Lacey T.,1 Complainant,v.Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Nov 1, 2016

0120160254 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 1, 2016)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Lacey T.,1
Complainant,

v.

Loretta E. Lynch,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice
(Federal Bureau of Prisons),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120160254

Hearing No. 460-2011-00140X

Agency No. P20110054

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s September 17, 2015, final order concerning
her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order finding
no discrimination.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Quality Assurance
Manager2, GS-11, at the Agency’s Federal Correctional Complex (FCC), Low Security
Facility, in Beaumont, Texas. During the relevant time, the Superintendent of Industries, at
the FCC, Low Facility, was Complainant’s first level supervisor (S1). During the relevant
time, the Low Facility produced military trousers.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
2 Quality Assurance Manager and Quality Assurance Specialist are used interchangeably throughout the
record.
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On November 30, 2010, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency
subjected her to discrimination and harassment.

Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race
(African-American), sex (female), and age (45) in the form of harassment from January
2010, through December 2010, regarding hostile and intimidating tones during
conversations, unwarranted comments, harassing phone calls, the painting of her office,
office being searched and files being moved, harassment from coworkers, work
assignments, leave [issues], and circumventing her supervisory authority.

Complainant also claimed the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex
(female), beginning on May 10, 2010, through the present in that she did not receive
equal pay for completing all of the Quality Assurance (QA) Manager duties for more
than 90 days.

Thereafter, Complainant filed an amendment to her complaint alleging that she was subjected
to harassment in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

1. On October 29, 2010, Complainant alleges her supervisor (S1) called her to her office
and told her she did not appreciate Complainant going to the Associate Warden about
S1 calling Complainant’s home on October 15, 2010. Complainant also alleged
retaliation was taken against her for contacting the Warden in 2010 regarding her
complaints against S1.

2. On November 7, 2010, Complainant alleges S1 called her in again for Complainant having
spoken to the Associate Warden.

3. On November 8, 2010, Complainant alleges S1 ordered Complainant to place the majority of
her QA inspectors in part-time status after Complainant told S1 that an inmate S1 wanted to
promote did not have the most time in grade for promotion.

4. On November 17, 2010, Complainant alleges S1 refused to let Complainant hire a
replacement worker after two workers left her crew.

5. On December 1, 2010, Complainant alleges S1 told her she needed to change her annual
leave schedule for 2011, and told her she could not request annual leave in one-day
increments but instead had to request entire weeks.

6. On December 7, 2010, Complainant alleges S1 ordered her to move Complainant’s file
cabinet claiming it was blocking a part of a window in Complainant's office.

7. On December 13, 2010 Complainant alleges S1 called Complainant to S1’s office and told
Complainant she was not authorized to have blinds in her office.

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8. On December 15, 2010, Complainant alleges S1 treated her unfairly and showed favoritism
to the Factory Manager by ordering Complainant to send her lead QA inspector back to his
unit.

9. On December 17, 2010, Complainant alleges she asked S1 to leave the institution to go see
her sister who was ill and not doing well. She alleges S1 verbally harassed and retaliated
against her during the exchange they had regarding this matter.

10. On January 6, 2011, Complainant alleges S1 called Complainant to S1’s office to tell her to
remove the blinds in her office.

11. On October 5 or 6, 2010, Complainant alleges she emailed S1 to advise S1 that she was
going to write up an inmate for his attitude in a discussion with her and S1 told her not to
write up the inmate.

The Agency accepted Complainant’s complaint of harassment. With regard to her amendment,
the Agency determined the allegations of continued harassment were additional evidence in
support of her underlying claim of harassment and did not raise a new claim in and of itself.
With regard to the equal pay claim, the Agency dismissed that claim on the grounds it was
untimely raised.

At the conclusion of the investigation on the accepted claims, the Agency provided
Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a
hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant requested a hearing. On September 24, 2012, an EEOC AJ (AJ1) reinstated
Complainant’s equal pay claim.

On June 25, 2013, another EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ2) removed Complainant’s case
from the docket and returned the matter to the Agency for a supplemental investigation on
Complainant’s claim of retaliation. Thereafter, a supplemental investigation was conducted on
Complainant’s claim of retaliation.

AJ2 held a hearing on July 16, 2015, and issued a decision the same day. With regard to
Complainant’s claim that she was subjected to discrimination and harassment from January
2010 through December 2010, the AJ found Complainant did not identify an employee outside
of her protected categories who was treated more favorably under similar circumstances. The
AJ found that the evidence provided by the witnesses, including those called by Complainant,
established there was a personality conflict between Complainant and S1. The AJ noted that
Complainant did not agree with S1’s approach and resisted her managerial effort. The AJ
found the hostile words and tones were exchanged by Complainant and S1 as described by
Person C. The AJ stated that Complainant and S1 could often be heard shouting behind closed
doors. However, the AJ recognized that S1 also engaged in this behavior with Person A, who
is not the same race as Complainant. The AJ noted the office was painted, file cabinets were
moved, and blinds removed at the direction of the Warden and not S1. The AJ found that any
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other issues at the job-site were caused by miscommunication or were explained by the
Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory rationales. In addition, the AJ
noted the record was completely devoid of any epithets, comments, jokes, or references to
Complainant’s race, sex, or age.

The AJ also stated that even though it was not an accepted claim, Complainant failed to
document her health issues and never supported her need for an accommodation or requested
FMLA (Family Medical Leave Act). The AJ noted that Complainant testified that S1
requested medical verification of the need for leave and Complainant responded that that was
not fair. The AJ noted that on other occasions S1 contacted personnel to ensure that she was
following the correct procedures. The AJ stated that instead of viewing these actions as
necessary administrative duties, Complainant saw them as harassment. The AJ disagreed with
Complainant.

With regard to Complainant’s equal pay claim, the AJ found Complainant had not established
that she did equal work for a time period which would entitle her to damages. The AJ noted
that the Assistant Human Resources Manager (HR Manager), who was called by Complainant,
indicated that an employee must perform at a higher graded position for more than 120 days to
qualify for a promotion to that higher grade.

The AJ noted Complainant performed some of the Comparative’s duties, but assumed his
position at the Medium Security factory after it was shut down. Moreover, the AJ noted that
the Comparative’s GS-12 position was abolished and he was retained at the GS-12 level with
special permission. The AJ noted, however, that Complainant was never a GS-12. Thus, the
AJ specified that the special permission did not apply to her.

With regard to the amended complaint, the AJ found that most of the claims were caused by
the strained relationship between S1 and Complainant. The AJ noted that Complainant’s own
witnesses provided evidence which defeated her claim. The AJ noted that Person A, who is
not African-American, spoke of shouting behind closed doors with S1. The AJ noted Person A
also had to remove her blinds and a plant because it blocked a window.

In addition, the AJ noted that with respect to the call to Complainant’s home, the AJ found that
one call to her home to determine her whereabouts does not rise to the level of severity
required to establish a hostile work environment. The AJ also noted that Person B indicated
that when she filled in as QA Specialist, she would notify upper management by electronic
mail about a problem, but Complainant testified that when she had similar problems, she would
simply stop production or send the items back as opposed to notifying S1 ahead of time.

Finally, the AJ found no evidence provided establishing a nexus between Complainant’s prior
EEO activity and S1’s actions. The AJ noted that proof of complaints to upper management
about difficulty with a supervisor is not enough. The AJ noted those complaints must relate to
a protected category. The AJ stated in this case no such complaint was made. Thus, the AJ
found Complainant did not establish that the Agency’s actions were retaliatory in nature.
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The Agency subsequently issued a final order on September 17, 2015. The Agency’s final
order fully implemented the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency
subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

On appeal, Complainant argues the AJ was biased against her. Complainant claims the AJ
fragmented her EPA claims. She notes that she filed a subsequent 2015 EPA claim that she
argues should have been consolidated with the subject 2010 EPA claim. Complainant states
that she filed her new EEO complaint on May 23, 2015, and did not identify it during the pre-
hearing report because the pre-hearing report was due in March 2015. Complainant provides a
copy of her 2015 EEO complaint and the EEO Counselor’s Report for the 2015 complaint on
appeal, which she states was not available at the time of the hearing because the Agency did
not accept the complaint until August 2015.

In addition, Complainant complains about the investigation of her complaint. She states the
Agency never investigated her 2010 EPA claim. She also states the Agency did not initially
investigate her retaliation claim when she first reported it in 2010.

Complainant also argues that the AJ erred in admitting the Assistant HR Manager’s untimely
declaration and by allowing the Assistant HR Manager to testify. Complainant states the
Assistant HR Manager falsely claimed that Complainant had to work at the Medium factory for
120 days before she was entitled to GS-12 pay. Complainant claims the testimony by the
Assistant HR Manager violated the Agency’s own policy Program Statement 3000.03, Human
Resource Management Manual. Complainant notes the HR Management Manual stated that
“Temporary Promotion, a bargaining unit employee who is assigned to a higher graded
position (within the unit) for three full weeks or more who is qualified will be temporarily
promoted without competition and will receive the rate of pay for the higher graded position
effective the first day of the first full pay period of the assignment.” Complainant states that
although she is a nonbargaining unit employee, she actually met the Agency’s three full week
requirement. In addition, Complainant claims that she was required to continue performing the
Comparative’s job duties through October 2010, which she states was more than five months.

Complainant explains that the Comparative previously worked as a Factory Manager.
Complainant states that the Comparative was not doing a good job as Factory Manager and in
2007, he was reassigned into the QA Specialist GS-11 position after the previous QA Manager
had retired. Complainant contends that the Agency allowed the Comparative to keep his GS-
12 grade when they reassigned him, and failed to open the GS-12 Quality Assurance
Manager’s job to competition. Complainant states that she was forced to cover up for the
Comparative whenever he “messed up;” however, she did not receive the same GS-12 pay that
he did.

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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld
if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual
finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions
of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ’s credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice
of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the
testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit
it. See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, at § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015).

At the outset, we find the record in the present case was adequately developed. Despite the
delay in investigating Complainant’s retaliation claim, we note that the Agency ultimately
investigated the retaliation claim. We find there was no showing of bad faith in the Agency’s
delayed investigation. Moreover, with regard to Complainant’s EPA claim, we find, after
development at the hearing stage, the record contains sufficient information to make a
determination on the merits of Complainant’s equal pay claim. Additionally, we find no
evidence that the AJ was prejudiced against Complainant.

Next, we address Complainant’s contention that her 2015 EPA claim should be consolidated
with the subject 2010 EPA claim. Complainant notes that she filed her new EEO complaint on
May 23, 2015, and did not identify this during the pre-hearing report because the pre-hearing
report was due in March 2015. The AJ held a hearing on the 2010 EPA claim on July 16,
2015, and issued a decision on her complaint the same day. Complainant states the
subsequently filed 2015 complaint was not accepted by the Agency at the time the 2010 case
was heard and decided. Upon review, we find the 2015 equal pay claim is not part of the
subject complaint and will not be considered in this decision.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission determines that the AJ's findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the AJ's decision properly
summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.
We note Complainant does not challenge the definition of the issues or bases identified by the
AJ (apart from requesting the inclusion of the 2015 EPA claim). We find the record in the
present case fully developed. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision.

Harassment

To establish a claim of discriminatory hostile environment harassment, complainant must show
that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the
form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the
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harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment
affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment; and (5) there be a basis for imputing liability to the Agency. See Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).

In short, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to
conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant's
position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove
that the conduct was taken because of a protected base - in this case, because of her race, sex,
age, or prior EEO activity. Only if Complainant establishes both of those elements, hostility
and motive, will the question of Agency liability present itself.

Upon review, we find the AJ’s conclusion that Complainant failed to establish a discriminatory
hostile work environment based on her sex, age, or race is supported by substantial evidence.
The record supports the AJ’s finding that there was a personality conflict between Complainant
and S1. The AJ found that hostile words and tones were exchanged by Complainant and S1
and that Complainant and S1 could often be heard shouting behind closed doors. However, the
record also demonstrates that S1 engaged in this behavior with an employee outside of
Complainant’s race. Moreover, the order to paint Complainant’s office, move Complainant’s
file cabinet, and remove the blinds from Complainant’s office was at the direction of the
Warden and not S1. The record also supports the AJ’s finding that other issues at the
workplace were caused by miscommunication or were explained by the Agency’s legitimate
nondiscriminatory rationale. Upon review, we find Complainant has produced no evidence to
establish that her race, sex, or age was a factor in any of S1's actions.

Next, we address Complainant’s claim that the Agency subjected her to harassment in reprisal
for prior EEO activity. With regard to issue (1), Complainant claims that S1 called her into
her office on October 29, 2010, and told her she did not appreciate Complainant going to the
Associate Warden about S1 calling Complainant’s home on October 15, 2010. Complainant
also alleged that retaliation was taken against her for contacting the Warden in 2010 regarding
her complaint against S1. During the hearing, S1 testified that she did not remember speaking
to Complainant on October 29, 2010 as Complainant alleged. With regard to issue (2),
Complainant claims that on November 7, 2010, S1 called her in again for having spoken to the
Associate Warden. S1 testified that she did not call Complainant into the office on November
7, 2010, for speaking with the Associate Warden. Upon review, we find Complainant failed to
show by a preponderance of evidence that issues (1) and (2) occurred. However, we note that
even assuming the incidents occurred, Complainant did not establish a nexus between her prior
EEO activity and S1’s actions. The record supports the AJ’s finding that there is no proof the
complaints made to upper management about Complainant’s difficulty with a supervisor were
related to protected activity. Further, we note that even if S1 knew Complainant had contacted
an EEO counselor at the time issues (1) and (2) occurred, that is not the same as knowing that
Complainant's contact with upper management had to do with protesting discrimination.

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With regard to the remaining claims of retaliatory harassment, substantial evidence supports
the AJ’s finding that most of the issues involved concerned disputes caused by the strained
relationship between S1 and Complainant. In addition, Person A, who was a different race
than Complainant, spoke of shouting behind closed doors with S1 and explained she had to
remove her blinds and a plant because it blocked a window.

In addition, Person B indicated that when she filled in as QA Specialist, she notified upper
management by electronic mail message if a problem was detected so they can communicate.
In contrast, Complainant testified when she had similar problems, she would simply stop
production or send the items back as opposed to notifying S1 ahead of time. The record
reveals this caused strain between Complainant and S1 as well as the Factory Manager. On
appeal, Complainant argues that Person B was an Accountant and lacking in experience as a
QA Manager. Complainant also argued that in her position as a QA Manager and government
inspector, she had authority to stop production or send the items back. However, Complainant
does not dispute that she would not notify S1 or the Factory Manager ahead of time when there
was problem.

We find the Agency presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s actions were a pretext for prohibited
discrimination or retaliation. Further, we find Complainant failed to establish that she was
subjected to a hostile work environment as she failed to show that the alleged actions were
based on her protected classes.

Disability

We note that disability was not raised in Complainant’s formal complaint and was not an issue
accepted by the Agency. However, even if disability was raised we find there was no discrete
discrimination based on disability and no showing that Complainant needed a reasonable
accommodation.

Equal Pay

The United States Supreme Court articulated the requirements for establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination under the EPA in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan. 417 U.S. 188
(1974). To establish a prima facie case of a violation under the EPA, a complainant must
show that she or he received less pay than an individual of the opposite sex for equal work,
requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working conditions within the
same establishment. Sheppard v. EEOC, EEOC Appeal No. 01A02919 (September 12, 2000),
req. for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05A10076 (August 12, 2003).

Once a complainant has met this burden, an employer may avoid liability only by showing that
the difference in pay is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth in the
EPA: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production of work (also referred to as an incentive or piecework
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system); or, (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. Id. We note that the EPA is
limited to certain sex-based differentials in wages. The EPA does not prohibit discrimination
in other aspects of employment, even those that have compensation-related consequences, such
as hiring, firing, promotion, transfer, or other issues. Wiley v. Department of the Treasury,
EEOC Appeal No. 01972118 (June 27, 2001) (citing Schnellbaecher v. Basking Clothing Co.,
887 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989) (a claim of discriminatory promotions is beyond the scope
of the EPA but actionable under Title VII)).

The requirement of “equal work” does not mean that the jobs must be identical, but only that
they must be “substantially equal.” Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). The terms skill, effort, and responsibility, “constitute separate tests, each of which
must be met in order for the equal pay standard to apply.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a). The
factors of skill, effort, and responsibility used to measure the equality of jobs are not precisely
definable. Id. Skill includes such things as “experience, training, education, and ability.” 29
C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). Effort addresses the amount of “physical or mental exertion needed for
the performance of a job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a). Responsibility concerns “the degree of
accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance of the
job obligation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a).

Upon review, we find that substantial evidence supports the AJ’s finding that Complainant and
the Comparative did not perform equal work. Specifically, the record reveals that the
Comparative was a QA Manager for Medium Facility at the time it was producing military
helmets. However, when Complainant assumed the Comparative’s position as QA Manager
for the Medium Facility, production of helmets had already stopped.

The record reveals that Complainant served as the QA Manager for the Medium Facility from
May 10, 2010, to August 19, 2010. Complainant argues that she continued to perform the
Comparative’s duties through October 2010. However, we find Complainant was released to
return to her QA Manager position at the Low Facility on August 19, 2010, and did return to
the Low Facility at that time. While the record shows that Complainant continued to do some
duties for the Medium Facility after her return to the Low Facility, we find she was not
performing equal work as the Comparative after she returned to the Low Facility.

We note Complainant cites the Agency’s policy Program Statement 3000.03, Human Resource
Management Manual which she claims states that a bargaining unit employee who is qualified
will be temporarily promoted without competition and will receive the rate of pay for the
higher graded position effective the first day of the first full pay period of the assignment. She
claims that she met the three week requirement for higher pay. However, we note that
Complainant acknowledged that she is a nonbargaining employee. Thus, the cited Program
Statement does not apply to Complainant.

Additionally, the record reveals that the Comparative was assigned to the High Security
Institution, United States Penitentiary at Beaumont, Texas effective June 17, 2012. The record
reveals that this action was based upon a management reorganization in operations which
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abolished the position of QA Specialist, GS-12, at FCI Beaumont and resulted in the
Comparative’s acceptance of the lower graded QA Specialist, GS-11, at USP Beaumont, with
grade retention at the GS-12 pay level. As Complainant was never a GS-12, pay retention did
not apply to her.

Finally, we note that it appears that a differential based on a factor other than sex was at issue
in this case. The record reveals that the Comparative was a Factory Manager prior to
becoming a QA Manager at the Medium Facility. Complainant acknowledges that the Agency
reassigned the Comparative from a Factory Manager into the QA Manager GS-11 position
after the previous QA Manager had retired. Complainant contends that the Agency allowed
the Comparative to keep his GS-12 grade, when they reassigned him and did not open the GS-
12 QA Manager position for competition before placing the Comparative in the position.
Thus, we note the Agency’s desire to keep the Comparative at a GS-12 grade when they
moved him from the Factory Manager position to the QA Manager position was a differential
based on a factor other than sex.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Agency’s final decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant
or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to
establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material
fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices,
or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R.
Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments
must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In
the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is
received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29
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C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other
party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil
action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department”
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court
has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File
a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

November 1, 2016
Date