its answer that Perkins "has been during cer-
tain times in the past a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act." The record shows, and I find, that Perkins was acting in a su-
pervisory capacity on June I, when he discharged Spain.
6Spain's account of his discharge and the preceding events were not
disputed by Respondent. I was impressed by his demeanor and I credit
Spain's account of those events.
? Puderer admitted having difficulty recalling when, on June 1. he was
told of his layoff.
I Both Spain and Harold Puderer testified that they had their own
safety belts which they were using on that day
9 Perkins' threat to discharge Spain was not alleged as a violation
1221
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which were received in evidence, reflects that he was
terminated because of "reduction in force."
The timing of Puderer's termination or layoff"' creates
a strong suspicion that the action flowed from his in-
volvement in the protest. Moreover, Puderer's termina-
tion slip contains the notation "Not for Rehire." Howev-
er, no evidence was offered to rebut the evidence that a
reduction in force was necessitated on June I solely be-
cause of business considerations. Moreover, the terminat-
ed slips of other employees laid off on June I contained
the notation "Not for Rehire." Additionally, no evidence
was offered to show that Puderer was treated in a dis-
parate manner in the selection process. The General
Counsel did nothing to rebut Respondent's testimony
that Puderer and the other laid-off employees were se-
lected through a regular business-related process.
Therefore, under the doctrine of Wright Line, a Divi-
sion of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083 (1981)," 1 find
that Respondent proved that Puderer would have been
terminated on June 1 absent his protected activity.
Moreover, Puderer's account of the protest raises seri-
ous questions regarding the extent of his involvement. At
various points in his testimony, Puderer expressed confu-
sion as to whether he took off his shirt on June 1. Al-
though Puderer's shirt was cut up, he admitted that the
foreman said nothing about that. Against the back-
ground, I find the evidence is insufficient to show that
Puderer's concerted activity contributed to his June 1
layoff. 12
'O In addition to timing, I find Puderer's June 7 layoff (see infra "The
Remedy"), cast additional suspicion as to Respondent's motive behind the
June I layoff On that occasion, Puderer was told by the union steward
that neither he, Spain, nor Whitfield could remain on either the night or
day shift. All other employees were permitted to remain on either of the
two shifts. However, no evidence was offered connecting the steward to
Respondent. Therefore, I cannot consider the steward's comments proba-
tive evidence in consideration of Respondent's motivation
" See Limestone Apparel Corp, 255 NLRB 722 (1981) Under my un-
derstanding of the Wright Line doctrine, regardless of the strength of
General Counsel's prima facie case, Respondent may by showing that the
alleged discriminatee would have been terminated absent protected actis-
ities, establish a conclusive defense. Unless the evidence supporting Re-
spondent's defense is either inconclusive, is discredited, or is effectively
rebutted, I must find against the General Counsel. Here, I find no basis
on which to question Respondent's evidence that Puderer was selected
for layoff on June 1 along with some 12 employees because of business
reasons. Nothing was offered to rebut that evidence. Although Respond-
ent's evidence was rather general, the General Counsel, who in this case
was represented by a most competent counsel, had all the normal proce-
dures including subpena authority and cross-examination opportunities,
available to develop the specifics behind the business motives. Nothing
was developed on the record which demonstrated any basis on which I
can question the conclusiveness of Respondent's motive evidence.
" The General Counsel makes the point that the June 2 referral of
Spain and Puderer back to the Gramercy job demonstrates the "pretex-
tual nature" of the June I reduction in force. Again, that fact raises suspi-
cion as to Respondent's motive. However, it does not necessarily follow
that a June 2 hiring of employees on the night shift shows a layoff from
the day shift on the day before was unjustified. The evidence demonstrat-
ed that reductions were not unusual on the Gramercy job and no evi-
dence was offered to show that employees were added to the day shift
until June 7. Therefore, I must determine that no evidence proved the
June I layoff was a pretext.
CONCILUSIONS OF LAW
The issues presented:'3 Did Respondent violate Section
8(a)(l) by discharging Joseph Spain on June 1, 1980, be-
cause of his protest against Respondent's employees
working at a high level without safety belts?
In the first instance I shall consider whether Spain's
June I activities were protected under the provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act. I find that his actions
were both concerted and protected. Spain acted in con-
cert with other employees including Puderer and Whit-
field. The object of the protest was a matter of employee
safety on the job-a recognized working condition.
(Service Machine & Shipbuilding Corp., 253 NLRB 628
(1980); Hintze Contracting Company, Inc., 236 NLRB 45
(1978); Richbond Community Mental Health Council, Inc.,
242 NLRB 1267 (1979); Magna Visual, 213 NLRB 162
(1974); Tamara Foods, Inc., 258 NLRB 1307 (1981).)
Secondly, I must question the credibility of Respond-
ent's asserted basis for the discharge of Spain; i.e., that
Spain's removal and refusal to replace his shirt constitut-
ed the basis for Respondent's action. The record cast
doubt on Respondent's assertion. According to Respond-
ent's defense only Spain was discharged on June 1. At
least two other employees engaged in similar conduct.
Of the two others some doubt remains as to whether
Harold Puderer actually removed his shirt. However, the
evidence is unrebutted that Clayton Whitfield removed
13 Two procedural questions were also presented. Respondent argues it
was denied due process because the General Counsel did not present it
with a proper opportunity to defend the instant charges prior to com-
plaint issuing. The General Counsel stipulated that the factual basis in
support of Respondent's arguments in this regard was correct Respond-
ent in its brief argued:
In August 1980, Charging Parties, Joseph Spain and Harold Puderer
filed separate charges with the 15th Region of the National Labor
Relations Board alleging that their employment had been terminated
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because of their protected
concerted activities (of complaining about unsafe working conditions
on the job These charges were served upon Respondent along with
a foirm cover letter. On November 26, 1980, without any further
contact with the Respondent or attempt to investigate Respondent's
position with respect to the charges. the Acting Regional Director
for the 15th Region issued a Consolidated Complaint and Notice of
Hearing. After Respondent filed its answer to complaint, the Region-
al Director, by letter of December 12, 1980, indicated that Respond-
ent would be given an opportunity to present evidence in response
to the charges. See General Counsels' Exhibit No. 2. After investiga-
tion of Respondent's position was conducted for the first time, the
Regional Director notified Respondent on April 17, 1981, that the
complaint as originally issued would stand TR. 5-12. See General
Counsel's Exhibit No. 3.
There is no doubt that the General Counsel erred in failing to fully in-
vestigate Respondent's defense prior to issuing the complaint. However,
following issuance of the complaint and long before a hearing was con-
ducted in this matter, Respondent was afforded a full opportunity to
present evidence. While the General Counsel's negligence may have re-
sulted in inconvenience to Respondent, I find that the error did not prej-
udice nor deny due process to Respondent Respondent's motion is there-
fore denied
Additionally, Respondent argued that Joseph Spain filed charges over
his discharge with Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The
dispositive portion of a letter from OSHA regarding Spain's complaint
states, "The Complaint in the above-captioned matter has been adminis-
tratively closed by this office." I find nothing herein which would justify
my ruling that a decision herein should be deferred or withheld because
of the OSHA matter. (See Vewporr News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Com-
pany. 254 NIRB 375 (1981); 7Tamara hoods, Inc., 258 NLRB 1307, 1310
(1981).)
1222
LAFAYETTE STEEL ERECTORS
his shirt at Spain's suggestion on two occasions on June
1. Whitfield may have been laid off on June 1, but on the
basis of Respondent's defense which I credit regarding
the Puderer allegations, Whitfield was not disciplined for
removing his shirt." He was laid off in a reduction-in-
force because of business reasons. Therefore, Spain, the
prime mover in the protest, was clearly treated in a dis-
parate manner. Against that backgound it is apparent,
and I find that the true reason behind Spain's discharge
was not his refusal to put on his shirt, but was his protest
against unsafe working conditions. (Jones Dairy Farm,
245 NLRB 1109 (1979); Pepsi Cola Bottling Company, 242
NLRB 265 (1979); Northway Nursing Home, 243 NLRB
544 (1979).)
In reaching the above determination I am also mindful
that Spain's actions posed no immediate danger whereas
the object of his protest, i.e., employees working without
safety belts, presented a situation with the possibility of
grave consequences. 15
In view of those possible consequences it is difficult to
fault the measures employed by Spain. "The general rule
is that the protections of Section 7 do 'not depend on the
manner in which the employees choose to press the dis-
pute, but rather on the matter they are protesting,' Plasti-
lite Corporation, 153 NLRB 180, 184 (1965)," Tamara
Foods, Inc., supra. Even if I should credit Respondent's
asserted basis for discharge, I would find that Spain's ac-
tions did not remove him from the ambit of the Act's
protection. (Jones Dairy Farm. supra.) 6
CONCI USIONS OF LAW
1. Lafayette Steel Erectors, Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent, by discharging its employee Joseph
Spain on or about June 1980, has engaged in and is en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As I
have found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
" Whitfield, unlike Spain, did not engage in discussions with the fore-
man regarding the protest Moreover, the record shows that Spain initiat-
ed the protest and continued to be its spokesman and prme mover
1" Cf Irvin H. Whitehouse & Sons Co. v. VN.LR.B., 659 F.2d 830 (7th
Cir. 1981), where the situation was unlike the instant matter in that the
protesting employees walked off the job and the object of their protest
did not "involve a hazard that suddenly arose and posed an immediate
threat to worker safety " Moreover, the basic issue in the Whitehouse case
dealt with application of grievance and no-strike provisions of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement In the instant situation no evidence swas pre-
sented giving rise to issues regarding contract provisions
" Although Spain admittedly violated one of Respondent's safety rules
by removing his shirt, that fact is "insufficient to deprive employees of a
statutory right." Tamara Foods. Inc., supra. There was no evidence that
Spain's actions violated the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement
Joseph Spain, I shall recommend that Respondent be or-
dered to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to
his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his se-
niority or other rights and privileges. I shall further rec-
ommend that Respondent be ordered to make Joseph
Spain whole for any loss of earnings he may have suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination against him. 7
Backpay shall be computed as shown in F W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as pre-
scribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977). 18
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER' 9
The Respondent, Lafayette Steel Erectors, Inc., Scott,
Louisiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging its employees because of its employ-
ees' concerted activities.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization, to form, join or assist a labor
organization, or to refrain from any and all such activi-
ties, or to engage in protected concerted activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and
found necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer Joseph Spain immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
his seniority or other rights and privileges; and make
Spain whole for any lost earnings he may have suffered
'? On June 2, 1980, Spain was again referred to Respondent's Gramer-
cy job where he worked as a carpenter on the night shift until he was
laid off on June 7. Respondent offered evidence that the June 7 layoff
was a voluntary one and that the employees, including Spain, could have
elected to remain on the night shift or transfer to the day shift Spain
admitted hearing someone say that those employees laid off from the
night crew could transfer to days. Howevei, the evidence regarding the
June 7 layoff was confused by testimony from Harold Puderer Puderer
testified that he was told of the layoff by the union steward and that the
steward said that Puderer and Spain were specifically excluded from ex-
ercising an option of remaining on either the night shift or the day shift.
Although I credit Puderer's testimony, the evidence does not reflect
whether the union steward was acting for Respondent in notifying em-
ployees of the layoff and their retention rights. Superintendent Louis De-
lahoussaye testified that he announced the layoff to the employees and
the union steward and he did not exclude any employees from working
on the day shift. The record evidence gives rise to an issue regarding Re-
spondent's obligation under my recommendation that it reinstate and
compensate Spain for lost earnings. However, the issue was not fully liti-
gated and the evidence received herein is insufficient to resolve those
questions I recommend that the issues be handled in subsequent proceed-
ings if necessary.
'"See Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
'9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall he deemed waived for all purposes
1223
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as a result of the discrimination against him in the
manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
(b) Post at its Gramercy, Louisiana, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 0 Copies of the
notice to be furnished to Respondent by the Regional
Director for Region 15 and duly signed by a representa-
tive of the Respondent shall be posted by the Respond-
20 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National L abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing at
Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
ent immediately upon receipt thereof, and shall be main-
tained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereaf-
ter, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Decison
what steps it has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it
hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not specifically found.
1224